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ABSTRACT 
Following a profusion of interest in the 1970s and early 1980s, Marxist legal theory entered 
something of a fallow period. This was down to a number of persistent and intractable theoretical 
problems, and the more general decline in Marxism's popularity as a theoretical perspective 
following the collapse of 'Marxist' regimes in the Eastern bloc. Despite this, the contention here is 
that Marxism can still provide a viable legal theory. 
When grounded in Marx's 1859 Preface, historical materialism raises two key problems for legal 
scholars: One concerns determination, and the other the notion of base and superstructure. One 
way of understanding how each theorist tackles the two problems is to realise that their solutions 
are context bound; bound by time, bound by place, bound by what we might call their concrete 
socio-political situation. Each theorist takes the insights of Marx and applies them to their own time 
and place. This has led to a wealth of Marxist approaches to law, which will be detailed in Part 1. 
The solutions that have been proposed to the two problems, however, have been consistently 
unsatisfactory. 
As Part 2 will outline, socio-economic and political conditions have changed massively over the last 
three decades or so: A distinctive 'late modern' period has emerged. Just as each Marxist legal 
theorist responded to their own distinctive milieu, so any contemporary socio-legal theorist must 
recognise and respond to the realities of the late modem world. 
Late modern developments have created the potential for a modified Marxist legal theory that seeks 
to alleviate the difficulties associated with the old ones. The shape of such a theory is outlined in 
Part 3. The new theory is based on the work of Hugh Collins, but it is contended that late modern 
changes in society help to alleviate the great Achilles heel of his Marxist theory of law- the need to 
rely on an all-encompassing and thus implausibly elastic dominant ideology associated with a well- 
defined ruling class. Instead, under late modern conditions a series of 'micro-ideologies' guide the 
creation of law and norms in a number of discrete spheres, and the state's former monopoly on law- 
making is progressively eroded. Thus, the core idea of Collins' work- the ideological determination 
of law- is preserved, but adapted to contemporary, late modern conditions. 
The result is a prolegomenon for a revived Marxist theory of law that is in tune with current socio- 
political and economic conditions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Every beginning is difficult, holds in all sciences" 
Marx, Capital, Preface to the first German edition of 1867 (1954: 18) 
The aim of this work is to demonstrate that the Marxist theory of law, at least in its 
superior variant, offers a plausible, robust and convincing perspective on the 
contemporary legal world. At the heart of the argument is the contention that the 
changes advanced capitalist societies have undergone over the past three decades or 
so have actually served to render the Marxist theory of law more plausible, and have 
strengthened its theoretical bite. In short, Marxism remains capable of providing a 
viable socio-legal theory. 
This introduction will briefly outline the context of the task at hand. To that end, the 
current state of Marxist theory, particularly with regard to law, will be discussed. 
Following this the idea of 'late modernity' will be introduced, and then the proposed 
argument will be presented. Finally the structure of the thesis will be outlined. 
Marxism and Marxist Legal Theory at the `End of History' 
For Marx, all 'beginnings were difficult', and this was particularly so in the case of 
Capital, which commenced with some rather dry and and theoretical chapters on the 
nature of commodities. The difficulty here is rather different; in the face of the declining 
influence of Marxism, the task at hand is to outline why a theory commonly considered 
to be all but redundant still has something to offer socio-legal studies. 
It would be a mistake to reductively offer a single explanation as to why Marxism's 
influence has waned so dramatically. Many point simply to the 'fall of the wall' and the 
end of 'actually existing socialism' as confirmation that Marxism is redundant, and 
although this is not entirely irrelevant it is a little disingenuous. Broadly speaking, there 
are two further reasons for the declining influence of Marxism that actually predate the 
collapse of the Eastern Bloc. Firstly, there are a number of problems internal to the 
theory which came into sharp relief in the fifteen or so years before the fall of the wall. 
Secondly, partly as a result of this, a number of external challenges in the shape of 
competing theoretical perspectives had a negative effect upon the popularity of the 
theory. These two reasons will be dealt with in turn, before the fallout of 1989-91 is 
considered. 
i 
The internal crisis of Marxism reached its apogee by the middle of the 1980s. During 
the 1970s there had been a great optimism amongst Marxist intellectuals that a 
progressive transformation of society could be effected. However, a number of 
intractable theoretical problems had proven impossible to resolve satisfactorily and 
consensually. The exact nature of the relation between base and superstructure, the 
role of agency and the tendency towards economic reductionism were among the most 
crucial. ' But, most fundamentally, it was the failure of the radical left to successfully 
ally theory and practice in the classical Marxist sense, even in the face of a readily 
identifiable Thatcherite, neo-conservative enemy in the UK, that contributed to the 
malaise of the theory. There had been a belief, often implicit, that theoretical work 
could and would somehow segue into practice, but as this failed to occur, a new 
pessimism took over and the energy and vigour (and number) of Marxists diminished. 
Quite simply, Marxists had underestimated the strength and durability of post-war 
capitalism. A similar pessimism could be detected in the communist parties of Europe 
over the same period. Many initially adopted reformist 'eurocommunist' policies in the 
late 1970s, before wholeheartedly embracing social democracy after 1989.3 
As Marxism saw its internal coherence be increasingly called into question, the 
situation was compounded by the emergence of new theoretical approaches. This 
external challenge initially came from poststructuralism, and then, in the 1980s, 
postmodernism. Indeed many who aligned themselves to these positions were former 
Marxists. Suddenly Marxism began to look unwieldy and outdated. Further to the 
right, neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism also grew in popularity. The latter gained 
ground particularly after the 'fall of the wall' in 1989, when many commentators were 
quick to point to the death of Marxism and its usurpation by neo-liberalism both 
theoretically and politically (see Anderson 2000). Fukuyama, for instance, famously 
declared that we had reached the 'end of history', in the sense that ideological 
struggles were over and neo-liberalism had emerged victorious on the ideological 
battleground (1989,1992). 
A second external challenge that Marxism had great difficulty in dealing with was the 
tumultuous social changes of the late 20th century. Perhaps the most damaging of 
1 On Marxism's tendency to economic reductionism, see Mouzelis (1990). 
2 Ironically, as Anderson points out, pessimism had been the natural tenor of Western Marxism 
down the years (1976: Ch 4), 3 On the continuing role of former Communist Parties in central European politics, see Hough 
(2005). 
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these was the rise of 'new social movements' including, inter alia, women's, ethnic, and 
ecological groupings. Marxism's traditional privileging of class politics hindered its 
attempts to deal with such movements and contributed to its waning popularity and 
influence. Of course, postmodernism had the theoretical tools to deal a little more 
successfully with such non-class groupings. ' 
Thus, by the end of the 1980s Marxism was in serious theoretical difficulty. The 
situation was then compounded by the collapse of communism in the Eastern Bloc. 
With this, it seemed that the final blow had been dealt. A theory that, classically, had 
claimed that it would be ultimately vindicated through practice had suffered the ultimate 
defeat. As Douzinas and Warrington wrote, somewhat prophetically before the final 
collapse of the USSR, "the crisis in Marxism is both political and theoretical. Marxism 
in all its variants has been built on the premise that its validity, the epistemological 
foundation of its statements, depends on the possibility of verification in political 
practice" (1986: 802). The events of 1989-91 seemed to confirm the impossibility of 
the verification, and thus the inapplicability of Marxism to the contemporary world. 
The story of Marxist legal theory followed a similar course. With a couple of notable 
exceptions, the study of law was traditionally incidental to the key Marxist thinkers. 
This was reversed spectacularly in the 1970s, when many of the wider debates within 
Marxism were conducted through the prism of the law. Collins' Marxism and Law, 
published in 1982, represented the apogee of Marxist legal theory, distilling some of 
the best work of the previous decade into a concise statement of a coherent Marxist 
position. But ultimately, as Collins himself acknowledged, the theory was still beset with 
difficulties. Thus, by the early 1980s over a decades' worth of collective endeavour 
had failed to produce a convincing total explanatory framework, despite some valuable 
piecemeal advances. And just as Marxism in general saw its academic ascendancy 
challenged by new theories in the 1980s, so too did Marxist legal theory. 'Critical Legal 
Studies, ', once a term denoting, by and large, Marxist approaches to law, broadened 
out and became more eclectic. Postmodern legal theory eased Marxism out of its 
position as the legal perspective of choice for the left-leaning academic radical. 5 
Marxist legal theory became almost an archaic survival of an earlier age; it had 
valuable lessons, no doubt, but it had ceased to be a living, evolving tradition. 
° Laclau and Mouffe attempted to unite Marxism with postmodernism to deal with precisely this 
problem in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). 
3 
As a result, remarkably little Marxist legal work has emerged over the last fifteen to 
twenty years. Despite this, there is undeniably a continuing academic interest in 
Marxism, and some legal theorists are beginning to tentatively return to it. The 
question must therefore be, is there anything worth salvaging from this much maligned 
theoretical tradition? 6 
In Defence of Marxism 
If Marxism, and more specifically the Marxist theory of law, is to remain viable, then the 
three challenges posed above must be met. Marxist legal theory must show that its 
own internal theoretical problems are not insurmountable. This will in turn enable it to 
compete once again against other socio-legal theories that have overtaken it in 
popularity over the last twenty years (the 'external' problem). Finally it must be shown 
that the dissolution of communism does not render the entire theoretical tradition 
moribund. Through the course of this work, an argument will be constructed which 
aims to do just this. The result will be a renovated and revived Marxist legal theory that 
can contribute once again to socio-legal scholarship. 
We can take the first step towards resuscitating Marxist legal theory by repudiating the 
exclusive link between Marxism and the 'actually existing socialism'' of the USSR. 
Critics claim that the Soviet Union represented Marxism in practice. Thus, when the 
Soviet Union dissolved, so too did Marxism. These critics implicitly conflate the Soviet 
version of communism and Marxism. There are two potential responses to this. 
Firstly, one could argue that Soviet communism represented the bastardisation of 
Marxism (see Callinicos 1991). Secondly, one could argue that although Soviet 
5 Postmodernist legal theory is not without its own problems, of course; for critiques, see Hunt 
1990a, Wicke 1991, Donaldson 1995 and Edgeworth 2003. 
6 It would be remiss not to note some of the landmark Marxist works that have, in spite of 
everything, emerged since the end of the 1970s. As mentioned above, Laclau and Mouffe 
embraced postmodern ideas with their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). Jameson 
produced landmark studies of postmodernist culture from a Marxist vantage point, while 
geographer Harvey did the same for postmodern socio-political developments. Eagleton has 
been a staunch critic ' of the most radical postmodernism, while Callinicos has maintained 
perhaps a more orthodox and politically involved line. Following Cohen's rigorous defence of 
historical materialism, analytical Marxism enjoyed a brief heyday, with Elster (who fused 
Marxism with rational choice theory), Roemer and Wright its chief protagonists. Outside of the 
arena of theory, the burgeoning global anti-capitalist movement, despite its theoretical 
eclecticism, owes a considerable debt to Marx; as Woolf points out, "we can think of Marx as the 
great-grandfather of today's anti-capitalist movement" (2002: 2). 
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communism was a legitimate interpretation of the Marxist canon, it is not the only 
interpretation possible. Many other Marxisms can be and have been theoretically 
constructed. It is this latter position that will be taken here. 8 
Marxism is far from a unified tradition or a homogenous entity. Few of who Perry 
Anderson calls 'Western Marxists' (1980) have supported the kind of crude orthodox 
Marxism that was propagated by the Bolsheviks for almost a hundred years. Instead, 
Western Marxism has been characterised by variety and multiplicity, debate and 
argument. As Pierson points out, an initial internal challenge to orthodoxy could be 
said to have come from the 'revisionist debate' within German social democracy at the 
turn of the 20th century: "If we date the codification of Marxism from the propagation of 
the Erfurt Programme in 1891, this might give us eight years of untroubled orthodoxy 
followed by one hundred years of crisis". Thus even in the period of its greatest 
political and intellectual authority, the power of Marxist thinking lay as much in its 
dissenting as in its orthodox tradition (1995: 55). It is certainly true that the best 
Marxist thinking has always occurred out of the orthodox box, and indeed often as a 
reaction to that very orthodoxy. Furthermore, Western Marxism was always critical of 
'actually existing socialism', and the latter's demise has provided theoretical breathing 
space for those attracted to the themes and ideas of the former. ° 
Of course, it would be foolish to deny that the interest in and influence of Western 
Marxism is infinitesimally smaller than it was in its heyday in the 1970s. But that 
Marxism offers alternatives to its own hypostatised orthodoxy should be clear. It is trite 
but true that there as many Marxisms as there are Marxists. At the root of this 
multiplicity is the fact that Marx's own writings are open to a variety of interpretations 
and often require expansion and extension. Such an expansion and extension will be 
undertaken throughout the course of this work, but for now it is enough to note that the 
failure of one branch of Marxism does not render the whole tradition defunct. 
In addition, it is also worth noting at this juncture that Marxism, in its best variants, is a 
non-dogmatic, self-reflexive theory. It is a theory fully aware of the historical conditions 
of its own possibility; indeed, this is one of its defining features. This is particularly so 
In what follows, 'actually existing socialism' and 'Soviet communism' are used 
interchangeably. 'Orthodox Marxism' is used to denote the branch of Marxist theory that 
influenced the two. 
8 The reasons for this choice will be outlined in Chapter 1. 
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of the variant that will be developed here, based on Gramsci's idea of historical 
materialism as 'absolute historicism'. What this means for our purposes is that 
adapting and relating to new circumstances is not antithetical to Marxism; indeed, it is 
made necessary by the very structure of the theory. The Marxism that will be 
developed and deployed here is based on the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy, in which Marx declares that, "social being determines 
consciousness". We may extend this by analogy and argue that 'socio-economic 
conditions determine the content and tenor of theory'. Thus it is within the remit of 
Marxism to modify itself in order to better account for contemporary developments. 
The ultimately historical nature of all Marxist thinking is amply demonstrated by Marxist 
legal theory. Such theory has always been, within the theoretical parameters set by 
Marxism (chiefly a need to grant some primacy to the economic without lapsing into 
economism), ultimately dependent upon the socio-political context of each thinker. 
If Marxism has always been a multitudinous and complex tradition, then we can 
plausibly argue that all that happened in the period of its supposed 'demise' was that 
the orthodox tradition was finally discredited. Most Marxists would welcome this. 
Perhaps we will soon begin to see the fruits of a re-engagement, whereby those not 
encumbered by the dictates of orthodoxy will begin to re-theorise contemporary social 
phenomena from a non-doctrinaire Marxist standpoint. Such is the spirit of this work. 
Eagleton has written perceptively on the supposed demise of Marxism: "I have spoken 
of symptoms of political defeat; but what if this defeat never happened in the first 
place? What if it were less a matter of the left rising up and being forced back, than a 
steady disintegration, a gradual failure of nerve, a creeping paralysis? What if the 
confrontation never quite took place, but people behaved as though it did? As though 
someone were to display all the symptoms of rabies, but had never been within biting 
distance of a mad dog" (1996: 19). If one acknowledges the depth and scope of the 
Marxist tradition, then one can see that the discrediting of just one branch of that 
tradition does not render the whole edifice moribund. Eagleton is right; Marxism never 
died in the first place. The challenge is to re-engage with the theory and discover what 
it can offer us today; the immediate challenge of this work is to perform this very task 
with specific regard to law. 
9 Of course 'actually existing socialism' reached its nadir with Stalinism. In some respects it is 
possible to see Stalinism the logical culmination of the orthodox Marxist project: the belief in 
'iron laws' of history, the need for a vanguard party to lead the masses, and so on. 
6 
Into Late Modernity 
Over the last three decades or so there have occurred a set of far reaching economic, 
social and political changes that have transformed the nature of the capitalist mode of 
production to a great extent. 10 For some, these changes taken together herald the 
beginning of a new era, a postmodern era. Others, although not denying the enormity 
of the changes, feel that they represent not the opening of a new era, but the speeding 
up, deepening and intensification of the processes of modernity so forcefully described 
by, inter alia, Marx. This latter view is the one taken here. We live in 'late modernity'. 
It is important to note that there is virtually no disagreement as to the nature of the 
changes that society has undergone between theorists of postmodernity and theorists 
of late modernity. The empirical evidence harnessed by both camps is identical. The 
only point of issue is whether the changes agreed upon constitute a decisive break with 
modernity. " 
From the 1980s to the present, one of the main preoccupations of sociology has been 
the description and analysis of the scope and impact of massive changes to the 
fundamental structures of society. Indeed, in a similar manner to the way in which 
postmodern philosophy and politics usurped their Marxist predecessors, a concern with 
late modern or postmodern sociology has, to a degree, supplanted Marxist sociology, 
particularly in what one might broadly call the 'left-field' of the academy. Yet the bulk of 
the work on late or post modern social formations has been concerned merely to 
describe the changes so labelled; theorisations of the rigour and sophistication of 
Marxist sociology have been a little rarer. Nevertheless, it is little wonder that the 
status of Marxist theory, so rooted in the familiar structures of modernity, has found its 
applicability to the contemporary social world questioned in the face of the range of 
developments so powerfully outlined by theorists of late and post modernity. 
The monumental changes in society have been accompanied by far reaching changes 
in law and legal systems. Any socio-legal theory must take into account these changes 
if it is to render itself relevant and theoretically forceful. Yet a return to Marx in order to 
do this does not necessarily evidence a lack of concern with contemporary problems. 
10 The rise of 'new social movements', as just one example of a new socio-political situation that 
Marxism has had difficulty in coming to terms with, was noted above. 
" In the 1980s and early 1990s the 'postmodern' position was the most popular. Lately, 
particularly under the influence of Giddens and Bauman, premature theorisations of a 
distinctively new era have been viewed a little more cautiously and the 'late modern' position 
has come to the fore. 
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"On the contrary", write Beyleveld and Brownsword, "it is sometimes necessary to 
return to first principles in order to address contemporary issues" (1986: 50). 12 
The Argument of the Thesis 
Existing Marxist theories of law run into difficulties on two axes. Firstly, they have been 
unable to convincingly articulate a plausible relationship between base and 
superstructure, as per Marx's theory of historical materialism. Collins' Marxist theory of 
law represents the best attempt to solve these problems, but it remains flawed. 
Despite this it still has a great deal to commend it and it is used as the basis here. 
Secondly, Marxist legal theory has always indissolubly been a product of its time and 
place. This difficulty is, of course, inevitable, and it only becomes a problem when an 
attempt is made to hypostatise theory and apply it to a time and a place where 
circumstances are different or have altered. Collins' theory, despite its advantages, is 
based on outdated concepts and assumptions associated with the height of the modern 
period. The processes of late modernisation have created a new context, a new 
concrete reality, which Marxist legal theory must now respond to. 
Fascinatingly, the processes of late modernisation, which had barely been documented 
at the time that Collins constructed his theory, have actually made that theory more 
plausible. They have done this by providing the means by which the great flaw of 
Collins' theory, the need to rely on an all-encompassing and elastic 'dominant 
ideology', can be avoided. Furthermore, making this modification to Collins' theory is 
perfectly in tune with the idea of a historicist Marxism which is alive and willing to adapt 
to changes in concrete circumstances. 
The upshot is a Marxist legal theory, based on the work of Collins, which is relevant to 
today's late modern world. Because late modern developments actually aid the Marxist 
theory of law by removing the need for an overarching dominant ideology, that theory 
can illuminate late modern developments in law, and provide a convincing and critical 
explanation of legal phenomena. In short, Marxist legal theory is shown to be still 
relevant today. The end result is a prolegomenon for a detailed and nuanced Marxist 
theory of law applicable to late modern societies and legal systems. 
12 Beyleveld and Brownsword are discussing natural law theory rather than Marx here, but the 
8 
The Plan 
Part 1 will commence, in Chapter 1, by outlining the variant of Marxism to be utilised. It 
is based on Gramsci's notion of 'absolute historicism' and Marx's outline of historical 
materialism in the 1859 Preface. Then the two key problems that historical materialism 
raises for Marxist legal theory will be introduced. They are the 'problem of 
determination' and the 'problem of base and superstructure'. The remainder of Part 1 
will then be occupied with an history of the major mainstream Marxist approaches to 
law, situating each in their concrete socio-political context and analysing how they 
came to terms with the two problems; Chapter 2 will consider Engels and Lenin, 
Chapter 3 Pashukanis and Renner, Chapter 4 the debates of the 1970s, and Chapter 5 
Collins. Although each of the thinkers has attracted a voluminous literature, such a 
survey of Marxist legal theory, placing each thinker in their context in order to 
understand how they applied Marx and where they went wrong, has never been 
undertaken before. The conclusion will be that, although Collins' theory represents the 
apogee of Marxist thinking on law, his solution to the problem of determination, through 
the concept of the dominant ideology, is ultimately unconvincing, and furthermore, his 
work is based upon assumptions about society and the legal system that are no longer 
applicable. 
Part 2 will describe the changes ushered in by late modernity, initially, in Chapter 6, in 
society at large, and then, in Chapter 7, specifically with regard to law. The 
momentous nature of these changes has, as hinted at above, led some to argue that 
they constitute an entirely new era and a decisive break with modernity. Even if this is 
premature hyperbole, the impressive scale and scope of change is undeniable. What 
the late modern social formation provides for our purposes is a decisively new socio- 
political context in which legal theory must operate. Each Marxist legal theory is the 
product of its time and its place, in its tenor and approach and its solution to the two 
problems; thus, in these new times, there is an opening for a new Marxist legal theory 
that is responsive to and has the concepts capable of dealing with late modernity. 
Part 3 thus describes such a modified Marxist legal theory, rooted in the work of Collins 
but sufficiently realigned to late modern conditions to ensure its contemporary 
relevance. This nascent Marxist theory of law, it is suggested, theorises in a 
convincing and plausible way about the nature of late modern law. Specifically, it 
point remains. 
9 
articulates with the theory of late modernisation in two mutually reinforcing ways. 
Firstly, late modern developments in both law and wider society actually render Collins' 
thesis more plausible, by removing the need for reliance on a single, all-encompassing 
dominant ideology. Instead, we see the emergence of numerous legal actors each 
operating with unique 'micro-ideologies'. Secondly, Collins' thesis, with its 
sophisticated economic determinism, can help to explain the cause of postmodern 
legal developments, albeit in a provocative and controversial way. Chapter 8 will 
outline this new theory, whilst Chapter 9 will look at some of the consequences of the 
new position. 
The result, it is argued, is a prolegomenon for a plausible and robust Marxist theory of 
law that is in tune with current socio-political conditions. 
10 
PART 1. MARXISM AND LAW 
"Without a developed theory of ideology the Marxist theory of law must be doomed to stagnate in 
the platitudes of economic determinism and class reductionism. " 
Sumner, Reading Ideologies (1979: 293) 
ii 
CHAPTER 1. MARX, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND LAW 
This chapter will provide a foundation for the Marxist theory of law that will be utilised 
throughout the work. Its central aim is to delineate the specific kind of Marxism that will 
inform the theory. Firstly, various Marxist responses to the challenges alluded to in the 
Introduction will be outlined. Drawing on each of these responses, it will be argued that a 
conception of Marxism as a diverse and evolving tradition emerges. Once Marxism is 
seen in this light, the argument that the collapse of communism also signals the death of 
Marxism simply evaporates. Then, the particular strand of Marxism that will be utilised 
throughout the course of this work will be presented. It is a Marxism based on the Preface 
to Marx's 1859 work, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. The Preface also 
suggests it is possible to view Marxism as a historicist theory. The idea that this 
legitimises the project of constructing a new Marxist legal theory applicable to the late 
modern condition will be explored. Finally, the consequences of the Preface for law will be 
considered. It raises two particular problems for legal theorists, the problem of 
determination and the problem of base and superstructure. 
Marxist Responses to the Three Challenges 
In the Introduction it was suggested that Marxism faces three contemporary challenges. 
The first was the internal challenge, those theoretical difficulties that have proven difficult 
to resolve. The second was the external challenge. This involves the rise of new theories, 
specifically postmodernism, that claim a superior understanding of the social world. The 
final challenge is the collapse of the political systems of the Eastern Bloc. The idea that 
Marxism has 'died' is based on the supposed insurmountability of these three challenges. 
This insurmountability, claim the critics, demonstrates that Marxism has failed in its self- 
proclaimed tasks of producing a universally applicable theoretical framework and 
vindicating itself through political practice. 
In general, Marxists have offered three responses to these challenges. The first response 
is an acceptance that Marxism has died, accompanied by either an attempt at 
reconstruction, or, more commonly, the embracing of alternative theories. The second 
response is to argue that the collapse of orthodoxy actually confirms some of the central 
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planks of Marxist theory. The final response is to suggest that Soviet Communism was a 
deviation from or a bastardisation of 'real' Marxism. 
The first response, the acceptance of the death of Marxism, has been a common one. 
Upon acknowledgment of Marxism's passing, two strategies have been typical. Firstly, 
there are those one-time Marxists that completely renounce the theory. Occasionally a 
resigned move away from theoretical endeavours occurs, but, more typically, such thinkers 
have embraced alternative theories, most notably postmodernism. Indeed, some of the 
most important exponents of postmodernism began their intellectual careers as Marxists, 
or at the very least were heavily influenced by Marxism, before turning away from the 
theory. ' Secondly, some Marxists have readily accepted the demise of the theory as 
classically conceived, but have taken steps to reinvent or retheorise Marxism away from 
orthodoxy. Aronson, for instance, argues that Marxists can no longer point to a class or 
even a broader movement that embodies change away from capitalism. Although he 
maintains his opposition to capitalism he argues that change must be sought through new 
movements such as feminism and anti-racism, especially as informed by postmodernism 
(1995). 2 
The second response has been to argue that far from representing the final discrediting of 
Marxism, the collapse of the Soviet Union actually serves to confirm Marxist theory. The 
crux of this argument is that pre-Bolshevik, Czarist Russia was a backward, non- 
industrialised country without a developed proletariat. Therefore, Marx's own analysis, 
which was targeted at the most advanced industrial capitalist states of the day, was 
inapplicable. Cohen makes this point emphatically; he regards Soviet failure as no less 
than a "triumph" for Marxism. He suggests that given the undeveloped state of Russia, 
revolution was bound to fail according to the central tenets of historical materialism. 
Indeed, success would have been disastrous for the theory: "the Soviet failure can be 
regarded as a triumph for Marxism: a Soviet success might have embarrassed key 
propositions of historical materialism" (1999: 99). Wright agrees that Marx's analysis was 
inapplicable to Russia and that the core ideas of classical Marxism would also lead one to 
predict that revolution in such a backward, non-industrialised country would eventually fail 
1 For instance, Foucault was a member of the French Communist Party from 1950-53, while Lyotard 
was a member of Socialisme ou Barbarie. This Trotskyist group existed from 1948 to 1965 and 
became increasingly critical of Marxism, ultimately rejecting it. 
2 Of course, it is not clear that such a programme is incompatible with Marxism. 
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(1993: 16). The main consequence of these arguments is that Marxism not only survives 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, but is actually vindicated by it and should be considered 
to have renewed relevance. McLellan points to the "paradox" that "with Russia's now 
rejoining the historical trajectory marked out in Capital, its citizens are likely to find Marx's 
work now more grimly relevant than they ever did under Soviet rule" (1999a: xxv). 3 
The third response sees Marxists claim that the Eastern Bloc was a deviation from, or a 
bastardisation of 'real' Marxism. For instance, Callinicos, who offers a spirited defence of 
Marxism against those who say it died with the 'fall of wall', refers to the Eastern Bloc as 
the "negation of socialism". His hope is that "its collapse may thus allow the authentic 
Marxist tradition, long driven underground, to return to the light of day" (1991: 2-3). 4 
Similarly, Sherman argues that "Soviet Marxism" was a "distortion of Marx's thought and 
was mainly designed to justify the Soviet status quo of dictatorship and extreme central 
planning" (1995: 3). 
All three of these responses act as useful correctives to the rather hyperbolic declarations 
of Marxism's death. The first response hints that Marxism, if it is to survive, must seek to 
develop internally. In addition, even those that do adopt other theories imply that Marxism 
would do well to embrace and learn lessons from other modes of thought rather than 
attempt to hypostatise and artificially close itself off. The second suggests that, if parts of 
Marxism seem to actually be confirmed by the demise of communism, then the theory is a 
good deal more complex than Soviet orthodoxy indicates. The third response implies that 
some form or forms of Marxism survive intact the collapse of the USSR as they never 
advocated such a system in the first place. Yet it is only if we take these responses to 
crisis together as a whole that the fundamental reason for Marxism's persistence emerges. 
Read collectively, the three responses suggest that it is wise not to see 'Marxism' as a 
coherent and unified theoretical paradigm that either has died, needs reconstructing, has 
3 In a similar vein, Marsh argues that the Eastern Bloc's demise removes a constraint on Marxism, 
namely "the need to justify development in central and eastern Europe". This means that the 
"collapse of communism frees Marxism from an inhibiting legacy, and [... ] at the same time, it offers 
fruitful new fields of study' (1999: 333). Hence, according to Robinson, the emergence of modern 
capitalism in the Eastern Bloc means that "Marxist analysis of post-communism might actually be 
very healthy' (1999: 317). 
° Callinicos amusingly illustrates this point with a tale of graffiti on a Bucharest wall in February 
1990: "Down with communism", it read, underneath which was written in another hand: "What is this 
phenomenon? We have never experienced it! " (1991: 95). The implication is that the form of social 
ordering experienced in the Eastern Bloc was not 'authentic' communism, but a deviation from it. 
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been confirmed, or was bastardised. Instead, it makes a great deal more sense to see 
Marxism as a living, evolving tradition that contains a great many different braches and 
modes and styles of theorising, all with equal claim to the label 'Marxist'. 
Towards Another Marxist Response 
There has always been a tendency within Marxism, perhaps to a greater extent than with 
other schools of thought, to draw very distinct lines around the theory. Of course, no 
reasonable Marxist or critic of Marxism would claim that there is only one type of Marxism. 
However, there remains an inclination to see the Marxist tradition as being very clearly 
delineated and forming a readily identifiable object. Both its adherents and its enemies 
have always, either implicitly or explicitly, purported to know precisely what 'Marxism' is. 
Perhaps this stems from Marxism's historical use as a political term denoting allegiance to 
a very particular set of ideas. 5 
In reality, however, Marxist theory has always been something of a chameleon, exhibiting 
an array of quite different forms. There are a veritable plethora of approaches all with 
good claim to the label 'Marxist'. Ever since Engels promulgated a very particular and 
narrow interpretation of Marx, which will be discussed in the next Chapter, Marxism has 
been a multifarious tradition, constantly building upon and extending the work of its 
founder in a variety of directions. At the most banal level, this would seem to be confirmed 
by even the briefest consideration of Marxism's history. Just how far did Engels take the 
work of Marx in a direction that the latter may not necessarily have recommended? What 
of the differences between contemporaries such as Bernstien and Kautsky, Gramsci and 
Lukacs, or Sartre and Althusser? Yet it is unlikely that anybody would deny any of these 
thinkers the label 'Marxist'. Each of them stressed different elements and periods of 
Marx's oeuvre, and very different Marxisms emerged. As Gamble laconically puts it, "there 
was never one Marxism" (1999: 3). e 
5 Indeed, as Miller notes, one of the problems of defining Marxism has always been its political 
connotations: "What Marxism is and what it is not is a matter of considerable dispute, partly 
because of the very wide variety of theories so described and partly because of the use of the term 
as one of political approval or disapproval' (1991: 322 [italics added]). But, as Avineri points out, 
pre-empting some of the ideas of this section, "it seems a truism, yet it has been repeatedly 
overlooked, that Marx's political theory should not be judged by Lenin's or Stalin's policies any more 
than Mill should be judged by Gladstone's performance" (1968: vii). 6 At the broadest level, Gouldner famously talks of 'the two Marxisms' one being scientific, with a 
stress on determinism and 'iron laws' of history, and the other being "some kind of critical theory" 
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In the broadest possible terms, three reasons can be identified for the multiplicity of the 
Marxist tradition. Firstly, there are ambiguities in the founding works of the tradition, the 
works of Marx himself. Secondly, there is the interplay between Marxism and other 
theories. Thirdly, there is the constant adaptation of Marxism to what we might call 
changed concrete conditions. Of course, this is not unique to Marxism; ambiguities in 
founding works, the influence of other theories, and adaptation to new circumstances will, 
almost inevitably, result in the development of any theory in any discipline. Given this, one 
may wonder why Marxism is often treated as though it is a static and unchanging body of 
doctrine. 
The first reason for the heterogeneity of the Marxist tradition is the ambiguous nature of 
Marx's own works. Presumably most would agree that the starting point for any 'Marxist' 
work must be Marx's own writings. And, as Shaw points out, "Marx' and Engels' own 
conceptions of their work were broadly coherent and unified. [... ] However much tensions 
can be shown to exist within their writings [... ] there is little doubt that they saw these as in 
principle resolvable" (1985: 7-8). Despite this, anybody seeking to resolve these tensions 
is immediately faced with a fundamental problem: the sheer scope of Marx's (and Engels') 
writings. Marx wrote books, articles, letters, pamphlets and the like over many years, for a 
variety of different audiences and purposes. As Elster notes, the bulk of Marx's corpus 
contains unpublished manuscripts and letters "in a very uneven state of completion". 
Many of the published writings are "largely journalistic or agitatorial and as such are 
unreliable guides to his considered opinion" (1986: 2). Then one faces the divide, alluded 
to above, between what was written by Marx and Engels, and how far Engels represents 
Marx's views (ibid: Ch 2). In addition to this there is the fact that Marx's thought evolved 
over time. Some argue that all periods of Marx's thought can be reconciled as part of a 
gradual evolution, while others maintain that there are discontinuous breaks. This debate 
flowered particularly in the 1960s and 1970s following the work of Althusser. 7 Finally, 
Elster argues that only two long-published works show Marx at the height of his powers. 
These are The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, published in 1852, and Volume I 
of Capital, published in 1867. Yet even these masterly works "are far from perfectly clear 
(Gouldner 1973: Ch 16, see also 1980). Although this usefully highlights one of the central axes 
upon which Marxists have disagreed, it fails miserably to capture the bewildering variety of Marxist 
approaches. 
See Chapter 4 below. 
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and consistent themselves" (ibid: 2). Given all these difficulties, it would be a Herculean 
task to render all of this consistent and emerge with one correct and complete reading of 
Marx. 
Yet in spite of these difficulties there are numerous examples of writers attempting to 
accurately outline what Marx wrote, meant or thought regarding specific areas. Such 
endeavours have often led to internecine debates where interpretations have differed. For 
instance, according to Cohen (1978), the economic base of society consists of relations of 
production only. Callinicos, on the other hand, treats the base as comprising both forces 
and relations of production (1988: 175). 8 Another example is provided by the 'Marx and 
justice' debate that occurred in the 1980s. Geras (1985)' claimed that Marx did have a 
theory of justice, while Buchanan argued that Marx had no non-relativistic concept of 
justice (1982). Douzinas and Warrigton lament these attempts "to find ever more 
wonderful explanations for seeming inconsistencies" (1986: 825). Thus it is more 
appropriate to take a rather modest view of Marx's work and accept that it is riddled with 
gaps, ambiguities, inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Of course, deciphering what Marx thought is a perfectly legitimate area of study, if fraught 
with difficulty, but constructing a Marxist theory is a different project entirely. There is a 
danger, as Gamble notes, that if the former area of study is pursued, then Marxism "might 
linger on like mediaeval scholasticism, based on textual exegesis of sacred texts, with no 
observable connection to anything in the real world", (1999: 4). Furthermore, even if a 
'correct' reading of Marx was possible, this would by no means guarantee the validity of 
the argument. Instead, we can take Marx as a starting point, and accept that attempts to 
understand his legacy "cannot be confined to a correct exogenesis'of his work" (Walton 
and Gamble: 1972: i). Thus, to arrive at a coherent Marxist theory of law one is forced to 
clarify and develop many points and consider the work of subsequent thinkers. Different 
selections or emphases from Marx and the Marxist tradition can lead to different 
perspectives; this is particularly so in the case of law (Hunt 1981: 91-2). Cohen outlines 
the flavour of such a venture in the foreword to his defence of historical materialism; "The 
aim is to construct a tenable theory of history which is in broad accord with what Marx said 
on the subject [... ] to offer a less untidy version of some of his major thoughts than he 
8 The 'base and superstructure' metaphor will be dealt with below as part of the discussion of 
Marx's 1859 Preface. 
17 
himself provided" (1978: ix). This is analogous to the aim here, the difference being that 
law is the focus of interest rather than historical materialism as a whole. 
It is worth stressing that, if this view of Marx and the Marxist tradition is correct, one can 
accept that largely discredited interpretations such as the economist reading of Marx, 
Bukharinist mechanical materialism and even Soviet Communism, are all plausible 
readings of his oeuvre. " As such, these have as much claim to the label 'Marxist' as any 
other interpretation. However, although one may accept that Soviet communism or even 
Stalinism can be classed as 'Marxist' systems, this does not remove one's ability to pass 
judgement on them. Such systems can be criticised for a number of other reasons, and 
condemned wholeheartedly, whilst still maintaining that they are Marxist. Instead of flatly 
denying that the Soviet Union was Marxist, it is better for a Marxist to look at the historical 
conditions of its emergence, ascendancy and downfall in order to account for which 
elements of Marx's legacy were utilised and how they were put to use in ways that would 
have shocked Marx. Surely such a historical analysis is the stuff of Marxism? 
The second reason for the multiplicity of Marxism is the interplay between it and different 
theories. The best Marxist thinkers have always been alive to the benefits that other 
theoretical trends can bring. Take, for instance, Bernstein's support for reformist 
democracy, Lukacs' restoration of Marx's Hegelian heritage, Gramsci's use of themes from 
Machiavelli and Croce, Sartre's alliance of Marxism and existentialism, Althusser's 
structural bent, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe's embrace with postmodern ideas. 
Indeed, Anderson talks of a cross fertilisation of Marxist and other thought systems as 
being one of the defining features of 'Western Marxism' (1976: 58). A Marxism 
incorporating elements of, say, existentialism, is certain to look very different from one 
incorporating ideas from structuralism. 
The third and related reason for the bewildering variety of Marxism is the fact that it is 
constantly being adapted to changing conditions and circumstances. Every Marxist thinker 
takes the insights of Marx and applies them to their own time, place and socio-political 
situation. As, for instance, Bernstein's situation was vastly different to Laclau and 
Mouffe's, then we should hardly be surprised that their application of Marxist ideas is also 
9 As Mouzelis puts it, "that authoritarian conclusions can be drawn from Marx's varied oeuvre is 
undeniable" (1990: 36). Note that some Marxists, such as Cohen and Geras, still embrace major 
aspects of economism (Marsh 1999: 326). 
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very different. This will be expanded upon below when we consider Marxism as 
historicism. 
These three reasons suggest that attempts to show Marxism as "a monolithic, systematic 
world-view must be failures from the start" (Carver 2003: 2). Instead, as McLellan puts it, 
"the very variety of Marxism shows that the ambivalences inherent in Marx's legacy have 
indeed been fully explored by his followers" (1979: 333). On this view, Marxism is far from 
a "monolithic, systematic world-view", but rather can be taken to be a cluster of theories 
bearing family resemblances and drawing on the same theoretical " resources and 
traditions. This rather messy view of Marxism neatly sidesteps the three problems outlined 
in the Introduction. The internal problem is negated if one realises that Marxism, like any 
other theory, is constantly dealing with its own internal blockages and obstacles. As 
concrete conditions change, new difficulties emerge, and new strands of the theory are 
produced in order to deal with them. That a branch of the theory runs into difficulties, even 
if those difficulties render that branch redundant, does not collapse the entire theoretical 
edifice. The external problem is also blunted. Of course, new and competing theoretical 
paradigms have emerged, but various strands of Marxism have learned from them and 
adapted themselves to their challenges. This is only possible if one acknowledges the 
multifarious, developing and open nature of the tradition. Finally, the dissolution of 
'actually existing socialism' does indeed sound the death knell for one particular branch of 
Marxism. However, other strands of the theory persist, and may even be strengthened by 
it. The type of theory that was used to legitimise the USSR, and the USSR's actual 
political system are just examples of some of the many things that can be done with 
Marx's oeuvre. Their passing cannot possibly render the entire tradition defunct. 1° 
Instead, the Marxist tradition continues to offer a diversity of approaches, ideas and 
concepts that remain useful in analysing contemporary society and law. " 
10 At the most the collapse of the USSR has shown the hollowness of Marx's positive proposals, 
which were always the weakest part of his writings. As Chimni puts it, "Marxism as a critique has 
not exhausted itself [... ] despite its failure to articulate the normative basis for creating a just 
society" (2004: 3). 
11 Mouzelis (1990: 1-2) makes a similar point. 
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Marx's 1859 Preface 
Having constructed a view of Marxism as a fluid, evolving tradition with multiple branches 
rather than a hypostatised and brittle orthodoxy, it is necessary to outline which elements 
of that tradition will inform the legal theory to be developed here. The particular part of 
Marx's work that will be utilised henceforth is the theory of historical materialism as 
outlined in the Preface to Marx's 1859 work A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy. Marx began to develop this historical materialism, his "main contribution to 
social and political theory" (Miller 1991: 319) from around 1845, with the writing of The 
German Ideology with Engels (1970). 12 Marx never again dealt with historical materialism 
at such length as in the first section of The German Ideology, and it remains "rich and 
exciting" reading (McLellan 1975: 85). 13 By the time of A Contribution Marx's focus had 
shifted; the nascent ideas which would form the basis of Capital now occupied his 
attention. However, for our purposes the splendidly concise outline of historical 
materialism provided by Marx in the Preface will serve beautifully. 
There are a number of reasons for this choice. Firstly, the relevant passages of the 
Preface offer a sociological understanding of society. Here, 'sociological understanding' is 
intended in its broadest sense; the Preface purports to uncover the social rules and 
processes that underlie society and govern its members, institutions and groups. 
Secondly and relatedly, the Preface offers a macro-level social ontology, a large-scale 
map of what there is in society, and it explicitly locates "the legal" within that ontology. All 
socio-legal theory attempts to perform these tasks of understanding law sociologically, 
locating it within society and identifying its role. Thus the Preface has a certain resonance 
with the very broadest and foundational aims of socio-legal theory in general and this work 
in particular. 
The third reason why the formulations of the Preface are utilised here is that most previous 
Marxist legal theory has utilised them, even if only implicitly. The idea of the legal as 
superstructural is the anchor of almost all Marxist legal theory. Even where that idea is 
rejected, it is that idea that acts as the starting point. Thus those Marxists who reject the 
12 The German Ideology remained unpublished during Marx's and Engels' lifetimes. 
13 The German Ideology is made up of three parts. The first, and most important, deals with the 
nascent theory of historical materialism, while parts 2 and 3 contain vast "super polemics" against 
the writings of some Marx and Engels' contemporaries (Arthur 1970: 2). 
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idea of law as superstructural define themselves in opposition to the Preface. As such, 
there is a ready tradition of Marxist legal theory rooted in the Preface that one can draw 
upon and criticise as one seeks to construct a new, superior theory. Put simply, the 
Preface is the most readily applicable facet of Marx's writings to studying large scale social 
institutions. Thus it has set the tone for Marxist legal thought through the years. 
A fourth reason for the focus on the Preface is the dearth and relatively unsophisticated 
nature of Marx's writings on law. Because of this, it is far better for socio-legal scholars to 
look at his broader sociological writings and theories. One is more likely to successfully 
derive a coherent and comprehensive legal theory from these rather than the piecemeal 
and scattered writings on law itself. Marx, of course, was the son of a lawyer, began his 
academic career as a law student, and was happy to defend himself in court in Cologne 
against charges of slandering officials and inciting insurrection in 1848.14 Despite this, 
"neither Marx nor Engels produced anything that could or should be called a theory of law; 
law was never a sustained object of their attention, although they did have much to say 
about law that remains interesting and relevant" '(Hunt 1991: 104). Indeed, following his 
degree studies, Marx "quickly lost interest in the subject and wrote nothing systematic or 
sustained on questions of legal theory, legal history, or the place of law in society" 
(Bottomore 1983: 274). What can be discerned from these piecemeal writings on law, 15 
however, is the clear development in his thought over time. In his period as a 'Young 
Hegelian', he took the view that 'true' law was the systematisation of freedom. For the 
young Marx, law was that which expressed the "internal rules of 'universal' coherent 
human activities and could therefore never confront human beings from outside as a form 
of coercion" (ibid. 274). In his 1842 Rheinische Zeitung article Debates on Freedom of the 
Press he described a statute book as "a people's bible of freedom" (1975: 162). Marx can 
plausibly be interpreted as a natural law theorist at this point, with the statue book equating 
to freedom provided it codified those natural laws that existed prior to it (see McBride 
1970, Taiwo 1996). These "natural law tendencies" (Phillips 1980: 6) were still in evidence 
in the next phase of his thought, immediately prior to (and overlapping with) the working 
out of the materialist conception of history. In this second phase, Marx developed the view 
that actual, existing law "was a form of alienation, abstracting the legal subject and legal 
14 For details of Marx as a law student, see Wheen (1999: 15-33). For details of his Cologne 
defence, see Kamenka 1983: 49. 
15 Which have been collated (along with those of Engels) by Cain and Hunt (1979) and Phillips 
(1980). See also Vincent (1993). 
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duties and legal rights from concrete human beings and social realities, proclaiming formal 
legal and political equality while tolerating, and indeed encouraging, economic, religious 
and social servitude" (Bottomore 1983: 274). Finally, Marx's mature view, often 
caricatured, is that law is a form of class domination. This view was worked up more 
systematically by Lenin, as we shall see in the next chapter. Clearly there are several 
themes and ideas that may be useful to legal theorists in Marx's' own writings on law, and 
this variety goes a long way to explaining the range of Marxist legal theory that has 
developed subsequently. However, Marx never worked up any of these nascent ideas on 
law, as law was very much a peripheral interest for him. Instead, it is the historical 
materialism of the Preface that provides the best footing for a more rigorous and coherent 
Marxist theory. 
Following on from this, a final reason for utilising the Preface can be identified. The aim 
here is to construct a Marxist theory of law, rather than conduct a Marxist analysis of law. 
Hunt alerts us to the difference between the two. Analysis makes use of elements of 
theory and concepts from the Marxist tradition. It refers to explanations or inquiries 
produced "under the signs" of Marxism, but not the application of a "completed or unitary" 
theory (1981: 92-3). Theory, meanwhile, may not necessarily involve the substantive 
analysis of legal phenomena, but it does require the construction of a coherent and 
comprehensive analytical framework. As Adams and Brownsword point out, "sooner or 
later, the possibility of staking a general theoretical position must be examined" (1992: 
262). Given this, one may conclude that Marx's own writings on law are suited to the 
purposes of analysis, but not theory. 16 The construction of a Marxist theory of law requires 
a rather more rigorous starting point, and it is precisely this that the Preface provides. 
Put bluntly, one selects the part of Marx's oeuvre that suits their purposes, and interprets it 
in light of those purposes. It would be equally legitimate to utilise any part of Marx's work 
'ß Hunt acknowledges that analysis and theory never develop autonomously, but their development 
is related. He suggests that Western Marxism's break from orthodoxy allowed significant advances 
in the Marxist analysis of law, which bore fruit particularly in the 1970s. Yet that this largely died out 
by the late 1980s is at least partly due to the fact that Marxist theory had not kept pace, as it were, 
with analytical developments. This in turn has contributed to the comparative dearth of analysis we 
see today. Of course, the wider problems of Marxism following the demise of Soviet communism 
discussed in the Introduction are even more crucial in this regard. 
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or set of ideas and concepts to construct a socio-legal theory. " Selection and 
interpretation are always bound up with interests; no other part of Marx's work serves our 
interests quite so directly. Thus, we select Marx's Preface due to its promise of 
underpinning a rigorous and coherent socio-legal theory. 
Historical Materialism in the Preface 
In the most famous passage from the Preface, Marx writes: 
"In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are 
indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a 
definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of these 
relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, 
on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social 
consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the 
general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
determines their consciousness. " (1962: 362-3) 
This passage, which has been described as the "most pregnant" statement of historical 
materialism (Hobsbawm 1964: 10), has proved to be of totemic significance for Marxists 
over the years. 18 
In these few short lines, Marx pitches historical materialism against idealism, which credits 
the human mind with the ability to transcend its material circumstances and create its own 
history, and cruder forms of materialism that see people as direct, unmediated products of 
circumstances. As Woolf relates, utopian socialists such as Owen were materialist in that 
they saw people as products of circumstances. For them, this meant a change in 
circumstances would also change people. Hobbes and Feuerbach would have agreed. 
17 Foucault recommended such tactics with regard to his own work. He saw his books as, "if you 
like, little tool boxes. If people want to open them, use a sentence, an idea, an analysis as a 
screwdriver or a spanner in order to short-circuit, disqualify and break systems of power... well, so 
much the better" (quoted in O'Farrell 1989: 110). 
18 Indeed it was in Engels' review of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy that the term 
the "materialist conception of history' was coined (Engels 1962: 368). Engels' phrase can be said 
to have "brought Marxism into existence" (Carver 2003: 47). 
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This is what can be termed a 'correspondence' theory and according to it human beings 
are passive, responding automatically to external stimuli. Yet this is plainly untrue; 
humans are active in the world. Idealist philosophers such as Kant and Hegel recognised 
this. For Hegel, the mind developed dialectically, but as an idealist he saw mind, or 
consciousness, as making up the world. Thus, materialism was unreflective and ahistoric, 
it did not understand the role humans play in the world, but it did understand man's 
continuity with nature. Idealism, on the other hand, understood historical development, but 
restricted it to the development of thought. Marx thus took the best from both schools of 
thought. He saw that man changes through activity in the world (Hegel) but that this 
process takes place in the practical world, as practical activity, and not merely in thought 
(Owen, Feuerbach). Productive labour is crucial here; it is need that provides the main 
motivation for man's interaction with the natural world (Woolf 2002: 23-8). 
With these broad themes of historical materialism in mind, it is possible to provide a 
general outline of the theory. The claim at the heart of the theory is that the movement of 
human history can be explained by changes in the underlying economic structure of 
society. As Engels put it in Anti Duhring, "the economic structure of society always 
furnishes the real basis, starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate 
explanation of the whole superstructure of juridical political institutions as well as of the 
religious, philosophical and other ideas of a given historical period" (1969: 37). 19 This 
economic structure is made up of the relations of production and the forces of 
production. 20 The relations of production are the social relations that people enter into as 
they go about sustaining themselves through the reproduction of, inter alia, food, clothing 
and shelter. Under capitalism, the relations of production are constituted by the system of 
what one may call 'free labour', where the wage earner sells his labour power to the 
employer in return for wages, and the employer takes the profits of the wage earner's 
labour power. The exact form that the relations of production take at any given time is 
dependent on the forces of production. The forces of production are made up of the 
natural resources that are available, and the level of technology (the means of production) 
that exists in order to exploit them. So "relations of production... exist in relation to 
material productive forces and at any given time they more or less correspond with the 
stage of development of the latter" (Cotterrell 1992: 107). 
19Engels' Anti- Duhring: Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science, first published in 1878, was 
the first attempt to provide a systematic account of historical materialism. 
20 Though note the disagreement on this point between Callinicos and Cohen (see above). 
24 
Thus the relations of production are always functionally linked to the forces of production. 
Collins illustrates this idea through the example of a group of nomadic hunters, "the 
earliest kind of human society". It is probable that such groups entered into some form of 
arrangement for governing the hunting procedure and dividing the spoils. Such an 
arrangement, the relations of production, would have been necessarily linked to the forces 
of production, in this instance "the primitive weapons and the abundance of wildlife". If the 
arrangement does not enable an efficient use of the forces of production, then "it will 
probably never arise, or at least be very quickly abandoned" (1982: 19). 
It is on this economic base that the superstructure of social institutions arises. The form 
and content of law, as a part of this superstructure, is ultimately determined by the 
relations of production in the base. The superstructure also includes "forms of social 
consciousness"- ideas, values and beliefs- so these too are seen by historical materialism 
as determined by the relations of production. Here is the crux of Marx's anti-idealism. If 
ideas are determined by the relations of production, by the social relationships that men 
enter into in order to survive, then we cannot look upon the "history of ideas" as the 
development of great systems of thought in pursuit of truth or justice, but instead that 
history must be seen as "a series of responses to transformations within the relations of 
production" (Collins 1982: 19-20). 21 
Such transformations only occur as a result of conflicts in the economic base between the 
forces and relations of production. As scientific and technological knowledge increases, 
more efficient methods of exploiting the available natural resources can be developed. 
Such changes in the forces of production cannot always be readily accommodated within 
the existing relations of production. To utilise another example from Collins, "the machines 
invented for spinning thread could only be utilised if workers were introduced into 
centralised places of work instead of the raw materials being farmed out to individual 
households. The new relations of production in the factory provided the opportunity to 
satisfy the functional requirements of the new technology" (ibid: 20). Social groups that 
21 This is part of a broader point, made best in The German Ideology. It is not man's ideas alone 
that are determined by the relations of production, but as Arthur puts it, "man produces himself 
through labour" (italics added). Therefore he has neither a "fixed unchanging nature" nor does he 
develop "in accordance with some spiritual essence" (Arthur 1970: 21). Further support for this idea 
comes from Marx's famous 6th thesis on Feuerbach: "But the human essence is no abstraction 
inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations" (1968: 29). 
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aim to use new technological developments in order to facilitate a more efficient 
exploitation of natural resources will involve themselves in political struggle in 'order to 
overthrow the social rules that govern the existing relations of production. Such social 
rules hinder the emergence of new arrangements better suited to accommodating the new 
technologies. In this way, history can be seen as a series of struggles between groups, or 
social classes, as pressure to introduce new relations of production is exerted and 
resisted. A successful revolutionary movement will bring about a major alteration in the 
relations of production, and consequently in the superstructure. 
Historical materialism's base and superstructure metaphor, which holds that law and legal 
institutions are superstructural and are determined by the economic base of society, is 
therefore the starting point for a Marxist analysis of Iaw. 22 As McLellan points out, "at first 
sight, Marx would appear to have bequeathed a firm body of doctrine to his followers" 
(1979: 1). However, the Preface patently leaves a great many questions unanswered. 
Indeed, it serves to highlight some of the difficulties involved when attempting to come up 
with a precis of what Marx really meant or thought. For instance, as was noted above, for 
Cohen (1978), the base consists of relations of production only, while Callinicos treats the 
base as comprising both forces and relations of production (1988: 175). Such disputes are 
not uncommon. Many Marxists have also rejected the base and superstructure metaphor 
outright; indeed few would now adopt it wholesale without any modification or qualification. 
Spitzer calls this the "flattening project" as the distinction between the upper and the lower 
levels is being flattened. He points to what he calls 'imbricationists' or'culturalists' such as 
EP Thompson, who shy away from the idea that law is constrained, in any strong sense, 
by the base (1983: 109). 23 Of course it was not the intention of Marx to comprehensively 
outline his theory in the Preface, nor could he have done so in just a few short lines. Yet 
22 And interestingly, the base and superstructure model outlined in the Preface is an ontological and 
sociological insight, and as such it is difficult to see how the collapse of the Soviet Union could, on 
its own, make such an insight redundant. 
23 Thompson also famously declared in Whigs and Hunters that the rule of law is "an unqualified 
human good" which inhibits the exercise of naked power by the rulers (1975: Chapter 10, especially 
262-3,266). See Sugarman (1983a 1-2) for a sympathetic response to this position, and Horwitz 
(1977: 566) for a more critical one. Redhead (1982) criticises Thompson's rather indiscriminate use 
of the term 'rule of law', while Hunt notes that in reaching his conclusion, Thompson "moves, 
without further argument, from his historically specific study to a generalisation about the function of 
legal ideology in modern capitalist society". For Hunt, this is illegitimate (1985: 28). See Cole 
(2001: 189-202) on some other responses to Thompson's position. 
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"Marx never provided any extended general account of historical materialism as such" 
(Anderson 1976: 4). Instead we are left with the reasonably lengthy but embryonic 
account of The German Ideology, and the subsequent but brief and somewhat opaque 
outline contained in the Preface. Thus, with so much unsaid, any theory that utilises the 
Preface must necessarily interpret and extend it. Any interpretation and extension is 
inevitably sectional and biased and will reflect the needs and interests of the interpreter. 
This is perfectly in line with the view of Marxism as a multifarious and developing tradition 
outlined earlier. 
Clearly, however, the Preface does strongly suggest that certain ideas should be at the 
heart of any analysis of law. If the Preface is taken as a starting point, then it is difficult to 
avoid the notion that some causal power must be assigned to the economy. It is not clear 
how much causal power the economy has, or through which mechanisms it makes its 
influence felt. Nevertheless, that the economy has some determining influence on law 
would seem to be an inescapable consequence of utilising the Preface. Marxists have 
always experienced a tension in attempting to remain faithful to this line but avoid lapsing 
into a crude economism where the economic is seen to mechanically determine everything 
else. As Laclau and Mouffe put it, "even those Marxist tendencies which struggled hardest 
to overcome economism and reductionism maintained, in one way or another, that 
essentialist conception of the structuring of economic space which we have just described. 
Thus, the debate between economist and anti-economist tendencies within Marxism was 
necessarily reduced to the secondary problem of the weight that should be attached to the 
superstructures in the determination of historical processes" (1985: 76). Laclau and 
Mouffe reject such economism, even if it is latent. Here, it is accepted that a Marxist 
theory of law based on the Preface will inevitably have to assign some priority to the 
economic. The challenge is to do so in a plausible and non-reductionist way. As Hunt 
argues, "there is a self-evidence to the contention that people have to reproduce their 
physical survival that does not sustain the conclusion that production retains its priority 
throughout human history". Therefore, we can insist that "theory does not state 
conclusions but rather provides methodological suggestions about the questions to be 
asked and where to start with answering them. This means that inquiry should start, not 
with the conclusion that the economy determines social and political outcomes but, rather, 
that economic relations should be considered as the appropriate place to initiate the 
inquiry" (2001: 601-2). Such is the methodology adopted here. 
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4 
Historicism 
In addition to suggesting that economic relations are a fruitful place to start any analysis of 
law, the focus on the Preface results in a Marxism that may be described as historicist. It 
is crucial to be precise about what is meant by 'historicsm' in this context, for the term has 
picked up various meanings. Herder, who can be considered to be the father of 
historicism, wrote in the 1770s and 1780s. He reacted against the universal assumptions 
of Enlightenment theories. He saw "people as belonging to national groups, 24 each with 
their own traditions, habits and norms. There existed no "universal set of values by which 
national values can be assessed" (Birch 2001: 249). In law, the concept tends to be 
associated most strongly with Savigny and his followers in the German historical school 
(see Cotterrell 1992: 20-3). Savigny warned against the codification of German law as it 
would fix what he felt should develop naturally and spontaneously, in accord with the spirit 
and cultural outlook of the people. Both of these senses of historicism serve as pointers 
for the sense in which the term will be deployed here. 25 
It was Gramsci who gave the concept of historicism currency among Marxists. He 
famously referred to historical materialism as "absolute historicism": "The philosophy of 
praxis is absolute historicism, the absolute secularization and earthliness of thought, an 
absolute humanism of history" (Gramsci 1971: 465). 26 Although Gramsci only offers a 
series of hints as to what this may actually entail, three fundamental and interrelated 
consequences are immediately apparent. 
Firstly, Gramsci's is a rigorously non-teleological position. It suggests that society and 
social outcomes are contingent upon never-ending struggle. As Torfing puts it, In 
Gramsci absolute historicism refers to the idea that unity of a social formation cannot be 
reduced to a moment in the progressive unfolding of an abstract, trans-historical logic, but 
is a result of political struggles taking place within a particular historical terrain" (1999: 
298). This stands a considerable distance from the orthodox Marxist belief in 'iron laws' of 
24 Indeed, Herder also founded the theory of nationalism. 
25 For a brief overview of other types of historicism, see Miller (1991: 208-10). 
26 Gramsci used the phrase 'philosophy of praxis' in place of historical materialism in order to 
escape the Italian prison censors. 
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history whose direction and unfolding can, at most, be accelerated or decelerated through 
practice, but not fundamentally altered 27 
Secondly, Gramsci's historicism, read in the wider context of his work, suggests that the 
'correctness' of a theory can be measured by its ability to be used practically rather than 
by its adherence to some abstract form of rationality, logic or natural law. This would 
appear to render Marxism unscientific, and is one of the reasons Althusser criticised 
Gramsci. 28 Cain contrasts the two positions: Althusser considers Marxism to be a science, 
distinguishable from ideology, whereas for Gramsci all knowledge, including Marxism, is of 
the same status theoretically, but not politically. Gramsci's view suggests that all 
knowledge is human centred, there are no timeless truths, and all science and philosophy, 
including Marxism, are temporal human productions "whose correctness relates to their 
use-values" (Cain 1983: 104). This is, of course, the reason why many, including Marxists, 
have refused to accept historicism; its acceptance necessitates rejection of ultimate truths, 
which are seen as philosophically idealist fantasies. Whatever one's views on this 
position, it is clearly compatible with the Preface, where "social being determines 
consciousness". Clearly, adherence to this kind of relativism leads into a massive debate 
well beyond the bounds of this work. For now, one can agree with Cain. As she puts it, 
"that one's truth must be historical, contingent, political, and mediated by personal 
experience makes it no less true" (1983: 104). 
A third consequence of Gramsci's historicism is that it regards all theory as context 
dependent. Each variant of Marxism is contingent upon its time, its place and its 
circumstances. As was alluded to in the Introduction, one of the unique things about much 
Marxism is an acceptance of its own historical contingency. The best Marxism is alert to 
its own "historical grounds of possibility" (Eagleton 1990: 220). As Anderson puts it, 
"Marxism lies apart from all other variants of critical theory in its ability- or at least 
ambition- to compose a self-critical theory capable of explaining its own genesis and 
metamorphoses" (1983: 12). This is particularly true of Marxism based on the Preface, 
27 Contrast this with Popper (1957), a notable critic of Marxism and historicism. He suggests that 
historicism serves tyrants due to its belief in laws of historical determinism. Popper is guilty of 
taking a restricted view of historicism. Although some who adopt the label 'historicist' may well take 
such a view, a belief in laws of historical determinism is the antithesis of the historicism outlined 
here. Interestingly, Popper also takes a similarly reductive view of Marxism, equating it with 
orthodoxy. 
28 Popper also suggested Marxism was unscientific as it cannot be falsified (1959: 40-3). 
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where, again, "social being determines consciousness" and modes of thought (including, 
presumably, Marxism) rise and fall with the forces and relations of production. This also 
reinforces the suggestion that there is no one true or correct reading of Marx. If social 
being does indeed determine consciousness, and we may add, if human nature is the 
ensemble of social relations, then Marxism by the very nature of its theoretical structure 
must be fluid and ever changing, and perhaps ultimately self-abolishing. 29 This compels 
one to study each Marxist legal theorist in their own particular context, considering the 
concrete socio-political conditions that each theory was conceived in. Each Marxist 
theorist takes the insights of Marx and applies them to their own particular time, place and 
circumstances. The classic Marxist legal theorists that will form the focus of Part 1 were 
very much products of modernity. Today, we are witnessing the emergence of a new 
context, that of late modernity. Thus, a new Marxist legal theory is possible, desirable and 
necessary. 
A fourth consequence of Gramsci's historicism is that it justifies the view taken here of 
Marxism as a heterogeneous, fluid and evolving tradition which constantly adapts itself to 
new circumstances. This is closely related to the above point; as the context for legal 
theory has changed, then the time is ripe for a new, or at least a modified Marxist theory of 
law that builds upon the existing tradition and simultaneously extends it in order to better 
account for the new developments. The result is a contemporary addition to the diverse 
Marxist canon. In addition, this buttresses the argument that the Soviet version of 
Marxism, whatever its other flaws, is perfectly entitled to be labelled Marxist. The Soviet 
hierarchy took a particular brand of Marxism, and guided by their political needs, adapted it 
to their situation. Historicism accepts that this is what each interpreter of Marx and 
Marxism must inevitably do. One is reminded of Sherman, who claims that "Soviet 
Marxism" was a "distortion of Marx's thought and was mainly designed to justify the Soviet 
status quo of dictatorship and extreme central planning" (1995: 3). Yet Sherman himself 
then goes on to 'reconstruct' Marxism's basic framework (ibid: xvi). To do this he retains 
the concepts of the forces and relations of production but jettisons the base and 
superstructure metaphor as unnecessary and confusing. He replaces this with concepts of 
'economic' and 'social' processes, and stresses the reciprocity that exists between the two. 
29 Of course, the argument that all social thought and philosophy is historically relative is not itself 
historically relative, and here we are drawn into a peculiar paradox that will be familiar to students of 
postmodernism. 
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Society is thus a set of relations, and critical Marxism is the "relational-historical approach". 
Whatever advantages this may have the fact remains that this is a theory which, although 
based upon Marx's thought, modifies and extends that thought in certain ways, according 
to the situation and needs at hand. Is this not precisely what occurred in the Soviet 
Union? Even if the aims were rather less laudable than Sherman's, the fact is the theorists 
of the Soviet Union drew on Marx's work and created their own interpretation of it, just as 
Sherman did, and just as this work seeks to do. 
Although few contemporary legal theorists would explicitly align themselves with Marx, 
Gramsci, or historicism, the usefulness of studying legal theory in its historical context is 
widely accepted. Cotterrell, for instance, argues that "the succession of dominant 
approaches in Anglo-American legal philosophy since the 19th century- the approaches 
which today make up much of modern jurisprudence- can be usefully understood, to a 
large extent, as responses to particular political conditions and also, especially, conditions 
of legal professional practice. [... ] This perspective may provide a way of showing that 
debates in jurisprudence which tend to be portrayed as timeless, and which often seem 
interminable and incapable of resolution, are better understood as reflecting specific 
responses in legal philosophy to pressures, developments and conditions arising in 
particular times and places" (1989: v). McCoubrey and White would agree: "There must 
always be considered the question of the historical and cultural climate in which a theory 
was originally advanced. The fact that a theory might have been advanced in a historically 
remote or very different social and political context from that which now exists by no 
means necessarily deprives the theory of modern relevance. It may, however, have a 
major impact upon its application and significance in the context of modern societies" 
(1999: 7). 
Despite these good reasons for adopting Gramsci's view of Marxism as 'absolute 
historicism', it is important to sound a warning at this stage. As Kulcsar suggests, 
"knowledge of all features of the legal categories, concepts, institutions [... ] becomes 
possible only through historical enquiries" (1993: 146). However, it is important not to 
reduce law and legal theory to its historical context. Thus, just as some Marxists have 
shied away from explanations that reduce all phenomena to mere effects of the economic, 
one should be similarly careful not to perform a historical reduction. At the level of legal 
theory, this may mean ensuring that theory is internally consistent and plausible, and takes 
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care to address potential blockages, aporias and lacunas. As Eagleton puts it, "there is no 
reason why an intelligent non-radical should refuse to look at phenomena in their historical 
context. She may jib at reducing phenomena to their historical contexts, but then so do 
almost all radicals except vulgar Marxists, who exist these days largely as convenient 
figments of the anti-Marxist imagination" (1996: 3). 
The Preface and Law: Two Problems 
Historical materialism, as outlined in this Chapter, raises two major problems for any legal 
theory constructed upon its foundations. They are the problem of determination and the 
problem of base and superstructure. The success or failure of the various Marxist legal 
theories is, to an extent, dependent on the strength of their responses to these two 
problems. " 
The Problem of Determination 
The first major problem facing Marxist legal theorists surrounds the nature of 
determination: How exactly is law, as a superstructural phenomenon, determined by the 
base, and what room is there within this for the conscious intervention of human beings? 
Taken at face value, the "uncompromising line" of the Preface suggests that individuals 
are "puppets, controlled from offstage by the interplay of forces and relations of 
production" (Hollis 1994: 6). Human thought and action (and the "legal and political") are 
explicitly reduced to superstructural phenomena dependent upon the base. This 
deterministic interpretation of the Preface, which is certainly a plausible one, relegates the 
importance of human action; it becomes a mere sideshow, incapable of affecting the 
march of history. On this view law is a simple response to the processes occurring in the 
base, somehow representing or mirroring them. 
Yet such a line is extremely difficult to reconcile with some other statements issued by 
Marx. For instance, he also claimed that "men make their own history". Of course he 
added in the very next breath, "but they do not make it just as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
30 These two problems are derived from Collins' Marxism and Law. He outlines them most 
concisely in the introductory remarks to Chapter 4 (1982: 77). 
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encountered, given and transmitted from the past" (1963: 15). 31 Despite the rider, this 
would still appear on the face of it to stand a considerable distance away from the line 
pursued in the Preface. Furthermore, in The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels urge 
the proletariat to "unite" and lose "their chains", and praise the revolutionary force of the 
bourgeoisie in overthrowing the feudal fetters that stood in the way of capitalism. Indeed 
in the outline of historical materialism above, it was demonstrated how there is space in 
the theory for assigning an active role to social groups who seek to challenge the existing 
relations of production when those relations can no longer adequately accommodate the 
productive forces. Clearly, Marx was concerned to leave some scope for human agency 
within his scheme. Of course, the aim of this work is not to reconcile all of Marx's 
statements or produce a theory of law perfectly in line with the Preface. The Preface is 
simply the starting point for the investigation. However, it is clear that Marx did see human 
agency as central to his own project. 
The problem of agency is rendered "particularly acute" in the arena of law because law 
and legal systems are usually seen to be "purposive human creations, the product of 
deliberate conscious action" (Collins 1982: 16). A plausible legal theory should therefore 
make room for human action. Concomitantly, any theory that sticks to a rigidly determinist 
line and denies the possibility of conscious human thought and action must be viewed with 
caution. The wealth of deliberately created statutes, regulations and case law that abound 
in contemporary society would seem, on the face of it, to immediately empirically falsify 
any theory that does not render the possibility of human action open. As Adams and 
Brownsword put it, "explanation should start with the reasons and purposes of individual 
actors" (1992: xii). Yet to remain within the bounds of historical materialism, that 
conscious action must somehow be demonstrated to be ultimately determined by material 
factors. This balancing act between structure and action within the confines of historical 
materialism has informed, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, each of the Marxist 
theories of law we shall consider presently. Understanding how each theorist addresses 
this issue is one of the keys to understanding their view of law. 
The debate over how structure and action are to be precisely balanced within the 
framework of historical materialism has been one of the enduring controversies in Marxist 
31 This is one of the opening lines of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. 
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philosophy generally, not just in Marxist legal philosophy. 32 The most famous example is 
the attack launched by Thompson on the theories of Althusser. The latter's "theoretical 
anti-humanism" (Bottomore 1983: 17) explicitly reduced humans to "supports of the 
relations of production" (Althusser 1970: 112). This stood in marked contrast to 
Thompson's own ideas. In The Making of the English Working Class (1980)33 Thompson 
argued that the working class effectively created itself when the conditions were ripe. 
Later, in direct and open confrontation with Althusser, he wrote that men and women are 
the "ever baffled and ever resurgent agents of an unmastered history" (1978: 280). M 
Many Marxists have, in more sober fashion, attempted to find a plausible middle position 
between the two extremes of unmediated structural determination (Althusser) and 
anarchic, unconstrained human freedom (Thompson). Raymond Williams outlines a 
useful way of conceptualising the concept of 'determination' which allows room for agency. 
He suggests that we can see determination as the "setting of limits" and the "exertion of 
pressures [... ] in effect a compulsion to act in ways that maintain and renew [a social 
mode]". On such a view, 'society' is "never only the 'dead husk' which limits social and 
individual fulfilment. It is always also a constitutive process with very powerful pressures 
which are both expressed in political, economic and cultural formations, and, to take the 
full weight of 'constitutive', are internalised and become 'individual wills'. Determination of 
this whole kind- a complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures- is in the whole 
social process itself and nowhere else" (1977: 87). In a similar vein, Wright suggests that 
the Marxist theory of "historical trajectory" can be saved if we shift the emphasis to 
"historical possibility". Instead of arguing for determinate series of stages, "it may be more 
useful to focus on the ways in which alternative futures are opened up or closed off by 
particular historical conditions". This "does not presume that sequences follow a single 
trajectory as opposed to a variety of possible trajectories" (1993: 24). Thus, he concludes 
"structures limit practices but within those limits practices transform structures" (ibid: 28). 
Larrain too is in broad agreement with this concept of determination. He argues that 
"social change is neither arbitrary nor absolutely predetermined" as "individuals can try to 
32 Indeed, the debate on structure and action is one of the constants of social and political science 
generally, not just Marxism. See Hollis (1994: Ch 1). 
3 First published in 1963. 
34 These issues will be explored further in Chapter 4. For a balanced assessment of the debate 
between Thompson and Althusser on the issue of agency, see Anderson (1980: Ch 2). Cohen 
(1978: 73-77) criticises Thompson's definition of 'class' and suggests a return to a more traditional 
Marxist formulation, where one's 'class' is their objective position within the relations of production. 
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transform these [existing] circumstances within a finite set of options which the very 
circumstances allow" (1986: 123). 
Such formulations offer a useful starting point, but the precise machinations of legal 
determination need to be specified in more detail if the aim is for a comprehensive and 
coherent legal theory. As the rest of this Part will show, Marxist legal theorists have been 
largely unsuccessful in producing a concept of determination that is sufficiently 
sophisticated to allow for the type of human agency that Williams, Wright and Larrain talk 
of. 
The Problem of Base and Superstructure 
If one's aim is to demonstrate precisely how the base determines law as an element of the 
superstructure, then it follows, logically, that one should also be able to distinguish 
between the two. Marx himself implies such a distinction, for in the Preface he writes that 
"legal and political superstructures" arise upon the economic structure of society, which is 
"the real foundation". As Williams points out, "in the transition from Marx to Marxism and 
in the development of Marxism itself, the proposition of the determining base and the 
determined superstructure has been commonly held to be the key to Marxist cultural 
analysis" (1977: 75). Law has always raised particular problems in this respect, for it is 
especially difficult to think of law as belonging exclusively to the superstructure. 
John Plamenatz famously and forcefully criticises Marxism's base and superstructure 
metaphor, and he does so through an analysis of law's place in it. He argues that, 
contrary to the Preface, law is necessarily part of the economic base. Plamenatz gives the 
example of the law of contract. It seems difficult to envisage capitalist commodity 
exchanges, which are for the most part transactions carried out between strangers who 
need never meet one another, functioning successfully without the rules and regulations 
provided by contract law. On the face of it, contract law is thus at the very heart of the 
capitalist mode of production. How, then, can it be classed as 'superstructural', when it is 
concerned with regulating and conditioning the very relations that people enter into in 
society? As Plamenatz puts it, "it is easy to see that the system of property often has a 
great influence on the form of production". Given this, he asks "in what sense... are they 
[the relations of production] the real foundations of these other sides? " (1963: 282-3). 
35 
Furthermore, Plamenatz argues that modes of production cannot actually be described 
other than by reference to legal rights and legal duties concerning ownership and 
exchange. "Unfortunately, " he writes, "it is quite impossible to define these relations 
except in terms of the claims which men make upon one another and recognise" (ibid: 
281). For him, this is further evidence that law goes to the root of a mode of production. 
Because of these and other problems with the metaphor, opposition to it is one of the 
constants of Marxist theorising. Lukes, for instance, denunciates it in the starkest of terms, 
arguing that it is "a dead, static, architectural metaphor, whose potential for illumination 
was never very great and which has for far too long cast nothing but shadows over Marxist 
theory and Marxist practice" (1983: 119). 
In light of these and other criticisms, Marxist legal scholars must either demonstrate how 
law can be classed as superstructural, or otherwise modify or even, as Lukes suggests, 
abandon the metaphor altogether. Yet if the metaphor is modified too radically, or if it is 
completely abandoned, it would seem to be the case that the potency, power and 
distinctiveness of Marxist explanation would be lost at a stroke. Any Marxism based on 
the Preface is surely wedded to the idea that there a fundamental element of society that 
does the determining, and a number of peripheral elements that are so determined. The 
strength and directness of this determining and the effect that the superstructures 
themselves can have may be open to debate, but it is surely anathema to any Preface 
derived Marxism to deny the split, at some fundamental level, between determining base 
and determined superstructure. Stone would agree. What he terms the 'Superstructure- 
structure dichotomy', "is one of the cornerstones of both the Marxist view of society in 
stasis and the Marxist conception of historical change" (1985: 48), and should be 
maintained. 
Perhaps the metaphor can be preserved by taking a rather more modest view of it, and 
accepting its status as no more than a theoretical model, a cognitive aid that presents a 
simplified picture, rather than an accurate reflection or distillation of society. Williams 
suggests that, over time, the metaphor has become hypostatised and its original intention 
has been forgotten. The main sense of the original arguments was "relational", rather than 
denoting precise concepts and descriptive terms for observable areas of human life. 
However, Marxist writers have tended to separate the base and superstructure either 
temporally (first base, then superstructure) or spatially (the 'layers' of the social formation). 
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Ironically, Marx's original criticism was against the separation of areas of thought, precisely 
the flaw of idealism (1977: 77-8). Williams himself maintains that "contrary to a 
development in Marxism, it is not the 'base' and the 'superstructure' that need to be 
studied, but specific and indissoluble real processes, within which the decisive 
relationship, from a Marxist point of view, is that expressed by the complex idea of 
'determination'" (ibid: 82). Kinsey also accepts that in concrete reality base and 
superstructure cannot be separated; "Any separation of the legal expression and the 
social-economic relation is wholly artificial". However, he does not rule out the possibility 
of separation for the purpose of theorising (1978: 206). The challenge for Marxist legal 
theory is to produce a plausible reading of base and superstructure that acknowledges the 
messy and interrelated nature of reality along these lines. Again, Marxist legal theory to 
date has struggled in this task. 
The Two Problems in Precis 
The Preface, then, provides the guiding threads for the construction of a coherent and 
plausible Marxist theory of law, but there remains considerable work to do. A coherent 
and plausible Marxist theory of law must successfully perform two key tasks: 
1. Explain how the base determines the legal superstructure without denying 
human agency: The problem of determination. 
2. Divide the base from the superstructure for theoretical purposes while 
acknowledging the complexity of real-life social formations: The problem of 
base and superstructure. 
How far have Marxist legal scholars satisfied these demands? It is to this question that our 
attention will be directed in the remainder of this first part. The following chapters will 
assess how the mainstream Marxist legal theorists have dealt with law and provided 
solutions to these two problems. 35 The context that each theorist worked in will be 
35 Part 1's primary focus is on the most influential Western Marxist legal theory. The Bolsheviks 
Lenin and Pashukanis are the exceptions. It should also be noted that a great deal of Marxist legal 
theory will not be assessed. For instance, aside from Pashukanis, there was an abundance of legal 
theory in Russia in the 1920 and 1930s. In the post-war period, the Eastern Bloc also produced 
many contributions that will not be analysed. This is for two reasons. Firstly such theory has had 
37 
outlined, and their ideas presented and critiqued. This critique will particularly address the 
nature of the solutions offered to the two problems. The aim is to arrive at the superior 
variant of Marxist legal theory. 
little influence in the West. Secondly, as Varga relates, much of this "Marxian legal theory was 
nothing but the function of Soviet rule". Its discrediting in the post-Cold War era "could even be 
favourable for the future of Marxist legal theorising" (Varga 1993: xvii-xviii). Other Western 
Marxists, such as Lukacs, Benjamin and Bloch have also considered law, but their contributions are 
marginal, somewhat maverick and less influential, so they too will only be mentioned in passing. 
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CHAPTER 2. ENGELS AND LENIN 
Engels and Lenin are, of course, amongst the most influential Marxists. Law, however, 
was not the focus of their interest: "the truth is that the classic Marxist theorists devoted 
very little attention to law", instead treating it "casually as part of the apparatus of the state" 
(Collins 1982: 107). Despite this, by looking at their thoughts on the state, and their 
scattered and fragmentary remarks on law, one can begin to see how Marxists have 
applied the insights of the Preface. Engels' and Lenin's approaches are very different, but 
there is one crucial similarity; they both fail to provide adequate solutions to the problems 
of determination and base and superstructure. Yet their monumental influence on the 
entire Marxist tradition means that their work is regularly utilised by Marxist legal theorists 
despite its unsatisfactory nature. As such, it is useful to consider their ideas and identify 
where they went wrong. 
Friedrich Engels 
Context 
Engels "was the first Marxist, and he had a defining influence on Marxism" (Carver 2003: 
38). As friend, benefactor and intellectual sidekick, he vigorously promoted Marx's ideas, 
particularly in the later years of his life and after the death of Marx: Engels, "far more than 
Marx, was responsible for the diffusion of Marxism as a world view within the socialist 
movement" (Bottomore 1983: 151). Indeed, historical materialism can be seen as 
"something left to us by Engels", rather than by Marx, for it was Engels who invented the 
term itself, and who has been its most "effective exponent" to date (Carver 2003: 75). His 
attempts to work up more thoroughly the slippery metaphors of the Preface left an indelible 
mark on the entire Marxist movement. Despite only dealing with law peripherally, it is in 
Engels' formulation of historical materialism that the difficulty of resolving the problems of 
determination and base and superstructure first reveals itself. 
Two decisive contextual factors played a significant role in Engels' reading of Marx. The 
first was the need, particularly towards the end of Marx's life and after his death, to 
produce a coherent and systematic version of his theory, in order to clearly delineate what 
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'Marxism' was. The second factor, which dovetailed neatly with the first, was the 
increasing influence and prestige of natural science. 
As Marx and Engels grew old, the "need for a systematic and complete synthesis of 
socialism, [... ] an encyclopaedic manual of Marxism" became increasingly urgent. Many 
of what are now considered to be Marx's finest works remained unpublished, and much of 
what was published consisted of his newspaper articles. In addition, there was growing 
criticism of Marx, particularly within the socialist movement and from anarchists such as 
Proudhon. Engels famously satisfied the need for a concise distillation of Marx's 
worldview with his 1878 work Anti Duhring. 1 Yet in spite of, or perhaps because of, its 
encyclopaedic nature, Anti Duhring readily lent itself to interpretations "that eventually led 
to the development of a rigid orthodoxy" (Larrain 1986: 30). Engels presented Marxism as 
a relatively inelastic and comprehensive doctrine. Yet his was a very particular reading of 
Marxism. Instead, Engels could have recommended Marx's work as providing a 
"hypothesis for investigating historical and contemporary conflicts in society". In the 
Preface, for instance, Marx did not "assert that all individual actions and social conflicts 
would be effects in some traceable sense to the mode of production of material life", nor 
did he ever claim that he had uncovered "a historical law in accord in some ultimate causal 
sense with all events" (Carver 2003: 79). But the need for a confident and forceful 
exposition of his friend's theories led Engels to present historical materialism as something 
of an iron law. 2 
One possible explanation for Engels' proceeding in this way was that he was attempting to 
attain for Marx some of the prestige and legitimacy that was being increasingly accorded 
to natural science. This can be seen as the second decisive contextual factor explaining 
Engels' later output. The ascendancy of natural science was crystallised in 1859, the year 
Marx wrote the Preface, with the publication of Darwin's' Origin of the Species. The 
"cultural climate of the late nineteenth century" valorised such advances; it was hoped that 
a complete knowledge of the human condition could somehow be achieved through the 
scientific method, and students of social processes were caught up in the excitement. 
1 Anti- Duhring is an abbreviated title. The original title is Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in 
Science. 
2 Indeed, the vast majority of Marxist theorists since the 1920s have rejected, in whole or in part, 
Engels' interpretation of Marx. The most notable exception to this is the Italian Sebastiano 
Timpanaro (Anderson 1976: 60). 
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Engels thus presented Marx's thought as being of the same genus as the latest successes 
of natural science and "made claims about its universality and certitude that were not 
made by Marx"; for Carver, such claims merely amount to "spin" (2001: 38). Engels' 
attempt to tap into the zeitgeist pushed him towards an exposition of historical materialism 
"couched in scientific- and even positivist- terms" (McLellan 1979: 4). 
Theory 
Engels' desire to present Marxism as a complete and unified worldview, and his related 
attraction to the themes and prestige of natural science, led him to argue that Marx had 
indeed discovered the laws of motion of human history in the manner of a positivist 
scientist. Consequently Engels tended towards "simple materialistic explanation" (Phillips 
1980: 209). His general view of the base and superstructure metaphor is that the 
superstructure 'expresses' or 'reflects' the relations of production or economic base. He 
arrives at this conclusion through an analysis of the state. In Ludwig Feuerbach and the 
End of Classical German Philosophy, 3 Engels argues that "the state- the political order- is 
the subordinate, and civil society- the realm of economic relations- the decisive element". 
The superstructural nature of the state could not be any clearer; the state "is not an 
independent domain with an independent development, but one whose existence as well 
as development is to be explained in the last resort by the economic conditions of life of 
society". Therefore the state "is on the whole only a reflection, in concentrated form, of the 
economic needs of the class controlling production" (Engels 1968b: 615-6 [italics added]). 
Engels does pay some attention to law, albeit briefly. To do so he draws upon another 
famous passage from the Preface, immediately following the selection utilised in Chapter 
1. Marx claims that property relations are but the "legal expression" of the existing 
relations of production (Marx 1962: 363). This is a development of his idea that the 
superstructure "rises" upon the base. On the face of it, Marx seems to be asserting an 
even closer link between determining base and determined superstructure. Not only does 
the legal superstructure rise upon the base, but it actually expresses the base's 
fundamental, underlying nature. 4 Engels follows Marx almost to the letter. He claims that 
3 This was Engels' last major work. It was published in 1886 in issues 4 and 5 of Die Neue Zeit, the 
chief theoretical journal of the German SDP, and in book form in 1888. 
The more recent work of Stone (1985) also relies heavily on this passage from Marx. Stone 
claims that particular legal rules are created in accord with the "essential legal relations" that are the 
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law "in essence only sanctions the existing economic relations between individuals. [... ] 
Legal rules merely express the economic life conditions of society in legal form" (Engels 
1968b: 615-7). Thus law would seem to be no more than a codified version of the 
relations of production. This is certainly a tidy interpretation of historical materialism, and it 
clearly resonates with Engels' "leanings towards scientific study" (McLellan 1979: 16). 
This is because it suggests that explanation of all social phenomena, including law, is 
possible if one refers to the base of society, the rules of which Marx had purportedly 
already uncovered. 5 
One of Engels' most famous theoretical contributions to Marxism is the 'withering away' 
thesis. He argues that as capitalism is superseded and the economic base comes to be 
constituted of socialist relations of production, the state will begin to gradually 'wither 
away'. This is because the primary function of the state is class oppression, and in a 
classless society there is no need for this function to be performed. The state and, by 
extension, law, thus becomes superfluous. Engels first developed this thesis in Anti 
Duhring. His declaration that the state will wither away in communist society6 has been 
taken to mean that law, either as a part of the state or an analogous element of the 
superstructure, will also disappear. Yet Engels adds a significant qualification to this. He 
notes that there will still be a need to administrate the new planned economy and the 
distribution of goods: "The interference of the state power in social relations becomes 
superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of 
persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of 
production" (Engels 1943: 309). So, to be precise, the bourgeois state will wither away, 
but there may well still be a role for something akin to the state, and indeed law, in a new 
communist society. 
"expressions of economic life" (1985: 57-9). As such, Stone is vulnerable to the same criticisms 
that can be levelled at Engels (see below). 
5 In his speech at Marx's graveside in 1883, Engels declared that "just as Darwin discovered the law 
of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history" 
Engels 1968a: 429). 
This famous quote reads "the state is not 'abolished', it withers away' (Engels 1943: 309 [italics in 
original]). 
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Critique 
Clearly, Engels comes nowhere close to providing the kind of comprehensive legal theory 
that this work is aiming for. Yet his work is of lasting importance to Marxists, and its 
weaknesses have bedevilled much Marxist jurisprudence over the years. For our 
purposes it is the inability of his theory to offer convincing solutions to the problems of 
determination and base and superstructure that is of utmost importance. 
The solution that Engels' work offers to the problem of determination is far from 
satisfactory. The economic base is seen to mechanically determine all the peripheral 
elements of the superstructure. On Engels' view, the relations of production determine the 
superstructure, and therefore law, automatically; the superstructure always aligns itself to 
the needs of the base. Analyses in the style of Engels' have been termed 'economist', 
'economic reductionist' or 'crude materialist' "because of the extreme emphasis placed 
upon the determining influence of the material base of society" (Collins 1982: 23). The 
superstructure, and law as a part of it, is seen as the mere reflection of the base. But 
despite its theoretical neatness, this interpretation of historical materialism is problematic 
for a number of reasons (see Collins 1982: 23-4). 
Crucially, Engels' formulation cannot tell us how the base determines the superstructure. 
It is asserted that the superstructure will always correspond to the base, but the 
mechanism through which this process occurs is not detailed. It was suggested earlierl 
that law is particularly problematic in this respect, for, on the face of it, it seems to be the 
deliberate creation of human subjects. Thus some room must be found within the bounds 
of historical materialism for human action. Yet Engels implies that, far from being active 
and even idiosyncratic in the process of law-creation, humans are actually passive and not 
integral to the process, other than as the supports or conduits of it. This is plainly 
unsatisfactory. Engels fails to provide "an account of how conscious action is determined 
by the material base" (Collins 1982: 25). 
According to Hunt, the reflection metaphor imports into Marxism a "dubious epistemology 
derived from naive materialism" (1985: 18). This is evidenced by Engels' work, for the 
only way that human action ban be accommodated within his scheme is if one subscribes 
' See Chapter 1 above. 
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to an empiricist epistemology. Generally, empiricism holds that "the only way to ensure 
that knowledge of matters of fact is sound or scientific is to base it on observations, or 
more generally, experience" (Miller 1987: 395). The empiricist epistemology claims that 
knowledge can only be "the passive assimilation of a ready made universe" (ibid: 180). 
Hence, upon experiencing the relations of production in any given society, humans will 
consciously create law that is in line with those relations. So the process of creating law is 
not entirely automatic, as it does rely on human activity, but that activity is always 
conditioned exactly by the relations of production. There is no scope for thought to diverge 
from the relations of production; in this way, we can see how law 'reflects' the relations of 
production. However, Marxists have consistently rejected the empiricism necessary to 
sustain Engels' theory of reflection on a number of grounds. 8 Crucially, empiricism is 
rejected as it "sees the world as a collection of unconnected appearances, ignores the role 
of theory in actively organising and critically reorganising the data provided by such 
appearances, and fails to identify its function as the attempt to re-present in thought the 
essential relations generating them" (Bottomore 1983: 149-50). 
In addition, Engels' theory is ultimately a functionalist theory. The superstructure, 
including law, is assumed to function in order to secure the existing relations of production. 
As well as limiting the scope for active human intervention, design and creativity, this also 
assumes the law's functions. Of course one should not deny that law has functions, but 
care should be taken not to specify them theoretically in advance of any empirical study. 
To do so is to lapse into functionalism. As Hunt puts it, "we must distinguish between 
function and functionalism, and reject the latter" (1985: 17). Functionalist accounts 
reductively reify functions and assume their existence; all social practices and institutions 
are classified and judged in terms of them. In reality, law may serve a number of 
functions, some of them contradictory, or it may not be functional at all. As such, it is 
prudent to avoid broad statements to the effect that 'law reproduces social relations'. " 
Engels' crude materialism leads to two other related difficulties that are also worth noting. 
Firstly, it renders an analysis of the relationship between law and all other social 
institutions largely meaningless. This is because the superstructure in its entirety is simply 
held to be the mere reflection of the base. If law and, say, politics are derived from the 
8 Of course, an anti-empiricist stance does not necessitate a hostility to empirical research. 9 Such a formulation, as Hunt again points out, also presents 'the law' as if it were a coherent and 
fully integrated phenomena. This is not the case (Hunt 1985: 28). 
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same source and perform the same tasks, then any analysis of their relationships and 
linkages is bound to be simplistic and impoverished. Secondly, the metaphor of 'reflection' 
does not tell us why law is needed to express the relations of production. It fails to 
consider exactly what is it about law that makes it so well suited to buttressing the relations 
that make up the fundaments of society. 
Late in his life, Engels admitted that "Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact 
that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. 
We had to emphasise the main principle vis-ä-vis our adversaries, who denied it" (Engels 
1968c: 683). Having realised his mistake, in much of his later correspondence he 
attempted to distance himself from his rigidly economist line. For instance in 1894 he 
wrote, "it is not that the economic situation is cause, solely active, while everything else is 
only passive effect" (Engels 1968d: 694). For Cain and Hunt, this suggests that "Marx' 
and Engels' comments on and discussions of law are not capable of an economic 
determinist reading, despite the fact that their summary statements of their position may 
give credence to such an interpretation" (1979: xiii). However, despite his later retreat, 
Engels' economic determinism, or crude materialism, profoundly influenced many 
Marxists, including legal theorists. 
Engels also fails to resolve the problem of base and superstructure. For him, there is a 
clear and unproblematic distinction between the two. This is best evidenced by the 
withering away thesis. Engels argues that once the capitalist relations of production are 
replaced by socialist relations of production, the entire superstructure of the former society 
will be superfluous, and will wither away, presumably to be replaced by a new 
superstructure better suited to the needs of the new society. 10 This assumes a simple 
division between base and superstructure, with the state and law belonging to the latter, 
and vulnerable to disintegration once the relations of production that they are based on are 
themselves swept away. Yet the position regarding law is not quite so straightforward, for 
it is not possible with any confidence to claim that law is exclusively a superstructural 
phenomenon. Plamenatz argues that law is often part of the base itself, and that relations 
of production cannot be'described other than in terms of legal rights and duties concerning 
ownership and exchange (1963: 281-83). Similarly, Collins points out that "it seems 
impossible to conceive of the relations of production without resort to the basic legal 
10 Note again Engels' functionalist bent. 
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framework of contracts and the protection of private ownership by the law of tort and 
criminal law" (1982: 33). Collins adds that the material base must also include some kind 
of normative element, which may be made up of legal rules, or indeed Engels' 
'administration', in order to be stable and reliable enough for an entire social formation to 
arise upon it (ibid: 81). Given this, a more sophisticated take on the relationship between 
base and superstructure than Engels provides is required. " 
In addition, Engels' notion of 'administration', presumably an attempt to avoid charges of 
utopianism, is problematic and raises a number of issues. Firstly, the differences between 
administration and law are not clear, and Engels is silent on this matter. The only way the 
withering away thesis can be sustained is if one adopts a definition of law that seems to be 
unduly narrow. Yet if one utilises a wider definition, it is perfectly possible that Engels' 
'administration' could be considered to be law. Thus Engels, in spite of himself, suggests 
the potential durability and persistence of law, albeit under another name (Collins 1982: 
106). Secondly, Engels' concept of administration highlights the difficulty of envisaging a 
social system that can function without law or its equivalent, whatever name is given to it. 
Thirdly, any attempt to locate the differentia specifica of law in order to support the 
withering away thesis may lead one to miss a more crucial issue. That issue is how 'law', 
or, for that matter 'administration', serves to maintain the existing social order. 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin12 
Context 
Lenin's theoretical work was conducted in a very different situation to that of Engels. By 
the time of the latter's Anti Duhring, the hopes of revolutionary action stoked by 1848 had 
been all but extinguished in Western Europe. Thus, Engels' concern was to provide a 
systematic and comprehensive account of the Marxist worldview, rather than directly 
contribute to revolutionary struggles. Lenin, however, was a revolutionary first and a 
theoretician second. His theoretical work was always given its shape by the immediate 
political situation, and as such it underwent a number of revisions and metamorphoses 
over time. As Geoghegan suggests, the "theoretical diversity of his voluminous writings" 
" These arguments were introduced more fully in Chapter 1. 
12 'Lenin' was a pseudonym, adopted by Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov in 1901 duirng clandestine party 
work. 
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and the "complexities of his political life", make it. "very difficult, even impossible, to portray 
an essential Lenin; however, ironically, the very boldness of some of his statements and 
acts encourage people to do precisely this" (1994: 105). 
The political context of Lenin's work changed with the ebbs and flows of the revolutionary 
movement of which he was a part. Lenin himself spoke of the importance of considering 
his work with reference to its socio-political context. He was specifically referring to his 
1902 pamphlet What is to be Done?. In it, he called for a Party of tightly disciplined 
professional revolutionaries dedicated to steering the working class away from 
spontaneous trade unionism and towards 'true' socialist consciousness. Such 
consciousness could not be formed without the aid of this revolutionary vanguard. 13 But 
as the particular socio-political circumstances that gave rise to What is to be Done? began 
to change, Lenin began to modify his views. Significantly, his pessimism as to the 
revolutionary potential of the unaided masses was rendered largely out of date by 1905, 
with a wave of strikes and unrest in Russia and a tenfold increase in Party membership. 
As a result "the distinction between an elitist party and a mass organisation became less 
rigid" (McLellan 1979: 89). Lenin acknowledged this and began to advocate 'democratic 
centralism', with 'freedom of discussion' and 'unity of action' at its core. Then, in 1917, 
another tenfold increase in membership led to an even more open and liberal Party, as its 
highly centralised structures collapsed. But the civil war of 1918-21 "necessitated a 
clampdown on previous liberties". After the war, the proletariat had been devastated and 
the newly renamed Communist Party commanded little support. The 10th Party Congress 
in March 1921, just weeks after the brutal repression of the Kronstadt rising, marked the 
end of free expression and proportional representation within the Party. Its role as 
'vanguard', in line with Lenin's' earlier views, was reaffirmed. Shortly afterwards Stalin 
became Party General Secretary. He canonised, for obvious reasons, What is to be 
Done? (McLellan 1979: 88-90). 
These socio-political changes undoubtedly influenced Lenin and led to distinct changes in 
his outlook over time; as a revolutionary he was bound to be aware of and responsive to 
the fluid nature of social reality. Yet his overall project was not fundamentally different to 
13 What is to be Done? was the last publication to have the assent of all orthodox Marxists. Its 
proposals were adopted by the majority (the 'Bolsheviks') at the 2nd congress of the Russian Social 
Democratic Labour Party in 1903, against the broader conception of the party suggested by Martov 
(and supported by the minority, or the 'Mensheviks'). 
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that of Engels. As suggested above, the early unity of Marxism had been largely due to 
Engels' systematisation of historical materialism. The central aim of Lenin's theoretical 
programme was to "reassert" the orthodoxy of that early period against the growing variety 
and "disarray" of the then current movement (McLellan 1979: 86). Lenin attempted to do 
this whilst always keeping one eye on the practical political consequences of the position 
arrived at. 
This partly explains the central difference between the theories of Engels and Lenin. 
Engels, concerned primarily to provide a systematic and comprehensive Marxism, 
promulgated a crude but straightforward version of the base and superstructure metaphor. 
Lenin, on the other hand, being increasingly engaged in the realities of political revolution, 
saw the state and, by extension, law as a tool of the ruling classes. 14 This has become 
known as the 'class instrumentalist' theory. 
Theory 
The 'class instrumentalist' view of law largely rests upon the argument laid out in The 
Communist Manifesto. Two particular features of this work are integral to Lenin's 
conception of the state. The first is the idea that all societies, up to and including the 
capitalist one, have been divided into antagonistic classes. This is made abundantly clear 
in the opening line of the first chapter of the Manifesto: "The history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of class struggles" (Marx and Engels 1968: 35). In capitalism, there 
are, according to Marx and Engels, increasingly just two classes. The owners of the 
means of production's interests stand diametrically opposed to those of the wage 
labourers. Thus, this is a conflict view of society. The second central idea from the 
Manifesto that Lenin draws on is Marx and Engels' famous declaration that "the 
bourgeoisie has at last [... ] conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, 
exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern state is but a committee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels 1968: 37). 
Lenin, following both the Manifesto and Engels' individual work, focussed on the state, but 
his ideas have been extended and applied to the legal sphere. He offers a straightforward 
and provocative definition of the state in the style of the Manifesto. In State and 
14 As Chapter 1 outlined, such a view was also that of the later Marx. 
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Revolution, 15 Lenin declares that the state is "an instrument for the exploitation of the 
oppressed class" (Lenin 1969: 13). On this view, the state is the institution through which 
the dominant class "imposes and defends its power and privileges against the class or 
classes which it dominates and exploits" (Bottomore 1983: 467). The legal system can be 
regarded as an integral part of the state apparatus, which shares the state's functions. 
Thus, extending Lenin's theory of the state, laws are not the mere 'reflections' of the mode 
of production, but instead are "direct expressions of the will of the dominant class" (Collins 
1982: 27). Laws are specifically created in order to further the interests of the ruling class, 
and help maintain their place atop the social hierarchy. "The state and the legal system 
are within the exclusive control of the dominant class, and [... ] they deliberately use the 
law to pursue their own interests at the expense of the subordinate classes" (ibid: 29). 
Lenin also developed a theory of ideology. As McKenzie outlines, in What is to be Done? 
Lenin broke with the idea of ideology as 'false consciousness' (1994: 16). Marx and 
Engels had tended to favour a view of ideology as the opposite of truth, forming a veil over 
the contradictions of capitalist society. Lenin moved away from these ideas of truth and 
falsity. For him, "ideas were not deficient for their being ideological but solely for the class 
interest that they might serve" (McLellan 1995: 22). Thus ideologies should be judged on 
the basis of their use-value in the revolutionary struggle. Lenin was also the first to 
explicitly establish a relationship between different classes and different ideologies. He 
argued that there was no middle way between bourgeois and socialist ideology, as these 
were competing world-views that represented the two remaining classes in society. 16 
Therefore, an ideology that is useful to the working class will be dangerous to the 
bourgeoisie, and vice versa. However, as was alluded to above, according to Lenin the 
working class was unable to successfully develop socialist ideology unaided. The 
ascendancy of the bourgeois world-view made it appear natural, even to those workers 
whose interests it did not represent. Socialist ideology therefore had to be developed 
outside of the working class and be imported into it by the party intelligentsia (McLellan 
1995: 62-63). 17 
15 State and Revolution was written in 1917, barely a month before the October revolution. 
16 "The only question, " writes Lenin, "is this: The bourgeois ideology or the Socialist ideology. There 
is nothing in between (for humanity has not worked out any 'third' ideology and, in general, in a 
society torn by class contradictions, there can never be an ideology that is outside or above 
classes). Hence, any belittling of the Socialist ideology, any withdrawing form it, means by the 
same token the strengthening of the bourgeois ideology (1963: 71 (italics in original]). 
17 Marxist theories of ideology, including Lenin's, will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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In addition to his class instrumentalist view of law and ideology, Lenin also defended 
Engels' withering away thesis. In State and Revolution, he argues that once the 
'dictatorship of the proletariat' phase has ended following the crushing of all resistance to 
the revolutionary movement, the state, including law, will indeed disappear (1969: 16-22, 
Ch5). Lenin, like Engels, thus maintains the line taken in the Preface and sees law, along 
with all other social institutions in society, as superstructural. Therefore he too is able to 
confidently assert that once new productive relations have succeeded the existing 
relations of bourgeois society, the entire superstructure of that bourgeois society will 
evaporate. Yet, in a further echo of Engels, Lenin adds a significant qualification. As was 
noted above, Engels recognised the continuing need to administrate the new planned 
economy and the distribution of goods in communist society. Similarly, Lenin 
acknowledges that even communist society will be bound together by "elementary rules of 
social intercourse" (1969: 81). Evidently, as Lenin has claimed that law will wither away, 
he does not consider these 'elementary rules' to be law, but he does not elaborate any 
further on what they may be. Presumably, Lenin felt that as these rules will not promote 
the interests of a particular class, and as they will not require institutional systems for their 
enforcement, then they cannot be 'law'. So, for Lenin, 'law' is only that which helps to 
ensure social order for the benefit of a dominant class. 
Critique 
The class instrumentalist view of law has significant advantages over the crude materialist 
approach associated with Engels. Rather than seeing law as the inevitable reflection of 
fundamental processes, it offers an explanation of the role and necessity of law. Law is 
seen to be a crucial element in the ruling class' maintenance of their pre-eminent position 
in society, and a mechanism for the diffusion of their worldview or ideology. This also 
suggests how it can be related to the other institutions of the superstructure, for the 
superstructure is seen to be an active creation of the ruling class; a set of institutions and 
practices deliberately designed to support ruling class dominance. Thus legal and political 
institutions are active creations designed to fulfil the same goal; the preservation of 
bourgeois domination. 
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More crucially, at first sight the class instrumentalist theory seems to provide what was 
missing in the crude materialist account of law, namely a plausible solution to the problem 
of determination. Instead of relying on an ill-defined notion of 'reflection', class 
instrumentalism demonstrates how the "origins of legal and political institutions are located 
in the pursuit of self interest by a dominant social class" (Collins 1982: 28). So the 
dominant class themselves are seen to provide the link between the base and the 
superstructure; "In short, the economic base determines the legal superstructure, not 
instantaneously and mechanically, but through a process of class rule in which the 
participants further their interests through the legal system" (ibid. 29). It seems that not 
only is there scope for human action in the class instrumentalist theory, but that the 
conscious, deliberate actions of the ruling class are at the very heart of its analysis. 
However, Lenin's brand of class instrumentalism remains unsatisfactory. Collins suggests 
there is an "ambiguity" in the theory. If class instrumentalism claims that all laws serve the 
best interests of the ruling class, then it requires that all the conscious behaviour of that 
class somehow coincides with their best material interests. This approach, then, sees 
Marxism descend into a crude conspiratorial theory, where "motivations inevitably coincide 
with a person's objective class position" (Collins 1982: 31-2). This is a difficult argument to 
sustain. On the face of it, it does not appear that classes of any kind have such a definite 
idea of where their best interests lie. 
In addition, this crude class instrumentalism has to confront the empirical reality that not all 
law does in fact directly benefit the ruling class. But as soon as one accepts this, the class 
instrumentalist theory is presented with a real difficulty. How can it account for laws that 
do not further the ruling class' cause? 
One solution would be to argue that laws that do not benefit the ruling class have been 
passed in error. However, this would suggest that the ruling class' hold on power is, at 
best, precarious, something that does not appear to be backed up by the evidence of the 
last two centuries of capitalist rule. On the other hand, this could also suggest that law is 
not quite such an intrinsic part of the ruling class' power base as one may intuitively feel; if 
laws are passed in error but the capitalist system continues regardless, perhaps law plays 
only a minor supporting role. However, if the ruling class are unable to ascertain precisely 
where their best interests lie, then they would presumably commit dangerous errors in 
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whichever superstructural sphere was most crucial to them, so to raise this objection is to 
miss the force of the argument against easily identifiable objective class interests. A 
second solution would be to hold that laws that do not benefit the ruling class have been 
passed by them as some kind of ruse to mystify the real class nature of the legal system. 
By offering strategic concessions to subordinate classes the ruling class may be able to 
protect its lofty position in society. But again, it does not appear plausible that any class 
has such a clear picture of what is necessary in order to maintain its position, nor does the 
image of a unified ruling class pursuing its interests and clandestinely making concessions 
to a suitably ignorant, compliant and malleable working class seem a particularly realistic 
view of the messy reality of law. 
In fact, the class instrumentalist position is premised on an empiricist epistemology similar 
to the one inherent in Engels' work. Lenin assumes that a class can ascertain where its 
best interests lie from a simple reading of the relations of production. But we have already 
seen that a coherent and plausible Marxism must deny that knowledge merely mirrors or 
reflects a prior empirical reality. However, once such an empiricist epistemology is 
rejected, another way to explain how a social group sees itself as such and formulates 
ideas about where its best interests lie must be found. 
These difficulties are compounded by Lenin's theory of ideology. It requires that class 
interests can be objectively 'read off' from the relations of production. Of course this too is 
problematic as it also relies on a crude empiricist epistemology. In addition, Lenin's rider 
that the working class themselves cannot perform this reading, and must rely on the 
intelligentsia to tell them what is in their best interests, has led many Marxists to reject the 
theory. It is not clear what gives intellectuals the capability to perceive so clearly the 
objective interests of all. Are they too not reliant on theory to actively organise and 
critically reorganise the data provided by surface appearances? If so, like the average 
labourer, they cannot escape subjectivity and the potential to misread. In addition, the 
dangers of granting 'intellectuals' too much power is obvious; it is hardly surprising that 
Stalin saw What is to be Done? as a key work. 
Moreover, Lenin fails to provide an adequate link between the relations of production and 
the development of ideology. In fact, his view of ideology is implicitly idealist, for it sees 
ideology as something developed in the minds of intellectuals and transposed onto the 
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working class. Only intellectuals can grasp the consequences of the relations of 
production for the working class, and develop appropriate responses and strategies. 
Luxemburg, and more penetratingly, Plekhanov, were the most notable critics of this idea; 
Plekhanov pointed to its implicit idealism (Larrian 1983: 65-69), an idealism unwittingly 
captured by Utechin: "Theories develop in the heads of intellectuals and are not born 
spontaneously among the masses" (1963: 17). 18 There is no sense that ideas and 
consciousness are somehow the product of, or active responses to, actual lived situations; 
surely this is the thrust of the Preface and at the heart of Marx's anti-idealism? 19 
Lenin also fails to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of base and 
superstructure. His defence of Engels' withering away thesis leaves him open to exactly 
the same criticisms as were outlined above. Most crucially, the idea that superstructural 
elements can be simply split from the base, and the related view that such elements have 
no influence on that base, does not seem plausible. This is particularly so in the case of 
law, where, for -instance, contract appears to go to the very heart of the relations of 
production in a capitalist society. 
The Influence of Engels and Lenin 
Engels and Lenin have had a monumental and lasting impact on the entire Marxist 
tradition. Their treatments of historical materialism and the state have formed the 
backbone of subsequent Marxist analyses of law. Interestingly, those who utilise or are 
influenced by Engels tend to focus on the form of law, while those for whom Lenin's work 
resonates are more inclined to concentrate on its content or substance. 20 
Engels' crude materialism, and chiefly the notion of 'reflection', lends itself to an analysis of 
the form of law as it suggests how fundamental structures in society are represented at 
more peripheral levels. It suggests ways of theorising the broad outline and shape of the 
18 Utechin is summarising the ideas of What is to be Done? 
19 Nevertheless, by broadly relating ideology to class position Lenin provides a signpost that will 
prove useful in Chapter 5. 
° Interestingly, Engels' and Lenin's distinct approaches are occasionally conflated by critics. For 
instance, Thompson writes of a strand of Marxism that sees law as "by definition a part of the 
superstructure, adapting itself to the necessities of an infrastructure of productive forces and 
productive relations. As such, it is clearly an instrument of the de facto ruling class" (1975: 259). 
Thompson thus combines Engels' notion of reflection, or'adaptation', and Lenin's notion of law as 
an 'instrument' of the ruling class. 
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legal system. This was taken on and developed by Pashukanis, as will be demonstrated 
in the next chapter. Meanwhile, the massive influence of Lenin's State and Revolution 
helped to ensure that the "prevailing trend from the 1930s to the 1960s displayed an 
almost exclusive emphasis on the repressive or coercive character of law, conceived as 
the direct embodiment of the interest of the ruling class. In this conception law itself is 
unproblematic: the analysis of legal developments or new legislation has the task merely 
of exposing the class interests contained in them" (Cain and Hunt 1979: x-xi). Thus, this 
"'law as coercion' tradition" (ibid: xi) directs attention to law's content or substance. 
Furthermore, Lenin's theory of ideology, which began the move away from the notion of 
'false consciousness', is also massively influential. Collins adopts and significantly refines 
this thesis, in the process formulating the strongest Marxist theory of law yet produced. 1 
In addition, Engels' and Lenin's 'withering away' thesis has proven to be an enduring 
influence on Marxism as a whole. Many Marxist legal theorists have adopted the theory; 
the most sophisticated variant is provided by Pashukanis. However, the withering away 
thesis has tended to lead to a rather caricatured view of Marxism as unduly hostile toward 
law and unjustifiably utopian, despite the qualifications that both Engels and Lenin were 
careful to make. 
Ultimately, however, as this chapter has demonstrated, Engels' and Lenin's works do not 
provide the theoretical tools for adequate solutions to the problem of determination and the 
problem of base and superstructure. The search for a coherent and plausible Marxist 
theory of law must continue. 
21 See Chapter 5 below. 
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CHAPTER 3. RENNER AND PASHUKANIS 
Law was clearly not a central focus of classical Marxist analysis. Marx, Engels and Lenin 
only dealt with law tangentially and it is not possible to construct a robust Marxist legal 
theory from what they did write on the subject. Of course, this is perfectly understandable; 
Marx identified the material circumstances of life, the relations of production, as the key to 
understanding society. Law is undoubtedly peripheral in such a schema. However, Karl 
Renner and Evgeny Pashukanis, two Marxists from very different traditions, did take law 
as the focus of their studies. Until the 1970s, theirs were the only Marxist works to have 
"attracted interest and respect among non- Marxist legal theorists" (Bottomore 1983: 275). 
Renner and Pashukanis are what one may term the classical Marxist legal theorists. 
Karl Renner 
Context 
Karl Renner was part of the Austro-Marxist tradition. This "was not a political or workers 
organisation, " but an "intellectual tendency" (McLellan 1979: 58), although its adherents 
did become prominent members of the rapidly growing Austrian Social Democratic Party 
(SPO). Austro-Marxism began to crystallise as an identifiable school of thought just after 
the turn of the 20th Century, flourished before the First World War, and died out in the inter- 
war years. Among its chief proponents were Victor Adler, the founder of the socialist 
movement in Austria, Max Adler, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding, Friedrich Adler and Renner 
himself (See Kolakowski 1978a: Chapter 12). Austro-Marxists reacted against the growing 
orthodoxy and dogmatism of contemporary Marxism, as "they did not regard Marxism as a 
closed, self-contained system" (ibid: 240). They also "virtually abandoned any notion of 
economic primacy" (Stone 1985: 42), although not always convincingly, as Renner's work 
shows. 
In addition, the Austro-Marxists became very much associated with reformism. This 
attracted criticism from more orthodox Marxists who favoured the original Marxist notion of 
a tumultuous and decisive revolution. Yet as Kinsey outlines, the Austro-Marxists actually 
represented something of a third position, placing them somewhere in between reformists 
and revolutionaries. Portrayals of them as reformist is somewhat simplified and 
55 
caricatured and fails to take into account their socio-political situation. In Austria, the SPO 
were making rapid gains through the ballot box. Suffrage was granted after a general 
strike in 1907. At that year's elections the Party became the second strongest in the 
country, and in 1911, the strongest. Thus, it was felt that the decisive victory over 
capitalism had already been won. As such, "their problem was not how to gain political 
power, but how to use it" (Kinsey 1983: 13). 
The Austro-Marxists thus saw themselves as being involved in the actual construction of 
socialism. Renner himself, for instance, did not see his work as being academic, but as a 
political statement and active intervention in this process of construction (Kinsey 1983: 12). 
Measures that orthodox Marxists may have considered to be reformist, such as the 
progressive extension of the socialisation of the means of production and the democratic 
organisation of the labour process, were seen as essential if the revolution was not to be a 
merely spontaneous gesture, doomed to failure. Previous Marxists had paid scant 
attention to the actual practical problems that those involved in the construction of the new 
society would face. This was not an option for the Austro-Marxists; they had to show what 
they were for and how they would attain it, rather than what they were simply against. 
In such a context, the question of law was a pertinent one, of immediate social and political 
relevance. As an existing bourgeois institution, did it have a role in the new society? If 
yes, what precisely was this role? Alternatively, would law wither away as Engels and 
Lenin had predicted? It is these questions that guide Renner's foray into legal theory. His 
work provides a splendid example of the Austro-Marxist concern with immediate, practical 
problems that other Marxist writers had not faced. ' 
Theory 
Three basic Austro-Marxist concepts were developed in response to this concrete socio- 
political situation. Renner implicitly utilises these linked concepts to underpin his analysis 
1 After the First World War the socialist movement broke decisively in two. Renner allied himself 
with the explicitly reformist wing which stressed, to an even greater extent than the Austro-Marxist 
movement, that the working class should value incremental advances rather than aim for violent 
revolution. He held the posts of Chancellor, Minister of Home Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in the First Austrian Republic. After surviving the counter-revolution of 1934 and the Second World 
War, he became the first Chancellor of the Second Republic in 1945. Later that year he was 
elevated to the position of President, a position that he held until his death in 1950 (See Bottomore 
1983: 36-38,417, and Kolakowski 1978a: 257). 
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of law (Kinsey 1983: 16). 'Political power' is the power of the 'common will' of the state. 
This is power exercised in the name of all citizens. The sovereign thus applies not 
individual but social power. 'Socialised man' is the supra-individual entity that exercises 
this power. Individual power holders, including lawmakers, are merely the agents or 
trustees of political power. What appears as the product of their individual wills is actually 
the will of this entity. It is the entity, not the individuals, that holds the power. 'Social 
evolution' is the idea that society becomes progressively more conscious of the needs and 
requirements of social organisation. In bourgeois society, the illusion that labour is not a 
social duty but a private affair for which no regulation is required persists. As 
consciousness increases, this myth is debunked. Law develops in line with this. Under 
socialism, which is fully conscious, law reaches its zenith (Kinsey 1983: 17-20). 2 
For Renner, it had become evident that capitalist private property was functionally 
inadequate as a means of social organisation. The ever-increasing productive potential of 
society had made centralisation, public law and the state regulation of the economy 
rational necessities. A fully conscious socialism, with highly developed material conditions 
of production, would allow for extensive co-operation, and the common will would be 
personified in the state and its role as legislator. 
Renner's classic work is The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions, which 
was first published in 1904. It is anchored in these themes and concepts of Austro- 
Marxism, but its explicit focus is far narrower. Renner asks "how can one account for the 
functional transformation of a norm which remains stable" (Kahn-Freund 1949 2); the most 
prominent example, and the focus of Renner's analysis, is the property norm. 
On the basis of his study, Renner offers four theses on law that constitute his underlying 
position: 
1. Fundamental changes in society are possible without accompanying 
changes in the legal system; 
2. Law does not cause economic development; 
3. Economic change does not immediately and automatically bring about changes in the 
law; 
2 Note here the similarities with Marx's early views on law (see Chapter 1 above). 
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4. Development by leaps and bounds is unknown in the social substratum, which only 
knows evolution, not revolution. Revolution only occurs at the level of political institutions 
(Renner 1949: 252-3). 
This immediately suggests a number of things. Firstly, if fundamental changes in society 
are possible without accompanying changes in the legal system then law is presumably 
not fundamental to society; in other words, it is superstructural. Secondly, if law does not 
cause economic development then this superstructural law has, at best, only limited 
effects on the base. Thirdly, if economic change does not immediately and automatically 
bring about changes in the law then one may assume that law has a degree of autonomy 
from the base. However, that autonomy is minimal, as point 4 would seem to suggest that 
the gentle and steady evolution of the base occasionally forces the superstructural 
elements to realign themselves through a revolution. In sum, Renner's position, at first 
glance, would appear to be that of an orthodox Marxist. 
The revolution Renner alludes to will take the form, inter alia, of a legal revolution. There 
will occur a "cognitive reappropriation" and "normative reordering" of the social relations of 
production; this will be a "revolution of reform". The new socialist legality will fully order 
and regulate the key economic functions of production, distribution and consumption, 
functions presently fulfilled by the owner of private property. The all-powerful state, in its 
role as legislator, will be the "fully conscious rational embodiment" of the common will 
(Kinsey 1983: 21). 
According to Renner, such societal changes occur in line with the level of development in 
the economic base. He argues that the greater the level of development in the base, then 
the greater the possibility of fully conscious or rational regulation of social relations in the 
form of law. In effect, the legal forms necessary for socialism already exist, but they are 
nascent or embryonic and require further development (Renner 1949: 298). The problem 
of transition to socialism is therefore one of articulating the 'social power' through the state 
and dispossessing the capitalist as 'trustee' of that power (Kinsey 1983: 27). The abolition 
of private property is the most crucial step in the transition as it signals the end of the 
private, irrational exercise of social power. Renner saw the Joint Stock Company as the 
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most crucial movement in this direction. 3 Joint Stock Companies bring together 'particles' 
of the total social capital which was previously aggregated by the market. As such they 
demonstrate the increasing tendency to establish production as explicitly social, for the 
'shareholder capitalists' who operate in Joint Stock Companies are too small to operate. in 
isolation from one another. Joint Stock Companies also enable the capitalist to leave the 
minutiae of the day to day running of the company to a salaried manager. As a result, the 
capitalist is revealed as a parasite. Rationally organised production is thus identified with 
management and 'technical experts'. This contrasts starkly with capitalism, where those 
best qualified to run things are excluded by'private property (Renner 1949: 281-7,294-5). 
This notion of progressive social evolution, with new forms of social ordering growing out 
of rather than replacing the old forms, directly influences Renner's most renowned 
contribution to jurisprudence. This is the idea that legal norms themselves can remain 
stable while their social function changes. As Kamenka puts it, Renner looks at "the 
remarkable persistence of certain basic legal norms and institutions over time through 
fundamental social and economic change" (1983: 60). In The Institutions, Renner argues 
that legal norms are neutral and relatively stable, but that they "perform different social 
functions according to the mode of production in which they were serving a function" 
(Bottomore 1983: 275). He analyses the functional transformation of the property norm to 
illustrate this thesis. He claims that while the property norm that existed in societies of 
simple commodity production still exists in capitalism, its function has dramatically 
changed. The norm formerly buttressed the system whereby the peasant or artisan owned 
the means of production; in such a system his possessions, such as his tools, safeguarded 
his livelihood. In capitalism, the property norm, in itself largely unchanged, supports an 
economic system where the worker does not own the means of production, and the 
product that he produces is owned by another (Renner 1949: Ch 2). Thus in the legal 
sphere, changes do not occur at the level of legal norms, which are relatively fast and 
unwavering. Instead, the connections between the norms are rearranged, and subsidiary 
norms are brought to the fore (Kamenka 1983: 64). 
Renner is able to deploy this theory because, in his view, legal institutions are neutral and 
detached; "the legal norm is indifferent to its social function, the economic effect 
3 Other important factors include the extension of credit and loan facilities, and the growth of co- 
operatives. For Renner, all are evidence of the increasing rationalisation of social production 
(Kinsey 1983: 28). 
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extraneous to the definition of a legal concept" (Kahn-Freund 1949: 2). This highly formal, 
positivist view of law places Renner at a considerable distance from the Marxists we have 
already encountered. For them, legal institutions are never neutral, for they always 
inherently favour the ruling class. For Engels this is because law directly reflects the mode 
of production that privileges a particular class, while for Lenin, law is the active creation of 
the ruling class and so is the very antithesis of neutrality. Renner instead sees the 
imperative form of law as neither inherently capitalist nor socialist, but as an empty form 
only given content and meaning in application. Law is an instrument, as Lenin held, but it 
is an instrument at the disposal of society as legislator, rather than just one particular 
historical class bloc (Kinsey 1983: 21-2). 
Renner suggests that law's most general role is to "hold [... ] together and to stabilise" the 
economic base. Indeed, the "existence of society as it is, depends on and presupposes a 
determined, historically conditioned, legal order" (Renner 1949: 252). This buttresses the 
argument that law is a fundamental component of any society, and there is nothing to 
suggest that it will 'wither away'. As Kolakowski indicates, Renner regarded law "as a 
permanent instrument for the regulation of relations between individuals" (1978b: 51). 
Yet by holding that society is in some sense 'dependent' upon its legal order, Renner 
begins to move away from his basic position, encapsulated in his four theses. He argues 
that not only is law imperishable, but it also may have important effects upon the base: 
"Law does not create the development of capitalist economics although it may be a 
condition of it", he writes (Renner 1949: 253). In fact, Renner goes further, hinting that 
"legal concepts are part of the description of the mode of production" (Bottomore 1983: 
275). As Kamenka puts it, for Renner "the norms were part of the fundamental 
organisation and description of economic and social processes, not something to be 
derived from them" (1983: 16). This clouds the distinction between base and 
superstructure, for it suggests that law and legal norms are not exclusively a phenomenon 
of the superstructure. This appears to be inconsistent with his basic position. 
Despite this, the bulk of Renner's work does appear to be broadly consistent with more 
orthodox interpretations of the base and superstructure metaphor and law's place within it. 
For Kahn-Freund, Renner's work ultimately suggests that legislation should still not be 
thought of as a prime mover in social change. It remains, "at best, a response of the law 
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to a change which has already taken place in the womb of society" (Kahn-Freund 1949: 4). 
Such a position is in accordance with Renner's first thesis: "Fundamental changes in 
society are possible without accompanying changes in the legal system" (Renner 1949: 
252). 
Critique 
Renner's The Institutions remains "a key Marxist text" on law (Kinsey 1983: 36). Renner 
was the first Marxist to take law as his object of study, and the first of a minority who 
seriously theorise about the potential role of law in socialism. This alone makes his work, 
according to Kinsey, "of singular importance and [... ] an advance over that of Pashukanis" 
(1983: 13). Renner also usefully acknowledges the durability of some legal norms across 
very different modes of production. This theme of continuity and evolution, redolent of 
Austro-Marxism in general, is manifest in Renner's realisation that any socialist law must 
necessarily be a development of existing bourgeois Iaw. 4 
Despite this, Renner fails to provide convincing solutions to the problems of determination 
and base and superstructure. This is because notwithstanding his hostility to economic 
reductionism and crude takes on the base and superstructure metaphor, he himself is 
unable to provide superior formulations, and ultimately his attempts to escape them are 
unconvincing. Unfortunately, as Kinsey puts it, Renner "lost his way" (1983: 38). 
Renner fails to provide an adequate solution to the problem of determination. 
Furthermore, he issues a number of statements that, on the face of it, appear to be flatly 
contradictory. As shown above, Renner's position, based upon his four theses, seems to 
be that law, despite a degree of autonomy, is ultimately dependent upon the base. Renner 
provides for law's autonomy in his third thesis: "Economic change does not immediately 
and automatically bring about changes in the law" (1949: 252). This allows scope for a 
4 For a more recent contribution to the enduring but often ignored issue of socialist law, see 
Sypnowich (1990). She argues that "law is essential to socialism, not in order to abolish social 
problems for all time but to permit their resolution by a socialist citizenry who subject their world to 
constant review with the aim of ever-possible improvement" (ibid: 170-1). However, Sypnowich 
wrongly asserts that the 'withering away thesis' is a "central tenet of Marxism" (ibid: 169). This 
leads to a certain reluctance to describe herself as 'Marxist', favouring the term 'socialist' (see, for 
example, her Preface, p. vii-viii). Yet if the argument in Chapter 1 on the multifarious nature of 
Marxism is accepted, it would be more accurate to argue that the withering away thesis is a central 
tenet of some, but not all Marxisms. 
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'time lag' between economic cause and legal effect, and perhaps also for a degree of 
institutional separation from the base that allows doctrines and the like to enjoy their own 
internal history. Yet the only way this can be rendered consistent with his other theses is 
to accept that, in the last resort, law is determined by the economy. This is a broadly 
orthodox position, precisely of the type that one may not expect from an Austro-Marxist. 
Yet according to Kamenka, Renner rejected "in its crude form, the conception of an active, 
independent economic base and of a passive, dependent legal superstructure (1983: 63). 
This argument is made plausible by some other statements by Renner. For instance, he 
bluntly claims that "the relation [between the base and superstructure] is not merely one of 
cause and effect" (Renner 1949: 56). In addition, he argues that "laws are made with the 
intention of producing economic results, and as a rule they achieve this effect [... ] they 
play a part which I will call their economic function" (ibid: 56-57). This appears to run 
directly counter to his second thesis, "law does not cause economic development (ibid: 
252). 
Thus, despite his best attempts, it seems Renner did not ultimately escape economic 
reductionism. Indeed Sumner claims that Renner carried out an "economist reduction by 
limiting the origin of law to economic relations. [... He] assumed an economy- law dialectic 
which effectively excludes all else". In attempting to escape this reductionism, suggests 
Sumner, Renner "weakly points to uneven relations between the law and the economy and 
he refuses to assert a one-to-one movement or correspondence" between the two. 
Renner's view that legal institutions remain constant over time but serve different 
economic functions "tends to negate a more sympathetic reading because Renner seemed 
to think that he had avoided economism by allowing for a time gap between economic 
origin and economic function" (Sumner 1979: 248). 
If Sumner is correct, then it seems that all Renner provides is a slightly more sophisticated 
variant of the crude economic determination thesis. At no point does Renner suggest that 
it is something other than the economy, such as politics, that determines law, nor does he 
sufficiently develop his idea that law can have its own effects upon the economy. There is 
potential space for human intervention in Renner's theory; the economy may determine 
the function of the norm but the actual content of individual pieces of legislation is, 
presumably, still a human creation. However, this is not something that Renner devotes 
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any time to. Presumably any conscious action would still need to be finely calibrated by 
the economy otherwise humans would be able to undermine the norms' function. 
Furthermore, Renner does not theorise the role of active human intervention in the 
process of changing the function of norms; this is something that seems to occur 
automatically as part of a superstructural realignment to changed economic conditions. 
Despite himself; Renner proffers an "essentially Bukharinist, mechanical materialism" 
(Sumner 1979: 256), susceptible to the same kinds of criticism that have already been 
levelled at such approaches. 5 
Similarly, although Renner's attempted rejection of crude economist Marxism promises to 
yield a more plausible response to the problem of base and superstructure than that 
provided by Engels and Lenin, ultimately he leaves more questions unanswered. 
Renner's suggestion that law actually forms part of the base of society provided a timely 
acknowledgement of the complexity of real-life social formations which, as Plamenatz 
(1963: 281-3) and others point out, cannot be simply divided into basic and superstructural 
elements. However, Renner fails to reconcile this acknowledgement with his triple 
insistence that fundamental changes in society are possible without accompanying 
changes in the legal system, that law does not cause economic development, and that 
economic change does not immediately and automatically bring about changes in the law. 
If law really is part of the base of society, then Renner must explain more carefully why law 
cannot cause economic development and why economic changes do not necessitate legal 
ones. In short, he does not render compatible his acknowledgement of law's place in the 
base with his maintenance that the economy is ultimately determining element in society. 
It seems that Renner is caught between two extremes. On the one hand he adheres to 
the typically Austro-Marxist denial of the crude base and superstructure metaphor. Yet on 
the other, he conforms to a Marxism which holds that the relations of production are the 
fundamental and determining element in society and can be analytically separated from 
the determined superstructural elements. His theory usefully directs attention to the 
complex nature of social reality, but in his drive to avoid the crude orthodox base and 
superstructure metaphor he fails to reconcile this complexity with a clear picture of the 
position, causes and effects of law. 
5 See Chapter 2 above. 
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There are a number of other criticisms that can be levelled at Renner's theory. Crucially, it 
is not what one might call a 'general theory' of law. Instead, Renner's focus is very 
narrow. He is concerned only with the continuity of legal concepts across different modes 
of production. Even then his analysis covers only the transition from 'simple commodity 
production' to factory based capitalism. Furthermore, as the title of his book suggests, 
Renner examines only the institutions of 'private law' such as property ownership and 
contracts; "public law, which includes the organisation of the state and of local government 
bodies is outside the purview of his analysis" (Kahn-Freund 1949: 1). Indeed, Sumner 
criticises Renner for treating public law as an "afterthought" (1979: 248). Renner's theory 
seems to imply that private law is a reflection of the economy whilst public law is a 
reflection of politics and culture. Sumner argues that it is simply not possible to conceive 
of public law as a pure and uncomplicated result of the state's expansion during the 20th 
century (ibid: 253). 
One must therefore be cautious when trying to apply Renner's results in a more general 
fashion. Renner himself acknowledges that he leaves many pertinent questions 
unanswered (Renner 1949: 299). For instance, due to his focus on the process of 
functional change, he completely ignores the question of how legal norms emerge in the 
first place. This is something of a lacuna in his theory. Renner also fails to specify the 
connection between legal form and content. His focus on general norms and their 
changing functions fails to illuminate individual pieces of legislation. A more finely grained 
theory must be able to incorporate the political and ideological factors that shape such 
legislation (Spitzer 1983: 100). In addition there is no consideration of whether and how 
norms themselves may change if the law changes its functions, or if norms are in fact 
"indestructible, eternal, changeless" (Renner 1949: 299). 
There are also difficulties with his analysis of Joint Stock Companies and his view of them 
as the harbinger of social change. For Renner, their mix of private production without 
private property heralded the end of capitalism. But Joint Stock Companies merely 
release production from the control of private property in the market. The aim of their 
production is that of all capitalist production: the creation of a surplus. Indeed, Joint Stock 
Companies actually aided the expansion of capitalism. Combined with other measures 
such as the extension of credit, it allowed production to continue uninterrupted without the 
need to wait for surplus value to be realised in the market before the next cycle could 
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begin (Kinsey 1983: 31-3). Yet because Renner adopts the basic concepts of Austro- 
Marxism, he focuses on the relation between individual wills rather than the social relation 
between class forces. Hence he reduces the problem to one of the power of the individual 
capitalist, and seriously misreads the potential of the Joint Stock Company. 6 
Another more general difficulty with Renner's work is its idealist undertones. As Kinsey 
points out, there is a significant difference between Marx's and Renner's concepts of 
'socialised man': "For Marx 'socialised man' refers to a potential condition which is to be 
actualised in socialism, whilst Renner is referring to an actual condition which is to be, and 
now can be realised cognitively". For Marx, this condition could only be achieved through 
actual class struggles and conflict. Yet for Renner, socialism seems to be a condition of 
pure knowledge, to be achieved through critical reflection (Kinsey 1983: 24). Socialism is 
thus a cognitive phenomenon; it is the move from partial understanding to science and 
fully conscious regulation. The implicit influence of Hegelian idealism is clear; Renner's is 
an idealist history. 
Evgeny Pashukanis 
Context 
Engels, Lenin, and Renner have all provided ample demonstration of the notion that theory 
is always indissolubly tied up with the socio-political conditions of the theoriser. The 
Bolshevik jurist Evgeny Pashukanis provides an even starker illustration of this idea. His 
theoretical work, as well as his professional practice and teaching, are all' intrinsically 
bound together with each other, and with the extraordinary socio-political context he found 
himself working in. Ultimately, his theory led to his death; rarely has Marxist jurisprudence 
had such profound consequences. 
Pashukanis was the first Marxist to outline a systematic and comprehensive theory of law. 
As an orthodox Bolshevik, he was determined to speed the progress of the revolution that 
had been set in motion in spectacular fashion in 1917. Having seized power, the task for 
the Bolsheviks was to fulfil their historical mission and rapidly usher in a fully-blown 
6 Marx's own understanding of Joint Stock Companies is at best ambiguous" (Neocleous 2004: 
158). In Volume 1 of Capital, Marx saw Joint Stock Companies as aiding the process of capitalist 
centralisation (Marx 1954: 588). However, by Volume 3, he takes a line closer to that of Renner's. 
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communism. Pashukanis' work represented the legal aspect of this process. He had 
emerged as the pre-eminent jurist in Russia on the basis of his celebrated General Theory 
of Law and Marxism, and also because he lined up against Trotsky's 'left opposition' as 
early as 1925, just after Stalin completed his de facto rise to power (Head 2004: 269). ' 
Pashukanis was a staunch critic of Renner. 8 For Pashukanis, Renner's great flaw was that 
he failed to see the bourgeois form of law as problematic. " Pashukanis saw law as an 
inherently bourgeois form, and therefore of little use to the burgeoning socialist society. 
This theoretical difference can, in part, be explained by the very different socio-political 
conditions each was working in. Renner's SPO had taken power in Austria electorally, and 
so it seemed that socialism could be attained peacefully. If the ballot box had proved 
useful to the movement, then there was no reason to suppose that other bourgeois 
institutions, such as law, could not be put to the same use. In Russia, meanwhile, power 
had been taken through the revolution. In the heady days of the early 1920s, society 
seemed a blank canvas. The old institutions and privileges had to be forcibly swept away; 
new and uniquely socialist ones were required to take their place. As such, Pashukanis 
was hostile to law, the bourgeois institution par excellence. He thus worked up in a more 
systematic manner the withering away thesis of Engels and Lenin. As Sumner puts it, 
"Pashukanis' position was no more than a sound reflection of his social circumstances" 
(1979: 2511). 10 
On Pashukanis' life prior to his rise to fame, see Head (2004: 274) 
8 Pashukanis refers to Renner as 'Karner'. This was a pseudonym Renner adopted when working 
as a public servant in the Austrian Parliament as a librarian (Kamenka 1983: 61). Early editions of 
The Institutions... carried the pseudonym. 
s Pashukanis also criticised Kelsen, another whom he saw as bourgeois. Kelsen worked from an 
abstract notion of law; Pashukanis instead proceeds from "actually existing law", from the abstract 
to the concrete, in the style of Marx in the Grundrisse (Mieville 2006: 79). 
10 Pashukanis' work was also "in accordance with the interpretation of Marx advanced at the time by 
Lukacs and Korsch" (Kolakowski 1978: 51). Lukacs elevated Hegel "to an absolutely dominant 
position in the pre-history of Marx's thought" (Anderson 1976: 61). In his 1923 work History and 
Class Consciousness (Lukacs 1971), Lukacs outlines his basic thesis that the proletariat is the 
'identical subject- object of history', a position derived from Hegel. This allowed Lukacs to overcome 
"the problem of the social relativity of knowledge" (Anderson 1976: 61). Having done so, he was 
able to assert that once 'alienation', the objectification of human activities, had been abolished 
through a socialist revolution, the working class would be free to attain true consciousness. 
66 
Theory 
Before Pashukanis' emergence as the doyen of Soviet legal philosophy, his 
contemporaries had tended to follow a line close to that of Lenin. Stuchka, for instance, 
the founder of Soviet Marxist legal philosophy, was the leading voice in this somewhat 
crowded field during the early 1920s. " He saw law as an instrument of class struggle, 
which is necessary only in societies where class struggle exists in order to suppress the 
resistance of subordinate classes. Consequently, in a classless society, where class 
antagonisms have ceased to exist, there is no need for law (Kolakowski 1978b: 51). 
Pashukanis was a pupil of Stuchka, but his theory of law, as set out in the General Theory, 
led to him "eclipsing even his juridical mentor" (Beirne and Sharlet 1980: 4). 
Warrington notes that the General Theory, which was first published in 1924, was only 
intended to be the first draft of a more definitive work that, in the event, never arrived 
(1983: 44). Head describes it as an "outline" written for "self-clarification" (2004: 275). 
Nevertheless, its impact was immense. Pashukanis provides "a theory of the historical 
specificity of the legal form" (Beirne and Sharlet 1980: 5). The work is concerned to 
identify the differentia specifica of law; Pashukanis outlines "what distinguishes law from 
other social manifestations, particularly from other bodies of rules or commands. The 
difference, according to Pashukanis, does not lie in the source or function of law, but in its 
form" (Kamenka 1983: 59). 
Pashukanis argues that the juridical element in human conduct enters where the isolation 
and opposition of interests begins" (Arthur 1978: 13). This isolation and opposition of 
interests enables the growth of capitalist society based upon commodity exchanges, 
where each agent in the exchange is an owner of private property and is formally equal to 
the other agent.. Indeed, "commodity exchange presupposes an atomised economy" 
(Pashukanis 1978: 85). As the system of commodity exchange emerges, isolated man 
comes to be seen as an individual legal personality, a bearer of rights. Law involves the 
mutual recognition of those rights, no more, no less. The law regulates exchanges 
between autonomous individuals, crucially the exchange of property rights in the market. 12 
" Other lesser-known Soviet Marxist legal theoreticians of the period include Adoratsky, Reisner, 
and Krylenko. 
12 Head notes that Pashukanis, in his chapter on 'Law and Morality' (1978: Ch 6), outlines "an 
underlying relationship between commodity exchange and capitalist morality based on the ethical 
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At the heart of Pashukanis' perspective, which came to be known as the 'commodity 
exchange' theory of law, is the assertion that law is the "product of fetishistic social 
relationships and therefore [... ] is a historical manifestation of the age of commercial 
production" (Kolakowski 1978b: 50). As Mieville indicates, "the legal form is the necessary 
form taken by the relation between these formally equal owners of exchange values" 
(2006: 78). This position is considerably different to the position of Lenin. As we saw in 
the last chapter, he holds that law is a 'tool' of the ruling class, used to help maintain their 
dominant position in the social order. However, the influence of Engels on Pashukanis is 
plain. Pashukanis essentially conceptualises law as the reflection of commodity 
exchanges that occur in the economic base; law reflects the very relations that are the 
stuff of capitalism. 
Nevertheless, Pashukanis does introduce an element of class conflict into his theory by 
outlining how law helps to ensure the dominance of the ruling class. The state, which 
stands above each individual wage labourer and capitalist, does not force the labourer to 
work for a particular employer, or endorse the relationship of exploitation. Instead the 
employment (and exploitative) relationship is established through a formally 'free' contract 
between two autonomous commodity owners, the labourer's commodity being his labour 
power. As Mieville puts it, "in its very neutrality, law maintains capitalist relations. Law is 
class law, and cannot but be so" (2006: 101). This supposed neutrality is personified by 
the state: "class authority must take the form of a public authority which guarantees 
contracts in general" (Arthur 1978: 17). Hence, the class nature of the state and of the law 
is concealed (Pashukanis 1978: Ch 5). 
Pashukanis also contends that law has extended its role from that of regulating trade to 
regulating "other types of personal relationship" (Kolakowski 1978b: 50). He intends to 
demonstrate that his commodity exchange theory is applicable to all types of law, not just 
the law concerned with exchange. It was on this point that critics and more moderate 
members of the commodity exchange school dissented, with Stuchka leading the criticism. 
They felt that Pashukanis extended his theory beyond breaking point. However 
Pashukanis maintains that, for example, 'criminal law' does not start from the violation of a 
idea of the equal worth of human personalities" (2004: 282). This is an interesting precursor to the 
work of Taiwo (1996). 
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norm established by the state, but from the damage suffered by the injured party. Hence, 
in the criminal trial, "the public prosecutor demands, as befits a 'party', a 'high' price, that is 
to say a severe sentence. The offender pleads for leniency, for a 'discount', and the courts 
pass sentence 'in equity'. If one were to reject this form of transaction completely, one 
would deprive criminal proceedings of their 'juridical soul'" (Pashukanis 1978: 177). 
The best-known facet of Pashukanis' work is his defence of the 'withering away' thesis. 
For Sugarman, Pashukanis' "overwhelming theoretical commitment" to this thesis marks it 
out as "the cornerstone of his jurisprudence" (1983a: 4). The withering away thesis 
dovetails neatly with Pashukanis' insistence that law is the codification of the relationship 
between commodity owners. If law is the institution that regulates the relations between 
commodity owners in the marketplace, then when such relations no longer exist, it follows 
logically that law too will disappear. As Pashukanis puts it, the "immortality of the legal 
form" is a fallacy, as law is the result of "particular historical conditions which had helped to 
bring it to full fruition". Therefore, the "withering away of the categories of bourgeois law 
will [... ] mean the withering away of law altogether, that is to say the disappearance of the 
juridical factor from social relations" (Pashukanis 1978: 61). 
Pashukanis also draws a distinction between legal regulation and what he dubs 'technical' 
regulation. He famously classifies train timetables as belonging to the latter category 
(Pashukanis 1978: 79). This is because train timetables lack the crucial element that 
makes legal regulation legal; the opposition of private interests. Train timetables cannot 
be legal, for, as Pashukanis puts it, "a basic prerequisite for legal regulation [... ] is the 
conflict of private interests" (ibid: 81). Technical regulation, on the other hand, has a 
"singleness of purpose", and all concerned parties "are interested in the smooth running of 
the service" (Arthur 1978: 15). Another example of non-legal regulation is suggested by 
Kamenka. He talks, of the rules and regulations of the army. They cannot be legal under 
Pashukanis' scheme because they are based upon relations of domination and 
submission, and rely upon obedience to rules, rather than the opposition of private 
interests (1983: 56). 
Pashukanis' withering away thesis can be said to be a jurisprudential expression of 
Lukacs' core ideas. Pashukanis sees law as buttressing the "fetishistic character of 
personal relations in a society dominated by commodity exchange". Given this, it follows 
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that once "social life returns to its unmediated form", human beings will no longer conduct 
their relationships through abstract legal rules (Kolakowski 1978: 51). Hence the 
attainment of true consciousness (Lukacs) goes hand in hand with the end of law 
(Pashukanis). 13 
Critique 
A number of criticisms have been levelled at Pashukanis' theory. For instance, Warrington 
suggests, inter alia, that Pashukanis 'over-extends' the commodity exchange theory of law, 
applying it to areas that it cannot explain such as criminal law (1983: 62). Von Arx argues 
that the commodity form theory, although it may have had explanatory power in 
Pashukanis' day, no longer provides a convincing picture of the legal form, given 
developments over the 20th century such as transformation of the legal subject in private 
law (1997: 203, quoted in Mieville 2006: 102). As Hunt points out, it is "simply wrong to 
contend that the legal form [today] restricts recognition to atomised economic agents" 
(1992: 116). Gregory feels that the incredible growth of administrative or public law 
undermines Pashukanis' theory (1979: 141); in seeing law as exclusively based on 
commodity exchange, Pashukanis' theory is blind to the growth of administrative law, or at 
least it cannot grant it the status of law, something which seems counter-intuitive. 
In addition, Pashukanis' withering away thesis is problematic. Just as it did for Engels and 
Lenin, the entire thesis rests upon a narrow definition of law. Of course, Pashukanis is 
perfectly entitled to define law in whichever way he pleases. But in defining it solely as the 
codification of commodity exchanges in the base, it becomes more difficult to account for 
phenomena that most would consider to be law. For instance, victimless crimes, such as 
the taking of soft drugs, cannot be explained by the mutual recognition of rights thesis. 
Instead, in such crimes, sanctions are imposed because the offender "has violated the 
established norms in the community which must be upheld in order to deter other 
disruptions to the social order" (Collins 1982: 109). This is not to suggest that 
conventional understandings are necessarily correct, but Pashukanis defines out of the 
13 The introduction of Hegelian categories into interpretations of Marx has always been 
controversial. Those who have done so, particularly Lukacs, Korsch and Marcuse, have claimed 
legitimacy from Marx's early works, particularly the 1844 'Paris Manuscripts'. Della Volpe and his 
followers, most notably Colletti, and the Althusserian school have been the most trenchant critics of 
this trend. See Anderson (1976: Ch 3). 
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category 'law' a great many things that would ordinarily be considered to fall within it. His 
narrow definition also forces him to create another category to cover those norms that will 
not perish in the transition to communism. This is his category of 'technical regulation'. 14 
On the basis of other, more commonly accepted definitions, these too would be classed as 
law. An uncharitable and unsympathetic critic may well wonder whether Pashukanis' 
insistence on such a narrow concept of law is a definitional fiat designed to sustain the 
withering away thesis. 
There are two further powerful criticisms of Pashukanis' work. They are, firstly, that he 
focuses on exchange at the expense of production and thus misses the thrust of Marx's 
critique of capitalism, and secondly, that there is no space in his theory for politics. 
For Head, the "real problem" with Pashukanis is his focus on exchange rather than 
production. This is because the source of surplus value, the existence of which is 
necessary for the successful continuation of capitalism, is not to be found in exchange, but 
in production; "therefore, the essential role of law must relate to the extraction of surplus 
value in the production process" (2004: 290). Warrington concurs, arguing that 
"Pashukanis appears to have written production out of the law", concentrating instead on 
exchange (1983: 53). 15 Furthermore, Warrington suggests that Pashukanis "severely 
misreads Marx's economics", focussing narrowly on just the opening sections of Capital, 
and taking these to constitute the entirety of Marx's economic theory (1983: 56-57). In 
these sections Marx did indeed focus on commodity exchange, but elsewhere he analyses 
the production process itself. It is through this process, not through exchange, that labour 
power reproduces itself and creates the all-important surplus. Volumes 2 and 3 of Capital 
then go on to consider the circulation and distribution of this surplus. This is ignored by 
Pashukanis, and the centrepiece of Marx's economics, the production of surplus, does not 
figure in his theory (Warrington 1983: 57). 16 
14 Pashukanis' 'technical regulation' is analogous to Engels' category of 'administration' and Lenin's 
'elementary rules of social intercourse', which were also utilised in order to cover the norms and 
rules required by communist society. 
15 In a similar vein to Von Arx's criticism above, Warrington adds that Pashukanis ignores the 
process of transformation that commodity production undergoes in the development of the modern 
world. His theory is only applicable to petty commodity production (1983: 53-4). 
16 The futility of attempting to outline a 'correct' reading of Marx has already been noted. Even if 
such a reading was possible, it would not automatically produce a coherent and comprehensive 
theory of any field, let alone law. Nevertheless, the argument is that Pashukanis' own selections 
and interpretations render his theory hopelessly flawed. 
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The second major criticism of Pashukanis is that he leaves no room open for politics. The 
actual processes of creating law seem to be written out of his theory. As Kamenka notes, 
Bolshevik propagandists who saw law as a "hypocritical cloak for bourgeois interests" were 
critical of Pashukanis' theory. More sincere critics felt he "minimised the normative 
element in law and ignored the ideological interests enshrined in specific legislation" 
(1983: 59). Pashukanis' one-time mentor Stuchka was one such critic. He was concerned 
about the absence of any notion of coercion in Pashukanis' theory. As we have already 
seen, the idea that law is a weapon in the hands of the ruling class is not an entirely 
helpful one, but nevertheless many Marxists feel that Pashukanis fails to understand the 
reality of law as an instrumental tool at the disposal of the ruling class. For such critics, 
some notion of law as part of the means of ruling class control ought to be incorporated in 
Marxist legal theory. 
In a recent work, China Mieville deals successfully with these and other objections to 
Pashukanis' theory. " In particular, his response to the critics who castigate Pashukanis 
for focusing on exchange at the expense of production, and who claim that his theory 
leaves no room for politics are largely successful. In addition, they provide a useful optic 
through which to view Pashukanis' solutions to the problems of base and superstructure 
and determination. 
Mieville suggests that Pashukanis' concentration on circulation and exchange at the 
expense of production is not problematic. In outlining why this is the case, he also offers a 
promising solution to the problem of base and superstructure. Mieville notes the confusion 
that has arisen over whether Pashukanis felt that law was part of the base (2006: 86-7). 18 
He argues, convincingly, that Pashukanis did hold that law is a part of the base. The 
problem is that Pashukanis' law is based on exchange relations rather than productive 
17 Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (2006). See particularly pages 101- 
115 for Mieville's counters to Pashukanis' critics. Mieville's is not an uncritical acceptance of 
Pashukanis' theory, however. He demonstrates where the commodity exchange perspective needs 
extension or reconstruction, and offers criticism where necessary. For instance, he argues that 
Pashukanis' concept of technical regulation would be "excessively bureaucratic, and has no 
mechanism for dealing with continued conflict under socialism" (2006: 99-100). 
18 Mieville (2006: 89-90) cites the work of Binns (1980), who criticises Pashukanis for asserting that 
law is part of the base, and Warrington (1981), Eldred (1984) and Taiwo (1996) who disagree. See 
also Kinsey, an adherent of Pashukanis' commodity exchange theory. He rejects the base and 
superstructure metaphor in its entirety", and holds that legal relations are intrinsic to the economic 
order of capitalism (1978: 202-205). 
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relations. This raises an obvious question: How can a phenomenon based on relations of 
exchange rather than relations of production be fundamental to the Marxist scheme? 
Mieville suggests that social relations of production only become penetrated by economic 
and juridical aspects-at a certain stage of development. This is the capitalist stage, the 
stage of generalised commodity exchange, where the overwhelming majority of production 
is production for exchange. Indeed, at this stage production actually becomes dependent 
upon exchange, for a market for its products and for the ability to purchase worker-owned 
labour power, without which the entire system of production would grind to a halt. To 
exploit labour, capitalists rely on exchange in the market rather than legal or physical 
coercion. Exchange relations thus become part of the base under the capitalist mode of 
production. Hence the legal form too is part of the base (Mieville 2006: 93-5). 
Mieville concedes that at various points in the General Theory Pashukanis appears to be 
arguing that law is superstructural. But the component of law that is superstructural, 
according to Mieville, is not the legal form itself, but the actual legal content; such content 
is the superstructural mechanism through which the legal form makes itself visible. "The 
various particular mechanisms by which the legal form is actualised in various historical 
conjunctures are superstructural", writes Mieville, and these may include pieces of 
legislation, or courts, trials and the like; "so, the legal form is of the base, and it actualises 
through the necessary particularities of the legal superstructure". In sum, those relations 
directly connected with production (the legal form) are part of the base, while those not 
directly connected with production (particular legal proceedings) are superstructural. 
"'Law' is a complex of social relations, norms, rules and formal proceedings which, under 
capitalism, straddles both levels of society" (Mieville 2006: 95-6). 
For the first time we have a solution to the problem of base and superstructure that 
acknowledges the central role that law plays in capitalist society, yet does not waver from 
the line of the Preface that suggests that it is the relations of production that are the key to 
sociological understanding. Mieville's work is singularly important in bringing out what is 
latent in Pashukanis' theory. Not only does he convincingly rebut the critics who find 
Pashukanis' focus on exchange problematic, but he offers a sophisticated and plausible 
solution to the problem of base and superstructure. 
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Mieville's response to the critics who argue that Pashukanis' theory leaves no room for 
politics is also a successful one. Yet it also highlights the real lacuna of Pashukanis' 
theory; this is its failure to successfully meet the challenge posed by the problem of 
determination. 
According to Mieville there are a number of ways in which Pashukanis' theory leaves room 
for politics. Firstly, Mieville maintains with Pashukanis that the legal form is derived form 
exchange relations. Yet he adds that the form of law should be differentiated from its 
content; norms, rules, regulations and the like may well manifest class relations of 
production. All the actual form of law itself does is reflect exchange relations. Class 
exploitation is an extra-legal fact and within the form prescribed by the exchange relations 
there is scope for struggle over the actual content of norms (Mieville 2006: 91-3). This 
suggests that Pashukanis' theory does incorporate space for politics. Secondly, this space 
is also provided by Pashukanis' notion of 'technical regulation', or what Mieville calls 
'administration'. Mieville points to administrative law which does not seem, on the face of 
it, to belong to the genus 'law' according to Pashukanis' scheme. Yet Mieville proposes 
that it can be considered to be law, if not in its purest sense. Administrative law is derived 
from the commodity form of law, and it plugs the gaps left by the abstract nature of 
commodity exchange law; it is necessarily particularistic and political as it deals with 
problems at the micro-level that cannot be dealt with by the broad, overarching categories 
of commodity exchange law (Mieville 2006: 103-111). 
Yet there is another, even more central reason why Pashukanis' theory leaves open room 
for politics. Pashukanis insisted that the content of legal norms should not be fetishised. 
For him, it was the form of law that was all important. Analysis of law's content is useful, 
but privileging such analysis can lead to a "nebulous left functionalism" (Mieville 2006: 
118), where all is assumed to correspond to the needs of the ruling class. Yet Pashukanis 
himself did not outline with any precision the relationship between form and content. 
Mieville argues that his theory does provide the means to deal with this, however. 
Pashukanis' theory can be read in a way that suggests form and content should not be 
looked at in isolation; it is the very form of law that supports capitalist domination, but 
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within that the powerful can and do utilise law for their own ends, and weaker parties can 
and do resist such uses (Mieville 2006: 117-21). 19 
As shown above, Mieville's defence of Pashukanis' focus on exchange yields a plausible 
solution to the problem of base and superstructure. His defence of Pashukanis' theory 
and its implications for politics is also a sturdy one. However, it highlights the limitations of 
Pashukanis' theory when confronted with the problem of determination. On the face of it, 
Pashukanis' solution to this problem is little different to that of Engels'. The form of law is 
seen as determined by economic relations. Law is thus the reflection or the expression of 
commodity exchange; this is very much a crude materialist theory of law. Law is seen to 
spring, fully formed, from the economic base of society and always functionally 
corresponds to the base. The critique of Engels in the previous chapter outlined the 
problems inherent in the crude materialist approach. For all its nuances, Pashukanis' 
commodity exchange theory of law cannot escape these reductionist moorings, and, inter 
alia, it cannot convincingly account for the role of conscious human action in shaping law 
and legal systems. 
Mieville's reading of Pashukanis does successfully avoid the worst vices of reductionism, 
where potentially the entire institution of law, both its form and its content, is determined 
rigidly and automatically by the 'base'. He points out where Pashukanis leaves space for 
the operation of politics in law. However, Mieville is concerned primarily to develop a 
theory of international law, and one is forced to wonder how far the theory so developed is 
applicable to domestic law. International law is presented as the ideal type of law by virtue 
of the fact that it lacks an overarching sovereign power. But what does this mean for other 
forms of law, for instance domestic law? What is its status? Is it somehow a lesser form of 
law? Is it even law in Mieville's sense? It is here that the active intervention of human 
19 On this basis Mieville takes Pashukanis' basic argument that law is the relation that inheres 
between the owners of commodities, those 'sovereign, formally equal individuals' who meet in the 
capitalist marketplace to partake in exchange, and applies it to international law. The relationship 
between states, he argues, is analogous to that between commodity owners in the marketplace. 
States face each other as property owners, each with exclusive ownership of their territories. 
Furthermore, there is no overarching institution to act as an arbiter in cases of dispute. Thus, 
despite the fact that both states in a dispute enter that dispute as formal equals, the interpretation of 
law that will be triumphant is inevitably that of the stronger party. For Mieville, this constitutes the 
great paradox of international law: 'it is simultaneously a genuine relation between equals, and a 
form that the weaker states cannot hope to win. That [... ] is the meaning of Marx's words that 
"between equal rights, force decides(2006: 142). Thus, law is neither the opposite of force or a 
check on force. Instead, it is recast as force. Just as commodity exchange conceals class relations, 
so international law conceals power relations between formally equal states. 
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beings in designing institutional apparatus needs to be theorised. This is the lacuna of the 
commodity exchange theory. Pashukanis also fails to tell us why certain classes, in filling 
the empty form of law with its content, are attracted to certain ideas and have an 
understanding, however imperfect, of their needs and interests. Why is the content of law 
as it is? Of course these questions are way beyond the scope of Mieville's book, which by 
its own admission is concerned only with public international law. Thus he should not be 
criticised for not addressing such questions, but they lie tantalisingly in the background. 20 
The Influence of Renner and Pashukanis 
Given that law was the focus of Renner and Pashukanis' analysis, it is hardly surprising 
that they provide a more sophisticated and nuanced jurisprudence than Engels and Lenin. 
Indeed, Hunt suggests that Renner and Pashukanis "may be treated as signposts" in the 
construction of a Marxist theory of law. However, he adds that caution must be exercised 
when utilising their work for this purpose, for it is not certain "whether they point in the right 
or even a hopeful direction" (1981: 92). 
Renner's work only began to exert a real influence on Marxist jurisprudence in the 1970s, 
when a resurgence of interest in the subject occurred. McManus, for instance, argues that 
the ability of legal norms to remain stable while their social function changes, a 
phenomenon he describes as law's elasticity, allows the holders of power to refrain from 
over-intervention. This preserves law's autonomous image. Instead, the powerful can 
achieve their goals through the renegotiation of existing legal forms. In this way 
legislations' real relationship to power is concealed. Indeed, "resort to legislation may be 
atypical" (1978: 201). 21 More recently, Renner's arguments for law playing a central role in 
socialism have been taken up by, among others, Hunt (1992) and Sypnowich (1990). 
Renner's work certainly remains pregnant with potential and there is undoubtedly scope 
20 Kamenka is similarly appreciative of Pashukanis' achievements, though sees them in a more 
modest light than Mieville: "I interpret Pashukanis as grasping an important legal 'moment'- a 
systematic logical tendency built into the structure of law, working itself out over time. This I call the 
Gesellschaft moment- adjudicative, individualist, contractual- and I contrast it, as Pashukanis to 
some extent does, with other 'moments' that can be or have been called part of law- the 
gemeinschaft moment and the bureaucratic -administrative moment. " Any legal system is a mix of 
all three (Kamenka 1983: 59). Similarly, Stone maintains that "one need not accept his commodity 
form theory of law to accept its insights into the legal subject, individual responsibility and the 
structure of the legal system generally" (1985: 42). 
21 McManus attempts to demonstrate his theory through an analysis of hire-purchase legislation. 
(1978: 185-201). 
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for it to be developed and extended. Even so, this would be no small task; it would require 
a systematic but careful renovation, of the type Mieville provides for Pashukanis. As it 
stands, Renner's work does not provide the answers to the two problems of concern here. 
Pashukanis' influence in his homeland in the wake of his General Theory was massive, 
and unique among Marxist legal scholars. As a Vice-Commissar of Justice, and aided by 
his colleagues and followers at Moscow State University, he began devising draft criminal 
codes to replace the legal codes of the New Economic Policy with "shorter, simpler 
models". He reasoned that if bourgeois law "could be gradually thinned out, the ground 
could eventually be cleared, with the remaining legal structures becoming increasingly 
superfluous and falling into disuse towards that time when they would eventually be razed" 
(Beirne and Sharlet 1980: 24-5). None of these draft codes was ever taken up. 
Nevertheless, students in the law schools were instructed to write essays on the 
pointlessness of their studies; an atmosphere of "disarray" prevailed (Warrington 1983: 
43). 
However, by 1930 the commodity exchange perspective and its accompanying withering 
away thesis stood in marked opposition to official Soviet policy. The processes of large 
scale industrialisation and collectivisation made a collision inevitable, "as it became 
apparent that the intervention and active support of strong and stable legal and political 
systems would be necessary in the USSR" (Beirne and Sharlet 1980: 26). Indeed, the 
concept of the gradual withering away of law and state was explicitly rejected by Stalin at 
the 16th Party Congress in 1930 (Hazard 1951: 234). fl As Pashukanis called into question 
the survival of law in a truly communist system, he therefore simultaneously cast doubt on 
the communist credentials of his homeland. Such dissent was not to be tolerated in 
Stalin's Russia. Criticism of Pashukanis grew, although most opponents did not genuinely 
engage with his theory, instead wisely contenting themselves with simple restatements the 
new Soviet orthodoxy (Warrington 1983: 64). In response to this, Pashukanis began to 
modify his theory, primarily by asserting that law is not simply reducible to economic 
relationships. 
22 See Head (2001) on the Soviet Union's steady move away from the position that law would 
eventually be dispensed with, culminating in the announcement at the 16th Party Congress. 
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The first 'correction' to the General Theory was issued as early as 1927. Responding to 
Stuckha, Pashukanis conceded that Soviet law was not simply residual bourgeois law, and 
agreed that it could serve socialist purposes and aid the transition to communism (Head 
2004: 270). In 1932, he redefined law as "the form of regulation and consolidation of 
production relationships and also of other relationships of class society' (Pashukanis 1980: 
287 [italics added]). The great thrust of Pashukanis' General Theory is thus lost at a 
stroke. Of course, it is not clear how much ground Pashukanis conceded simply in order 
to protect his position at the Moscow Institute of Soviet Law, and indeed his own safety. 23 
Regardless, his efforts in this regard proved fruitless. Although Stalin ordered Pashukanis 
to work on the 1936 constitution (Head 2004: 271), in January 1937 he was arrested as 
part of the infamous Vyshinski purges 24 "as a symbol of the defeated revolution of the law" 
(Beirne and Sharlet 1980: 32). He was shot without trial (Head 2004: 275). 
There were calls for Pashukanis' rehabilitation at the 20th Party Congress of 1956, and 
although it was recognised that he was "unjustly condemned for sabotage" (Arthur 1978: 
10), the official opposition to his theory remained until the USSR collapsed. However, 
McCoubrey and White point out that that following Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev 
moved some way towards renewing the withering away theory in practice. After the 22nd 
Party Congress in 1961 "there was some movement towards less formal proceedings in 
minor cases before 'comrades' courts' and the use in minor criminal cases of techniques of 
shaming". This move toward communal dispute resolution never occurred on a large 
scale, however (1999: 130). 
In the 1970s, Marxists in the capitalist world began to return to Pashukanis' theory. 2,5 As a 
result of his 'liquidation' by Stalin in 1937, Pashukanis' ideas were effectively hidden from 
view for many years. Their reappearance formed "part of the process of recovery of the 
heritage of Bolshevik thought repressed by the Stalinist bureaucracy" (Arthur 1978: 9), and 
contributed to the growth of Marxist debate, and particularly Marxist legal debate, in the 
23 As Beirne and Quinney put it, it is "impossible to distinguish between those modifcations to his 
theory of law that he may actually have intended and those that were forced on him by a political 
climate in which personal survival became increasingly hazardous" (1982: 303). 
24 Andre Vyshinski went on to assume Pashukanis' position as the central figure of the Soviet legal 
system. His notion of 'socialist legality' which would serve the ends of the Soviet socialist state was 
the antithesis of Pashukanis' withering away thesis, and theoretically legitimised Stalin's political 
programme. 
5 Although, as Head notes, praise for Pashukanis was forthcoming in the intervening years, from 
such jurisprudential luminaries as Kelsen, Hazard and Fuller (2004: 271). 
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1970s. Pashukanis' work reverberated with many of the themes of the Althusserians. 26 
Althusserian theories of law, with their focus on the form of law, clearly belonged to the 
same tradition as Pashukanis' commodity exchange theory. Balbus (1977), Holloway and 
Picciotto (1978) and Edelman (1979) were structuralist Marxists who clearly owed a 
theoretical debt to Pashukanis. More recently, Mieville's deployment of a "Pashukanisite 
theory of international law" (2006: 77) is not only the most sophisticated reading of 
Pashukanis, but promises to renew interest in him. 
Nevertheless, many writers feel that Pashukanis, and particularly the withering away 
thesis, have had a negative impact on Marxism. - Hunt, for example, stresses that law 
should be taken seriously because it will not simply 'wither away'. This is because "any 
feasible socialism would require law", as the "complex social arrangements" that would 
constitute socialism "require- co-ordination and regulation". According to Hunt, this "should 
not be controversial" (1992: 113-4). Redhead (1982) also argues that Marxist theory 
laboured under Pashukanis' opposition to law for many years. It was only with the 
publication of EP Thompson's controversial Whigs and Hunters in 1975 that space was 
opened up within Marxism for the serious theorisation of the role of law under socialism. 
Santos has also argued for a Marxist theory of law, rather than a Marxist theory against 
law (1982: 364-6). 27 
There are clearly vast differences in the tenor and approach of Renner's and Pashukanis' 
theories. The starkest difference is in Renner's advocacy of law and Pashukanis' hostility 
to it. For our purposes, however, what is of utmost importance is Renner and Pashukanis 
fail to provide adequate solutions to the problems of determination and base and 
superstructure. Fundamentally, this is because they both place too much stress on the 
economic and subsequently there is not enough focus on human agency. One should 
also remember the non-comprehensive nature of their theories. Renner is concerned only 
with the persistence of the norms of private law, whilst Pashukanis concentrates entirely 
on law's form. Yet their theories represent clear advances over those of Engels and Lenin. 
Renner, although he ultimately failed to escape economic determinism, does at least 
acknowledge the redundancy of crude takes on the base and superstructure metaphor. 
Pashukanis, when read in conjunction with Mieville, promises to provide the foundations 
26 See Chapter 4 below. 
27 Santos' chapter appears in the same collection as Redhead's. 
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for a rigorous solution to the problem of base and superstructure. However, although he 
potentially leaves space for human intervention in the process of creating laws, nowhere is 
this expanded upon, and in any event it is secondary in his work to the notion of reflection 
in explaining the form of law. Renner and Pashukanis, then, provide useful insights and 
offer us a staging post in the quest to solve the two problems that the Preface leaves for 
Marxist legal theory. However, more work needs to be done. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE 1970s: INSTRUMENTALISM AND STRUCTURALISM 
One of the central propositions of much sociology is the portrayal of "modern Western 
societies" as "cohesive entities". Law is often seen as "expressing this cohesion and 
playing a significant part in guaranteeing it" (Cotterrell 1992: 71-2). Such themes run 
counter to some of the core notions of classical Marxism, which holds that, at root, society 
is inherently the site of conflict between classes. Given this, one may have expected the 
Marxists of the mid-20`h century to have devoted considerable energy to the study of law, 
in order to challenge the position of mainstream sociology. 
Yet this was not the case. The omission of law from the Marxist programme was 
particularly surprising as the philosophers who made up what has been dubbed `Western 
Marxism' centred their investigations on the superstructural mechanisms that had foiled 
revolution in advanced capitalist societies. Law could have formed one of the central foci 
of these investigations. Instead, "it was culture that held the central focus of its attention" 
(Anderson 1976: 4). As such, Marxist jurisprudence entered something of a fallow period 
after the murder of Pashukanis and the suppression of the commodity exchange school. 
The early theoretical work of Renner and Pashukanis was not built upon. ' 
It was not only Marxists who neglected jurisprudential questions during the immediate 
post-war years. As Cotterrell relates, "legal scholarship and education" at the end of the 
1960s was a "claustrophobic world": "Most legal study [... ] at the end of the 1960s, 
seemed to focus on technicality as an end in itself and was unconcerned with fundamental 
questions about law's nature, sources, and consequences as a social phenomenon or 
about its moral groundings. Value judgements pervading legal studies cried out for 
theoretical examination but were routinely treated as obviously correct or simply 
unrecognised. [... ] Legal study [was] confined to interpreting rules and analysing their 
logical or plausible interrelations" (2002: 633). The slowly dawning recognition of the limits 
of this mode of study led to a "deeply felt crisis" (Hunt 1980: 49). A revitalised Marxism 
' There were isolated attempts at legal study during this period. Lukacs, for instance, made 
frequent though passing references to law (see Kamenka 1987, Varga 1981,1985). From the 
Frankfurt School, Walter Benjamin suggested that the foundation of all law is force (see Mahlmann 
2003), while Otto Kirchheimer sought to establish the political nature of law in Political Justice 
(1961). Ernst Bloch, whose work represents the "most extravagant of the peripheral manifestations 
of Marxism", with its metaphysical concerns (Kolakowski 1978b: 419), attempted to combine 
Marxism with a theory of natural law. 
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greatly contributed to the easing of this crisis. It came in two forms: instrumentalism and 
structuralism. 2 
Instrumentalism 
Context 
As late as 1971, Currie could quite plausibly claim that there were "very few Marxian 
analyses in the academic -sociology of law" (1971: 137). Little did he realise that he was 
writing on the cusp of an enormous sea-change. Interest in Marxism and socio-legal 
studies was about to explode. Three central contextual factors propelled this shift. The 
first was the realisation, alluded to above, that the strictly 'black-letter' approach to law was 
severely limited. The second was increased working class unrest. The third factor, 
brought on in part by the second, was increased academic interest in Marx and Marxism. 
These factors will be dealt with in turn. 
In the legal field, as the limits of the 'black-letter' approach began to be felt more keenly, 
interest in jurisprudence flowered. However, with some notable exceptions such as 
Durkheim and Weber, traditional jurisprudence had focussed on matters such as the 
relationship between law and morality, and the delineation of a precise concept of law. 
The discipline of the sociology of law grew in response to this; Hunt calls it the "forced 
offspring of the deficiencies of sociological jurisprudence and the jurisprudential tradition in 
general" (1978: 137). The rise of socio-legal studies represented a "breakout" from the 
crisis of legal scholarship (Cotterrell 2002: 633). 
The second central contextual factor was the upsurge in working class activity of the late 
1960s and early 1970s. For a brief moment, the historical impasse that had led to 
Western Marxism appeared to be coming to an end. As Downes and Rock relate, "both 
the American 'war on poverty' and the Labour Government in Britain were seen as failing 
crucially to correct structural inequalities of class, status and power". In such a context, 
the events in Paris in May 1968 "came to symbolise the possibility of revolutionary change 
2 Gold, Lo and Wright introduced the categories of 'instrumentalism' and 'structuralism' (and 
'Hegelian Marxism') in their discussion of Marxist theories of the state (1975: 30). Their aim was to 
reconcile them, but their typology only succeeded in intensifying debate. 
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in affluent, western societies" (2003: 262). May 68 provided a catalyst for Marxists to 
sharpen their focus; capitalist subordination of the proletariat, without recourse to force or 
violence, appeared, fleetingly, to be coming to an end. Problems of organisation and 
tactics, and the state and law, were back on the agenda; the lofty philosophical debates 
that had characterised much of Western Marxism were forced into the background. 
The third central factor was the explosion of "Marx studies". The increasing academic 
interest in Marx was the result of a number of mutually reinforcing and interpenetrating 
dynamics. The rise in working class activity provided much of the impetus for the return to 
Marx. McLellan adds that the translation and publication in English of Marx's early writings 
and the revival of interest in Hegel in the Anglophone world were also crucial. Moreover, 
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956 
reinvigorated many Western Marxists. It allowed those in Western Communist Parties "a 
new freedom of criticism and of intellectual movement" (McLellan 1999b: 956-8). 3 
Furthermore, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in the same year alienated many Western 
Marxists and freed them from any attachment they may have previously felt to the 'actually 
exiting socialism' of the USSR. 
As a consequence of these three factors, by the late 1960s, Marxism had begun to re- 
emerge as a popular theoretical paradigm, and there was a rising tide of interest in 
sociological jurisprudence. Furthermore, 'socio-legal studies' was very much a movement 
in search of a theory. A group hitherto largely external to the Marxist tradition was largely 
responsible for their cross-pollination. A number of radical criminologists with a 
background in labelling theory and pluralist conflict theory brought law back onto the 
Marxist agenda and simultaneously established Marxism as possibly the most popular 
theoretical perspective in the socio-legal arena. 4 
3 Benton, specifically referring to the Part! Communiste Frangais (FCP), suggests that prior to this 
shift, "official theoretical work [... ] was largely subordinated to the requirement of legitimating policy 
options already settled in advance by the political leadership" (1984: 3-4). This had seriously 
limited the space for meaningful philosophical and theoretical work within the orthodox tradition. Of 
course, to a certain extent this remained the case even after 1956. 4 There were two notable precedents for the new Marxist criminology. Willem Bonger's Criminality 
and Economic Conditions (1969) was first published in 1916. He argued that capitalism 
encourages egoism and greed rather than altruism. The poor and insecurely employed have their 
greed criminalised, unlike the rich. Thus capitalism itself, and the social inequality it generates, is 
the major driving force behind criminality. According to Bonger, even non-economic crimes such as 
prostitution and rape occur due to the low economic status of women. Whatever the merits of this 
argument, it was certainly ahead of its time (Jones 1998: 215). So too was the attention he paid to 
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Labelling theory gained real popularity in the US in the mid 1960s. The work of Becker 
was central. At the heart of the perspective lies his insight that "deviance is not a quality of 
the act a person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules 
and sanctions to an 'offender'. The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully 
been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label" (1963: 9). From this 
starting point, labelling theorists embraced an anti-establishment political message that on 
the surface was not dissimilar to that promulgated by Marxists. However, Marxists 
complained that labelling theorists did not take their contentions through to their logical 
conclusions. Labelling theorists focussed on the interactive processes between rule 
definers, rule breakers and the social audience, but did not then go on to consider the 
nature of the social totality in which those processes occurred (Beirne 1979: 375-7). In 
short, labelling theory seemed to be morally neutral. Yet for many thinkers in the wake of 
Vietnam and the civil rights movement, and with the growing fragmentation of interest 
groups, such neutrality seemed "inadequate to explain the ferment that was growing 
around them" (Jones 1998: 208). Indeed, "a fierce impatience was expressed with the 
gradualism of liberal, social democratic politics" (Downes and Rock 2003: 262). 
Conflict theory addressed precisely these theoretical weaknesses. Among its chief early 
proponents were Dahrendorf and Turk (see Jones 1998: 206). Quinney and Chambliss 
introduced a steadily more radical political element. Conflict theory began from the 
contention that "power is the basic characteristic of social organisation [... ] wherever men 
live together conflict and a struggle for power will be found" (Quinney 1970: 11). 
Legislation thus occurs as a result of conflicts that are resolved according to the desires of 
those holding power. Conflict theorists were essentially pluralists; they saw society as 
white collar crime. Nevertheless Bonger's position was, at root, an economically determinist one 
(Russell 2002: 115). Rusche and Kirchheimer's Punishment and Social Structure (2003) was first 
published in 1939. Melossi details the unusual genesis of the book (2003: x-xxi). What came to be 
known as the 'Rusche and Kirchheimer hypothesis' was that there was a direct positive relationship 
between changing imprisonment rates and changing unemployment rates. Melossi suggests that 
there is a rather more complex argument within their work, particularly in Rusche's early work. 
When the labour market is flooded with the 'offer of labour', wages and general living standards of 
the working class decline, along with conditions of life in prisons. The converse is also true; when 
labour is rare and therefore valuable, living standards and wages improve. This is accompanied by 
better working class organisation, such as the formation and consolidation of trade unions and more 
effective resistance to exploitation. During such periods, forced labour, which undercuts ordinary 
labour, is introduced in prisons as a means to break this resistance (Melossi 2003: xxiii-xxxvii). 
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consisting of numerous groups all attempting to promote their interests and gain a foothold 
on the ladder of power. From here, it did not take long for "an impressive body of research 
[to accumulate] that strongly indicated that all legislation was typically the product of 
conflicts of interests" (Beirne and Quinney 1982: 11). 5 
It was a short step from this point to the adoption of a more explicitly Marxist position. 
Marxist criminology "is essentially a more specific form of conflict theory" (Jones 1998: 
214). Marxist conflict theory's distinctiveness was that it located the source of conflict in 
that central feature of capitalist society, the division between the bourgeoisie and 
proletariat; all law was held to be "created and coded according to the narrow interests of 
dominant social classes" (Beirne and Quinney 1982: 11). Armed with this basic theoretical 
insight, radical criminologists rehabilitated the Marxist instrumentalist perspective first 
advanced by Lenin. 6 
Theory 
The class instrumentalism of the 1970s was not a unified theoretical paradigm but rather a 
loose collection of theories sharing the same basic theoretical insight; law, just as Lenin 
argued, is a tool of the ruling class. Three main strands of the theory will be considered 
here. Firstly, the criminologists who embraced instrumentalism and gave the perspective 
its intellectual cachet will be considered. Secondly, two notable instrumentalist theories of 
the state will be introduced. Finally the work of Pritt, focussing exclusively on law, will be 
presented. 
Among the central figures in the shift from conflict theory to a Lenin-esque class 
instrumentalist position were two American scholars, Richard Quinney and William 
Chambliss. By the mid-1970s they had fully embraced the instrumentalist perspective. 
The most trenchant statement of this was Quinney's Critique of Legal Order (1973). 
Quinney's aim was no less than the "development of a new consciousness- a critical 
philosophy", which would render possible "a whole new way of life" (1973: 1). To this end, 
S Beirne notes conflict theory's imprecision; 'power' and 'conflict' were loose terms, and how and 
why conflicts were resolved was never properly considered (1979: 377). 
6 Beirne and Quinney (1982) detail growth of interest in Marxism and law from the late 60s through 
the 70s. For a good summary of Marxist critical criminology in the 1970s see Russell (2002: 115). 
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he confidently asserted that a critical theory of crime control could be systematically 
outlined in just 6 points: 
"1. American society is based on an advanced capitalist economy. 
2. The state is organised to serve the interests of the dominant economic class, the 
capitalist ruling class. 
3. Criminal law is an instrument of the state and ruling class to maintain and perpetuate 
the existing social and economic order. 
4. Crime control in capitalist society is accomplished through a variety of institutions and 
agencies established and administered by a governmental elite, representing ruling 
class interests, for the purpose of establishing domestic order. 
5. The contradictions of advanced capitalism- the disjuncture between existence and 
essence- require that the subordinate classes remain oppressed by whatever means 
necessary, especially through the coercion and violence of the legal system. 
6. Only with the collapse of capitalist society and the creation of a new society, based on 
socialist principles, will there be a solution to the crime problem. " (Quinney 1973: 16) 
The influence of Lenin is clear: Law "is a tool of the ruling class, " and "any threats to the 
established order can be dealt with by invoking the final weapon of the ruling class, its 
legal system" (Quinney 1973: 52,55). ' 
Quinney also deploys a theory of ideology similar to Lenin's. He claims that one is able "to 
get at the objective interests that are external to the consciousness of the individual [... 
and] to determine the interests of those who make and use the law for their own 
advantage" (Quinney 1973: 54). These interests manifest themselves in an ideology. The 
ideology of the ruling class becomes dominant in a society; "whether the process is a 
deliberate effort to shape public consciousness or simply a general conception of the 
world, an ideological hegemony is established" (ibid: 140). Quinney uses this concept of 
ideology to buttress his rigidly instrumentalist line, stressing the role of ideology in the 
"deliberate effort to shape public consciousness" (ibid: 137). Hence, he talks of the ruling 
7 Notice too the influence of Marx's 1844 Paris Manuscripts, specifically in Quinney's reference to 
"the disjuncture between existence and essence". 
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class "manipulating the minds of the people" and of the "process of indoctrination" (ibid: 
140). 8 
The bold confidence and polemical tone of Quinney's work is rather startling today. But he 
was not alone. By the mid 1970s, Chambliss had also fully embraced instrumentalist 
Marxist theory. He argued, inter alia, that acts are defined as criminal when it is in the 
interests of the ruling class to define them so, that members of the ruling class will be able 
to violate the laws with impunity while members of the subject class will be punished, and 
that as the gap between the two classes widens, penal law will expand in an effort to 
coerce the subordinate class into submission (Chambliss 1975: 152). 9 
This rather simplistic instrumental Marxism has, to a certain degree, endured in the US. 
For instance, Reiman (1990) 
, argues 
that the "American criminal justice system 
methodically created a misleading imagery of the criminal as young, black, working class 
and male, an imagery that filters out the middle class and the white collar crime by 
differential treatment" (Downes and Rock 2003: 274). This system generates and 
reproduces crime, and ensures that Middle America remains firmly against those classes 
below them, rather than those above them (Reiman 1990: 4). 
UK criminologists tended to be rather more sophisticated than their American 
counterparts, although some unmistakably class instrumentalist themes persisted. Taylor, 
Walton and Young provided "the most vigorous attempt to supplant existing approaches by 
a neo-Marxist alternative" (Downes and Rock 2003: 282). The New Criminology (1973) 
carried out a "ground clearing critique", which salvaged certain elements from theoretical 
predecessors for incorporation into a new Marxist framework (Downes and Rock 2003: 
282). The New Criminology sought to create a comprehensive Marxist theory of deviance, 
8 Quinney's position constantly shifted. Having already moved from the conflict perspective to the 
Marxist position detailed here, in the latter part of the decade he advanced an Althusserian position. 
By the 1990s he had embraced 'peacemaking criminology' (see, for instance, Pepinsky and 
Quinney 1991). 
a In On the Take (1978), Chambliss provides a flipside to the argument that law serves the ruling 
class. His claim here is that crime itself serves the ruling class. On the Take looked at racketeering 
in Seattle. Based upon several years' participant observation, he argued that the "'hidden hand' in 
organised crime in America is not 'the Mafia', but leading representatives of the city's ruling class"; 
even Presidents Nixon and Johnson had substantial dealings with businessmen involved in illegal 
businesses (Downes and Rock 2003: 272). Crime, and the growth of the networks that support it, is 
inevitable in capitalism; crime, government and business are interlinked. In a similar vein, Platt 
argued that street crime is not merely a by-product of capitalism, but is endemic to it (1978: 29). 
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focussing on how certain acts came to be classed as deviant; "this involved highlighting 
the role of the powerful in the creation and enforcement of law". Deviance and crime were 
seen as "simply diverse forms of behaviour which are criminalised by the powerful in 
society to protect their own interests" (Jones 1998: 226). The lingering influence of 
labelling theory is clear, as is the notion of law, specifically criminal law, being in the hands 
of the ruling class. 
Taylor, Walton and Young were heavily influenced Marx's earlier work, particularly the 
1844 Paris Manuscripts (Downes and Rock 2003: 263). Thus they stress that human 
behaviour is not determined, but a willed form of freely chosen political action, and they 
focus on alienation and consciousness as well as modes of production. For them, all 
societies based upon exploitation and oppression, such as capitalism, are necessarily 
criminogenic. However, there is nothing inherently deviant about any act and as such, in a 
form of society where material differences are abolished and diversity is tolerated, the 
power to criminalise would be unnecessary and a crime free society could be realised. 
The three authors later responded to criticism in Critical Criminology (1975). They 
lamented their "individualistic idealism" and concern with "expressive deviance" and the 
meaning deviants give to their own actions. Young in particular was particularly keen to 
repudiate much of his earlier position (see Jones 1998: 244-8). Of course, at least initially, 
this "radical critique" was "essentially an orientation", or even a "mood" or "stance", rather 
than a fully worked up theoretical perspective (Hunt 1981: 95). On this basis, Jones 
argues that criticism of The New Criminology was a little unfair, for it was the product of "a 
fermenting British criminology scene which had discovered interactionism and wanted to 
use it to attack 'the system"' (1998: 229). 10 
10 Later Marxist criminologies would move away from the framework of The New Criminology. The 
Birmingham School, under Stuart Hall, focussed on the reproduction of capitalist order in Britain. 
This theme was explored largely in the "context of youthful deviance and adult control" (Downes 
and Rock 2003: 265-7), most famously in Hall et al's Policing the Crisis (1978). Many of those 
initially attracted to The New Criminology, most notably its co-author Young, would become 
disenchanted with its focus on grand, large-scale theorising at the expense of empirical inquiry and 
practicality. They formed the 'left realist' school, the central work being Lea and Young's What Is 
To Be Done about Law and Order? (1984), although the key ideas can be ultimately traced to 
Young's chapter in Critical Criminology (1975). For more recent applications, see Taylor (1999a) 
and Young (1999), which specifically focus on crime in late modernity (see Downes and Rock 
2003: 285-92; Hopkins Burke 2001: Ch 15). Marxist criminology also suffered, like its parent theory, 
from the rise of postmodern approaches: Russell claims that postmodernism has certainly attained 
the pre-eminent status of 'meta-narrative' within [... ] critical criminology" (2002: 118). Nevertheless, 
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The second strand of class instrumentalism in the 1970s focussed on the state. Taylor, 
Walton and Young had particularly regretted the fact that they neglected to fully consider 
the role of the state. However, some Marxists attracted to the themes and concepts of 
instrumentalism but working outside of the criminological tradition did take the state as 
their object of study. This trend was hardly surprising, for it could claim intellectual 
ancestry from Marx's own writings, particularly The Communist Manifesto. The American 
Paul Sweezy outlined an instrumentalist analysis of the capitalist state in his influential 
1942 work The Theory of Capitalist Development (1968). Sweezy, like Lenin, closely 
follows the line of the Manifesto. He argues that the essential feature of the state is its 
maintenance of the system of private property. He claims that the class occupying the key 
positions in the process of production "gets the upper hand over its rivals and fashions a 
state which will enforce that set of property relations which is in its own interest" (1968: 
242). This is necessary because the structure of society is not "self-enforcing". Instead, 
the class or classes that are the chief beneficiaries of the existing society must monopolise 
state power in order to maintain it. Thus the state is "an instrument in the hands of the 
ruling class for enforcing and guaranteeing the stability of the class structure itself', and 
the system of private property on which it is based (ibid: 242-3). In the UK, Ralph Miliband 
closely followed this line. His 1969 work The State in Capitalist Society is the classic 
example of Marxist instrumentalist analysis of the state. Miliband includes "judicial elites" 
in his category of "servants of the state", claiming that they are biased towards the 
dominant classes (1973a: Ch 6). Miliband's work proved enormously influential on the 
burgeoning instrumentalist movement. Indeed, the debate between Miliband and the 
structuralist Nicos Poulantzas, conducted in the pages of the New Left Review from the 
late 60s through the 70s, presaged the debate that would later flower in the arena of 
jurisprudence. " 
The third and perhaps least developed strand of 1970s class instrumentalism was the 
strand that focussed specifically on law itself. Undoubtedly the most exhaustive 
instrumentalist survey of law itself was conducted by Pritt; his Law, Class and Society 
spreads over four volumes. Pritt declares that "law is one of the weapons of the ruling 
see Taylor (1999b), who maintains that Marxism is still relevant for criminologists. On more recent 
examples of Marxist criminology, see Jones (1998: 220-22). 
" See Poulantzas (1969) and Miliband (1970). The debate continued into the middle and late 
seventies: See Miliband (1973b) and Poulantzas (1976). 
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class in the class struggle" (1970: 6). He adds that "law is determined above all by the 
work and wishes of the dominant or ruling class, [... ] the ruling class by no means uses its 
power impartially [... ], nor are its servants, including the legislators, judges and lawyers, in 
any sense neutral". For Pritt, then, the ruling class "governs in its own interest, which it 
professes to believe, and perhaps sometimes does believe, to be identical with the 
interests of the whole people" (1971: 8). 
However, Pritt's analysis is decidedly more nuanced than, say, Quinney's. He suggests 
that law is determined not just by the wishes of the ruling class, but by the process of class 
struggle. As ruling class power is not unlimited or absolute, "in most countries [... ] it 
always has to take account of the wishes and resentments- and the actual or potential 
strength- of the majority of the people" (Pritt 1971: 8). The majority can, through strikes, 
boycotts, or other forms of resistance "short of revolt or revolution", get "something of its 
own way". As such, the body of legal "rules is not simply imposed upon the masses from 
above. Instead law is the cumulative work of those who have enjoyed "direct power to 
shape it in their own interests, and of those who could do no more than obstruct or modify 
this shaping in varying degrees by their organised insistence or passive resistance" (ibid: 
9). Pritt thus steps back from the basic instrumentalist line that law is simply naked ruling 
class power; instead, law is a site of struggle. Nevertheless, the ruling class only gives 
way to resistance "as far as it must" (ibid: 10). 12 
Pritt also adds a second qualification to standard instrumentalism: Not all law is designed 
to further the interests of the ruling class. For Pritt, some law is "neutral", for it is designed 
to "govern the relations between individuals or groups within fields with no strong element 
of class conflict". He gives the example of rules regulating which side of the road traffic 
must drive on. Nevertheless, Pritt does suggest that these rules, despite their lack of 
connection to class struggle, were probably developed in accordance with what the ruling 
class believes is best (1971: 11). 
12 Despite belonging to a vastly different tradition, Kirchheimer mounts a similar argument in 
Political Justice (1961). He argues that as the intensity of the conflict between the bourgeoisie and 
its opponents increases, so too does the significance of law and legal procedure as a political force. 
Kirchheimer suggests that the political trial is a functional authentication of political repression (see 
Sumner 1979: 259). 
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Ultimately, Pritt holds that "in its general form and character", law "corresponds" to the 
economic base of society (1971: 6). Based upon this, in a flourish of optimism typical of 
the era, he concludes that "what we need is a fundamental change in our political and 
economic structure, carrying with it a corresponding change in our law and our legal 
system" (1972: 184). 
Critique 
At their best, the various strands of class instrumentalism of the 1970s offered a valuable 
insight into the enduring nature of the stratified class system of capitalism. For instance, 
Michalowski argues that "by framing the class structure and the institutional arrangements 
of 20th century corporate capitalism as causal forces in the labelling of crime and criminals, 
radical criminologists linked social constructionism with a critique of domination as 
manifest in the politico-economic framework of the nation and the world. At its best, this 
analysis helped reveal the subtle dynamics of race, class and gender oppression in the 
making of laws and the administration of justice" (1996: 11-12). 
In addition, it is important to remember that the 'instrumentalism' described above consists 
of a number of related but separate approaches. Each of the approaches that fall under 
the banner of instrumentalism can be criticised individually on very different grounds. For 
instance, when compared with its more critical British counterpart, Downes and Rock feel 
that American based Marxist criminology was "relatively uncomplicated", pointing to a 
"more obvious and uncomplicated set of relations between American crime and American 
capitalism" (2003: 271). Care should therefore be taken to differentiate between the 
various strands of instrumentalism and ensure that criticism is specific. 
Furthermore, any deficiencies in the theories of the instrumentalists can be at least partly 
explained by the fact that, like Renner, instrumentalists were not primarily concerned with 
advancing a perspective on law. Only Pritt took law to be the exclusive focus of his 
analysis. Instead, the focus of writers such as Sweezy and Miliband was the state, with 
law taken to be a simple extension of it. Meanwhile, the criminologists of the 1970s such 
as Quinney were concerned with developing theories of crime and deviance. Perhaps it is 
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unfair to expect such necessarily partial perspectives to provide the basis for a more all 
encompassing theory of law. t3 
Nevertheless, the revived instrumentalism of the 1970s, in all its variants, patently failed to 
resolve the two central problems of any Marxist legal theory based upon the Preface: the 
problem of determination and the problem of base and superstructure. Taken together, 
70s instrumentalism starkly illustrates the problems raised by a "narrow class analysis" 
(Sumner 1979: 254). 14 
Firstly, instrumentalism represented a step backwards from the more sophisticated version 
of the base and superstructure metaphor that was latent in the work of Pashukanis. 
Instead, instrumentalism remains largely silent on the matter of law's relationship to the 
base. However, the implication of the theory is clear. For instrumentalism to remain 
coherent, law must be exclusively a phenomenon of the superstructure: the law is explicitly 
created by the ruling class to suit its needs, which are determined by the base. Pritt 
suggests as much by relying on a notion of "correspondence" (1971: 6) and suggesting 
that changes in economic structure will bring about concomitant changes in the legal 
system (1972: 184). Yet law often appears to be functioning as part of the base of society; 
it regulates and indeed constitutes the relations of production. 15 
Secondly, class instrumentalism fails to provide a robust solution to the problem of 
determination. This may seem counter-intuitive, because class instrumentalism does offer 
13 Indeed Hirst (1972,1975) argued that crime and deviance are inappropriate subjects for Marxist 
analysis, and suggested that theorists should stick to the more traditional concerns, for instance the 
mode of production, class struggle, state and ideology (1975: 204). Although it is undoubtedly 
important to remain cautious of the claim associated with Engels that Marxism can explain 
everything in a manner analogous to natural science, such a dogmatic and reductive view of the 
ambit of Marxism must also be viewed with suspicion. Hunt rejoins that Hirst's conclusion "is 
incorrect because it is premised upon an insistence that Marxism can only constitute objects of 
inquiry at the level of its own concepts; this suggests Marxism has a finite range or set of concepts 
and that they exist at the macro or general societal level" (1980: 43). See also the reply to Hirst 
from Taylor and Walton (1975). 
14 Sumner is specifically referring to Quinney's work. 
15 See Chapter 1 above. During the 1970s, the view that law formed part of the base was aired by 
EP Thompson. For him, "law was deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive relations, 
which would have been inoperable without this law [... ] rules and categories of law penetrate every 
level of society" (1975: -261). Later, in the course of a memorable slight at Althusser, Thompson 
returned to this theme. In his characteristically effervescent prose, he declares, "I found that law did 
not keep politely to a level but was at every bloody level; it was imbricated within the mode of 
production and productive relations themselves" (1978: 96). 
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space for human intervention in the process of creating laws. Indeed, this space is at the 
very heart of the theory, for instrumentalism holds that law is the deliberate creation of the 
ruling class. In effect, then, the ruling class become the mediating link between base and 
superstructure. However, none of the instrumentalist theorists convincingly demonstrate 
how a class can become aware of its interests, and how it can act as one in pursuit of 
them. 16 
Merely asserting that the ruling class use law to pursue their own ends does not provide a 
solution to the problem of determination. If one cannot demonstrate how the base 
conditions the thought of those controlling the law, then class instrumentalism does not get 
us far beyond the notion of 'reflection' utilised by crude materialism. Take, for instance, 
Pritt's notion of 'correspondence' between base and legal superstructure. Pritt's 
suggestion is that the latter must always correspond to the needs of the former. Not only 
is this functionalist, but human action can only be preserved on the basis of a crude 
empiricism of the sort that that has already been rejected. 17 As Taylor, Walton and Young 
argue in relation to the 'conflict approach' (1973: 267), it "is in danger of withdrawing 
integrity and purpose- or idiosyncrasy- from men: and, thus, is close to erecting a view of 
crime as non-purposive (or pathological) reaction to external circumstance". 
Quinney's concept of ideology also fails to resolve the issue, for it requires that the ruling 
class can somehow 'read off their best interests from the relations of production. This 
notion is untenable, as it relies on empiricist epistemology. Quinney also assumes a 
unified and coherent ruling class, a means of effectively disseminating the dominant 
ideology, and a pliant and malleable working class. 18 However, Quinney's idea of ideology 
being a "general conception of the world", though nascent and undeveloped, is crucial to 
the salvaging of the class instrumentalist perspective. 19 
Overall, then, the instrumentalism of the 1970s did not represent much of an advance on 
the theories outlined by Lenin half a century earlier. The central problem of how the 
relations of production determine the conscious thought that shapes law is barely 
16 Lenin had also failed to adequately address this issue. See Chapter 2 above. 
17 For more detail on the objections to crude materialism and related functionalism and empiricism, 
see Chapter 2 above. 
18 Lenin's notion of ideology is defective for precisely the same reasons. See Chapter 2 above. 19 See Chapter 5 below. 
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considered, and would appear to be reliant on a crude materialism that is easily dismissed. 
Furthermore, the challenges to the base and superstructure metaphor, which were gaining 
momentum, are not adequately addressed. 20 
In addition to this, no sooner had class instrumentalism gained a foothold than the 
concrete socio-political context it was premised upon began to shift. Two changes were 
particularly pertinent. Firstly, the social struggles of the 1960s and 70s on such issues as 
racial and sexual oppression seemed to render a focus on class conflict alone redundant. 
A new mode of analysis was required that located the new, non-class struggles within the 
"dynamics of capitalism as a total system, yet did not reduce them to mere epiphenomena 
incidental to the 'real' struggle at the 'point of production'" (Picciotto 1979: 166). As White 
and Haines put it, power "may not be totally encapsulated or explainable in class terms. 
Power and powerlessness can exist in a sense outside the class structure, such as the 
power of men over women" (1996: 109). 
Secondly, it was becoming increasingly evident that the state was not unequivocally the 
tool of the ruling class. In Lenin's day, laissez faire capitalism was being aggressively 
diffused around the globe through imperialism, and the Russian establishment was fighting 
a doomed counter-revolution against the Bolsheviks. To take an instrumentalist line in 
such circumstances was perhaps understandable. But by the 1970s, the state and the law 
had demonstrated themselves to be capable of securing very real gains for the working 
class. In the UK, the promotion of Keynesian economics and the creation of the welfare 
state, comprising chiefly of education, health, social security and welfare provision, was a 
notable achievement. 21 Meanwhile, the ability of trade unions to decisively affect the 
political climate of the day was amply demonstrated by the successful miners' strikes of 
1972 and 1974. The 1974 strike was of particular significance, for it "led to a three day 
week, precipitated a general election and brought about the defeat of the [Conservative] 
Heath government" (Milne 1994: 6). In such a climate, the idea that the state and law 
were tools of the ruling class, and that the working class was largely powerless against its 
20 For further balanced assessment of instrumental Marxism see Young (1979). For critiques 
specifically focussing on Marxist criminology, see Jones (1998: 222-225), Hopkins Burke (2001: 
155-7) and Downes and Rock (2003: 277-84). 
21 Of the many works on Keynes, Stewart's (1986), written at the height of Thatcher's monetarism, 
provides a sympathetic but still worthy introduction. On the history of the welfare state, see 
Timmins (2001). 
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might, seemed outdated. 22 The state and law increasingly appeared to be neutral; rather 
like Renner's legal norms, they were 'blanks waiting to be filled in'. There appeared to be 
a degree of autonomy, and this was something that the class instrumentalist perspective 
could not readily accommodate within its theoretical scheme. The stage was set for a new 
Marxist theory of law, and the work of Louis Althusser provided its underpinnings. 23 
Louis Althusser and Structuralist Marxism 
Context 
The work of the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser was a very deliberate and 
considered intervention in response to a very particular state of affairs in French Marxism. 
Intellectually, Althusser pitched his theory directly against the work of 'humanist' or 
'existential' Marxists, who had embraced the Marx of the recently published 1844 Paris 
Manuscripts. Chief among this group were Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. They rejected 
Stalinism and Marxist orthodoxy which presented historical materialism as a science; all 
economically and technologically determinist accounts were shunned. In the place of 
these 'iron laws', existentialists "posited a 'subject-centred' history, and the lived 
experience of the historical actor as the source of cognition" (Benton 1984: 10). They 
stressed the central role of creative human activity in history. As Benton explains, 
"Althusser's critical vocabulary and in many respects his positive attempts to at the 
construction of alternative concepts constitute an effort to detach the legacy of Marxism 
from the tradition defined by these two thinkers" (ibid: 5). Althusser also rejected 
Gramsci's notion of Marxism as historicism. 
22 Nevertheless, it is not only instrumentalist Marxists who argue that law and the judiciary is 
conservative, protective of the interests of capital and property, and supportive of established 
institutions of authority. See, for instance, Griffith (1997), Thomas (1999) and Wedderburn, who 
writes, "because we live in a society whose inequalities are strongly related to social class, it should 
be no embarrassment to discuss the class character of the legal product" (1986: 861). 23 Sumner attempted to sound the final death-knell for deviance theory in The Sociology of 
Deviance (1994). He claims that the entire concept of 'deviance' was based upon the social 
democratic 'consensus' of the post war period. Sumner suggests that the universality and strength 
of the consensus may have been overstated, but in any case it was definitively abandoned during 
the Reagan-Thatcher years of the 1980s. Thus the 'common view', against which deviance was to 
be measured, disappeared. Sumner proposes in its place 'censure', an ideological tool used to 
uphold and reinforce the capitalist system (see Jones 1998: 230). 
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Instead, Althusser embraced the 'structuralist' theories of thinkers such as the linguist 
Saussure, the anthropologist Levi-Strauss and the psychoanalyst Lacan. This school of 
thought, which was hugely influential in the 1960s, stressed that the key to understanding 
humans was not their conscious activities, but the unconscious structure of society that 
their activities depended upon and presupposed. Althusser provided a structuralist 
interpretation of Marx. Although Althusser did not explicitly align himself with the 
structuralists, their influence upon him was clear (Benton 1984: 14). 
Politically, three events decisively shaped Althusser's outlook. These factors contributed to 
an increasing freedom of thought within the communist parties of Western Europe, and 
allowed Althusser to re-theorise Marxism from within the confines of the PCF. As outlined 
above, the renunciation of Stalin's crimes by Khrushchev at the CPSU's 20th Congress in 
1956 and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 allowed for a greater intellectual 
freedom; no longer did Western Marxists feel so strongly attached to the USSR. The 
rather difficult task of justifying the Soviet system ceased to be the primary objective for 
many Western Marxists. The third key political factor was the Sino-Soviet split, which 
gathered pace through the 1960s. For Western Marxists this meant that, "increasingly, 
China could be looked to as a model of socialist construction which challenged the 
paradigm status of the Soviet pattern" (Benton 1984: 3). 24 
Althusser's theory proved attractive to many Marxist legal scholars in the 1970s. Such 
scholars were working in the same context as their class instrumentalist counterparts; 
socio-legal studies was very much a nascent movement in search of a theory. Althusser's 
promise was to provide a comprehensive and rigorous Marxism that could underpin a 
theory more specific to the legal field, and more alive to the changes in concrete 
circumstances that were beginning to derail the instrumentalist project. In addition, the 
24 Indeed the Sino-Soviet split prompted the Chinese Communist Party to attack existentialist 
Marxism as a form of bourgeois revisionism. Maoists saw individual identity as culturally rather than 
individually determined, so refused to accept the existentialist Marxist vision of individuals freely 
creating themselves. The emphasis on unconstrained subjectivity was seen as a bourgeois 
concern that obscured class conflict, and a product of the west's decadence. Althusser's own 
attack on existential Marxism coincided with this; he too dismissed 'subjectivity' as bourgeois 
ideology. For him, all culture was ideological and all ideologies subjected people by imposing 
individual identities on them (see below). Indeed, Althusser cited Mao's On Contradiction, although 
he did not share Mao's optimism that culture could be a liberating force (Binder 1989: 1368-9). 
Meanwhile, the USSR began to warm to the themes of the existentialists in the post-Stalin days. As 
a result, many Althussserians lauded the Chinese system as superior to the Soviet one. Only later 
was the terror of the Cultural Revolution exposed. 
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allure of fashionable structuralism and Parisian philosophy proved an irresistible 
combination for many on the left. Althusserian theories of law began to constitute a rival to 
class instrumentalist theories; very quickly, and certainly by the mid 1970s, they were the 
more popular of the two. 
Theoiy25 
Althusser's first contention was that the humanists, historicists and economic reductionists 
had misinterpreted Marx's work. For Althusser, that work did not constitute a coherent 
whole. Instead, there existed an 'epistemological break' between Marx's early works and 
his mature works. Prior to the break, in works such as the 1844 Paris Manuscripts, Marx 
was tied to a Hegelian notion of the subject, utilising such concepts as 'alienation' and 
'species being'. Marx was advancing a "theoretical ideology" (Benton 1984: 53). After the 
break, Marx replaced this 'problematic'26 and "established a new philosophy" of dialectical 
materialism (Althusser 1969: 33). His mature works, chief amongst them Capital, were 
governed by the new "scientific problematic" (Benton 1984: 53). 
Only a 'symptomatic' reading of the texts could reveal this; it was "impossible to innocently 
and straightforwardly grasp the meaning of a text" (McLellan 1979: 299). A symptomatic 
reading is one where the "explicit discourse is read cojointly with the absences, lacunae 
and silences, which [... ] are so many symptoms of the unconscious problematic buried in 
the text" (Geras 1977: 245). According to Althusser, such a reading reveals Marx's 
rejection of empiricism. As noted earlier, empiricism holds that "to know is to abstract from 
the real object its essence, the possession of which by the subject is then called 
knowledge" (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 35). 27 
For Althusser, this is not satisfactory; the object of thought and the real object must be 
separated. Knowledge "does not work on the real object", but instead on the 'object of 
knowledge', which exists only in thought and is therefore totally distinct from the real object 
25 For a good short summary of Althusser's structuralist Marxism, see McLellan (1979: Ch 22). 
Callinicos (1976) provides an excellent book length critique, written at the height of Althusser's 
popularity, while Benton (1984) offers a more distanced but still engaging commentary from the 
viewpoint of the mid 1980s. 
26 Althusser defines a 'problematic' as "the objective internal reference system of its particular 
themes, the system of questions commanding the answers given' (1971: 90). 
27 See Chapter 2 above. 
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(Althusser and Balibar 1970: 43). Theoretical practice consists of three elements, 
'Generalities 1,2 and 3'. Generalities 1 is the raw materials of a discipline, its ideas and 
concepts. These are worked upon by Generalities 2, the means of theoretical production. 
These are the "framework of concepts of a science which constituted its problematic" 
(McLellan 1979: 300). Generalities 3 is the end result of this process; the concrete in 
thought which provides knowledge of the real concrete (Althusser 1969: 183). The Marxist 
philosophy of dialectical materialism is the theory of this theoretical practice, and "the 
result of this epistemology when applied to society was the science of historical 
materialism" (McLellan 1979: 300). The role of historical materialism, which is a 
theoretical practice, is to "study the different practices in their specificity, and their relations 
to one another in the complex unity of social practice which is the social formation" (Geras 
1977: 239). In this way, Althusser sought to theoretically justify one of his key contentions; 
Marxism is not ideological, but scientific. 28 
The separation of thought objects from real objects allows Althusser to reject the Hegelian 
notion of a totality in which each element is but the expression of an inner essence, and 
economist interpretations of Marx that hold that all essences can be reduced to the 
economic. Instead, Althusser advances a notion of society as a complex totality, 
constituted by three 'relatively autonomous instances', the economic, political and 
ideological (Althusser 1969: 232). 29 Thus the superstructures are instances "which are 
distinct from the economic structure" (Geras 1977: 250). Each instance is a structure and 
despite their degree of autonomy, they are united in a structure of structures. Causality is 
itself structural, for "the effects are not outside the structure [... ] on the contrary, it implies 
that the structure is immanent in its effects [... ] the whole existence of the structure 
28 Althusser, however, does not tell us how to judge whether or not a theory is scientific. His notion 
of the opposition between science and ideology is therefore a mere assertion (McLellan 1995: 29). 
29 The German 'capital logic' or 'state derivation' school provided an interesting contemporaneous 
take on the relative autonomy thesis. Their ideas were brought into the Anglophone world by 
Holloway and Picciotto (1978). As Spitzer outlines, they argued that the state has to perform 
several functions, such as securing social order and providing infrastructure, in order to maintain 
capitalism (1983: 113). In 1776, Adam Smith had argued much the same in the Wealth of Nations 
(1976). As Steinert puts it, "since the state and state intervention developed exactly because these 
tasks could not be performed profitably by single capitalists (otherwise they would have) and since 
the state has to step out of the competition between capitalists to fulfil these tasks it must (and 
does) have a certain amount of independence from capital and its factions" (1977: 439). The 
approach was criticised on familiar grounds; Hunt, for instance, felt that it was a functionalist 
method of explanation (1981: 100). The debates surrounding the state derivation perspective now 
seem a rather marginal and even "occult" sideshow (McLellan 1999b: 959). 
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consists of its effects, in short [... ] the structure, which is merely a specific combination of 
its peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects" (Althusser and Balibar 1970: 188). 
The relationship of the three instances or levels to one another at any given time Althusser 
terms the 'conjuncture'. A conjuncture is 'overdetermined', as each level determines the 
structure whilst simultaneously being determined by it. 'Overdetermination' refers to the 
process of "determination by multiple factors" (Williams 1977: 83). This complex notion of 
determination stands in opposition to the classical Marxist idea that there exists just the 
one contradiction between the forces and relations of production. This, according to 
Althusser, was the result of a flawed reading of Marx. 
Nevertheless, Althusser maintains that the autonomy of the instances is only relative. This 
is because in the last instance the economy is always determining, even if it merely 
determines which of the other instances is dominant, as it did with the political level in 
feudalism. Hence society is a 'structure in dominance', with the economy as the 
determining element. However, the economy cannot be isolated from the overall structure; 
"the lonely hour of the last instance never comes" (Althusser 1969: 113). 30 
Following from this notion of structural causality was Althusser's most famous proposition, 
that history is a process without a subject. For Hegel, the subject was the 'Absolute', and 
"according to Althusser, all Marx did in his early writings was to substitute the idea of 
human essence for the Absolute as the subject of history" (McLellan 1979: 302). Only 
during the period of the epistemological break did Marx begin to see that human nature "is 
no abstraction inherent in each single individual" but instead "the ensemble of social 
relations" (Marx 1968: 29). With this new understanding, history could be understood as a 
process without a subject: "The structure of the relations of production determines the 
places and functions occupied and adopted by the agents of production, who are never 
more than the occupants of these places, in so far as they are the 'supports' of these 
functions". The real subjects of history were the "definers and distributors: the relations of 
production". However, as these were simply 'relations', "they cannot be thought within the 
category subject"(Althusser and Balibar 1970: 180). 
30 In Reading Capital, Balibar extended the idea of relative autonomy and argued for law's 'non- 
correspondence' with the social relations of production. Hindess and Hirst (1977) took this idea 
further and saw the political as almost totally autonomous and dominant (see Sumner 1979: 260). 
99 
This theoretical system was largely developed in For Marx and Reading Capital . 
3' Later 
Althusser offered a number of refinements and addendums to his basic position. The most 
"fundamental departures" from his earlier work were the development of a new conception 
of philosophy, and the refinement of his theory of ideology. Both of these advances posed 
the question "of the role of agency in social transformation" (Benton 1984: 83). 
The first new development was the new conception of philosophy. In his earlier work, 
Althusser somewhat avoids the issue of the relation of theory to practice by claiming that 
theory itself is a practice. This allows him to effectively cut off theoretical work from the 
real struggles of the working class. His revised position attempts to remedy this. 
Althusser's later conception of philosophy sees it as "in the last instance, class struggle in 
the field of theory" (Althusser 1976: 37). Philosophy is no longer held to provide an 
external guarantee of validity to the sciences, but instead it can defend existing sciences 
by providing their own specific, internal criteria of validity. The materialist and idealist 
positions that are taken up in philosophy reflect the class position the philosophers 
represent; Marxist philosophy's novelty is that it openly admits its partisan nature 
(Callinicos 1976: 80-1). Theory, then, is no longer autonomous. Instead it is an extension 
of class struggle. This rejection of epistemology, of the guarantee of the validity of the 
sciences, marked a significant retreat from his earlier position (Benton 1984: 92). 
The second new development was a more detailed theory of ideology. In. Althusser's early 
work, ideology was the set of illusions that opposed the truth provided by science, a 
position largely in line with the classical Marxist view of ideology. Marxists had traditionally 
seen ideology as shrouding the real nature of the relations of exploitation. Thus, once 
such relations are abolished, the need for ideology will disappear. 32 Althusser's new 
conception resonated with one of the central features of his earlier work; the idea that the 
essence of reality is not present in surface appearances, which led to his distinction 
between 'thought objects' and 'real objects'. As such, ideology becomes a necessary and 
permanent feature of any society, for even in communism, history would not simply 
31 Both For Marx and Reading Capital were originally published in French, in 1965 and 1968 
respectively. 
32 See Larrain (1983), and Chapter 5 below. 
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become transparent; "there is no practice except by and in ideology" (Althusser 1971: 
159). 
Althusser outlined his revised theory of ideology in his famous essay Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses (1971), and in doing so hinted at the scope and, more 
importantly, the limits of human action. 33 Althusser contends that ideology is the imaginary 
relation of men to the relations of production. The function of ideology is to constitute 
concrete individuals as subjects, in order that they fulfil the role allotted to them in the 
relations of production; "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete 
subjects" (Althusser 1971: 162). This concept of ideology is connected to the idea of 
history as a process without a subject. Ideology "is the way in which men are formed to 
participate in a process of which they are not the makers" (Callinicos 1976: 70). It is the 
cement that binds the social together and provides the indispensable framework for every 
action (McKenzie 1994: 17). 
Althusser classes law as an 'ideological state apparatus' (ISA), concerned with 
reproducing the conditions of production by securing the ideological domination of the 
ruling class. ISAs are "superstructural formations that function by ideology rather than by 
violence" (Benton 1984: 101). Other examples include schools, churches, the family, the 
media, literary, cultural and sporting organisations, trade unions and political parties. ISAs 
inculcate the requisite worldview and the skills and attitudes necessary for the continuation 
of capitalism. 34 
Althusser's work inspired a significant amount of Marxist scholarship on the state and law. 
Although this scholarship was of a varied nature, at the heart of all Althusserian 
approaches is the contention that the "functions of the state are broadly determined by the 
structures of society rather than by the people who occupy positions of state power" (Gold, 
Lo and Wright 1975: 36). Furthermore, the state and law were seen to help ensure the 
reproduction of the capitalist system. So, despite Althusser's distance from class 
instrumentalism, he still saw the state as working unequivocally for the benefit of the ruling 
class; "not for one moment can there be any question of rejecting the fact that this really is 
33 In this essay Althusser refines themes that first surfaced in For Marx (1969: 231-6). 
34 The ISAs operate behind the shield of the 'repressive state apparatuses' (RSAs), which include 
the police and the army. In effect, the RSAs are the state more narrowly and commonly defined. 
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the essential point" (Althusser 1971: 132). Of the many Althusserian approaches, the work 
of Nicos Poulantzas is the most important. Other major legal works were provided by 
Edelman and Balbus. Each will be dealt with in turn. 
According to Spitzer, one of the reasons that Althusser's theory was taken so seriously in 
the legal arena was because of the extensions and refinements of Nicos Poulantzas, the 
most feted and one of the most prolific of Althusser's 'disciples' (1983: 108). Yet as 
McLellan points out, "the work of Nicos Poulantzas got more interesting the further he 
departed from his original Althusserian inspiration" (1999b: 959); Poulantzas certainly did 
not shy away from supplementing Althusser's basic concepts with insights of his own. 35 
He offers a detailed account of the capitalist state, and the place of law within it. Although 
his work is extremely complex, Jessop identifies its key theme: "the crucial role of the legal 
order and juridico-political ideology in mediating the political class struggle as well as 
securing the institutional matrix necessary to capital accumulation in the economic sphere" 
(Jessop 1980: 351). 
Poulantzas' key contribution to Marxist jurisprudence is his theory of the 'effect of 
isolation'. For Poulantzas, the juridical and ideological structures of the capitalist mode of 
production create the effect of isolation, which is indispensable to it (Poulantzas 1973: 
130). "Juridico-political ideology" sets up "individuals-persons" or "subjects of law" who are 
"free" and "equal" to one another. Socio-economic relations are thus experienced by the 
"supports" as fragmented and atomised. This allows the proper functioning of those 
juridico-political structures that are essential to the mode of production, for example the 
labour contract, private property, and competition (ibid: 214). The atomisation of the 
supports of the mode of production conceals from them their actual class relations in the 
economic struggle and the real structure of capitalist relations of production. 
In actual fact, there exists an unprecedented socialisation of the labour process under 
capitalist relations of production, but this is hidden by the isolation effect. The capitalist 
state presents itself as representing the isolated unity, even though this isolation is largely 
its own effect. This is the "double function" of the capitalist state; it isolates individuals and 
35 Ultimately, Poulantzas embraced eurocommunism and its reformist thrust. The extent to which 
this is compatible with Althusser's theory, which maintained the class nature of the state, is 
debatable. 
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then represents the atomised unity (Poulantzas 1973: 134). In effect, in place of the real 
class unity that actually exists under capitalist relations of production, there is a "forced 
unity and cohesiveness in a social formation" (Milovanovic 1989: 111). 
Juridical ideology thus fulfils the key function of ideology identified by Althusser in Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses: it "cements together" the social formation "under the 
aegis of the dominant class" (Poulantzas 1978: 88). 36 This, then, is the process of 
interpellation in action. Law interpellates social agents and provides them with a place in 
the social formation endowed with rights and obligations: "Law institutes individuals as 
juridico-political-subjects-persons by representing their unity in the people nation. Law 
establishes individualisation" (ibid: 86-7). 37 
This theory of the isolation effect and interpellative role of law is the main feature of 
Poulantzas' jurisprudence. However, there are other facets of his work directly applicable 
to legal theory. 38 For instance, Poulantzas outlines law's role and effects in the economic, 
political and ideological spheres. He also charts the rise of 'authoritarian statism' as 
hegemonic crisis deepens. This is accompanied by the growth of 'state administration' 
and 'particularistic regulation', which suggests that "while the law is evidently not defunct, it 
is undergoing a clear retreat" (Poulantzas 1978: 203-4,220). 9 In addition, Poulantzas 
contends that law is not merely an ISA. In the face of working class political struggle it 
also organises and sanctions rights for the dominated classes, and limits the exercise of 
state power by the dominant classes (Poulantzas 1978: 91). 40 This is the autonomy of 
law, a feature that the instrumentalists, with their view of law as a tool of the ruling class, 
have great difficulty accommodating. However, the rights that the legal system grants to 
subordinates are inevitably saturated with the dominant ideology. Thus they also help to 
36 See also Hunt, who is in agreement with Poulantzas on this point (1976: 178-87). 37 Poulantzas explicitly adds that the state, in its relatively autonomous capacity, plays a role in 
"forging" individualist ideology (1978: 66-7). This suggests an active role for the state in the 
creation of isolation. 
38 See Jessop (1980) for a detailed summary. 39 This echoes Pashukanis' theory of administration replacing law in socialist society, except that for 
Poulantzas, the process is occurring within capitalism. The idea that we are experiencing a 
"breakdown in legal autonomy" is also a theme of much contemporary non-Marxist legal scholarship 
isee Cotterrell 1992: 298-303). 
° Perhaps surprisingly, this position is close to that of the arch anti-structuralist EP Thompson, who 
claims that law is a "central area of [class conflict]" and famously adds that "the rule of law [... ] 
seems to me to be an unqualified human good" (Thompson 1975: 264,266. See also Chapter 1 
above). Beirne and Quinney note this rare point of contact, and wonder "whether or not this is 
sufficient ground to establish a dialogue between Poulantzas and EP Thompson" (1982: 182). 
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guarantee the preservation of the mode of production (Poulantzas 1982: 190). Ultimately, 
the mode of production promotes the narrow interests of the dominant group; "an unstable 
equilibrium of compromise" results (Jessop 1980: 353). 
Edelman does not exhibit quite the catholic sweep of Poulantzas. His focus is far 
narrower. He is concerned with "the juridical constitution of the individual as a legal 
subject" and the "manner in which changing conditions of accumulation and/or class 
struggle are reflected in the redefinition of juridical categories" (Jessop 1980: 361). 
Following the premise that the levels of a social formation are relatively autonomous and 
have their own relatively independent histories, Edelman analyses the doctrinal 
development of law as a specific instance. To this end, he examines the property rights of 
photography and cinema in France in order to demonstrate the changing role of the 
subject in law. French law, with its doctrine of 'author's right', did not originally see 
photographs as the property of the photographer as they merely mechanically reproduced 
reality and did not involve any creative activity. However, as capitalism advanced, the role 
of the subject as producer grew; "all production is the production of a subject" (Edelman 
1979: 52). As a result of this, photographs (and films) soon became the property of their 
creators. However, this "ideology of individual creativity is then transformed and travestied 
in the service of the economic realities of capitalist industrial production of images" (Hirst 
1979: 15). Creative activity becomes subject to a contract, and "the authors become 
proletarians who are paid for the job [... ] capital takes on the face of art but retains the 
necessary methods of capital" (Edelman 1979: 58). 41 
At the heart of Edelman's work lies Althusser's theory of ideology and interpellation. For 
Edelman, law is "the imaginary relation of subjects to their conditions of existence which 
has the effect of representing them in such a way that the reproduction of the relations of 
production is secured" (Hirst 1979: 3). Law constitutes its subjects as commodities in 
order to guarantee the continuation of the capitalist mode of production, which itself 
functions through the process of commodity exchange: "Law depends on reference to the 
subject for the constitution of its categories", yet simultaneously "it constitutes the very 
subject whose existence it refers to" (ibid: 2). As Jessop puts it, for Edelman "law 
41 As Hirst notes, Edelman's analysis holds only for French law. The English law of copyright 
"would not serve Edelman's purpose" (1979: 14-17). 
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addresses people as legal subjects and, in accepting this form of address, people 
simultaneously affirm their status as juridical subjects and confirm the effectivity of legal 
institutions and practices" (1980: 362). 
As suggested earlier, the work of Pashukanis dovetailed neatly with the themes and foci of 
Althusserian approaches to law. 42 Pashukanis' commodity exchange theory, largely 
dormant since his murder, was picked up by some Althusserian scholars and began to 
make its influence felt once again.. Although Poulantzas rejected the theory, Edelman 
placed commodity exchange at the heart of his analysis. However, it was in the work of 
Balbus that the decisive marriage between Althusserian and Pashukanisite theory took 
place; Balbus provides, according to Warrington, "the most sympathetic development of 
Pashukanis' commodity form theory" (1983: 67). 43 
Balbus bemoans instrumentalism's failure "to pose the problem of the specific form of the 
law and the way in which this form articulates with the overall requirements of the capitalist 
system" (Balbus 1977: 571). For him, the logic of the legal form and the logic of the 
commodity form are identical. He argues that this "homology between the legal form and 
the commodity form" ensures that the legal form develops, like the commodity form, 
autonomously from the "preferences of social actors". However, it does not develop 
autonomously from the system in which those actors participate (Balbus 1977: 585). It is 
the very fact that law is divorced from the particular needs and interests of a particular 
class that helps to maintain the capitalist mode of production; "the autonomy of the law 
from the preferences of even the most powerful social actors [... ] is not an obstacle to, but 
rather a prerequisite for, the capacity of the law to contribute to the reproduction of the 
overall conditions that make capitalism possible, and thus its capacity to serve the 
interests of capital as a class" (ibid: 585). The influence of Pashukanis is clear. 
Balbus supplements this theory with a Poulantzas-esque view of capitalist isolation and 
forced unity. Individuals in capitalism are essentially commodities, "which are viewed 
legally as equal, although qualitatively different" (Reasons and Rich 1978: 9). By viewing 
individuals in this way, the legal form successfully replaces the "actual needs of socially 
42 See Chapter 3 above 
43 This was, of course, written before the more recent work of Mieville. 
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differentiated individuals" with abstract concepts of "will" and "rights" (ibid: 9). Class 
differences are thus ignored, and the development of class consciousness is hindered. 
Critique 
Althusser's theory provoked hostility and reverence in equal measure, and was the central 
reference point for all British Marxism in the 1970s and early 1980s. For a time it seemed 
that if one was not amongst Althusser's 'disciples', then one defined oneself in opposition 
to their ideas and work. 
Of the many criticisms levelled at Aithusser's theory, perhaps the most fundamental were 
those that attacked not Althusser's work itself, but that of the structuralism that it was 
constructed upon. During the course of the 1970s structuralism began to fall out of 
fashion. As Bauman recounts, many sociologists became concerned about its ahistorical 
nature and its apparent inapplicability to advanced societies. Many also found the link 
between society and language untenable (1992: 211). 
Althusser's work itself was subject to a raft of more specific criticisms 44 Some found his 
theory of knowledge unattractive. Althusser correctly saw the limits of empiricism. 
However, in his desire to reject empiricism, he went too far and lapsed into a theoreticism 
where knowledge is held to work in a separate domain, divorced from real objects and not 
subject to empirical verification and re-verification. His notion that knowledge works on a 
'thought object' rather than the real object, and his theory of the 'generalities' led to the 
charge that he was an idealist (see Bottomore 1983: 17; Geras 1977: 262-72). The link 
suggested in the Preface between human ideas and consciousness and the relations of 
production is in danger of being lost in Althusser's scheme 45 
Related to this, Althusser's conception of philosophy as an external guarantee of validity to 
the sciences and the notion of ideology as the opposition to science and truth legitimised 
the separation of Marxism from everyday politics and struggles. Scientific Marxism 
44 A frequent, though relatively marginal, complaint against Althusser was his use of unwieldy, 
pretentious prose at the expense of clarity. He has been variously accused of "pretension and 
posturing" (Miller 1991: 10), and of making declarations "unargued and cryptic, smacking of evasion 
or apologia" (Bottomore 1983: 17). 
45 As Geras wryly remarks, it seems that "the real object is the object, 'but only in the last instance'" 
(1977: 244). 
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operated at a level above the concrete, and was thus effectively closed off from actual 
working class activity. This view justified the existence of an intellectual elite; such an elite 
would be adept in the 'sciences' and therefore properly qualified to use the scientific tool of 
Marxism. 46 
Althusser's epistemological break, although finding favour among many, was also the 
subject of a great deal of concern. Avineri neatly captures the thrust of the opposition: 
"Instead of considering the mature writings of Marx as a closed system with which his 
earlier writings must be confronted, I prefer to view Marx's life works as one corpus" (1968: 
2). Similarly, Vincent argues that "Marx worked his way towards his fundamental premises 
on political economy- which subsequently became the 'guiding thread' of his life's work- 
with philosophical and ethical tools. His decision to concentrate on the particular 
processes was clearly derived from this philosophical critique. This philosophical element 
underpins all his later work" (1993: 390). Althusser was, of course, free to select the part 
of Marx's oeuvre that he was most attracted to and that best suited his purposes. 
However, his mistake is surely that he denies those parts not selected the status of 
Marxism and attempts to draw very definite boundaries around what can be classed as 
authentically Marxist. 47 
46 This is not too dissimilar to Lenin's notion of the vanguard group of professional revolutionaries. 
Like Lenin's, Althusser's was a position with "serious political consequences" (Callinicos 1976: 101). 
It served to justify the Party, for it was only through the organisation of an intellectual elite that 
progress could be made. This in itself was unremarkable, for Althusser was theorising from within 
the PCF, and was under pressure to make his position acceptable to the leadership. However, 
according to some, Althusser provided Stalinism with the theoretical systematisation that it had 
lacked during Stalin's own lifetime (see Benton 1984: 202). "It is only in our own time that Stalinism 
has been given its true rigorous and totally coherent theoretical expression" wrote Thompson; "the 
Althusserians [... ] are working hard, every day, on the theoretical production line of Stalinist 
ideology" (1978: 333). Many French Trotskyists and PCF members agreed, and left the Party in the 
wake of Althusser's work to set up short-lived Maoist factions (Benton 1984: 16-7). Benton calls 
Thompson's charge "outrageous", arguing that by re-opening the channels of communication 
between French Marxism and the rest of French philosophy, Althusser can be said to have 
contributed to the de-Stalinising of Marxism (ibid: xi). Anderson also rejects Thompson's claim that 
Althusser provides a post facto theorisation of Stalinism (1980: Chapter 5). Benton does neatly 
outline Althusser's dilemma, however: anybody who sees Marxism as science, he argues, must 
outline how that science "can become a living force in history". Failure to do so means that "theory 
has no relevance to socialist practice ('theoreticism, Althusser calls this). Resolve it through 
imposition via a coercive party or state apparatus and you have Stalinism" (1984: 19-20). Thus, 
perhaps "one of the limits to Althusser's anti-Stalinism" is his refusal to separate the question of 
"'what is authentically Marxist? ' from the question 'what is authentically scientific? '" (ibid: 31). 
47 See the argument of Chapter 1 above. Of course, Althusser "was not obliged" to agree with 
anything that Marx wrote. However, "to pretend to have read in Marx the opposite of what is there 
is a form of obscurantism" (Bottomore 1983: 17). Bottomore is referring to Althusser's idea that 
Marx himself rejected his earlier works. On this point, see also Geras (1977: 259). 
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More pertinent here, however, is Althusser's failure to solve the problems of determination 
and base and superstructure. As outlined above, Althusser attempts to escape crude 
economist versions of determination. He does so by developing the more complex notions 
of structural causality, 'overdetermination' and 'determination in the last instance'. As 
Williams points out, this serves as a useful corrective to more orthodox Marxist notions of 
determination which. place far too much stress on economic processes or technological 
developments (1977: 88). However, Althusser's determination is not without its own 
problems. 
Crucially, as Laclau and Mouffe point out, Althusser fails to render the concept of 
'overdetermination' compatible with the notion of 'determination in the last instance': "If the 
economy is an object which can determine any type of society in the last instance, this 
means that, at least with reference to that instance, we are faced with simple 
determination and not overdetermination. If society has a last instance which determines 
its laws of motion, then the relations between the overdetermined instances and the last 
instance must be conceived in terms of simple, one directional determination by the latter" 
(1985: 98-9). Thus it appears that Althusser barely moves beyond the crudest Marxist 
notions of economic determination. 
Douzinas and Warrington agree. For them, "relative autonomy seems to give a linguistic 
rather than a theoretical answer to the bipolar opposition between determination and 
autonomy" (1991: 118). If Althusser were to stress the idea that the economy determines, 
even if only in the last instance, then there is still a clear causal relationship; the link 
between economic base and determined superstructure remains linear and mechanical. 
On the other hand, if Aithusser stressed the autonomy of the instances, then his theory 
would not fit the parameters of the Preface, where it is the relations of production that 
ultimately determine the superstructure. Indeed, for Douzinas and Warrington, if 
autonomy is emphasised, then the theory ceases to be Marxist (ibid: 119). This is 
asserted on the basis of what they call "Hall's law". According to Hall, "when we leave the 
terrain of 'determinations', we desert not just this or that stage in Marx's thought but his 
whole problematic" (1977: 52). 
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Althusser cannot offer a route out of this impasse because he does not leave space for an 
adequate theory of human agency. Such a theory would begin to make the link between 
base and superstructure more plausible, provided it could account for how the 
machinations of the relations of production. condition and shape human action. Yet 
Althusser, in his early works, not only fails to provide this space, but he explicitly denies 
that there is any need for it in the first place. His rejection of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty's 
existentialist Marxism leads him to argue that humans are but the supports of the mode of 
production, the passive units that fill in the spaces allocated to them by the process of 
capitalist production. This 'theoretical anti-humanism' completely removes the possibility 
of conscious human action effecting a change in society. 48 
This stance attracted a great deal of criticism. Althusser's response, as outlined above, 
was to distance himself from some of his earlier positions, and to rework some of his 
central concepts in order to create the theoretical space for active human intervention. 
Philosophy was recast as "class struggle in the field of theory" (Althusser 1976: 37), while 
ideology was retheorised as a permanent feature of society and the omnipresent 
framework for all action. Yet even these new concepts failed to resolve the difficulties, and 
remained beset with tensions carried over from the earlier work. The notion of philosophy 
as the class struggle in theory implies that it is intellectuals like Althusser who are at the 
forefront of the class struggle, and that such struggles take place on a philosophical level 
rather than at the point of production. The working class alone cannot constitute an 
adequate revolutionary agent. The new theory of ideology also suggests that, as the 
masses must always labour under ideology, it remains open for theoreticians to work at a 
level far removed from class struggle in pursuit of a pure theory, although whether and 
how intellectuals themselves can escape the fog of ideology is not clear. Both refinements 
do little to assuage fears of a lapse into theoreticism and idealism. Additionally, it is not 
clear that the notion of the permanence and omnipresence of ideology is compatible with 
Althusser's continued maintenance that Marxism is scientific. 49 
More importantly, Althusser's attempts to resolve the problem of human agency clearly do 
not provide a solution to the problem of determination. The old, flawed and incompatible 
48 Thompson was the most forceful critic of this idea. See especially The Poverty of Theory (1978). 
49 Indeed, there were doubts on many counts as to the compatibility of Althusser's refinements with 
his earlier work. See, for instance, Bottomore (1983: 17) and Geras (1977: 255-6,272) 
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notions of 'overdetermination' and 'determination in the last instance' are preserved. No 
clues are given as to how the relations of production condition the thought and 
consciousness of individuals, and how those individuals can shape and reshape the 
various levels of society. Instead, the populous are beholden to an ideology essentially 
imposed upon them from above which they have little, if any, opportunity to interact with 
and alter. 
Althusser's solution to the problem of base and superstructure is also problematic. 
Althusser attempts to abandon the crude base and superstructure metaphor by outlining 
an ontology of 'instances'. The economic, political and ideological instances are 
autonomous from one other, but are ultimately united in a structural conjuncture. This 
more complex social ontology has a distinct advantage over the more traditional base and 
superstructure metaphor, for it accepts that each instance has its own internal histories 
and development, and allows them to be studied in their 'specificity'. However, ultimately 
Althusser's idea of instances collapses for precisely the same reason as his theory of 
determination. If the economy determines the other instances, even if that determination 
is in 'the last instance', then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what Althusser 
presents is more verbose and unnecessarily complex version of the orthodox base and 
superstructure metaphor. There is little sense of the effects that the political and 
ideological instances can have upon the economic, or how exactly their interpenetrations 
and the notion of structural causality works. Society may be made up of a number of 
distinct instances, but if one of those instances is more fundamental than the others, then 
this is merely the old Marxist theory in new clothes. 
Given these problems with Althusser's theory, it is hardly surprising that the legal scholars 
that followed in his wake also failed to provide a robust jurisprudence. There was one 
significant advantage associated with Althusser's theory, however: It legitimised a more 
detailed study of law, for it conceptualised law as a specific instance with looser 
connections to the economic. This encouraged Althusserians to look at law in its 
specificity, and they offered a range of detailed analyses unencumbered by the need to 
conform to the tenets of Marxist orthodoxy. 
The general thrust of Althusserian legal scholarship echoed that of Pashukanis; they 
argued that "law serves the ruling class, not because its substance embodies their 
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interests, but because its form does" (Grau 1982: 207). Indeed, the further away from 
Althusser's own work they got, the more useful their insights become. Yet this in itself 
became a problem, for Althusserians tended to be perfunctory in their treatment of 
economic determination in the last instance and focussed almost exclusively "on the 
specific properties of the several regions as if they were autonomous" (Jessop 1980: 342). 
A number of criticisms can be levelled at each of the Althusserian theories of law outlined 
above on an individual basis. Poulantzas seems to overestimate the effectiveness of law 
as an ideological mechanism (Sumner 1979: 263). Does law really conceal from 
individuals the real nature of the class system and establish them as legal individuals as 
comprehensively as Poulantzas suggests? How would one then account for the industrial 
action that was rife when Poulantzas was writing, or, for instance, Paris 68? 
Edelman, according to Jessop, "offers no more than the trite observations that, law fixes 
and assures the realisation, as a natural given, of the sphere of circulation and thus makes 
capitalist production possible". He is silent on the structural limitations of the legal form 
(1980: 362). There is also a danger that his reduction of the law to a unitary sphere that 
corresponds to the needs of accumulation is too simplistic and misses the complex reality 
of law, which on the face of it seems to be shot through with a variety of competing 
interests (ibid: 361). Kamenka argues that Edelman turns Pashukanis' theory into 
Althusserian "jargon" and, more crucially, he "converts a problem about copyright that is 
partly infrajural and partly a specific problem of French law into a 'contradiction' of 
bourgeois conceptions of ownership" (1983: 51). 
Balbus' application of Pashukanis is criticised by Young. He suggests that Balbus does 
not offer "any substantive link between commodity fetishism and legal fetishism. Their 
coexistence is argued on the level of metaphor with the invocation of the notions of 
homology and functionality". Any legal devices that are not analogous to the commodity 
form are "baldly linked to the occurrence of decommodifciation" (1979: 24). 
As well as these individual problems, there are also a number of collective failures 
associated with Althusserian legal theory. Firstly, taken as a group these theories rely too 
much on the notion that individuals, be they workers or capitalists, are the "archetypal and 
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necessary form of capitalist organisation" (Hirst 1977b: 99). 50 This is in spite of Althusser's 
objections to humanist Marxisms and his view of people as the mere 'supports' of the 
mode of production. As a result of this reliance, Althusserian legal theories were unable to 
come to terms with the existence, and even dominance, of other forms of economic 
organisation and property ownership in capitalism, for instance the joint stock company or 
the corporation (ibid: 99). 
Secondly, despite the insights provided by the Althusserians' focus on ideology and 
interpellation, difficulties remain. Crucially, whatever the merits of Althusser's reformulated 
ideology thesis, it needs to be harnessed in a more robust conceptual scheme. 
Poulantzas talks of legal ideology as though its place in Althusserian scheme is assured 
and non-controversial, but this is not the case. Its relationship to Althusser's other 
concepts requires further elaboration, for it is by no means a given that the two are 
compatible. In addition the relationship of ideology to the relations of production needs to 
be carefully outlined. Yet Althusserian legal scholars proceed as though Althusser's 
theory of ideology is unproblematic. 
As Picciotto suggests, a key problem for Althusserian theories of law was "to explain how 
the 'relatively autonomous' legal logic and procedure can succeed in reinforcing and 
maintaining the wage-labour relation in a way that is functional for capital" (1979: 170). 
Their solution to this is problematic; the "functions and effects of law and ideology tend to 
be specified theoretically in advance of empirical analysis" (Cotterrell 1992: 116). Of 
course, this tendency is hardly surprising, given that Althusser himself held that theoretical 
work can legitimately take place completely sealed off from the real world, a world whose 
essence cannot be properly grasped anyway. This leads to a functionalism, where it is 
assumed that the needs of the mode of production will be met (ibid: 116). Poulantzas 
provides a good example of this when he claims that the state plays a role in forging 
individualist ideology. Yet "to explain the advantages of juridical ideology for the rulers (in 
terms of its 'isolation effect' on the working class) does not explain how this ideology came 
into being" (Fine 1979: 36). This functionalism also tends to lead back to an economic 
determinism. The law supports the needs of the social system, and these needs are 
50 Note that Hirst is not only directing his criticisms at structuralist theories of law: "The position on 
property right I am criticising is no aberration of one particular and divergent 'school' of Marxists" 
(1979b: 100). 
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ultimately determined by the economy, even if only in the last instance. As Grau suggests, 
structuralists reduce form to a reflection of ruling class interests (1982: 207). It seems that 
Althusserian theories of law fall into the very trap that they set out to avoid. 
A final and related problem is the "simple equation of law with state" (Grau 1982: 199). 
Despite the notion of 'instances' allowing a more detailed study of the specificity of law, the 
state and law tend to be seen as functionally identical. Both institutions are held to 
operate in order to guarantee the reproduction of the mode of production. As such they 
are frequently conflated, if only implicitly. 51 Indeed the same could be said of all of 
Althusser's ISAs; do the state, the law, schools, the media, churches and the like really all 
pull in the same direction by functioning to preserve the mode of production? 52 
These problems with Althusserian legal theories severely curtail their usefulness. 
However, what is more pertinent is their collective and now familiar failure to resolve the 
problems of determination and base and superstructure. 
Following Althusser, the orthodox Marxist view of economic causation is abandoned in 
favour of the somewhat ill-defined notions of 'structural causality' and 'determination in the 
last instance'. How does determination 'in the last instance' occur, and what are the 
mechanisms for the process? Althusser's jurisprudential followers add no further insights. 
Ultimately, Althusser's concept of determination cannot help but collapse into the very 
economism that he and his followers purported to reject. 53 These problems are 
compounded by the Althusserians' reluctance to theorise on the role of human agency in 
the process of creating law; again, this omission is hardly surprising, for it is demanded by 
the parent theory. 
The difficulties associated with Althusser's rejection of the base and superstructure 
metaphor are also not adequately addressed by the legal scholars he influenced. Means 
to avoid the collapse back into an orthodox ontology of a determining base and determined 
superstructure are not outlined. The potential for law to interpenetrate, affect and even 
constitute the economic level is not adequately addressed; as Cotterrell puts it, the relative 
51 As suggested above, this criticism also applies to the instrumentalist theories of law. 52 For other criticisms of Althusser's theory of ISAs and RSAs, see Benton (1984: 101-5) 53 Poulantzas goes some way to conceding this when he accepts that that law's roots have to be 
sought in the social division of labour and the relations of production" (1978: 86). 
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autonomy formulation adopted by Althusserian legal scholars "often merely ignores the 
difficult problem of specifying the exact nature of the relationship between law and 
economic structure" (1992: 116). Poulantzas is particularly vulnerable to this criticism; the 
sheer scope and weight of his work on the 'instances' leads to a degree of 
"overpoliticisation" (Jessop 1980: 358). Once again, Althusserian legal theorists do little to 
advance the original framework that inspired them. 
The Influence of 1970s Instrumentalism and Structuralism 
In a sense, during the 1970s, Marxist legal theory blossomed. Never before had there 
been such interest in the way that Marxism could shed light on the institution of law, and 
there was certainly a sense among some that their theoretical endeavours could contribute 
to the process of concrete change in society. Yet the instrumentalists and Althusserians of 
the 1970s collectively failed to provide answers to the problems of determination and base 
and superstructure that are so crucial. These theoretical difficulties, and the difficulties 
that Marxism in general soon began to encounter, 54 ensured that the influence of the 
1970s Marxist legal scholars was surprisingly brief and modest. 
It was gradually realised that the crude instrumentalist perspective, if it was to avoid 
collapsing into a conspiratorial theory where the ruling class cleverly manipulated society 
and its institutions for their own ends, required extension and supplementation. From the 
late 1970s and into the 1980s, Marxists began to take seriously the need to produce a 
sophisticated theory of ideology to help account for the formation of class interests. The 
fruits of this engagement will be analysed below. 55 
Althusser's star burned brightly but briefly. By the beginning of the 1980s his position was 
largely discredited, and the Althusserian 'moment' had passed. Indeed, as early as 1984 
Ted Benton was able to title his book The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism. In one 
sense Althusser provides the clearest evidence of the context-bound nature of theory; 
once the circumstances that gave rise to Althusser's thought had passed, it withered away, 
so to speak, remarkably quickly. 
sa See Introduction and Chapter 1 above. 
55 See Chapter 5 below. 
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Laclau (1990) suggests two key reasons for the sudden disappearance of the Althusserian 
school. Firstly, it had little time to mature intellectually as the events of 1968 led to an 
explosion of interest and new interpretations of Marx's holy texts. Althusser's key works 
were old news almost before they had been published, particularly with the delay in 
publication in English. 56 Secondly, Althusser's work was conceived as an attempt at 
internal theoretical renewal of the PCF. This project gradually lost its significance in the 
1970s. As McLellan intimates, Althusser's disappearance was at least partly due to the 
fact that as a member of the PCF his work was intended to contribute to revolutionary 
class struggle (1999b: 959-60). As this prospect receded, so to did Althusser's 
prominence. 57 
For all his flaws, it would be remiss not to note Althusser's achievements. Walton and 
Gamble, critics who reject the notion of the epistemological break, recognise his 
accomplishments. For them, "Althusser's strength is that he insists on the centrality of the 
theoretical. He recognises that from the point of view of contemporary Marxism, textual 
exegesis of Marx's work have little interest. What is important is to understand Marxism as 
a theory, to look for the coherences and the absences in Marx's system of concepts, and 
to grasp the object these concepts create" (1972: 140). In addition, Althusser's theory of 
ideology as the permanent 'cement' of society became increasingly influential both within 
and outside of Marxism, particularly once uncoupled from its theoretical moorings in 
Althusser's early work. 58 It is also important to acknowledge Althusser's recognition of the 
flaws in other forms of Marxism, despite his failure to fully transcend them. Through this 
recognition, however, he did "leave the field open" for new efforts at reconstructing 
Marxism, chiefly Laclau and Mouffe's (Torfang 1999: 2). 
The body of work produced by instrumentalists and Althusserians over the course of the 
1970s may not have provided a comprehensive and robust Marxist legal theory. 
56 For Marx (1965) and Reading Capital (1968) were only published in English in 1969 and 1970 
respectively. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, containing work from throughout the 60s, 
was published in English in 1971. 
57 On Althusser's self-criticism and revisions, see Benton (1984: Ch 5). On Althusserianism's 
decomposition and the critical attacks launched on it, see Benton (1984: Part 3). Sadly, Althusser 
was admitted to a psychiatric hospital in 1980 after admitting to the killing of his wife. Upon release 
in 1983, he lived reclusively until his death in 1990. The end of Poulantzas' life was also tragic; he 
committed suicide in 1979. 
58 See Chapter 5 below. 
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Nevertheless, it did provide the intellectual context and point of departure for the next 
wave of Marxist legal theory. 
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CHAPTER 5. SALVAGING THE MARXIST THEORY OF LAW 
Despite the explosion of Marxist thinking on law during the 1970s, the collective efforts of a 
multitude of scholars failed to produce a satisfactory theory. Gradually, however, 
increasing interest in the concept of ideology began to suggest that there was still potential 
for such a theory. However, it was not until Hugh Collins' 1982 work Marxism and Law 
that this potential was realised. It is this work that will form the focus of this chapter. 
Hugh Collins' Marxism and Law 
Context 
The proliferation of academic interest in Marx that occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s 
coincided with a period of great social upheaval. The events in Paris in 1968, set against 
a backdrop of increasing political activism, and the deepening capitalist crises of the 
1970s, suggested to Marxist scholars that revolutionary change was not only possible, but 
may even be imminent. Furthermore, there was a feeling amongst such scholars that their 
work could contribute to the success of any movement for change. The polemical 
confidence of much of this work is startling today. ' 
Yet these revolutionary hopes soon faded, and the 'New Right' gained a political foothold. 
There was a sharp decline in the number of works that were conceived as political 
interventions with the explicit aim of contributing to an upsurge in revolutionary 
consciousness. According to McLellan, "the late 1970s was characterised by a post-coital 
tristesse compared to the excitement of the previous decade" (1999b: 960). Alternative 
theoretical perspectives, most notably postmodernism, quickly began to grow in 
popularity. 2 
Nevertheless, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, a healthy level of interest in Marxist 
theory persisted. Many thinkers saw a great deal of latent, unrealised potential in it, and 
works that set out to address the theoretical difficulties of Marxism remained common. 3 
These works, as theoretical ones, tended to be purely academic excursions. Their aim 
1 See especially Quinney (1973). 
2 See Introduction above. 
3 Most notably GA Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (1978). 
117 
was not expressly political; rather, the intention was simply to produce a more workable 
and robust theoretical framework. Collins' Marxism and Law (1982) fell precisely into this 
category. As such, it mattered little that Marxism's momentum had faltered; Collins' was 
an attempt to resolve the theoretical impasse of Marxist legal scholarship .4 
Despite the failure to develop a satisfactory Marxist theory of law, valuable progress had 
been made over the course of the decade. Collins harnessed some of these advances. 
Crucially, he placed ideology at the heart of his approach. This concept had a long history 
in the Marxist tradition; indeed, it was the writings of Marx that "gave the concept of 
ideology the wide currency that it now enjoys" (McLellan 1995: 9). 5 However, during the 
1970s, interest in the concept, and deployments and developments of it, increased 
exponentially; for Hunt, it was "no accident" that advances in Marxist legal thinking were 
accelerated once ideology began to be taken seriously (1985: 13-4). The heightened 
interest in ideology was the result of a number of factors. Firstly, there was an increasing 
awareness of the work of Antonio Gramsci, particularly his notion of hegemony (Vincent 
1993: 374). 6 In the Anglophone world this interest was fostered by the translation of his 
writings through the 1960s and 70s; Selections from the Prison Notebooks, for instance, 
was published in English in 1971. Secondly, Althusser's Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses (1971) gave the concept currency among the then booming structuralist 
movement. ' Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, was the need to theoretically 
understand the persistence of capitalism. Despite the social upheavals of the 1960s, the 
shock of Paris 68, and the crises of the 1970s, capitalism had proven remarkably durable 
and the perceived prospects of revolutionary change sharply receded as the 70s 
progressed. Ideology and the notion of hegemony provided a means to theoretically 
understand this. 8 
° Note that Collins does outline the political implications of his theory in the final chapter of Marxism 
and Law, 'Class Struggle and the Rule of Law' (1982: 124-46). 
5 See'Theory' section below. 
6 Indeed, Gramsci's famous aphorism regarding the 'pessimism of the intellect' fitted the prevailing 
mood of late 70s and early 80s Marxism perfectly. Of course, in the same breath Gramsci also 
called for "optimism of the will" (1978: 19). 
7 Albrow characterises the development of Marxist legal theory during the 1970s as a movement 
"from a Gramscian interest in politics to an Althusserian interest in ideology and finding in law a 
bridge between the two" (1981: 127). 
8 Interestingly, it was largely the same concerns that had prompted the rise of Western Marxism half 
a century before. Thinkers such as Gramsci and the members of the Frankfurt School asked how 
capitalism had sustained itself in the face of economic depression and war. 
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Collins' overwhelmingly theoretical bent marks him out from almost all the other legal 
scholars that have been considered thus far. As Eagelton puts it, Marx's aim was to 
"fashion a kind of practical philosophy which will help transform what it is seeking to 
comprehend"; his was an "action oriented theory" (1997: 3). Correspondingly, Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, Renner, Pashukanis and Althusser were all politically committed, and 
combined their theoretical concerns with more practical endeavours, be it party 
membership or the leading of a successful revolutionary movement. Tellingly, Collins has 
never returned to the subject since. 9 
Theory 
Collins explicitly sets out to resolve the problems of determination and base and 
superstructure. As he puts it, the first task is to "differentiate clearly between the material 
base and all aspects of the superstructure. If we should fail to disentangle the political, 
legal and cultural aspects of a society from its relations of production, then Marxism would 
lapse into incoherence. Second, the mechanisms by which the material base determines 
the form and content of the superstructure have to be explained" (Collins 1982: 77). 
Although he draws upon an eclectic range of Marxist thinkers and ideas to resolve these 
difficulties, fundamentally his is a class instrumentalist position. His solution to the 
problem of base and superstructure will be considered below. Firstly, his solution to the 
problem of determination will be outlined. 
Collins attempts to provide an attractive and workable theory of the determination of the 
legal by the economic without lapsing into reductionism. After the convoluted efforts of 
Althusser to escape 'economism', Collins recognises that for any Marxism some notion of 
economic determination must, ultimately, be preserved. This is particularly the case for a 
Marxism based upon the Preface. As Douzinas and Warrington put it, "whatever degree of 
conceptual or verbal sophistication is introduced in the base-superstructure metaphor, 
economic determinism cannot be fully exorcised [... ] The priority may be defined as 
causal, methodological or even aesthetic, the superstructure may be given maximum 
autonomy consistent with the scheme. But the way the question is posed already 
concedes the main point. The search for a determined autonomy will always discover 
Indeed, Marxism and Law is written in a style which suggests that Collins has very little 
attachment to Marxism at all. The book outlines what a defensible Marxist theory of law looks like; 
that Collins would actually support such a theory is less clear. 
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necessity at the relatively determining and contingency at the relatively autonomous [... ] 
This cleavage cannot be closed" (1991: 120). Collins accepts this, but maintains the 
possibility of an attractive theory; such a theory is possible if room is created for human 
agency. 
Collins is well aware that his instrumentalist predecessors, going back to Lenin, failed to 
adequately resolve the problem of determination. 10 Collectively, they are unable to explain 
"how the ruling class become aware of their interests and then act as one body in pursuit 
of them" (Collins 1982: 35). This is the defect that Collins' theory of ideology is designed 
to remedy. In both Marxism and social and political science more widely, ideology is a 
notoriously slippery and elusive concept. The term has become associated with a variety 
of different meanings; no single uncontested and uncontroversial concept of ideology 
exists. " Thus Collins is forced to outline very precisely what his own use of the term 
entails. 
Two basic approaches to ideology have developed within Marxism: Larrain terms them 
the 'negative' and the 'positive' approach (1983: 4). Marx's own work; which Larrain 
claims for the negative tradition (ibid: 42), can be divided into three stages. The first stage, 
in his early writings up to 1844, consists in a critique of religion and the Hegelian 
conception of the state. Marx describes these as 'inversions' concealing the real character 
of things; the term 'ideology' is not used. During the second stage, from 1845 until 1857 
and exemplified best by The German Ideology, Marx introduces the word 'ideology' to 
describe those thought-systems that start from consciousness rather than the real, 
material world. As Marx and Engels memorably put it in the Preface to The German 
Ideology "Once upon a time a valiant fellow had the idea that men were drowned in water 
only because they were possessed with the idea of gravity. If they were to knock this 
notion out of their heads, say by stating it to be a superstition, a religious concept, they 
would be sublimely proof against any danger from water" (1970: 37). Instead, Marx and 
Engels "do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, 
thought of, imagined conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real 
active men, and on the basis of their real life processes we demonstrate the development 
of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process" (ibid: 47). There are a number 
10 See Chapters 2 and 4 above. 11 Indeed, Eagleton lists 16 "definitions of ideology currently in circulation" (1991: 1-2). See also, 
inter alia, Miller (1991: 235-7), McLellan (1995: 1) and Heywood (2003: 5). 
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of problems with this passage, not least the language of "reflexes and echoes", which 
lends support to crude materialist notions of the superstructure reflecting the base 
(Williams 1977: 59). Nevertheless the general thrust against idealism is clear. The third 
stage in Marx's work on ideology again saw the actual term largely disappear. Beginning 
with the Grundrisee and culminating in Capital Marx reworked the idea of inversion 
through a detailed analysis of capitalist social relations. Here, ideology conceals "the 
hidden essential pattern by focusing on the way in which the economic relations appear on 
the surface" (Bottomore 1983: 220). 
As Larrian argues, "although the elements of Marx's concept of ideology are scattered, are 
not systematically elaborated and are sometimes ambiguously presented, there is a 
remarkable continuity and consistency in Marx's treatment". The perspectives that Marx 
offers are "complementary and progressively complex, not contradictory" (1983: 41). 
Larrain claims that Marx cultivated a 'critical' and 'negative' approach to ideology: 
Ideology arises where contradictions exist in order to mystify or conceal those 
contradictions. 
Despite this basic and persistent theme, there is support for different conceptions of 
ideology in Marx's work. Sumner accepts that Marx and Engels used ideology to refer to 
false representations, but "such statements do not warrant a conclusion that ideologies 
always mask and thereby sustain social structures". Sumner suggests that Marx's 
'ideology' could reasonably and defensibly be said to include "sentiments, illusions, modes 
of thought, views of life, principles, ideas and categories. None of these things themselves 
seem to be the sole referent of ideology in Marx's work" (1979: 12-13). Larrian concedes 
that there are the seeds of a 'positive' and 'neutral' conception of ideology in Marx's 
work. 12 Most notably, the Preface seems to refer to ideology not as a veil masking the real 
nature of things, but as an all-encompassing superstructural form: "a distinction should 
always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of 
production [... ], and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic- in short, 
12 On the precise meaning of 'positive' and 'neutral', see Larrain (1983: 239 n. 73). For him, 
'positive' refers to the idea that "the same notion of ideology expresses the political ideas and 
interests of all classes in society'. Intrinsically related to this, the term 'neutral' "refers to the fact 
that this notion of ideology no longer passes judgement upon the validity or adequacy of ideas". 
The conception advanced by Marx in The German Ideology, meanwhile, can be described as 
'negative' and 'critical'; Negative in the sense that it refers not to ideas and interests in general, but 
only those that mystify reality, and as this implies that those ideas are not accurate representations 
of that reality, critical. 
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ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out" (Marx 
1962: 363). Similarly, Engels talks of the "ideological superstructure" and "ideological 
sphere" in Anti Duhring (1969: Ch 9). 13 
As a result of these ambiguities, there was potential for a 'positive' conception of ideology 
to flourish. Two additional factors ensured that this potential was realised. Firstly, there 
was a growing need to theoretically account for "the political ideas of the classes in 
conflict" (Bottomore 1983: 221). 14 The positive conception allowed this task to be fulfilled 
more readily than the neutral one. Secondly, the ascendancy of the positive conception 
was assured to a large extent by the fact that "the first two generations of Marxist thinkers 
after Marx's death did not have access to The German Ideology" (Larrain 1983: 54); key 
Marxists such as Lenin, Gramsci and Lukacs "were not acquainted with Marx' and Engels' 
most forceful argumentation in favour of a negative conception of ideology" (Bottomore 
1983: 221). 15 In the absence of The German Ideology, Marx's other statements on 
ideology, supporting the positive conception, were elevated to a greater level of 
importance. 
The first significant break from Marx' and Engels' negative conception of ideology was 
provided by Lenin. He argued that all classes in society had an associated ideology. 
Ideologies were not 'false' as such, but were to be judged according to their utility in the 
revolutionary struggle. 16 Following Lenin, Lukacs continued the move away from the 
negative conception of ideology. Throughout his oeuvre, "there is overwhelming evidence 
that Lukacs conceived of ideologies as expressions of different class interests, and in 
struggle with one another" (Larrain 1983: 71). In History and Class Consciousness, 
Lukacs emphasises that "we can only be liberated by knowledge" (Lukacs 1971: 262); a 
change in class consciousness can effect a change in actual class situation. Hence, 
"power is ultimately ideological. A ruling class dominates and organises its social totality 
by the impregnation of it by its own consciousness". Lukacs claims that the proletariat, by 
virtue of its structural position as the alienated class of capitalism, is the "first class to 
13 Despite this, Carver notes that it was Engels who most avidly promoted the idea of ideology as 
'false consciousnesses' opposed to science, for it fitted with his view of science as truth. He 
castigates Engels for coining the phrase 'false consciousness', which is "poorly thought through and 
productive of muddle", and thus "typical" of Engels (2001: 39). 4 See also Anderson (1976: 7,11) on this point. 
15 The crucial Part 1 of The German Ideology, 'Feuerbach', was first published in Russian in 1924 
and in German in 1926. 
16 See Chapter 2 above. 
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acquire an adequate social comprehension of society and history" (Stedman Jones 1977: 
44-6); it is the 'identical subject-object of history'. Hence the development of proletarian 
ideology is crucial if capitalism is to be overthrown. Lukacs' latent Hegelian idealism is 
clear, but what is crucial here is this furtherance of the positive conception of ideology. 
It was the theories of Antonio Gramsci that truly confirmed the ascendancy of the positive 
conception of ideology. Gramsci used the concepts of ideology and hegemony as part of 
his attempt to theorise away from the rapidly ossifying and outmoded Marxist orthodoxy. 
That orthodoxy, best represented by Kautsky and Plekhanov, suggested that "the unity 
and autonomy of the working class, and the collapse of the capitalist system, virtually 
appeared as facts of experience" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 17); reality, it was felt, would 
eventually coincide with classical Marxist theory, and any appearances to the contrary 
were merely transitory. " That capitalist collapse did not occur in the West, despite the 
turmoil of war, economic depression and the example of the Bolsheviks, provided Gramsci 
with his intellectual point of departure; he was concerned with the means by which 
capitalism had managed to survive these crises. 
For Gramsci, it is the dominant ideology that legitimises the dominance of the ruling class. 
These "ideological formations correspond to the interests of the dominant class"; however, 
"they cannot be reduced to mere emanations or epiphenomena of the structure" 
(Merrington 1977: 152). Instead, the dominant ideology is actively cultivated in both public 
and private institutions by intellectuals who exercise an "organisational function" (Gramsci 
1971: 97). Indeed, "the world view of the ruling class was so thoroughly diffused by its 
intellectuals as to become the 'common sense' of the whole society, the 'structure of 
feeling' in which it lived" (McLellan 1995: 27). Hegemony is thus established. The 
overwhelming power of ideology and its utility to those in power leads Gramsci to redefine 
the state as force plus consent, or as he puts it, "hegemony protected by the armour of 
coercion" (Gramsci 1971: 263). Within this, force (or coercion) is provided by political 
society, and consent (or hegemony) is provided by civil society. 18 
17 Conversely, Bernstein's revisionism can be regarded as an attempt to accept and work within the 
developments of the capitalist mode of production (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 29-36). 
18 Some relatively recent work picks up these Gramsican notions. Hall et al (1978) argue that in 
response to crises of authority and the economy, by the 1970s there developed a series of 'moral 
panics' (following Cohen (1972)). These culminated in a general 'law and order' campaign which 
reinforced the element of coercion in bourgeois hegemony and compensated for the decline in 
spontaneous consent. Similarly, Jessop places the work of Hay et al (1975) in the Gramscian camp 
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On the basis of Gramsci's analysis, it becomes crucial for the working class, through the 
mechanism of the party, to develop its own 'organic intellectuals'. Only then can the 
working class challenge the hegemony of the ruling class by developing its own 'counter- 
hegemony' and engaging in a 'war of position'. 19 Once a working class counter-culture 
has gained hegemony in civil society, the full frontal attack on the capitalist state can 
begin. Ideology is thus conceived as a site of struggle. Once again, it is clear that this 
'positive' conception of ideology stands a considerable distance from Marx's own. 20 
Althusser was initially hostile to Gramsci's historicism, but he openly acknowledged that 
Gramsci provided the intellectual precedent for his own notion of ISAs and RSAs in 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (1971: 136 n. 7). In arguing for the permanence 
of ideology in all forms of society as the indispensable framework for every action, 
Althusser's essay represents the culmination of the positive conception of ideology in 
Marxism. 21 With his intellectual cachet, Althusser's work also served to accelerate interest 
in ideology among Marxists to an unprecedented degree. 22 
Collins' Marxist theory of ideology belongs firmly in the positive tradition. He begins by 
contrasting the Marxist positive conception of ideology with the idealist notion of how ideas 
are formulated. Hegel had famously argued that the motor of historical progress lay in the 
dialectal transcendence of contradictory world-views. Such world-views were immanent in 
the human mind, and could be discovered by reason and reflection. Collins, following 
Marx, rejects this; he argues that knowledge and ideas are neither "arbitrary flights of the 
(1980: 363). See also Cain (1983) for a detailed take on Gramsci's 'narrow' and 'wide' conceptions 
of the state, and Williams (1977: 108-113) for a critical appreciation of Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony. 
19 Despite Gramsci's opposition to reformism his notion of the 'war of position' and the concept of 
'permanent revolution' influenced reformists such as those in the Eurocommunist movement 
ýBottomore 1983: 195). 
° Within Gramsci's scheme, law figures at the levels of both state and civil society. At the former 
level law operates "coercively to maintain hegemony, and directively in periods of ideological and 
political crisis". At the latter level, legal enactments "educate and adapt the masses to the goals of 
civil society" (Sumner 1979: 257). 
21 As suggested above, however, Althusser ultimately struggled to reconcile the notion of ideology 
as the cement that binds together all societies with his earlier insistence that ideology is the 
opposite of science. See Chapter 4 above. For a detailed critique of Althusser on ideology, see 
Sumner (1979: 25-50). 
22 Spitzer (1983: 114) notes this increase in work on ideology, citing the work of Lichtman (1975), 
Kellner (1978), Hirst (1979), and Sumner (1979). 
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imagination nor the product of research into the recesses of the mind, " but are in fact 
"constructed in response to practical experiences" (Collins 1982: 37). 
The view that knowledge and ideas are responses to practical experiences is consistent 
with the empiricism associated with crude materialism and much of the work of Engels. Its 
"central tenet [... ] is that the position of participants in the exploitation of natural resources 
determines what data they receive and what world views they form. Thus their ideas are 
reflections of productive activities, the relations of production". For Collins, this "simple" 
materialism is unsatisfactory (Collins 1982: 37). 3A more sophisticated materialism is 
necessary. This is because, firstly, "men are not the passive recipients of ideas from an 
external world" (ibid: 37). Instead, there is an interaction between consciousness and 
material circumstances. Deliberate human action can lead to a change in material 
circumstances, and this in turn affects consciousness. Secondly, empiricism is flawed as 
men's ideas and consciousness do not automatically 'reflect' the real material world. 
Instead, knowledge is formed "through the ideological classification and comprehension of 
sense perceptions [... ] these ideologies act as grids for analysing experiences" (ibid: 38). 
Williams makes a similar point. He suggests that consciousness and its products "are 
always, though in variable forms, parts of the material social process itself (1977: 61). 
According to this more sophisticated materialism, each individual carries with them an 
"ideological grid", which is formed in the processes of socialisation and education. 24 It is 
by means of this grid that "experience is translated into knowledge". The "continual 
interaction between thought and'practice" ensures that the grid is fluid rather than static 
(Collins 1982: 38-9). As Douzinas and Warrington put it, "people in everyday life get on by 
using an unnoticed but extensive grid of tacit meanings about the world, its objects and 
institutions, and the acceptable forms of social behaviour. These meanings have not been 
explicitly installed, nor are we fully aware of their existence or function. We are socialised 
into them by imitation, usage, and custom" (1991: 33). Bourdieu also deploys a similar 
idea. He argues that individuals posses powers of regulated improvisation which are 
shaped by experience. These powers allow an endless capacity to engender products; 
thoughts, perceptions, expressions, and actions. The limits to these products are set by 
the historically situated conditions of their production. The result is something of a halfway 
23 See Chapter 2 above. 
24 The concept of an 'ideological grid' was previously deployed by Sumner (1979). 
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house between idealism and crude materialism; it is neither unconstrained freedom 
leading to the creation of unpredictable novelty, nor is it the simple mechanical 
reproduction of initial conditionings (Bourdieu 1977: 95; Harvey 1989: 345). This is 
precisely the middle ground, according to Collins, that Marx himself was aiming for (1982: 
36). 
With this concept of ideology, class instrumentalist theory is provided with the means to 
avoid its traditional weaknesses. 25 Law is not merely a 'tool' of the ruling class, used to 
ensure the subordination of the masses, as crude instrumentalism supposes. Instead, 
groups which hold power in a society, by virtue of their similar positions, similar roles and 
similar experiences of the productive processes, also share similar ideologies; "The ruling 
class share common perceptions of interest as a result of similar processes of socialisation 
and experiences of productive activities. A consensus of values is established by the 
transmission of ideologies and their vindication through practical work" (Collins 1982: 40). 
As such, the ruling class enact "laws pursuant to that ideology", an ideology that 
"permeates their perceptions of interest". Objective class positions need not even be 
clearly perceived, and the theory does not require that that the ruling class develops an 
ideology that always represents its best interests. Instead the theory merely holds that 
people who occupy similar positions in relation to the productive process are likely to 
develop similar ideas precisely as a result of their shared position. Furthermore, there is 
certainly no conspiracy among an elite group that "deliberately sets out to crush 
opposition". Quite the opposite, in fact; the ruling classes' "perceptions of interest will 
appear to be the natural order of things since they are confirmed by everyday experience". 
Hence, laws will not be enacted with the aim of oppressing subordinate classes. Instead, 
the ruling class will simply have the maintenance of social and economic order in mind 
(ibid: 43). 
The ideology of the ruling class in society becomes the "dominant ideology" (Collins 1982: 
43). It permeates and is promulgated by the institutions of power and authority, and as 
such is largely adopted by the subordinate classes. Here, Gramsci and Althusser's ideas 
about the working class being bombarded with propaganda containing the dominant 
ideology are particularly important (ibid: 50). Althusser's theory of ISAs (1971), for 
instance, suggests how schools, churches, the media and so on inculcate the dominant 
25 See Chapters 2 and 4 above on these weaknesses. 
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ideology among the masses. 26 According to Collins, this dominant ideology is not only 
omnipresent, but it is also 'plastic'; it can be stretched to cover matters not immediately 
relevant to the productive process. For instance, the ruling classes "support through law 
for the established church or familial responsibilities can be accounted for by extensions of 
ideologies which are pertinent to practices in the relations of production. The church 
teaches deference to authority and private property, which could be useful to the owner of 
the means of production seeking to discipline his workforce. Similarly, familial ties such as 
paternal control over marriages of his offspring could be linked to dominant ideologies 
concerning ownership and disposition of property". Across the variety of interest groups 
and issues; then, is an "underlying unity of perceptions and values steered by the 
ideologies of the dominant class" (Collins 1982: 57) 
A number of further points are worth making about this notion of ideology. Firstly, there is 
"the possibility of divergences, inconsistencies, gaps and changes. The origin of the 
ideology in social practice permits individuals to express the variety of their experiences in 
diverse ideas and values [... ] there is always scope for a different interpretation of a set of 
production relations" (Collins 1982: 71). In short, the theory provides scope for human 
agency. This is inherent in the theory; as Sumner puts it, "each individual surely embodies 
a unique configuration of social experiences, structures and ideologies" (1979: 219). 
Moreover, according to Collins, "not every detail of ideologies is influenced directly by the 
relations of production. Only the broad outlines and elementary themes of the dominant 
ideology are determined by social practices within the mode of production" (1982: 43). 
Sumner adds that ideologies can also form in non-economic practices, for "social relations 
take more than an economic form" (1979: 216). Thus "law is not just a reflex of economic 
structures but also a reflex of political and cultural relations" (ibid: 253). Clearly, this 
provides space for human individuality and idiosyncrasy, but there are structural limits to 
the kinds of ideologies that are likely to form, 7 and a finite number of common 
interpretations of social relations; for instance, few would interpret slave relations as being 
'free'. Furthermore, those ideologies formed in non-economic practices will always 
iinevitably be shot through with the effects of one's position in the relations of production. 
Simultaneously, the fact that those with access to power are likely to occupy similar 
positions in the relations of production ensures the broad consistency of the legal order. 
28 For criticisms of Aithusser's theory of ideology and ISAs, see Chapter 5 above. 
27 See Sumner (1979: 220-222) and Chapter 8 below. 
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This is because by virtue of their similar positions in the relations of production they will 
share similar ideologies. 
Secondly, as already alluded to, ideology can no longer be seen as a superstructural 
phenomenon. Instead, as Althusser suggested, all social practice occurs within ideology. 
As Sumner puts it, "the concept of the ideology-social formation link as a connection 
between externals is a false one. [... ] Ideology [... ] is not a thought-mirror of the social 
formation but an active aspect of social practice and hence an integral, determinant part of 
the social formation at various levels" (1979: 35). And again; "the old notion of ideology as 
a gaseous effect of the economic structure is inadequate and must be replaced by a 
conception of ideology as an integral and substantive element of all social practice. In this 
way, ideology is an active force within all aspects of social development and not just an 
animal that roams around the ephemeral reserves of the superstructure" (ibid: 290). 
Thirdly, this conception of ideology entails that all ideologies "must always in a sense be 
true for they incorporate plausible conceptions of reality" (Sumner 1979: 287). The 
opposition between truth and falsity is thus rendered inappropriate; "all understandings, 
ideas and perceptions are obviously perfectly sensible" (ibid: 287). "Criteria of truth and 
falsity become unrealisable, " adds McKenzie, "because there is no original, non- 
ideological moment against which to judge them" (1994: 19-20). Williams agrees: If 
ideology is the complicated process within which men become aware of their interests, 
then the "distinction between 'true' and 'false' consciousness is then effectively 
abandoned, as in all practice it has to be" (1977: 68). Law, then, embodies appearances 
"as they have been seen and interpreted by the classes and groups that make the law" 
(Sumner 1979: 265). The phrase 'false consciousness', if it is to be retained at all, can 
now simply refer to the adoption of the dominant ideology of the ruling classes by the 
subordinate classes: "To the extent that this dominant ideology fails to match up to their 
experiences it is a misleading form of consciousness" (Collins 1982: 40). 28 
28 Sumner maintains that some ideologies are "more accurate representations of reality than others 
[... ] relations of accuracy between discourse and reality are real phenomena" (1979: 291). On this 
basis Parekh (1982) suggests that the two notions of ideology in Marx can be reconciled. He 
argues that for Marx "an ideology is a body of thought systematically biased towards a specific 
social group". This bias is "socially derived". But according to Parekh, Marx "continued to uphold 
the traditional concept of objective truth". This is possible if one accepts that "ideological thought 
owes its origin to the lack of social self-consciousness and self-criticism, and the consequent 
unwitting acceptance of the characteristic forms of thought of one's own social group". So an 
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Finally, this theory of ideology suggests how the legal system consistently works in favour 
of the ruling classes, despite the fact that law is not simply a 'tool' of the powerful. Collins 
adopts the Althusserian theory of the 'relative autonomy' of the state. According to Collins, 
the state's autonomy is derived from the fact that, contrary to the feudal system, economic 
status under the capitalist mode of production requires little political support. This is 
because capitalism primarily relies on the "dull compulsion of economic necessity to 
preserve the continuity of the processes by which surplus value is extracted" (1982: 131). 29 
As a result, the state is merely required to "guarantee the inviolability of private property 
and to provide a reliable system for the enforcement of contracts". Thus there is a 
relatively miniscule amount of direct manipulation of the organs of political power by those 
with economic power (ibid: 131). This entails that subordinate classes do have some 
access to the state and the legal system. However, any action by subordinate classes to 
utilise the machinery of the state to force legal reforms is likely to be rendered toothless for 
two reasons. Initially, the dominant ideology of the ruling class, in the absence of a well 
developed counter-ideology, sets the bounds of all action. The pervasiveness of the 
dominant ideology ensures that working class initiatives are invariably "founded on 
bourgeois conceptions of rights" (Collins 1982: 51). Thus, "the apparent variety of interest 
groups conceals [... ] an underlying unity of perceptions and values steered by the 
ideologies of the dominant class" (1982: 57). 30 Secondly, only those initiatives that are 
broadly amenable to the ideology of the ruling class are likely to be accepted at all. The 
ruling class' worldview and position is thus buttressed without the need for direct control 
over the organs of the state. 
objective truth does exist in opposition to the unreflective bias of ideology (1982: 214-16). How one 
can escape one's own socially derived biases and uncover this objective truth is not clear, however. 29 Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1980) suggest that the relative stability of capitalism is more a 
consequence of this "pragmatic acquiescence" (Hill 1990) than ideological factors. They see the 
main role of ideology as preserving the coherence of the dominant class itself. Eagleton agrees 
that such "dull compulsion" undoubtedly has a role in stabilising "late capitalism", and Abercrombie 
et al's thesis is therefore a valuable corrective. However, he adds that "their claim that late 
capitalism operates largely 'without ideology' is surely too strong" (1991: 36). 30 Beirne and Quinney agree: "Law reflects the ideologies of different fractions within the 
bourgeoisie and ideologies of other classes". Furthermore, law "also reflects the ideologies of 
occupational groups, minority groups, and the ideologies relating to family structure, morality, the 
environment, political representation and so forth". Nevertheless, ultimately it "expresses the 
ideologies of the dominant class" (1982: 253). Notice also the progression in Quinney's position 
compared to his work of the early 1970s. 
129 
Collins illustrates the theory's applicability with an analysis of the Combination Act 1800. 
This Act declared all trade unions to be criminal conspiracies with the aim of "discouraging 
the spread of trade unions amongst wage labourers" (Collins 1982: 41). Clearly, such a 
piece of legislation is amenable to crude class instrumentalist analysis; it seems that the 
ruling classes have responded to the growing threat of worker's combinations by simply 
outlawing them. However, the 1800 Act also made combinations of manufacturers illegal. 
"The presence of such a section in the Act could not be persuasively accounted for by a 
conspiracy theory, for cartels could benefit entrepreneurs enormously" (ibid: 42). Only a 
Marxist explanation conducted under the principles that Collins outlines can successfully 
explain-this. The capitalist relations of production that were then emerging were based 
upon the exchange of commodities; "these transactions took place between individuals 
who bargained for favourable terms". From these practical experiences arose an ideology 
that "stressed the naturalness of an individualistic market economy" which ensured 
efficiency and fairness. The ideal was for sovereign property owning individuals to bargain 
in the marketplace. Workers' combinations clearly presented a threat to the realisation of 
such an ideal. Equally threatening were the manufacturers' combinations, so they too had 
to go. Only a Marxist theory of law that looks to "the sources of ideologies in productive 
activities [... ] would provide the focus for an assessment of how the dominant class came 
to perceive legislation against combinations to be desirable" (ibid: 43). 
Collins addresses the problem of base and superstructure by engaging with the most 
forceful criticisms of it. Opposition to the metaphor had proliferated over the course of the 
1970s both within and outside of Marxism. 3' Plamenatz, not a Marxist, outlined the 
objections most precisely. 32 He argues that law is fundamental to society and as such 
cannot be considered to be superstructural. Contract law, for instance, appears to go to 
the very heart of the capitalist mode of production. In addition, he contends that modes of 
production cannot be described other than by reference to legal rights and legal duties 
concerning ownership and exchange; this too suggests that law cannot be merely 
superstructural. Collins, playing devil's advocate, proposes a third reason why law cannot 
be considered superstructural. He suggests that the material base "must include a 
normative dimension in order for it to possess the necessary stability and reliability to last 
31 Within Marxism this opposition crystallised around Thompson's Whigs and Hunters (1975). 
Thompson questioned whether law could be limited to the superstructural level alone. See Chapter 
4 above. 
32 See Chapter 1 above. 
130 
long enough for an entire social formation to arise upon it". More often than not, these 
"norms" or "rules" will be legal ones. All in all, there is a powerful case to suggest that law 
functions "in both base and superstructure and cannot be pigeonholed at the periphery of 
a social formation" (Collins 1982: 81). 
GA Cohen provided the classic response to these criticisms in his influential Karl Marx's 
Theory of History: A Defence (1978). He crisply surmises "the problem of legality": "If the 
economic structure is constituted of property (or ownership) relations, how can it be 
distinct from the legal superstructure which it is supposed to explain? " (Cohen 1978: 217- 
8). Cohen's solution is beguilingly simple. He "provide[s] a means of eliminating the legal 
terms [... ] used when production relations [are described]" (ibid: 218). Thus, instead of 
describing "rights", one can describe "powers"; the right to ownership becomes the power 
to ownership (ibid: 219). In this way, legal terms can be purged from descriptions of the 
mode of production. However, in a stable and law abiding society, "men's economic 
powers match the rights they have with respect to productive forces" (ibid: 232). This is 
because "law enforces rules containing the rights to exercise those powers" (Collins 1982: 
82). Nevertheless, this simply obscures the real distinction that exists between rights and 
powers, which becomes evident during periods of transformation. Only then is it clear that 
the economic base is "developed through extra-legal relations", which are subsequently 
formalised by law (ibid: 83). 33 
Utilising this method, Cohen "successfully meets Plamenatz's criticism that it is impossible 
to disentangle the legal superstructure from the material base" (Collins 1982: 83). 
However, while Plamenatz's two criticisms may be blunted, there remains Collins' third 
criticism: the base must contain a normative element of some kind in order for it to be 
stable enough for a social formation to arise upon it. Cohen's focus on distinguishing 
powers from rights blinds him to this. Lukes attacks Cohen on precisely this point. He 
claims that Cohen ultimately fails to distinguish the base from the superstructure because 
the norms that support and sustain the relations of production cannot do so without 
becoming part of their content. According to Lukes, norms themselves enable and 
constrain agents, for "there must exist a high degree of intersubjective acceptance of 
rules" if behaviour is to be regulated in a stable fashion (1983: 113). Given this, it is 
difficult to conceive of norms as being external to the base. Lukes, then, disputes Cohen's 
33 Cohen reaffirms this method in History, Labour and Freedom: Themes From Marx (1988: 30-2). 
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claim that such enablements and constraints can ever be identified in non-normative 
terms. He gives the example of contract law, holding that it is essentially norm-governed, 
for contract law itself defines the social practice of contracting; "the norms that define the 
practice of contracting enter into the description of the activities involved in that practice" 
(1983: 115). 
Cohen responds to this criticism by accepting that "powers generally need the support of 
norms" and that "in the standard case, norms [... ] are what enable people to exercise 
powers". However, he maintains that powers "are not essentially normative" (1988: 34, 
36). Cohen thus extends his existing argument to deal with the third criticism of the base 
and superstructure metaphor: One can "distinguish between powers on the one hand and 
norms which arise subsequently on the other" (Collins 1982: 84). 
Even if this argument is successful, Collins suggests that it remains unsatisfactory for 
other reasons. Cohen adopts what he calls a "functional explanation" to explain the 
content of the superstructure. 34 His argument is that the superstructure "has the content it 
does because that content is required to suit the relations of production" (Collins 1982: 84). 
As Cohen puts it, "legal structures rise and fall according as they promote or frustrate 
forms of economy favoured by productive forces [... ] bases need superstructures, and 
they get the superstructures they need because they need them" (Cohen 1978: 231-33). 35 
So, Cohen's superstructure always aligns itself to the requirements of the powers that form 
the base; "the normative superstructure arises in order to suit the temporary power nexus" 
(Collins 1982: 84). The difficulty with this view is that it threatens to remove the possibility 
of conscious human action. If the superstructure always mechanically adapts itself to the 
needs of the base, what room is there left for the active interventions of individuals? 36 
Collins suggests that Cohen "simply claims that superstructural norms arise to 
accommodate the exercise of power but gives no reason to suggest why [and how] that 
happens" (ibid: 84). So although Cohen successfully separates the base from the 
superstructure while admitting the complexity of real-life social formations, he can only do 
so by simultaneously negating the role of conscious human action in the creation of that 
34 See Cohen (1978: Chs. 9,10) for a detailed defence of this "functional explanation". 
35 Perhaps tellingly, the section in which these lines appear is itself entitled 'Bases need 
Superstructures'. 
36 This point has been made repeatedly throughout Part 1, notably in the sections on Engels 
(Chapter 2) and Althusser (Chapter 4). 
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superstructure. His position is, at root, a crude materialist one. 37 Indeed, as Larrain 
(1986) argues, despite his opposition to Althusser, Cohen ends by suggesting precisely 
what Althusser advocates; a type of determination that largely sidelines agency. 38 
To avoid this, Collins resolves the problem of base and superstructure through an 
alternative method. Upon rejecting Cohen's solution, Collins concedes that rules do 
constitute part of the material base (1982: 85). Yet, once again, if we cannot then 
separate the base from the superstructure and isolate the determining and determined 
elements, Marxism lapses into incoherence. Collins' novelty is to argue that "it is possible 
to accept that legal rules both express and constitute the relations of production, but to 
argue also that these laws are determined by the relations of production" (ibid: 87). Again, 
it is the theory of ideology that is crucial in supporting this argument. 
Collins' contention is that ideologies are determined by social practices in the relations of 
production. This in turn presupposes that those social practices are relatively "settled", 
where "norms of behaviour had established a degree of regularity of behaviour within 
which persistent conceptions of the world could emerge" (Collins 1982: 85). 39 As a 
conscious form of social regulation, law is inspired by the dominant ideologies. "These 
ideologies will be articulated initially in customary rules and moral standards. Legal 
regulation inevitably coincides with such norms of behaviour as it is merely a more precise 
and positive articulation of the requirements of the dominant ideology" (ibid 87). Yet once 
a formal legal rule is announced, the "special quality" of law is that it seems to "subsume 
the existing customs within itself', and it is the legal rule rather than the customary norm 
that people look to to guide their conduct. Collins terms this the "metanormative quality of 
law", because it "overlays and swallows up" existing norms of behaviour and standards of 
conduct (ibid: 88). It is this metanormativity that allows Collins to propose a solution to the 
riddle of disentangling the base from the superstructure. The dominant ideology, which 
arises from the relations of production, determines the content of law. Therefore, law is 
superstructural in origin. However, "the metanormative quality of law then places the legal 
37 Collins criticises Cohen on this point. He suggests that "crude materialist theories merely assert 
that conscious action is determined without locating the mechanisms by which this is effected" 
(Collins 1982: 84). Tushnet, whilst acknowledging that Cohen's is a "masterly contribution", holds 
that Collins' "analysis seems correct to me" (1983: 285-6). 38 For a further, detailed critique of Cohen, see Taiwo (1996: 45-54). 
39 Again this stands a considerable distance from Cohen's theory, where it is unclear whether a 
base made up of "transitory power relations" would have the requisite stability to support the rise of 
complex ideologies (Collins 1982: 85). 
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rules in the position of closely regulating the relations of production, to the extent of being 
the sole institution giving them concrete form and detailed articulation. Thus law is 
superstructural in origin but because of its metanormative quality it may function in the 
material base" (ibid: 88-9). 40 
Collins adds that the legal rules in the base provide a platform from which new or more 
sophisticated variants of ideologies may arise. Thus, the "connection between base and 
superstructure is one of ideological derivation and incremental growth" (1982: 89). This 
process will continue, and an increasingly sophisticated political and cultural life will 
develop, until such time as the relations of production are abruptly transformed; then, a 
new set of practices and dominant ideology will arise and the whole process of the 
cumulative development of a social formation will begin again. 41 
Collins' scheme undoubtedly "destroys the simplicity of the traditional interpretations of the 
base and superstructure metaphor" (1982: 90). The question of whether law functions in 
the base or the superstructure becomes irrelevant; law can and does function in the base 
as the critics of the metaphor have consistently argued, but it is still demonstrated to be 
superstructural in origin. 2 
Critique 
Collins' work quickly became the standard text on Marxism and law. Even his critics are 
happy to concede its undeniable strengths; "Collins' book is a landmark in Marxist 
jurisprudential writings. It is clearly written, analytically rigorous, and makes a genuine 
40 Sugarman makes a similar point on the basis of his study of law, economy and state in England 
from 1750-1914 (1983b). He questions whether modern contract, commercial and property law was 
essential in securing certainty in commercial transactions as capitalism grew. Instead, private law 
may merely facilitate and legitimate. Whether Sugarman would agree wholly with Collins' 
metanormativity thesis is unclear, however. 
41 As Wright pus it, "instead of understanding historical variation in terms of discrete, qualitatively 
discontinuous modes of production as in classical Marxism, historical variation can be analysed in 
terms of more complex patterns of decomposition and recombination of elements of modes of 
production" (1993: 24). 
42 A further "incidental advantage" of this formulation is that it "becomes unnecessary to distinguish 
clearly between social rules and legal rules once it is conceded that the base and superstructure do 
not always differ in form or function". Consequently, "no importance need be attached to the term 
law" (Collins 1982: '89). Again, this is in tune with Gramsci, who "makes no distinction between 
legal and other norms" (Cain 1983: 103). 
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attempt to pull together a Marxist theory of law within a fairly short book" (Douzinas and 
Warrington 1986: 818). The chief reason for such praise is that Collins' theory goes a 
considerable distance to resolving the problems of determination and base and 
superstructure. However, a number of criticisms have been levelled at it. 
Firstly, there remains unease at Collins' modification of the base and superstructure 
metaphor. Hunt, in a passage that "can be read as a criticism of Hugh Collins' solution to 
'the legal problem in Marx"' (1991: 130), argues that the view of law as merely giving 
"retrospective recognition to those economic relations which develop spontaneously in the 
course of economic change and innovation" and "formal expression to already exiting 
normative practices" is "misleading" (ibid: 121). Hunt is hostile to the idea that "all that law 
adds is a slice of formality" to what already exists, for he feels that this "ignores the extent 
to which legal relations have distinctive effects", the most important of which is that legal 
relations actually constitute economic relations. He cites the formation of the modern 
corporation with limited liability as an example of this (ibid: 122). However, it is not clear 
that Collins would disagree with Hunt's assertion that law has distinctive, economic effects. 
Indeed it is precisely this argument that he accepts, while simultaneously attempting to 
defend the idea that ultimately law is conditioned by the relations of production. 
Hunt adds that even when law does not create or constitute economic relations, it can still 
"make it possible for a social relation to exist in the complex form necessary to support and 
sustain its contemporary economic role" (1991: 122). Here the example given is the 
complexity of the modern contract, which "involves a degree of complexity that could not 
be sustained within informal normative mechanisms". Such is the sophistication of modern 
contracts, argues Hunt, that drawing analogies with "the simple [normative] act of barter" is 
not satisfactory (ibid: 122). Once again, though, Collins would seem to have already 
accepted such propositions, and made room for them in his scheme. Collins argues that 
once law has commenced its operations in the base of a social formation, it can itself form 
the basis for new, more complex ideologies which in turn may lead to new, more complex 
laws. Thus modern, sophisticated contracts have developed out of the less complicated 
exchanges that characterised the era of simple commodity production in capitalism's 
infancy. This process of accretion will continue until a set of productive relations are swept 
away in a revolutionary moment. 
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Hunt also suggests that for any set of economic relations "to operate with any regularity 
they must do so within conditions of a reasonable and sustainable degree of social peace 
and security". Law is one of the key mechanisms in providing such general conditions. 
Similarly, Hunt states that the mechanisms of law provide the "background conditions" 
which constitute the framework within which economic relations are conducted", and that 
law "provides the central conceptual apparatus of property rights, contract and corporate 
personality which plays a double role in both constituting a coherent framework for legal 
doctrine and providing significant components of the ideological discovery of the economy" 
(ibid: 122-3). Once again, it is difficult to envisage Collins disagreeing with this supposed 
criticism of his theory. As we have seen, he very definitively admits the role of law in the 
base. He would presumably be extremely amenable to Hunt's ideas, for he is at pains to 
point out the requirement for a normative element in the base on which ideology can form 
and progressively accrete. 
In short, Hunt's criticisms of Collins seem rather misplaced. His concern seems to be that 
Collins does not appreciate just how intertwined law is in the base. Yet this is something 
that Collins readily accepts. His breakthrough is to show how this can be the case, and 
yet retain the idea that the relations of production ultimately determine law, as demanded 
by the Preface. 
Cohen attacks Collins' metanormativity thesis from precisely the opposite angle. He 
describes Collins' criticism of his own work as a "mistaken polemic" (1989: 100), and in 
response he seeks to reassert the strict separation of base and superstructure, and 
maintain that law is exclusively an element of the latter. Cohen writes that "the centre of 
Collins' critique of my position proceeds from a premiss I endorse to a conclusion I reject" 
(ibid: 99). The premiss is that norms are required for stability and order in relations of 
production. The conclusion is that these norms are therefore in the relations of production. 
Cohen agrees that norms are essential to the stability of production arrangements, but 
claims that it does not follow that "the superstructure is in the base that needs it" (ibid: 99). 
Cohen suggests that his position is correct because both he and Collins identify the base 
as a set of productive relations. Cohen construes these relations as sets of de facto 
powers. So therefore law cannot be in the base. Collins never defines relations of 
production any differently, so he either accepts Cohen's definition, or he fails to define 
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them at all, "in which case nothing constrains what can be said about them", and anything 
could be part of them (ibid: 100). 
Therefore, despite his agreement that norms are essential if the base is to remain stable, 
Cohen defines the base in such a way as to exclude norms. This is, of course, perfectly 
legitimate. Yet the advantage of Collins' formulation is that it robs the criticisms of the 
base and superstructure metaphor, most notably those of Plamenatz, of their potency. By 
maintaining the superstructural origins of law, but accepting and demonstrating how it can 
go on to become part of the base, Collins responds directly to the central thrust of the 
objections to the metaphor. In addition, although Cohen's strict separation of base and 
superstructure may have the merit of clarity and crispness, Collins' formulation has the 
great advantage of more readily acknowledging the messy reality of real-life social 
formations in a manner that retains theoretical coherence. Raymond Williams reminds us 
of the importance of taking "indissoluble real processes" to be the objects of study, rather 
than a temporally or spatially correlated metaphor (1977: 82). 43 
Collins, then, provides a robust solution to the problem of base and superstructure. It is 
not without difficulties; the source of law's metanormativity is not specified and whether 
other superstructural elements have the same quality is not explored. But these are more 
peripheral issues. The problem of dividing the base from the superstructure for theoretical 
purposes while acknowledging the complexity of real-life social formations has been 
shown to be surmountable. 44 
However, it is with Collins' solution to the problem of determination where the real 
difficulties lie. Of course, there are a number of advantages. Most importantly, Collins 
provides a theory in line with the Preface that demonstrates how the relations of 
production are the ultimately determining element of the legal sphere. Yet he does so in a 
way that maintains a central place for human agency. This alone makes it a singular 
advance over all the other theories of law assessed here. In addition, Collins' theory offers 
43 See Chapter 1 above. 
as Mieville (2006) also deals with the problem of base and superstructure in a convincing manner 
(see Chapter 3 above). Despite their different solutions, the common thread that contributes to 
Mieville's and Collins' success is that they both treat the base and superstructure formulation as the 
metaphor it was always intended to be. The base and superstructure metaphor is simply a 
mechanism designed to simplify complex real processes for analytical purposes; Mieville and 
Collins do not shy away from reconstructing it to take account of the complexity of real-life social 
formations. 
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scope for "each piece of law [to] be examined independently for its economic, political and 
cultural roots" (Sumner 1979: 253) rather than bluntly asserting that all law reflects the 
interests or preserves the domination of the ruling class. Collins' is a "politically important 
polemic against idealism", which warns against "the reification of ideas" and focuses 
attention on "the vital importance of economic considerations which are often disguised in 
idealist rhetoric". It also "challenges the notion of law's neutrality" and stresses that 
"currents of ideas and beliefs are instruments of power" (Cotterrell 1992: 136). At the very 
least it provides useful insights into law: "In particular, the perception of the non-autonomy 
of law is an important counterpoint to the implicit assumptions of much formal legal 
discourse" (McCoubrey and White 1999: 142). 45 
Collins' solution to the problem of determination also resists the criticisms of it mounted by 
Cohen. Cohen suggests that there is common ground between his theory and Collins', for 
his model of superstructural determination tends to confirm "what Collins calls the 'class 
instrumentalist' view of law, which he is therefore wrong to contrast with my own view". 
Cohen maintains that "the essential mechanism is struggle between classes" (1989: 97). 
He reasserts that "people fight, successfully, to change the law so that it will legitimate 
processes they either have or perceive to be within their grasp, and lawmakers alter the 
law to relieve actual or potential strain between it and the economy" (ibid: 98). 46 However, 
Cohen then distances himself from Collins. Collins argues that classes are free to enact 
laws that are completely contrary to their interests, a position he adopts in order to avoid a 
reductive economic determinism. Cohen's historical materialism is more demanding of the 
ruling classes; he claims that classes must always act broadly within their best interests: 
classes must always "pursue their larger interests competently", he writes. If this was not 
the case, the class structure at any given time would not be, as Marx held, determined by 
the level of development of the productive forces. As Cohen puts it, paraphrasing Marx's 
The Poverty of Philosophy, "the 'steam mill' would not give you 'society with the industrial 
capitalist' if industrial capitalists systematically misread the opportunities the steam mill 
provides" (ibid: 98). 
Yet even here there is an element of common ground. Cohen accepts that "classes may, 
of course, misprosecute their interests in this or that respect" (ibid: 98). This is similar to 
45 Note that Cotterrell and McCoubrey and White are not talking specifically of Collins, but of Marxist 
legal theory in its best variants. 
46 A point Cohen originally made in Karl Marx's Theory of History (1978: 231). 
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Collins' position. Presumably, if this occurs, the negative consequences that would surely 
result ensure that speedy corrective action is taken. Given this, even in the worst case it is 
likely that favourable, if not best, interests will ultimately be pursued. So Collins is right to 
say there is nothing forcing best interests to be pursued in any particular case, but Cohen 
is also correct in asserting that, over time, ruling classes will follow what is in their 
interests. 
However, Collins' notion of an omnipresent, overarching dominant ideology leads to real 
difficulties. If, on the basis of the theory, one maintains that all law is conditioned by the 
relations of production, one is forced to stress the plasticity or the elasticity of the dominant 
ideology. Only then could it possibly explain those laws that are far removed from the 
processes of production. But the further ideology is stretched, the more "the link between 
the material world and ideologies" is strained, or even "disappears" (Collins 1982: 76). For 
instance, how can ideologies evolved from the relations of production explain the laws of 
marriage, or prohibitions of victimless crimes? It is not impossible that they can explain 
these and other rules and regulations, but often the dominant ideology must be implausibly 
extended in order to do so. 47 On the other hand, if one was to make "a serious attempt 
to situate the ideologies behind all legal rules in productive activities, large areas of the law 
are left unexplicated [... ] as our attention shifts to legal rules which govern subject matter 
only remotely connected to productive activities" (ibid: 76). 
There seems to be no way out of this impasse. The plasticity and malleability of the 
'dominant ideology' is, in the final analysis, a kind of necessary aporia. It is necessary as it 
is the only way a Marxist theory of law that is in line with the Preface and maintains scope 
for human agency can be rendered workable. Yet at the precise point where the theory 
should be engaging empirically in order to explain the content of law, it appears as 
toothless and vacuous. Collins himself suggests his "dissatisfaction" at the "ultimately 
unconvincing" theory (1982: 75). 
Tushnet agrees; he argues that this most "sensible" of Marxist analyses ends up as "an 
empty analytic theory that states no more than that particular laws are explained by the 
47 There is also a need to locate the source and limits of this malleability. 
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state of the class struggle" (1983: 282,287). 8 Stone concedes that the Marxist theory of 
law cannot be expected to predict specific laws. "The propositions underlying Marxism are 
too general to yield unequivocal predictions at an operational level". What Marxism can do 
is "provide a shape or structure to revealed relationships" (Stone 1985: 40-1)"49 
Mathiesen, writing prior to Collins, worried that it is "uncertain whether one can ever prove- 
in a strict sense- the materialist conception of law". Thus, "like other generalised 
conceptions of society, the materialist conception remains in the final analysis a political 
and theoretical interpretation of the world, a paradigm, a way of grasping the world 
conceptually" (1980: 72). 50 This, however, need not necessarily be a problem. As 
Cotterrell puts it, "the issue here is not proof, for social theory cannot prove or be proved 
[... ] the issue is the rigour of the concepts used" (1992: 136). The concept of an elastic 
and omnipresent dominant ideology, however, does not appear to be rigorous enough to 
be of much use theoretically or as a guide to empirical research. 
So, despite Collins' best efforts, Marxism would appear to be incapable of providing a 
complete and comprehensive explanation of law. Collins' theory, undoubtedly the apogee 
of Marxist thinking of law, fails to provide an adequate solution to the problem of 
determination. 
Beyond Collins? 
As this chapter demonstrates, Collins maintains the distinction between the norms that 
make up the base, and the legal norms that originate in the superstructure by relying on 
the concept of metanormativity. Collins holds that formal laws, once formulated, swallow 
48 According to Tushnet, the difficulties of Collins' theory demonstrates that "the only candidate for a 
viable Marxist theory is one that deals with the form and not the content of the law", and seeks to 
explain only the broad outlines of this form (1983: 289-90). 
as This means, according to Stone, that Marxism cannot be falsified. On Popperian terms this 
renders it unscientific (Stone 1985: 40-1). Tushnet feels that this is problematic, for he believes that 
"many Marxists" hold a Popperian view of science (1983: 284). This may be so, but there are also 
many Marxists who are not committed to such a view. 50 Mathiesen's Law, Society and Political Action: Toward a Strategy Under Late Capitalism (1980) is 
something of a staging post between the Althusserian structuralism that was very much the vogue 
of the time, and a return to a more traditional Marxism. Mathiesen harbours doubts about the 
traditional base and superstructure metaphor, but acknowledges the need to locate the 
"precedence of materiality" (ibid: 18). Thus he adopts Althusser's concept of the mode of 
production (ibid: 166), yet remains committed to political action capable of effecting a change in 
society in the manner of more traditional Marxisms. For a summary of his works, see Feest (2006). 
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up the informal norms that make up the relations of production. In this way Collins shows 
law to be superstructural in origin, but capable of functioning in the base. Once 
established, law becomes an important component. of the base, and central in guiding 
conduct. 
The idea that formal legal rules subsume the previously informal norms is one that Collins 
is perfectly entitled to use. As we have seen, it does provide a solution to the problem of 
base and superstructure. However, there is a sense in which the argument remains 
unsatisfactory. The key problem is that the method Collins utilises to solve the base and 
superstructure problem is entirely arbitrary within the Marxist framework that Collins 
adopts. The idea that law is metanormative and that it adds formality to previously existing 
norms has no particular significance, from a Marxist standpoint; it is not grounded in the 
theory that Collins elsewhere strictly adheres to, and goes to great lengths to preserve. 
The criticisms of Collins outlined in the previous section hint at this problem. Hunt is 
uncomfortable with the idea that law merely adds a slice of formality to already existing 
norms (1991: 121-2). However, the basis of his unease is that law has distinctive effects, 
something that Collins would readily accept. Hunt's criticism misfires because he does not 
outline why law is distinctive; he does not provide a definition of law that can separate it 
from norms, and that has meaning from within Marxist theory. Cohen is aware of the 
importance of defining law in a way that distinguishes it from norms: he criticises Collins 
for failing to provide an alternative definition of the relations of production (1989: 99-100). 
But, with his view of norms as de facto powers, Cohen also fails to go beyond the notion of 
formality and his solution, like Collins', seems arbitrary and rather meaningless within a 
Marxist framework. 
What is required to go beyond Collins, then, is the construction of a concept of law that 
distinguishes it from mere norms. This concept should maintain the distinction between 
base and superstructure, but also be simultaneously meaningful within the Marxist 
framework. 
Collins himself argues that Marxists should avoid specifying a concept of law with any 
precision. He holds that Marxists should reject the 'fetishistic' idea that there is one unique 
phenomena that can be described as law, for this obscures the more important point that 
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in each historical epoch there are a variety of institutions that preserve order and facilitate 
the smooth running of the relations of production for the benefit of the ruling class (1982: 
99,111). For Collins, the focus for Marxists should not be on proposing definitions of law 
and drawing up lists of its functions, but on explaining the functions that law and other 
social institutions perform in particular historical contexts (ibid: 13). 
Whatever the merits of these arguments, they do not prevent Marxists from holding that 
within capitalism there is something specific called law that can be identified, even if this 
law and its features are not trans-historical and universal. This position does not 
contradict Collins' insistence that there are various other social institutions in addition to 
law that preserve order. More importantly, if there is no attempt to specify what law is, 
then it is not possible to separate it from the non-legal norms that make up the relations of 
production. Therefore, without a suitable concept of law it is not possible to differentiate 
adequately between base and superstructure. 
Of course, Collins' theory of metanormativity necessitates the abandonment of simple 
versions of the base and superstructure metaphor. However, the maintenance of the idea 
that law originates superstructurally means that there must be something that marks it out 
as different from those norms that make up the relations in the base. This must be the 
case even if the picture at any given point is a complex one and there is no clear divide 
between base and superstructure in a complex society where the process of "incremental 
growth" (Collins 1982: 89) is well evolved. 
Capitalism, Law and Legitimacy 
It is possible to construct a concept of law that maintains the divide between base and 
superstructure and is simultaneously meaningful from the Marxist perspective if one 
focuses on the notion of legitimacy. 
As Collins has persuasively argued, law is ultimately an instrument of class oppression, 
even though less sophisticated variants of instrumentalist theory must be abandoned. 
This raises the question of laws' legitimacy. Why is law seen as legitimate by the very 
peoples whose continuing *subordination it contributes to? Why do such people accept it 
as providing legitimate standards of conduct and boundaries of acceptable action? 
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The writings of Max Weber offer a series of interrelated ideas that suggest why law is seen 
as legitimate in capitalism. These ideas can be profitably linked to the Marxist theory 
developed by Collins. Three of Weber's ideas in particular are of use; his typology of 
social action and rationality, his typology of legitimate domination, and his outline of law's 
logical formality. 
For Weber, the essence of capitalism consists in its privileging of one particular 'ideal type' 
of social action (Cotterrell 1992: 150). Traditional (habitual) action, affectual (emotional) 
action, and value rational action (which is "determined by a conscious belief in the value 
for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, 
independently of its prospects of success") (Weber 1968: 24-5) are increasingly marginal 
within capitalist society. Prevalent at their expense is instrumentally rational action 
(zweckrational), where "the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally 
taken into account and weighed" (ibid: 26). 51 Instrumentally rational action within 
capitalism is economic in nature, and oriented toward profit in the market (Cotterrell 1992: 
150). 
Weber also outlines three ideal types of legitimate domination. These are legal 
domination, charismatic domination, and traditional domination. "In a system of 
domination characterised by legal authority, legitimacy rests on 'rational grounds' and on 
the belief in the inherent 'legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to 
authority under these rules to issue commands'" (Morrison 1995: 291 [quoting Weber 
1968: 215]). The form of domination in advanced capitalist societies is clearly closer to 
this pole than the alternatives. 
The third facet of Weber's oeuvre that is of use concerns types of 'legal thought'. 
According to Weber, such thought can be either rational or irrational, and formal or 
substantive in orientation. Formally irrational law employs means that cannot be controlled 
by the intellect. An example of this would be the use of ordeals in criminal trials. 
Substantively irrational law is where decisions are made on the facts of individual cases 
s' It is crucial to recognise that Weber intended these as ideal types: "It would be very unusual to 
find concrete cases of action, especially of social action, which were oriented only in one or another 
of these ways" (Weber 1968: 26). As such they do not exist in pure form in experience, but are 
models of possible motivations for action (Cotterrell 1992: 150). 
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evaluated on ethical, emotional, or political grounds rather than by general norms. 
Rational law, on the other hand, is guided by general rules as opposed to subjective 
reactions to individual cases. Substantively rational law is guided by general rules that are 
determined by an ideological system other than itself, such as a system of morality, 
religion, or political authority. Formally rational law is guided by general rules which are 
applied to the facts of the case. Logically formal law is chief kind of formally rational law. 
It consists of highly abstract rules applied to fact situations. This type of law has 
commonly been seen as typical of the west and 'critical to capitalist development as it is 
best able to provide adequate and intelligible support for purpose rational economic 
activity (Cotterrell 1992: 153). It is systematised, logically formal, clear, internally 
consistent, gapless, it can subsume all conceivable fact situations, is self justifying and 
requires no appeal to outside forces for its legitimacy (Weber 1954: 62). 52 
There is a clear affinity and interrelationship between these three ideas. Capitalism is 
dominated by instrumentally rational social action; indeed, such action is the very stuff of 
the capitalist mode of production. Legitimacy thus comes to rest on rationality, so 
domination takes a rational-legal form. Within this, formally rational law is best placed to 
ensure continuing capitalist development. Law is increasingly important and accepted as 
"it provides a commonsensical and comprehensive framework of predictable rules which 
make it possible to pursue purpose rational social action. [... ] Law provides the basis for its 
own acceptance through its own logical form: as a set of rules within which individuals can 
orient their conduct in a purpose rational manner, a manner that becomes pervasive not 
only within economic life but well beyond it too" (Cotterrell 1992: 152). 
Where does this leave the search for a meaningful concept of law? Based upon Weber's 
observations, law can be distinguished from mere norms in terms of its legitimacy. The 
source of its legitimacy is its very form, its rational nature: Law is seen as legitimate as it 
buttresses the economic order and echoes the logic of the economic system. It resonates 
with the broader set of ideas that are current in society, as it 'fosters and expresses' the 
"general processes of rationalisation of life in capitalist society" (Cotterrell 1992: 152). One 
recalls Hart's famous distinction between habits of obedience and 'social rules' (1961). 
According to Hart social rules differ from habits in three crucial ways. Firstly, for a group to 
have a habit it is sufficient if their behaviour converges. Deviation from such a habit is not 
52 On the four ideal types see Weber (1954: 63) and Milovanovic (1989: 63-68). 
144 
a matter for criticism. This is not the case with social rules, where deviation is a cause for 
criticism. Secondly, with rules criticism is justified simply because of that deviation; "not 
only is such criticism in fact made but deviation from the standard is generally accepted as 
a good reason for making it" (ibid: 54 [emphasis in original]). Finally, we come to the 
internal aspect of rules. According to Hart, when a habit is general in a group, it is 
externally observable. However, "by contrast, if a social rule is to exist some at least must 
look upon the behaviour in question as a general standard to be followed by the group as 
a whole. A social rule has an 'internal' aspect, in addition to the external aspect which it 
shares with a social habit and which consists in the regular uniform behaviour which an 
observer could record" (ibid: 55). Hart uses the example of chess players to illustrate this 
point. They do not merely have similar habits of moving the Queen which an observer 
who knew nothing of their attitude could record. The also have a "critical reflective 
attitude" about the proper way of moving the Queen. As a result, the internal aspect is not 
the same as feeling bound to rules. People may accept rules but feel no compulsion. 
"What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of 
behaviour as a common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism (including 
self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements that such criticism and 
demands are justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the normative 
terminology of 'ought', 'must', and 'should', 'right' and 'wrong'" (ibid: 56). 53 
So, in sum, law is a formal, rational, abstract system of rules that finds its legitimacy in the 
fact that it fosters and expresses something of the underlying nature of capitalist 
rationality, and it is internalised by at least some members of the society. This then, is a 
concept of law that distinguishes it from mere norms. As a result, the distinction between 
base and superstructure can be maintained. In addition, the concept is meaningful from a 
Marxist perspective as it locates the source of law's legitimacy in the types of social action 
and rationality that are central to the capitalist mode of production. 
Nevertheless, there remains a point of friction between Weber's account and the Marxist 
legal theory developed by Collins. Weber's relationship to Marxism is complex54, and in 
S' Hart adds that it is only the officials of the system who require this internal aspect (1961: 59-60, 
113). 
sa Weber is commonly seen as being fundamentally opposed to Marx, crucially stressing that ideas 
and forms of rationality are drivers of history as opposed to Marx's emphasis on material conditions 
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this context there is a clear difficulty. Weber holds that the formally rational law that is 
dominant within capitalism requires no appeal to outside forces for its legitimacy (Weber 
1954: 62). In this it is unlike substantively rational law which is made up of general rules 
that are determined by an ideological system other than itself, such as a system of 
morality, religion, or political authority. Yet this would appear, on the face of it, to be 
inconsistent with Collins' theory of determination. According to that theory, the legal is 
always determined by reference to a dominant ideology; law is the product of a dialogue 
with that ideology. Clearly, there is a potential inconsistency here. However, in resolving 
that inconsistency, it becomes clear that by adopting the Weberian/Hartian concept of law 
outlined above, Collins' Marxist theory of law can actually strengthen its critical edge. 
Towards a Critique 
Collins himself points out this inconsistency. Contrasting his own approach with that of 
Weber, he suggests "instead of legal thought being a discrete, non-instrumental, and 
rational investigation of justice, it was portrayed as a dialogue with the background 
dominant ideology on the basis of the formal constraints of coherence and consistency" 
(1982: 136). How can this inconsistency be resolved? 
It is possible to accept Weber's view that capitalist law aspires to the ideal of being 
formally rational, and yet maintain Collins' idea that it is conditioned ideologically. This is 
possible if one sees the formally rational ideal as something valued by the dominant 
ideology; that law should be formally rational is something that is demanded by the 
dominant ideology. The idea that law should be purged of ideology and based purely upon 
principles of rationality is itself a product of ideology. 
In making sense of this, it is instructive to consider why law took a largely formally rational 
guise in capitalism. To remain true to the historical materialist method, in doing this one 
should look to the properties and processes of the material base for clues as to how the 
dominant ideology, and subsequently law, has developed (Collins 1982: 131). Why does 
the dominant ideology in capitalism value formal rationality? There are a number of 
interrelated reasons for this. 
(Cotterrell 1992: 150). However, the precise nature of Weber's relationship with Marx is not quite 
so clear (see Morrison 1995: 215). 
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Firstly, in capitalism, for the first time classes are constituted on a purely economic basis. 
There is no longer any need to tie labourers to the land as there was in feudalism. 
Instead, "capitalism relies primarily on the dull compulsion of economic necessity to 
preserve the process by which surplus value is extracted". As a result, the state and law 
are not required to explicitly support economic structures and status relations (Collins 
1982: 131). Ideologically, this represents a levelling of the traditional status distinctions 
that were upheld by law. Employer and employee became technically equal in their ability 
to make contracts and own and divest of property. Given this, it becomes unnecessary for 
law to expressly maintain the hierarchy that characterised feudalism. Instead, the 
development of law that is formal and abstract is encouraged by the ideology derived from 
the new relations of production. 
Secondly, as capitalism developed the system of commodity exchange saw the capitalist 
class of entrepreneurs enter the marketplace as equals in order to trade goods. These 
peoples had no mechanisms for establishing systems of authority or hierarchy, unlike the 
feudal system which was comprised of defined ranks. However there was a need for a 
stable and predictable framework within which economic transactions could take place. 
Clearly, as the parties to each transaction were equals, the law could not favour one over 
the other. As Collins puts it, all that was necessary were guarantees as to "the inviolability 
of private property" and the provision of "a reliable system for the enforcement of contracts 
[... ] this is the night-watchman state of liberal political theory" (Collins 1982: 131). Formal, 
abstract law was able to provide this without undue interference in the process of 
commodity exchange. Clear, abstract legal rules provide the space for instrumentally 
rational action in the marketplace to occur, no more, no less. They provide the 
background context within which people" can orient their conduct in instrumentally rational 
ways. Law became drained of any explicit class content and moved towards the formally 
-rational ideal of Weber. In addition, in case of dispute "an impartial arbiter within the 
bourgeoisie was required" (Collins 1982: 132-3). The 'neutral' state, divorced from 
economic power, was ideal for this role, and its formal, abstract law, disinterested and 
impartial and not reliant on any political or spiritual ideology, was entirely appropriate. 55 
ss These arguments could also be related to Weber's ideas of 'disenchantment' and 
bureaucratisation (Weber 1930,1968). 
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The move toward formally rational law can therefore be seen in Marxist terms as being 
grounded in ideological shifts themselves related to changes in the relations of production. 
Law is not autonomous from ideology; its appearance to the contrary is precisely as a 
result of ideological processes. The dominant ideology that emerged during the transition 
to capitalism placed value on instrumental rationality as it was through instrumentally 
rational social action that capital could be reproduced most effectively. The legal regime 
that was created on the basis of this ideology buttressed this, and by taking a formally 
rational, abstract form, was able to provide the framework for such action to continue. 
This also furnishes the basis for a Marxist critique of legal arrangements. Despite 
appearances to the contrary, the legal system and its laws are not neutral, autonomous, 
non-ideological phenomena. They actually play a central role in the preservation of the 
existing set of inequitable social relations. Given this, law should not be uncritically 
accepted as a source of action guiding rules. Indeed, for Collins, the demystification of law 
is the central task for Marxist jurisprudence (1982: 139). 
Overall, by looking to the work of Weber and Hart it is possible to construct a concept of 
law that differentiates it more precisely from norms. This ensures that the critical 
distinction between base and superstructure can be maintained. By focussing on law's 
legitimacy in terms of the underlying rationality of the capitalist system, that concept of law 
is also rendered meaningful within the Marxist framework. Furthermore, utilising such a 
concept of law sharpens the critical edge of the theory of law offered by Collins, for it 
brings into sharper relief the ideological nature of law, despite its appearance to the 
contrary. However, adopting this concept of law does not alleviate the real difficulty with 
Collins' Marxist theory of law, which remains the notion of an elastic and omnipresent 
dominant ideology. 
Marxist Legal Theory in the Wake of Collins 
Collins' Marxism and Law was published at a highpoint for not just Marxist legal 
scholarship, but Marxist theory in general. His work is plainly part of the burgeoning 
tradition of the time; this is evident in its central concerns, its tenor, its language, and 
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above all, its hope for a complete, general theory of law. Yet no sooner was the book 
56 published than Marxism entered into a serious decline. 
As a result, Marxist legal scholars since then have been forced to work in a less conducive 
atmosphere, isolated from any large, evolving tradition. Consequently, much of the 
Marxist legal scholarship that has occurred over the last quarter of a century or so is what 
Hunt calls 'analysis' (1981 ). 57 These attempts tend to take the "signs" (Hunt 1981: 92) of 
Marxism and use them to explore very particular areas of inquiry. Chimni (1993,1999, 
2004) and Koskenniemi (2004) both explore international law using Marxist concepts. 
Neocleous (2003) analyses company law, while Roth (2004) seeks to apply Marxist 
insights to the human rights 'project'. Roth in particular is alive to the nuances and 
potentially conflicting interpretations of Marxism, but none of these more recent authors 
attempts to resolve the question of what Hunt calls "completed or unitary" theory (1981: 
92-3) in the manner of Collins. Instead, Marx and Marxism are treated as repositories of 
ideas ready to be deployed as and when it is necessary. 
Hunt himself did attempt to address this lacuna. His work is notable for it is self-evidently 
a product of the ferment of the 1970s and 1980s and is clearly steeped in the traditions 
and ideas of the Marxist legal theory of that time. Hunt outlines a "relational" Marxist 
theory of law (1991). He argues that law is one of many types of social relation. Others 
include economic, political, class and gender relations. Each relation is made up of 
different dimensions; power, institutional, ideological and discursive. Legal relations 
contain all these elements. They are unique as they always generate a potential mode of 
regulation and they are interpellative; legal relations only exist by calling into existence 
legal subjects. Law is also distributive as it can change the relative positions of legal 
subjects in social relations. This "intentionally abstract" theory is in tune with Marxism's 
fundamental focus on relations and according to Hunt, it has the potential to explain 
relations of subordination and domination, accounting for their reproduction and 
persistence, and identifying the conditions for ending them (1991: 105-11). It is not clear 
that this scheme is incompatible with Collins' work, but the lack of focus on the questions 
of determination and base and superstructure is obvious. 
58 See Introduction and Chapter 1 above. 
57 See Chapter 1 above. 
149 
Another attempt to produce a systematic theory is provided by Taiwo (1996). He develops 
a Marxist theory of natural law which he terms "legal naturalism". His essential claim is 
that the positive law of any society is "reflective of deeper structures" (ibid: 1). According 
to Taiwo, the necessary or constitutive relations in a mode of production that are legal 
provide the 'natural law' of that mode of production (ibid: 58-9). 'Good' positive law 
expresses these natural laws., For instance, slavery was made illegal in capitalism as 
capitalism is based upon the freedom of individuals to dispense of their labour power as 
they see fit (ibid: 70-1). Taiwo's notion of natural law is potentially compatible with Collins' 
notion of ideology, where positive laws are enacted pursuant to the underlying dominant 
ideology. 
As demonstrated earlier, Mieville (2004,2006) has attempted to produce a fully-blown 
theory of international law based upon the work of Pashukanis. 58 Its applicability to forms 
of law other than international law is not clear, however. Mieville, following Pashukanis, 
also focuses on the form of law, whereas Collins' is a theory of content and as such sets 
5s up no strict rules about what can and cannot be classed as law. 
Conclusion: Theoretical Weaknesses, Contextual Changes 
As Part 1 has demonstrated, existing Marxist theories of law run into difficulties on two 
axes. Firstly, they all exhibit major theoretical weaknesses that seriously undermine any 
claims to defensibility. No one Marxist theory has been able to provide convincing 
solutions to the problems of determination and base and superstructure. Collins comes 
close, but ultimately his theory is also found wanting. 
Secondly, Marxist legal theory has always indissolubly been a product of its time and 
place. The flawed solutions to the two problems are very much the result of the particular 
concrete pressures and socio-political context of the day. Would Engels have constructed 
such a rigid materialism if he was not attempting to attack the theories of his rivals? Would 
Lenin have been so keen to conceptualise law as the weapon of the ruling class had he 
58 Indeed, Mieville's work, and that of Chimni, Koskenniemi and others such as Susan Marks 
(2000), suggests that if we are to see a revival of Marxist legal theory, then it seems it will be 
scholarship on international law that will be its motor. 
59 Interestingly, the two major attempts at theory in the last decade, that of Mieville and Taiwo, both 
support the withering away thesis (Taiwo 1996: Ch 6; Mieville 2006: Ch 3). 
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not been on his way to leading a successful revolutionary movement? Would Pashukanis 
have been so aggressive in his condemnation of law if he had not been a leading figure in 
a newly created society determined to sweep away the last vestiges of the old one? 
Would Althusser have sidelined human agency quite so readily if he had not defined 
himself in opposition to existentialist Marxism? Time and again, one sees that context is 
absolutely central in understanding the tenor, the strengths, and the weaknesses of theory. 
Recognition of the importance of context also alerts one to the fact that theories from 
different times and places must be utilised with extreme caution in the contemporary world. 
Even Collins' theory, the most recent in this study, is based on outdated concepts and 
assumptions associated with the height of the modern period. A decisively new and novel 
context has emerged which Marxist legal theory, if it to remain relevant, must respond to. 
Part 2 will detail late modernity. 
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PART 2. LATE MODERNITY AND LAW 
"All fixed, fast-frozen relationships (... J are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated 
before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air [... ]. " 
Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, February 1848 (1968: 38) 
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CHAPTER 6. LATE MODERNITY 
Part 1 demonstrated that the flawed legal theories that Marxists have developed are 
heavily context-dependent; that is, they respond to the particular socio-political 
environment of the time and place of their conception. To understand each of the 
theories, and their flaws, it is therefore necessary to situate them in their contextual 
milieu. However, since Collins' work, the most recent of that analysed in Part 1, a 
series of decisive economic, social, political, and cultural shifts have occurred. As such, 
many of the concepts and assumptions that Collins based his work upon are now 
outmoded. Part 2 will outline the nature of these shifts, which, taken together, 
constitute 'late modernity'; not an entirely new and novel era, but an era significantly 
different form the modern era that preceded it. This Chapter will firstly discuss the 
terminological issues: The adoption and precise meaning of the term 'late modernity' 
and its division into three constituent parts; late modernity itself, late modernisation and 
late modernism. Then, the central developments within each of these categories will 
be described. Following this, Chapter 7 will detail the concomitant changes in the legal 
sphere. 
Some Notes on Terminology 
Late Modernity, Postmodernity and the Persistence of Capitalism 
One of the central preoccupations of sociology over the last twenty years or so has 
been to document and theorise the nature and scope of the changes that contemporary 
society is undergoing. Despite widespread agreement on the extent and nature of the 
changes, notwithstanding differences in theoretical outlook, there is a considerable 
level of disagreement as to whether the changes constitute a decisively new era that is 
in some way beyond modernity, or whether they simply represent the continuation, 
extension and deepening of modern processes. Those in the former camp tend to 
favour the label 'postmodernity'. 1 
'Theories of postmodernity were not the first to suggest a decisive break with a modern, 
capitalist past. Bell's theory of 'postindustrial society' (1974) focused on the form of production. 
According to him, industrial societies manufactured goods, while today's postindustrial society 
increasingly produces services. The professional and technical class thus constitutes the new 
ruling class. Despite identifying a central trend of contemporary society, Bell's theory has been 
much criticised. See, for example, Callinicos (1989: 121-2) and Smart (1990: 14). 
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The term 'postmodern' was deployed expressly to denote a new phase of human 
history for the first time, and most famously, by Jean-Francois Lyotard in The 
Postmodern Condition (1984). Crook, Pakulski and Waters also argue that there has 
been a "phase shift" to a distinctive and radically new postmodern era (1992: 34). 2 The 
novelty of this postmodern phase is such that just as the "emergence of the modern era 
provided a nascent sociology with both its reason for theory and its topic to be 
theorised", the postmodern era now requires its own sociology (ibid: 1). In addition, the 
term is of value as it" registers the fact that "the emerging social form is still 
indeterminate and problematic: we have no firm knowledge of what it is but only that it 
is not modernity" (1992: 2). For Smart, the deployment of the label 'postmodern' 
suggests that there has been "a realisation that the goals and values which have been 
central to Western 'European' civilisation can no longer be considered universal, and 
that the associated 'project of modernity' is unfinished because its completion is 
inconceivable and its value in question" (1990: 27). Marxists have also argued that a 
new era has been entered. Harvey, for instance, claims that 'postmodernity' has seen 
capitalism become "ever more tightly organised through dispersal, geographical 
mobility, and flexible responses in labour markets, labour processes and consumer 
markets, all accompanied by hefty doses of institutional, product and technological 
innovation" (1989: 159). 
Some commentators, such as Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) have utilised the term 
'reflexive modernisation'. This draws attention to the processes by which modern 
society has come to reflect upon itself, understand its excesses, and question whether 
the progress that modernity and the Enlightenment promised has been or can ever be 
realised. Central to this reflexivity is a loss of faith in science, and also the idea that as 
society becomes increasingly individualised, people have greater opportunities to 
reflect upon their own lives and shape them in ways of their own choosing. 3 
2 Crook, Pakulski and Waters argue that this new era represents the continuation and extension, 
to "extreme levels" (ibid: 32), of modern trends, principally differentiation, commodification and 
rationalisation. These had been identified by Durkheim, Marx and Weber respectively, the 
giants of modern sociology (ibid: 3,10). 
See also their individual works: Beck (1992), Giddens (1998: 115-7) and Lash (1994). Beck's 
Risk Society (1992) is perhaps the definitive statement of reflexive modernity. For him, reflexive 
modernity is a society defined by risks that are increasingly less time- and place- bound. 
Perhaps the best example of this is environmental pollution. Consequently, society is 
increasingly organised around the response to risk; the main divisions in society are no longer 
between classes. Instead people occupy 'social risk positions' in society. Some individuals are 
more exposed to risk while others are safer. Wealth may well be a useful insulator against risk, 
but information and knowledge is even more vital. 
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Giddens has also talked of 'high', 'late' and 'radicalised' modernity (Giddens 1990; 
1991; Giddens and Pierson 1998). He sees these terms as interchangeable (Giddens 
and Pierson 1998: 117); they all denote a society where the consequences of 
modernity become more radicalised and universalised than ever before. 
The dilemma of adequately labelling contemporary society is perhaps most evident in 
the work of Zygmunt Bauman. Initially Bauman held that postmodernity was 
discontinuous and distinct from modernity, although he maintained that it was "brought 
about by the logic of modern development" (Bauman 1992: 64). Its distinctiveness was 
such that a new "sociology of postmodernity" was required (ibid: 27). The postmodern 
reality is "much more fluid, heterogonous and 'under-patterned' than anything the 
sociologists tried to grasp intellectually in the past" (ibid: 65). Although Bauman 
"continues to deploy the same methodological tools, and offers a similar analysis and 
conclusion about present social change to the kind evident in his earlier works" 
(Edgeworth 2003: 273), he has more recently described the contemporary social world 
as one of Liquid Modernity (2000). This suggests a retraction from the earlier, more 
confident assertions of a decisively new period. 
Lash and Urry sidestep the controversy over whether we still live in modernity or have 
moved into a postmodern era with their notion of "disorganised capitalism" (1987). ° 
This appears contrary to Harvey's idea of capitalism becoming more tightly organised, 
although Lash and Urry stress that disorganisation is not "a sort of high-entropy 
random disorder; disorganisation is instead a fairly systematic process of 
disaggregation and restructuration" (1987: 7). But crucially, both Lash and Urry and 
Harvey insist that capitalism itself, perhaps the central feature of modernity, persists. 
As Lash and Urry put it, "capitalist social relations continue to exist [... ] a certain level 
of capital accumulation is a necessary condition of capitalism's disorganised era in 
which the capitalist class continues to be dominant" (1987: 8). It seems undeniable 
that "we still live, in the west, in a society where production for profit remains the basic 
organising principle of economic life". So while it is important to register and 
understand the changes of the last 30 years or so, one should "not lose sight of the fact 
that the basic rules of a capitalist mode of production continue to operate" (Harvey 
1989: 122). 
4 This is in spite of Lash elsewhere favouring the term 'reflexive modernity' (see above). 
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It is the persistence of the core features of modernity, despite their transformed nature, 
that has led Giddens to be cautious about theorising the emergence of a novel 
postmodern period. Again, capitalism's tenacity is central to this. Giddens' world of 
'reflexive modernity' is one increasingly constituted by information where individuals 
are forced to make "future-oriented decisions". But this more open and problematic 
way of living is not, for him, postmodern, because "the dynamic sources of modernity 
are still there: the expansion of capitalism, the transformative effects of science and 
technology, the expansion of mass democracy. " As a result, Giddens argues the 
current era is one of reflexive modernity: "There is only modernity and we can only 
reflect on modernity through modernity" (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 115-7 [italics 
added]). 
In fact the changes that some believe to be the harbingers of a new postmodern era 
were actually identified by Marx himself, the definitive modern social theorist. 5 As 
Marshall Berman (1982) evocatively outlines, Marx's own Communist Manifesto is the 
classic outline of the uncertainty and creative destruction that modernity itself 
unleashed upon the world; Marx's passage from the Manifesto, "all that is solid melts in 
to air" (Marx and Engels 1968: 38), is "probably the definitive vision of the modern 
environment" (Berman 1982: 21). Marx also followed these themes through in Capital. 
Harvey notes that Marx demonstrates how the social processes operating under 
capitalism lead to "individualism, alienation, fragmentation, ephemerality, innovation, 
creative destruction, speculative development, unpredictable shifts in methods of 
production and consumption, a shifting experience of space and time, as well as a 
crisis ridden dynamic of social change". If this is correct, then it seems entirely 
possible that "the turn to postmodernism does not reflect any fundamental change of 
social condition" (Harvey 1989: 111). Instead it appears that the processes of 
modernity have just speeded up and intensified to the point where instability and 
uncertainty are the dominant leitmotifs of the social world. Current trends represent the 
continuation, but to extreme levels, of the central processes of modernity. In such a 
context it becomes difficult, despite the ever-increasing pace of change, uncertainty, 
and lack of stability, to talk of a distinctly new postmodern era; most significantly, the 
western world remains a capitalist world. ° 
5 As McLellan puts it, "Marx is one of the great early modernist writers, a true child of the 
Enlightenment in the self-confident sweep of his historical perspective" (1999a: i). 
e Indeed, the persistence of capitalism leads Callinicos (1989) to argue that we are not 
experiencing an epochal change in our social life. Quite the opposite, in fact; it is business as 
usual for capitalism. 
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To deny that we have entered postmodernity is not to underestimate the enormity of 
the changes that have occurred. As Smart puts it, "if the view is taken that the time in 
which we live may not after all be a unique moment or an 'interruptive point in history', 
it nevertheless does remain a time in which on a number of fronts (for example socially, 
politically, culturally, economically), and in relation to a range of matters (for example 
epistemology, morality, ethics), significant forms of change can be identified. In brief, if 
our time, our present, is in an important sense a 'time like any other', it nevertheless 
may in turn be regarded as marked by transformations of various significant kinds" 
(1990: 14). 
It may be the case that "the protracted debate about modernity versus postmodernity 
has become wearisome and like so many debates in the end has produced rather little" 
(Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994: vi). As Lyon suggests, "quite unprecedented social 
and cultural shifts are occurring. Whether or not 'postmodernity' is the best term to 
sum them up is a moot point. The important thing is to understand what is happening, 
not to agree on a concept to capture it with" (1999: 108). ' The term 'late modernity' is 
adopted here; it avoids the problems associated with the postmodern insistence on the 
emergence of a distinctive new era, and it seems to have gained popular acceptance 
now the vogue for the postmodern has somewhat passed. Nevertheless, as the point 
is indeed to 'understand what is happening', the work of those who do deploy the term 
'postmodern' will be considered alongside those who favour other labels. It is the 
substance of their arguments, not their terminology, which is of interest. 8 
Disentangling the Late Modern: Modernisation, Modernism, Modernity 
Berman proposes a useful categorisation of the 'modern', subdividing the phenomena 
into three constituent categories. For Berman, the term 'modernisation' refers to the 
technological, economic and social processes that were ushered in during the rise of 
capitalism. 'Modernism' is the "variety of visions and ideas" that accompanied the 
processes of modernisation (1982: 16). The term 'modernity' is an "umbrella concept 
[... ] an historical and spatial category" that "locates when and where this dialectical 
interchange happens" (Edgeworth 2003: 7). As Harvey puts it, "modernism is a 
troubled and fluctuating aesthetic response to conditions of modernity produced by a 
' Lyon, for his part, favours the term 'postmodernity'. 8 Of course, the label 'late modern' is not without its problems: As Downes and Rock put it, 
although use of the term 'late modernity' seems preferable, "even that raises the question, 'How 
late is late? ' or'Late in relation to what? '" (2003: 257). 
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particular process of modernisation" (1989: 99). This tripartite division is adopted here; 
modernisation, modernism and modernity become late modernisation, late modernism 
and late modernity. 9 
A Description of Late Modernity 
Modernity 
As Turner puts it, "modernity is broadly about the massive social and cultural changes 
which took place from the middle of the sixteenth century, and it is consequently and 
necessarily bound up with the analysis of industrial capitalist society as a revolutionary 
break with tradition and a social stability founded on a relatively stagnant agrarian 
civilisation" (1990a: 4). 10 As such, modern societies "can be identified by the 
appearance of a cluster of historically unique features" (Edgeworth 2003: 67). 
The "most striking indicator" of modernity is its political and administrative structure 
(Edgeworth 2003: 67). Political authority became centralised in the sovereign state. 
The "classic regime of sovereignty" gave national governments free reign in the 
constitution of economic and political relations, and untrammelled, effective power over 
a defined territory (Held 2003). In addition, traditional modes of economic organisation, 
based around locales and the household, were replaced with markets organised along 
predominantly national lines. Capitalist industry expanded rapidly, and became 
concentrated within relatively few industrial sectors and within a small number of 
significant nation states. This industry was predominantly concerned with 
manufacturing and the extraction of natural resources, and became a major source of 
employment (Lash and Urry 1987: 3-4). The various subsystems of modern societies 
also became increasingly differentiated, or "organised into separate spheres". Thus 
law, politics, the economy, science, religion and art became increasingly distant and 
"characterised by their own distinctive and autonomous functions" (Edgeworth 2003: 
9 In a similar vein, Edgeworth has adapted Berman's scheme for his study of the postmodern. 
Thus, modernisation, modernism and modernity become postmodernisation, postmodernism 
and postmodernity (2003: 6-7). This suggests the usefulness and durability of Berman's model. 
10 Note that "although there has been a tendency to equate the emergence of modernity with 
the Enlightenment and the advent of a 'tradition of reason' at the turn of the 18th century, other 
historical moments have been identified as marking the beginning of what we have been 
accustomed to regard as the 'modern' age or era" (Smart 1990: 16). For instance, Kroker and 
Cook argue that the modern age began in the 4th century with Augustine's radical reformulation 
of the philosophy of progress (1988: 62). Toynbee, meanwhile, suggests that modernity began 
amongst the peoples of the Atlantic seaboard of Europe in the last quarter of the 15th century 
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67). By the end of the nineteenth century, the increasing concentration of capital had 
given rise to an 'organised economy', and this had in turn led to the organisation of 
classes (Lash and Urry 1987: 7). 
These developments did not occur simultaneously and in a uniform manner across all 
western countries. Nevertheless, there was an unmistakable drift towards modernity in 
the advanced world. Bauman (2000) describes this modernity as being 'heavy' and 
'solid' and characterised by firm structures. It is modernity's solidity and firmness that 
is increasingly being transcended in the late modem era. 
Late Modernity: Where and When? 
Despite the differences in terminology and theoretical outlook of those who have 
documented the changes that society has undergone, there is remarkable consensus 
as to when and where these processes have occurred. 
Ernest Mandel was among the first Marxist thinkers to take seriously the immense 
changes that capitalism was undergoing. Pre-empting the periodisation of Lash and 
Urry, he argues that a third stage of capitalism, Late Capitalism, has emerged which is 
'purer' than the stages that preceded it. This third stage represents an expansion of 
capital into previously uncharted and uncommodified areas (Mandel 1975). " 
Similar themes emerge in the work of Jurgen Habermas, who "might be described as 
the last modern social theorist" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 27). During the 
1970s Habermas saw organised capitalism as entering a series of crises. The state 
was increasingly unable to insulate its citizens against these crises by delivering 
welfare and support. As such, the state began to suffer its own crisis. This was a crisis 
of legitimation as support for the state's 'steering' role eroded. By the 1980s, 
Habermas reasoned that capitalism had resolved these crises by evolving into a new, 
highly organised form, where the economy and state (the 'system', characterised by 
strategic action, or following Lyotard, 'performativity') increasingly 'colonise' the 
community and domestic subsystems (the 'lifeworld', characterised by 'communicative 
action'). The chances of communicative action in the lifeworld taking place are thus 
and derives from the emergence of a "cultural pharisaism" and an associated "technological 
conquest of the ocean" (1954a: 144). 
11 The stages that preceded Mandel's 'late capitalism' were 'market capitalism' and the 
'monopoly' or 'imperialist' stage. 
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progressively reduced as social participation becomes increasingly driven by rational 
and instrumental demands (Habermas: 1976,1984,1987). 12 
More recent work agrees that the early 1970s marked the genesis of late modernity. 
Harvey, for instance, argues that "there has been a sea-change in cultural as well as in 
political-economic practices since around 1972" (1989: vii). Fellow' Marxist Jameson 
similarly contends that the "economic preparation of postmodernism or late capitalism 
began in the 1950s", and the cultural "structures of feeling"13 began to change in the 
1960s. However, it was not until 1973 that "both levels in question, infrastructure and 
superstructure [... ] somehow crystallised". 1973 is marked out as a significant year 
due to "the oil crisis, the end of the international gold standard, [... ] the end of the great 
wave of 'wars of national liberation' and the beginning of the end of traditional 
communism" (Jameson 1991: xx-xxi). Lash and Urry suggest that "crucial aspects" of 
what they term 'capitalist disorganisation' emerged in Britain and the USA from the 
1960s, in France from the late 1960s/early 1970s, in Germany from the 1970s, and in 
Sweden from the late 1970s/early 1980s (1987: 7). 
Significantly, Lash and Urry specify exactly where the processes of late modernity have 
been occurring. The phenomenon is one associated with the advanced capitalist world; 
in addition to the countries mentioned by Lash and Urry, one may add places such as 
Canada and Japan, and other Western European nations. Countries with different 
levels and types of capitalist development have experienced very different processes 
during the last thirty years or so. Of course, to the extent that the world is increasingly 
interconnected, late modernity will still have impacts in these other regions. But the 
specific processes of late modernity have only been experienced in the fullest sense in 
what may be referred to as the traditional capitalist heartlands. 14 
Thus, it is possible to claim with a reasonable degree of certainty that, from around the 
early 1970s in the advanced capitalist world, a late modernity that is distinctive from its 
12 Habermas' one-time collaborator Claus Offe takes a different line, arguing that capitalism has 
overcome its crises by 'disorganising' rather than further organising; capitalism's contradictions 
have led to an unravelling of state management (1985). Indeed, much of the work on late 
modernity runs counter to the idea that the state has consolidated its power through a 
readjustment of its form, and instead asserts that various components of both state and civil 
society have become increasingly uncoupled from the centres of power and authority. 
13 An idea borrowed from Raymond Williams (1977). 
14 Furthermore, the effects of late modern processes may be felt more intensely in areas where 
populations and economic and political power are concentrated; late modernity's greatest 
impacts have generally been in urban centres rather than rural areas, even within advanced 
capitalist states. 
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modern predecessor has begun to emerge. However, Crook, Pakulski and Waters 
remind us that these societies are not even remotely "complete". They stress the 
incremental rather than the cataclysmic nature of the contemporary changes. As a 
result, "we can fully expect modernity and postmodernity [or late modernity] to coexist 
until well into the twenty-first century" (1992: 2). This serves as a useful reminder that 
late modernity is a nascent set of processes, and that however new and novel they 
appear, they are rooted in and stem from modernity itself. As such the idea of a clean 
break between modernity and late modernity is a redundant one. Late modernity is 
emerging and the features associated with it are becoming more dominant, but this is a 
continuing set of processes rather than a completed episode. 15 
Late Modernity and Globalisation 
During the period in which late modernity has emerged, related processes of 
globalisation have also been taking place. To a certain extent, the work on late 
modernity has been somewhat overshadowed by interest in globalisation over recent 
years. Rather like work on postmodernism in the 1980s, globalisation "is in danger of 
becoming, if it has not already become, the cliche of our times" (Held et al 1999: 1). 16 
Speaking in the broadest possible terms, globalisation can be thought of as the 
"widening, deepening, and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects 
of contemporary social life" (Held et al 1999: 2). " Clearly, there are a great many 
15 On the other hand, Charles Jencks (1977) suggested that the emergence of what he calls 
'postmodern' architecture can be dated and placed with the utmost precision. According to him, 
"modern architecture died in St Louis, Missouri, on July 15,1972 at 3.32pm (or thereabouts) 
when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe [housing] scheme, or rather several of its drab blocks, were given 
the final coup de grace by dynamite. [... ] Boom, boom, boom" (1977: 9). Jencks celebrated the 
demise of modern architecture and pre-empted many of the themes of the sociologists and 
philosophers who followed him. He was also significant in helping to popularise the term 
'postmodern'. See Edgeworth (2003: 21-23) and Anderson (1998: 21-4). 16 As Held and McGrew note, some observers feel that the terrorist attacks on the United States 
on September 11 2001 "mark the end of globalisation". Hoffman (2003), for instance, claims 
that post 9/11 we are witnessing the continued centrality of states and military power to the 
maintenance of world order. However, this overlooks the ways in which the responses to 
September 11 "are themselves products of, and conditional upon, a globalising world. In such a 
context, making sense of globalisation "has become a more, rather than less, urgent intellectual 
and political task" (Held and McGrew 2003: 1). 
" Held et al (1999) identify three general positions regarding globalisation. 'Hyperglobalisers' or 
'globalists' hold that globalisation defines a new era in which the marketplace increasingly 
becomes dominant. In this epoch, "traditional nation states have become unnatural, even 
impossible business units in a global economy" (Ohmae 1996: 5). The 'sceptics', on the other 
hand, believe that globalisation is essentially a myth. Instead, we can see the emergence of an 
increasingly international economy, but one that is not historically unprecedented, made up of 
regional blocs and within which national governments remain hugely powerful actors (Hirst and 
Thompson 1999). Finally, the 'transformationalists' contend that globalisation, as a historically 
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overlaps between the ideas at the heart of late modernity and those central to 
globalisation. Indeed, in what follows, ideas from writers whose concern is primarily 
with globalisation will be used to illustrate some of the features of late modernity. 
However, the exact nature of the relationship between globalisation and late modernity 
is open to debate, and specifying it is beyond the scope of this work. 
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true, if trite, to say that globalisation is part of late 
modernity and late modernity is part of globalisation. Giddens argues that "modernity 
is inherently globalising" (1990: 63). According to him, modernity led to the 
intensification of worldwide social relations and globalisation is the natural apogee of 
this process. Globalisation has thus ushered in the era of late modernity, where the 
consequences of modernity become more radicalised and universalised than ever 
before (1990; 1991). 18 This idea that late modernity and globalisation are intertwined 
processes, but that one cannot be reduced or collapsed into the other, is a valuable 
one. 
Late Modernisation: The Erosion of the `Solid' Features of Modernity 
Processes of late modernisation are "best understood as a continuation of the 
processes of modernisation, where those processes operate with increasing scope and 
intensity to erode what appears in retrospect as the regional stability of modernity" 
(Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 220). The resultant changes are best seen in three 
main realms of society. They are the economy and production, the state and politics, 
and class structure: Each will be dealt with in turn. 
unprecedented phenomena, is "a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and 
economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order". Governments and 
societies are forced to adjust to a world in which the old distinctions between international and 
domestic, and external and internal affairs are blurring. Globalisation is thus a powerful 
transformative force, but the direction of the 'shake out' remains uncertain (Held et al 1999: 7; 
Rosenau 1992,1997). This middle position seems soundest, soberly registering the extent of 
contemporary change. The best academic work on the debate can broadly be said to fall under 
this category. Contrast this with the decidedly more hyperbolic accounts of what Brown (2003: 
564) describes as the "very popular genre of anti-globalisation jeremiads", including Monbiot's 
Captive State (2000), Frank's One Market Under God (2001), Hertz's The Silent Takeover 
J2001) and Klein's No Logo (2001). 
8 Some have argued that globalisation itself "has effected the dawn of postmodernity" (Scholte 
2000: 24-5). Albrow (1996), for instance, argues that the global age is beyond modernity. 
Indeed he suggests that even the term 'postmodernity' confuses the issue by maintaining its 
reference to the modern; the break is more decisive than this allows. In addition, Lyon 
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Economy and Production 
One of the central themes of late modernity is the idea, developed most substantially 
by theorists of globalisation, that we now live in an era characterised "by the existence 
of a single global economy transcending and integrating the world's major economic 
regions. [... ] The pattern and intensity of contemporary economic globalisation is 
historically unprecedented; a single global economy can be said to be in the making". 19 
Although it is probably the case that the global economy may not be as highly 
integrated as the most robust and developed national economies, the trends seem to 
"point unambiguously towards intensifying integration within and across regions" (Held 
and McGrew 2003: 24,299). 20 
Scholte sees economic changes as crucial to the development of what he terms 
"superterritoriality". "It is hard to see how transworld connections could have emerged 
and proliferated in the absence of capitalism" he argues (2000: 96). For Scholte, 
capitalism has spurred globalisation in four ways. Firstly, driven by the capitalist logic 
of ever increasing accumulation, many firms have pursued global markets in order to 
increase sales. Global distribution, sales and communications networks have been set 
up to facilitate this process. Secondly, "superterritorial accounting" has also increased 
accumulation. Companies can maximise profits by varying prices across the globe; 
higher profit margins in mature markets can help the setting up of new sites at other 
points. Global accounting also allows profits to be concentrated in 'tax havens'. 
Thirdly, "global sourcing" is highly advantageous as firms can place their production 
facilities where costs are lowest. Finally, the rise of global communications and global 
financial flows "have done more than enhance the possibilities for accumulation 
through primary production and traditional manufacturing [... they offer] vast potentials 
for accumulation in their own right". "The very process of creating supraterritorial 
spaces has been a boon to capitalism" (Scholte 2000: 97-9). 21 
tantalisingly raises the possibility that postmodernity is merely a western phenomena, and one 
that may have been transcended in the global age (1999: 7). 
19 Among those espousing such a line are Dicken (2003) and Castells (2003). Hirst and 
Thompson (1999) dispute their conclusions, arguing that the world economy is becoming 
regionalised into three major blocs, Europe, Asia Pacific and North America. Many states in the 
'south' are excluded or marginalised from the international economy, so it cannot be classed as 
'global' in any meaningful sense of the word. 
2 Scholars whose focus is not exclusively on globalisation have also recognised these trends. 
See, for example, Lash and Urry (1987: Ch 4, Ch 5) and Harvey (1989: Part 2). 
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An "unprecedented financial globalisation" has also occurred. Finance has "shifted 
very substantially out of the territorialist framework that defined most banking, 
securities, derivatives and insurance business before 1960" (Scholte 2000: 79-82). 
Finance has become 'commodified'; dealings in the various instruments are undertaken 
not only to further capitalist production in the traditional sectors of agriculture, 
manufacturing and the like, but are also seen as "a means of accumulation in their own 
right". Indeed, the growth of financial markets "has given surplus accumulation one of 
its greatest boosts in history" (ibid: 116-20). As Held et al outline, national economies 
now struggle to insulate themselves from the operation of this global market: "National 
financial markets and the world's key financial centres are increasingly embedded 
within a global financial system". As a result, financial conditions in one region "almost 
instantaneously impact on national financial markets across the globe". The central 
feature of the global financial marketplace "is the sheer magnitude, complexity and 
speed of financial transactions and flows [... ] contemporary financial globalisation 
represents a distinctive new stage in the organisation and management of credit and 
money in the world economy; it is transforming the conditions under which the 
immediate and long term prosperity of states and peoples across the globe is 
determined" (1999: 234-5). 22 
There have been similar developments regarding trade: "The historical evidence at 
both the world and country levels shows a trend towards higher levels of trade today 
than ever before" (Held et al 1999: 176). This is related to the increasing liberalisation 
of international trade relations "that is unprecedented in the modern epoch". Today, 
virtually every national economy, with the odd exception such as North Korea, is bound 
up in an intensive global network of trading relations; "national markets are increasingly 
enmeshed with one another" (ibid: 176). This new global trading order "has significant 
impacts on the management of national economies but most especially the capacity of 
governments to ensure national prosperity" (ibid: 182). It is true that institutionalised 
regional trading arrangements have grown, but for Held et al these, "have tended to 
reinforce the trend toward freer trade" by providing a mechanism through which 
national economies and regional blocs can engage more strategically with global 
markets. Such is the interconnectedness of this global trading system that "autarky, or 
21 Scholte stresses that capitalism is not the sole generator of globalisation; rationalist 
knowledge, technological innovation and supportive regulatory frameworks are also crucial 
(2000: Ch 4). 
22 The volatility of global financial markets has also, as Scholte notes, "heightened insecurity 
among the world's wealthy and poor alike" (2000: 217). 
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'delinking' is also off the political agenda"; the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty 
has thus been significantly renegotiated (ibid: 187-8). 
Indeed Lash and Urry suggest that "individual nation states are unable to 'organise' a 
given national economy" (1987: 197). This is largely due to the fact that capital is no 
longer dependent upon labour thanks to its new freedom of movement, or 'footloose' 
quality. "The reproduction and growth of capital, profits and dividends and the 
satisfaction of stockholders have all become largely independent from the duration of 
any particular local engagement with labour" (Bauman 2000: 149). Although this 
independence can be overstated, capital has become "extraterritorial, light, 
unencumbered and disembedded to an unprecedented extent". National governments 
are forced into trying to attract capital to their territories through a host of deregulation 
and liberalisation policies; lower taxes, fewer rules, a 'flexible' labour market. Also 
crucial is a "docile population, unable and unwilling to put up any organised resistance 
to whatever decision the capital might yet take". Bauman captures the paradoxical 
nature of this situation: "Governments can hope to keep capital in place only by 
convincing it beyond reasonable doubt that it is free to move away- at short notice or 
without notice" (2000: 149-150). 
Closely related to these economic shifts is the emergence of a distinctive set of 
production arrangements. Indeed, one of the most visible features of late 
modernisation is industrial realignment. Crook, Pakulski and Waters identify three 
forms of this realignment; postindustrialism, renewed entrepreneurialism and flexible 
specialisation (1992: 173). It is the latter phenomenon that is of most significance, for 
"increases in service labour and entrepreneurship [... ] do not have the effect of 
dismantling the core industrial arrangements of modernity, those of Fordist 
manufacturing". Flexible specialisation, on the other hand, is doing precisely that (ibid: 
178). 
Fordism represented an advance on Taylorism, which involved "breaking work down 
into its component elements so that each could be accomplished by the application of 
minimum skill and then engaging in detailed measurement of levels of production in 
relation to effort". Taylorism's "key weakness" was the fact that it necessitated close 
supervision of workers. Henry Ford solved this by utilising the newly invented moving 
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assembly line to replace the supervisor (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 171). 23 
Fordism's novelty consisted in the "explicit recognition that mass production [partly due 
to the high fixed costs involved] meant mass consumption, a new system of the 
reproduction of labour power, a new politics of labour control and management, a new 
aesthetics and psychology, in short, a new kind of rationalised, modernist and populist 
democratic society" (Harvey 1989: 125-6). As such, profits were supported by 
consumer demand based upon high and growing wages. This was generated through 
compromise between large employers and trade unions. The resultant purchasing 
power of substantial parts of the working class ensured the mass consumption of mass 
produced consumer durables (Freidman 2000: 59). Thus the Fordist model became a 
great deal more than a way of organising industry. It became "an epistemological 
building site on which the whole world view was erected". The Fordist factory's 
"meticulous separation between design and execution, initiative and command 
following, freedom and obedience, invention and determination [... ] was without doubt 
the highest achievement to date of order-aimed social engineering. No wonder it set 
the metaphorical frame of reference [... ] for everyone trying to comprehend how human 
reality works on all its levels" (Bauman 2000: 56-7). Post-war Fordism was less a 
system of production; rather, it was a "total way of life" (Harvey 1989: 135-6). 24 
By the 1970s however, "the inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the 
inherent contradictions of capitalism became more and more apparent". Crucially, they 
were too 'rigid'; long term, large-scale investment in mass production systems, the 
rigidities of labour markets, allocation, contracts and state commitments, and the 
corporatist compromise all began to undermine accumulation. The solution was "a 
series of novel experiments" in the political and social spheres that have ushered in a 
new regime of "flexible accumulation", or 'post-Fordism' (Harvey 1989: 142,145-7). 
Post-Fordism sees the economy increasingly dominated by small-batch and niche 
production of goods with short life-cycles. Manufacturing systems have become more 
23 Mass production assembly line technology only really developed in Europe after the mid 
1930s. Despite being already well established in the US at this point, it still did not account for 
the entirety of US production at that time. 'Full' Fordism only came to fruition in Europe from the 
1950s (Harvey 1989: 128). 
24 For Bauman the supremely modern Fordist mindset of rational planning was so all pervasive 
that even the "confrontation between socialism and capitalism [was not] much more than a 
family squabble. Communism, after all, wished only to clean up the Fordist model of its present 
pollutions (nay imperfections)- of that malignant market-generated chaos which stood in the way 
of the ultimate and total defeat of accidents and contingency and made rational planning less 
than all-embracing" (2000: 57). As such, communism "was thoroughly modern in its passionate 
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flexible through adopting "adaptable, reprogrammable technology", by dispersing 
"organisational authority and responsivity so that differentiated organisational segments 
are free to stay in contact with and respond to market developments", and by 
developing multi-skilled workers "with an advanced capacity and freedom to acquire 
skills and knowledge and to apply them in decisive ways in order to enhance 
productive capacity" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 181). 25 This means that firms 
are able to alter product lines quickly and cheaply, which is necessary as demand is 
less stable as consumer goods are increasingly subject to the unpredictable and ever- 
changing dictates of fashion . 
2" This flexible production has led to the vertical 
disintegration of industries. Firms increasingly establish quasi-market, network 
relations with a myriad of suppliers, distributors and even their direct competitors. 
Large firms are broken up into smaller units, and new "small craft-like companies" 
flourish, especially in certain "hot-house development areas" (Friedman 2000: 59-60). 
The Fordist norm of male workers earning a "family wage" has also broken down. This 
contributes to the demise of the 'nuclear family' and creates further uncertainty and flux 
(Room, Lawson and Laczko 1989: 165-176). 
Crook, Pakulski and Waters argue that these transformations are driven primarily by 
the market rather than technological advances. The growth of small batch and niche 
production occurs as "producers in the advanced societies can no longer compete with 
second-wave industrialisers of the third world at the level of cost in mass producing 
commodities. Instead they must compete at the level of product variability, quality and 
customisation" (1992: 180). 27 
conviction that a good society can only be [... ] carefully designed [and] rationally managed". Its 
collapse was therefore the "final nail in the coffin [of] modern ambitions" (1992: xxv, 166). 
25 Lash and Urry make similar observations about what they term "flexible specialisation" (1987: 
198-9). 
26 This is particularly so in the world of consumer electronics. Continual innovation and rapid 
obsolescence, as well as swings in fashion, provide an excellent example of what Toffler called 
"future shock" (1971). This was based upon Toynbee's idea that technological advances had 
led to a crisis in human affairs for the pace of change was now beyond "the adaptational 
capacity of a single life" (1954b: 468). Indeed, Harvey suggests that the 'half-lives' of consumer 
products has tumbled. There is "much greater attention to quick-changing fashions", with the 
result that "the relatively stable aesthetic of Fordist modernism has given way to all the ferment, 
instability and fleeting qualities of a postmodernist aesthetic that celebrates difference, 
ephemerality, spectacle, fashion, and the commodification of cultural forms" (1989: 156). 
27 At the apogee of post-Fordism are firms such as Benetton. Ostensibly a producer of clothing, 
Benetton actually "engages in no production directly, but simply operates as a powerful 
marketing machine, which transmits commands to a wide array of independent producers" 
(Harvey 1989: 158-9). For a globalist's take on the Benetton model, see Castells (1996: 162). 
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As Held et al point out, "aside from global finance, perhaps the commonest image of 
economic globalisation is that of the multinational corporation [MNC]: huge corporate 
empires which straddle the globe with annual turnovers matching the entire GNP of 
many nations". MNCs are absolutely pivotal to the process of economic globalisation. 
They account for around two thirds of world trade, and up to a third of world trade is 
intrafirm trade between branches of the same company. The ability of MNCs to "adjust 
and reorganise production in an era of more flexible production systems is 
considerable and has significant repercussions for national economic management". 28 
In addition, small and medium sized enterprises are being increasingly integrated into 
global production and distribution networks as communications technology advances 
and the infrastructural conditions become ever more conducive to global trade and 
production (1999: 236,270). Indeed, it is now argued that global corporate capital 
"exercises decisive influence over the organisation, location and distribution of 
economic power and resources in the contemporary global economy" (Held and 
McGrew 2003: 26). The increased power and influence of MNCs tends to come at the 
expense of the power and influence of nation-states and their governments. 
State and Politics 
The notion that the world was made up of a collection of sovereign nation states was 
one of the centrepieces of modernity. According to Scholte, the "traditional conception" 
of sovereignty entailed "a claim by the state to supreme, comprehensive, unqualified 
and exclusive rule over its territorial jurisdiction" (2000: 135). 29 It was the case that 
"even in Westphalian times practice sometimes fell short of this definition of 
sovereignty", but "nevertheless, sovereignty remained hypothetically realisable in the 
territorialist world of old" (ibid: 135-6). 
The ability of states to rule over their territories in this sovereign manner is increasingly 
being eroded. Held and McGrew, for instance, note that "the globalisation of economic 
28 Though often described as 'footloose', MNCs "still have to produce somewhere and the 
advantages of familiarity, agglomeration, and economies of scale necessarily generate a certain 
geographical concentration"; production is rarely shifted on the basis of cost alone. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that capital and business have become increasingly mobile 
over time (Held et al 1999: 269). 
29 Scholte outlines precisely what this means: "With supreme rule, the sovereign state answers 
to no higher authority; it always has the final say in respect of its territorial ream and its cross- 
border relations with other countries. With comprehensive rule, the sovereign state governs all 
aspects of social life: money supply, language, military affairs, sexual behaviour, formal 
education etc. With unqualified rule, sovereign states respect a norm of non-intervention in one 
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activity exceeds the regulatory reach of national governments". Thus it often seems 
that "world markets effectively escape political regulation" (2003: 26-7). 30 But it is not 
only increasing economic integration and the power of the multinational corporation 
that impacts upon the nation state. There are now a range of other actors, forms of 
political power and sites of authority (Scholte 2000: Ch 5; Held et al 1999: Ch 1; 
Ohmae 1996; Strange 2003; Crook Pakulski and Waters 1992: 97-101). 'Above' the 
state, a diverse set of "extra" or "supra-state" bodies have emerged. Examples of such 
actors include UN bodies, political-military blocs such as NATO, supra-national 
integrative organisations such as the EC, trading blocs (NAFTA), financial 
organisations (World Bank, IMF) and cartels (OPEC). 3' Meanwhile, 'below' the state, 
privatisation, marketisation, deregulation, the increasing delegation of powers to semi- 
autonomous agencies and a variety of sub-state bodies, often tied to particular locales, 
have emerged. 32 Of these processes, "the privatisation of state-owned corporations is 
perhaps the most central and spectacular of all. What makes it spectacular is its 
almost universal acceptance by governments and parties, regardless of ideological 
shade" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 98-100). Privatisation also encompasses 
the selling off of public housing, the extension of private initiatives in schooling, 
reductions in the level of state controlled healthcare, the private contracting of services, 
reductions in state provided welfare and the gradual erosion of state protectionism. 33 
As Crook, Pakulski and Waters put it, "both the functions of the state as a tool of social 
and economic regulation and reconstruction, and the scope of state power and 
another's territorial jurisdictions. With exclusive rule, the sovereign state does not share 
authority over its realm with any other party" (2000: 135). 
30 For one of the strongest globalist statements that politicians and governments have lost the 
authority which they used to possess and world markets are now more powerful than states, 
see Strange (2003). Even Habermas (2001), a staunch defender of the project of modernity, 
accepts that one of the central planks of the modern world, the nation state, has had its 
sovereignty eroded by the global economy. 
31 The majority of these international organisations pursue or at least support neo-liberal 
economic globalisation. This suggests that "neo-liberal globalization represents a political as 
much as an economic phenomenon"; global neo-liberal markets have to be, and have been, 
actively engineered (Rupert 2005: 460). 
32 This is Slaughter's 'disaggregated state', where the state is not disappearing but 
'disaggregating' into its component institutions. Administrative agencies and devolved bodies 
dominate both domestic and international politics through newly emerging transgovernmental 
networks that are informal rather than organised and rigid. It is through such mechanisms the 
global economy is regulated (2003,2004). This has also been described as the "hollowing out" 
of the state (Rhodes 1994,1997). 
33 Ladeur (2004: 1-2) argues that globalisation's influence on nation states is still negligible 
when compared to national economic factors: "Major sectors of the economies of the leading 
industrial countries develop without the underlying major impact of the world economy". 
Globalisation may well be occurring, but in a much more institutionalised way than many are 
prepared to accept. According to Sassen (2004), states themselves have undergone a process 
of 'denationalisation' so their influence now extends beyond their own territory, although they 
are not the most powerful actors in the transnational order. 
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responsibility, have started to diminish" (1992: 79). The state is fragmenting, and 
increasingly its domains have "fuzzy boundaries and unspecific functions [... ] the very 
notion of 'the state' as a separate and autonomous institutional entity, intimately linked 
with the notion of 'politics' and 'public sphere' and clearly separated from the domains 
of economy, societal community and culture, is increasingly problematic" (ibid: 103-4). 
Ultimately, any new sociological model "cannot be grounded in the realities of the 
nation state, by now clearly not a framework large enough to accommodate the 
decisive factors in the conduct of interaction and the dynamics of social life" (Bauman 
1992: 65). 
The effect of these changes on politics has been significant, for in modernity politics 
tended to be primarily organised on national lines. National interest groups with 
relatively straightforward relationships to the economy and capital were a typical 
feature of modern capitalism. As these groups consolidated in the middle of the 20th 
century, they began to organise at a state level. In Western Europe, "the deprivations 
of the depression and the spectre of the revolution propelled welfare reforms, economic 
regulation, and defensive consensus building the national level. The world wars further 
strengthened these tendencies" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 84). The result 
was 'corporatism', a system in which, broadly speaking, "national organisations 
representing industry and labour work in co-operation with government representatives 
to constitute an intermediate layer [... ] between the state and civil society" (Birch 2001: 
212). 34 These organisations strike a quid pro quo, whereby they control their 
memberships and accept "reasonable settlements in a spirit of 'national unity', in 
exchange for which the national level organisations are given considerable powers 
within the state. apparatuses" (Lash and Urry 1987: 232). Corporatism thus "constituted 
a sort of 'middle solution', a state sponsored and state controlled Great Armistice" 
(Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 84). 35 
Corporatist arrangements have collapsed as the processes of late modernity have 
unfolded. The globalisation of the world economy is central to this, for corporatism was 
34 Classical tripartite corporatism sees groups representing labour, capital and the state. Where 
labour movements were weaker, a corporatism which excluded labour was possible, for 
instance in 1920s Italy, Third Reich Germany, Gaullist France (Lash and Urry 1987: 280), and 
1930s Portugal (Birch 2001: 213). To avoid this stigma, post war corporatism was sometimes 
dubbed "neo-corporatism" (Birch 2001: 213). 
35 Crook, Pakulski and Waters point out that "the corporate solution worked well". Even critics 
acknowledge that "in relative terms, it was successful", for it produced an enduring period of 
peace and prosperity, promoted social cohesion, economic growth, the spread of citizenship 
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very much a national project, set in a very definite national context. In addition, the 
decline in mass production in the west has meant that the workers who were once at 
the centre of the corporatist system "have become so unrepresentative of the national 
labour force that a corporatist solution [has] become increasingly unworkable". The 
loss of collective working class identity has also reduced the plausibility of the 
corporatist framework. By the mid 1980s, "there was virtually no unified 'working class' 
able to deliver a corporatist bargain to capital and the state". In addition the oil crises 
of the 1970s reduced the capability of the leading western economies to 'buy off the 
workers through the annual wages round; Keynesian stability crumbled (Lash and Urry: 
234-5). 36 As Crook, Pakulski and Waters put it, "the main social forces that the 
corporatist state has represented and empowered have ceased to be the principal and 
coherent actors, while the new, potentially disruptive social forces cannot be 
incorporated in the old deals" (1992: 95). 
The demise of corporatism is evidence of the "decoupling of political conflicts and 
cleavages from the old structural class divisions". Another central aspect of this is the 
"progressive decline in class voting" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 138). The 
social differentiation that has resulted in class decomposition has weakened the "stable 
socio-political milieux which were the 'natural' constituencies of traditional parties" (ibid: 
142). Lash and Urry stress that in the era of organised capitalism "one's occupational 
class provided a fairly good predictor of one's voting patterns". 37 However, particularly 
in Britain, "there has been a considerable process of class dealignment; in other words, 
the association between an individual's occupational class and party support has faded 
away" (1987: 212). Indeed, occupational class has now become a "relatively poor 
predictor of voting" (ibid: 214). The British political parties, for instance, traditionally 
relied on large class based voting blocs, but in the late modern world there is a much 
greater diversity of transitory groups with very particular sets of demands. 
rights and welfare, and "above all, [... ] prevented total warfare and the nuclear holocaust" (1992: 
89). 
36 Lash and Urry note that as corporatism crumbled in the West, British labour took a particularly 
dramatic "beating". This proved important, for "the collective actor in a given country which 
most clearly puts its mark on the organisation process will also be well placed to exercise 
considerable influence over the process of disorganisation". Thus capital has "almost solely 
determined the course of the new restructuration" in Britain (1987: 282-3). 
37 As recently as 1984, Taylor could confidently assert that the Labour Party had no need to 
maintain "an efficient vote mobilising machine" in the Yorkshire coalfields, such was their 
electoral dominance. This was due to the social homogeneity" and "one class character" of the 
area (1984: 107-8). 
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A wave of 'new social movements' or 'new politics' has moved in on the terrain of 
traditional class-based politics. Habermas points to the difference between an 'old 
politics' of economic, social, domestic and military security, and a 'new politics' 
concerned with quality of life, equality, individual self-realisation, participation and 
human rights (1981). 38 These concerns manifest themselves in a range of new 
movements and actors. 39 Their social bases "are contingent rather than structurally 
determined, they are socio-cultural rather than socio-economic, and they are related to 
consumption and lifestyle rather than to production" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 
146). The new social movements can appear to be apolitical as they reject the 
"conventional institutional idiom of politics" (ibid: 140); the state is often ignored or 
bypassed, and an anti-bureaucratic stance is cultivated. The international mass media 
exposure they enjoy is also historically unique, and tends to give the movements "a 
specific exhibitionist and didactic character"; indeed, "appeals combine with symbols 
and icons", and "images rather than discursive arguments determine outcomes". 
Movements come in various guises, such as formal organisations, and highly 
decentralised informal groups, loose social circles and "periodically activated networks 
of contacts and co-operation". Indeed, within each movement may be hundreds or 
even thousands of individual campaign groups with varying objectives and forms of 
action (Lash and Urry 1987: 223-4). The individual groups themselves tend to exhibit a 
"fuzziness and openness" which makes them difficult to confront and attack; often there 
are no formal criteria of membership, and activists, supporters and sympathisers, who 
need not share a "programmatic consensus", can all share in activities. Indeed, non- 
affiliated supporters and sympathisers "always form the large majority of participants in 
movement events". Such events may include conventional lobbying, mass rallies, 
38 For an even earlier recognition of this 'new politics', see Inglehart (1977). In a similar vein to 
Habermas, Offe talks of the "new values" of "personal self-realisation, creativity, and freedom to 
make decisions". These are gradually replacing the "traditional", work-oriented concerns of 
"income, security, diligence, subordination, discipline" (1985: 154). On the new subjects, 'life 
politics' and forms of intimate relationships that late modernity creates see Bauman (2003), 
Giddens (1991) and Giddens and Pierson (1998: Part 5). 
39 Examples include the nuclear disarmament movement, the ecological movement (CND and 
Greenpeace are the most visible and well-known organisations in these fields), the anti- 
globalisation movement and the women's movement. Single-issue movements have also 
emerged, such as the anti-war protests in the UK surrounding the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Single issue politics often has more micro-level concerns; Lash and Urry point to the growth of 
the 'urban left', such as tenants' associations and community groups (1987: 224). See also 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 159-65). Confronting power in this small-scale way resonates with 
Foucault's work (1980). He argues that there are multiple sites of dispersed power (prisons, 
asylums, hospitals, universities, schools, etc. ). These forms of power are independent of any 
overall 'discourse', logic or class domination. Instead it is the localised practices of repression 
that must be challenged. See also Aronowitz (1981). But, as Harvey (1989: 46) argues, it is 
difficult to see how "such localised struggles might add up to a progressive [... ] attack on the 
central forms of capitalist exploitation and repression". 
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protest marches, and direct action. New social movements operate outside of the 
conventional forms of old politics "as protests combine with leisure activities and merge 
into a total countercultural Gestalt'. Ultimately, unlike the "student revolts of the 1960s, 
[new social movements] have proved to be persistent, widespread and politically fertile". 
As such, "they cannot be treated as residuum of conventional politics, or dismissed as 
transient outbursts of conventional politics" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 146- 
54)40 
These developments raise significant questions for the traditional labour movement. 
As Offe suggests, "if wage labour is no longer the self-evident centre from which the 
subjective perspectives on life of the propertyless segments of the population emerge, 
problems arise for the organisation and policy of those associations- the trade unions- 
that traditionally presupposed precisely this". Not only does membership and influence, 
of the unions decline, but "the global aim of the labour movement- 'emancipating 
labour'- becomes unclear" (1985: 151). Indeed, it is possible that "the new politics 
marks a permanent shift away from structurally determined class politics" (Crook, 
Pakulski and Waters 1992: 162). 
Class Structure 
The industrial working class has undergone massive changes, to the point of 
disintegration. The idea of the decomposition of the working class is not a particularly 
new one. Dahrendorf (1959) highlighted some fundamental changes to class structure, 
including working class fragmentation and embourgeoisement, the growth of a middle 
class of professional and technical workers, and a growing diversity of lifestyle and 
consumption patterns. However, the pace and scale of working class disintegration 
has grown massively. Central to this is the decentralisation of industry, employment 
and population (Lash and Urry 1987: 102). Populations and employment have been 
spatially redistributed "away from the industrial heartlands and especially from the older 
central areas of large cities, which has led to the breakdown of old-style 'occupational 
communities". This has a very practical effect; organising a section of the labour force 
40 In sum, the "substantive novelty" of new social movements "lies principally in the increased 
diversity of political processes- more open organisational structures, more diverse elites, more 
fluid and fragmented alliances and loyalties, and more complex networks" (Crook, Pakulski and 
Waters 1992: 162-4). 
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is now extremely difficult (Lash and Urry 1987: 108). 4' As Gorz puts it, "the sites of 
production are no longer the sites of decision making and economic power", and thus 
"grass roots workers power" is something of an impossibility "within the framework of 
the existing structure of production" (1982: 48,51). 
Flexible specialisation has also had major impacts. There has been a growth in the 
number of small plants, and an increase in self-employment. In addition, there has 
been a rise in service or tertiary sector employment. This has occurred extensively in 
all the major western economies. Bauman also notes the rise of work on short-term 
contracts, rolling contracts, or no contract at all. These are positions with little security, 
and as such "working life is saturated with uncertainty" (2000: 147). Indeed, 
subcontracted, temporary and part time work is now the norm. The relatively large, 
stable working class that modernity brought into being and which class-based politics 
presupposed has largely disappeared. As Hobsbawn (1981) puts it, the 'forward march 
of labour' has been 'halted'. 42 
In addition, mass consumption and consumerism, which "elevates the principle of 
individual competitiveness" and the resultant atomisation of the worker has also helped 
to "dissolve" occupational communities (Lash and Urry 1987: 227-8). Indeed, "there 
has been an increasing articulation of various status groups and categories, including 
ethnic minorities and generational and lifestyle groups, whose identities and political 
aspirations have been shaped in the socio-cultural sphere of consumption and lifestyle 
rather than in production" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 95). Ultimately, "work 
can no longer offer the secure axis around which to wrap and fix self-definitions, 
41 To an extent this was always the case, even at the height of modernity. See Nichols and 
Armstrong (1976); their study, conducted on the cusp of late modernity (1970-3), looks at the 
problems involved in creating a homogenous working class bloc, even in a single factory. az Lash and Urry suggest that working class struggles may actually increase in disorganised 
capitalism, but they are more likely to be "sectional" and ideologically "community centred" and 
"radical democratic" rather than class based. Although "considerable working class capacities" 
do still exist, it is undeniable that "the power of a mass industrial working class to shape society 
in its own image are for the foreseeable future profoundly weakened" (1987: 8-13,311). Hardt 
and Negri (2000) have suggested that the rise of the information and knowledge economy 
creates greater potential for mass resistance and reappropriation of citizens' own labour power 
than was previously the case. As Rustin puts it, "the 'virtual' character of much modern 
production, and the importance of symbolic production, especially the media, invests power in 
active subjects and thereby removes it from the owners and controllers of material resources" 
(2002: 452). For Balakrishnan, this suggests that "contemporary capitalism, although seemingly 
impervious to anti-systemic challenge, is in fact vulnerable at all points to riot and rebellion" on 
the part of a "global multitude" (2000: 144). 
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identities and life-projects. Neither can it be easily conceived of as the ethical 
foundation of society, or as the ethical axis of individual life" (Bauman 2000: 139). 43 
Bauman argues there is a major schism between a modernity that engaged its 
members as producers and a late modernity that engages its members as consumers. 
"The difference is seminal", he writes, for "life organised around the producer's role 
tends to be normatively regulated" whereas life organised around consumption "must 
do without norms" and is guided instead by "seduction, ever rising desires and volatile 
wishes" (2000: 76). Furthermore, "to the extent that these class/gender positions are 
structured by consumption rather than production, further and more intensive 
differentiation becomes possible" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 131). The 
patterns of inequality in society become much more "fluid"; society begins to resemble 
"a mosaic of multiple status identities rather than a small number of enclosed social 
capsules". Personal status ceases to depend upon one's location in society, and 
instead will rely on "one's status accomplishments in the sphere of consumption, one's 
access to codes". This will include "the products one uses, the places one goes, the 
leisure pursuits in which one engages, the clothes one wears" as opposed to work and 
ownership (ibid: 132-3). Scholte argues that this 'consumer democracy' fostered by the 
global marketplace "has in practice allocated voice in proportion to assets" (2000: 281). 
As such, a new 'underclass' has emerged, which is largely excluded from consumption 
(Crook, Pakulski and Waters: 121). 44 
Once consumption is established as the focus for individual freedom, then "the future of 
capitalism looks more secure than ever", for social control becomes significantly easier 
and less expensive. The old methods of control, described by Bauman as "panoptical" 
(after Bentham and Foucault) are replaced by the more efficient tool of "seduction". 
Subjects do not experience this form of control as an external imposition, and as such 
there is no reason to resist it. Indeed consumption choices become a conscious 
articulation of the subject's 'freedom'. Panoptical control is reserved for that minority 
who, for whatever reason, "cannot be integrated through the consumer market" 
(Bauman 1992: 51). 45 
43 As Eagleton puts its, "thoughts fall apart from feelings, so that nobody thinks through their 
fingertips any more" (1990: 366). 
as The term underclass was popularised by Charles Murray's Losing Ground (1984). Of course, 
the idea of an underclass was pre-empted by Marx and Engels' notion of the 'lumpenproletariat'. 
See Marx and Engels (1968: 44), Engels (1956: 14) and Marx (1963: 75). 
as In addition, Harvey notes that there has been an increasing move towards the consumption of 
services as opposed to goods. These include personal, business, educational and health 
services, but also "entertainment, spectacles, happenings and distractions", such as visits to 
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According to Gorz, the cumulative effect of these changes has been the emergence of 
a "post-industrial neo-proletariat" (1982: 69). However, it is not only among the working 
class that processes of late modernisation are having significant effects. Concomitant 
to the erosion of the traditional working class is the rapid growth of the 'service class' or 
the 'new middle class', whose roots can be traced to the Taylorist and Fordist 
requirement for scientific, rational management of production. This class forms a 
"professional managerial strata" which has become a "powerful third force" in 
capitalism (Lash and Urry: 11,161) 48 The service class is made up of the "dominant 
positions or places within the social division of labour which do not principally involve 
the ownership of capital, land or buildings"; instead, they 'service' capital by controlling 
labour power in the workplace (ibid: 163-3). 47 
The service class has an "irredeemably disorganising effect on capitalist society" (Lash 
and Urry 1987: 162-3), as professional specialisation and fragmentation give rise to a 
variety of class fractions in place of the relatively unified working and ruling classes of 
old. Thus, "while the service class displaces the capitalist class it does not precisely 
replace it". Its structural location is different; the service class occupies a new position 
in a fundamentally reconstructed class system (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 115). 
In addition, the service class is even more 'consumption centred' than the classes it is 
eroding. The identities of its members are more intimately tied to consumption rather 
than their position in the social division of labour (Callinicos 1989: 162-4). As Anderson 
puts it, "the bourgeoisie as [inter alia] Marx knew it, is a thing of the past. In place of 
that solid amphitheatre is an aquarium of floating, evanescent forms- the projectors and 
managers, auditors and janitors, administrators and speculators of contemporary 
museums, attending rock concerts or movies, and going to health clubs. The "lifetime" of such 
services is difficult to estimate, but it is certainly shorter than the lifetime of consumer durables; 
"if there are limits to the accumulation and turnover of physical goods [... ] then it makes sense 
for capitalists to turn to the provision of very ephemeral services in consumption" (1989: 285). 46 The concept of the 'service class', comprised of mangers, social service workers and public 
service officials, was first elucidated by Renner, one of the Marxist legal theorists studied in Part 
1. According to Renner, the service class (as opposed to service workers; cleaners, cooks etc. ) 
do not receive wages in return for the sale of their labour power, but receive salaries or 
commissions which are fractions of profits (1978: 249-52). Indeed, Marx himself had predicted 
the increase of the number of workers in service industries in Results of the Immediate 
Processes of Production (1999), which had been intended for inclusion in volume I of Capital 
but was left out at the last minute (McLellan 1999a: xii). 
a' The service class can be seen as occupying a "contradictory class location" between labour 
and capital (Wright 1978: 61-2). Members of this class are simultaneously capitalists 
dominating labour and workers who do not own the means of production and are forced to sell 
their own labour (Wright 1993: 29). For refinements to the basic idea of 'contradictory class 
locations', see Wright (1985,1993). 
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capital: functions of a monetary universe that knows no social fixities or stable 
identities" (1998: 85). 
Meanwhile, globalisation means that "class formation is progressively less tied to 
territoriality" and as such the capitalist class is no longer organised within individual 
nation states. A "transnational capitalist class" has emerged as a global ruling class, 
which accumulates capital globally and also "controls the levers of an emergent 
transnational state apparatus and of global decision making" (Robinson and Harris 
2000: 12). Members of this transnational capitalist class are the owners of the major 
productive resources of the world. They are increasingly distinguished from national or 
local bourgeoisies due to their involvement in globalised production and circuits of 
accumulation. The transnational capitalist class is also increasingly class conscious 
and has actively pursued a project of globalisation through an emerging transnational 
state apparatus (ibid: 22). 48 
Late Modernism: the cognitive accompaniment of late modernisation 
Late modernism is the cognitive accompaniment to late modernisation. It is the set of 
visions, ideas, woridviews and forms of consciousness that have emerged in tandem 
with late modernisation. Late modernism can be divided across one central axis. 
Firstly, among many philosophers there has been a general rejection of epistemology 
and the notion of truth and the adoption of a thoroughgoing relativism. Secondly, there 
has been the growth of a distinctly late modern cultural realm 49 
Philosophy 
At the heart of the philosophical strand of late modernism is a rejection of the 
certainties and notion of progress that characterised the Enlightenment project. This 
definitively 'modern' project, as Hollis relates, is the "grand attempt to discover all 
nature's secrets, including those of humanity". Through the scientific method, rapid 
advances were made in the physical sciences, and before long the attention began to 
be paid to "the enquiring mind itself and [... ] the nature of society" (1994: 5). Modernity 
as All these changes taken together have led Pakulski and Waters to theorise The Death of 
Class, arguing that the "season and purpose" of class analysis is over (1996: vii). Even though 
social inequality and conflict remain rife (ibid: 157), the most advanced western societies are no 
longer class societies as they are no longer structured by productive industrial property (ibid: 4). 
as These trends are generally referred to as 'postmodern' ones. For the purposes of this section, 
the terms 'late modernism' and 'postmodernism' are interchangeable. 
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"came to be conceived of as the society in which the Enlightenment project is realised" 
(Callinicos 1989: 32). The ultimate aim of the social sciences, then, was for a rationally 
ordered society. The great modern thinkers saw that "the universe is essentially 
deterministic and that the human task consists in making a full inventory of its laws so 
that there will be no more groping in the dark and human action will be unerring and 
always on target" (Bauman 2000: 136). 
Today, this idea(l) has lost its potency; faith in the power of human reason has declined. 
As Morrison formulates the "postmodern problem", modernity "is founded partly on the 
belief that it will be possible to attain full self-consciousness concerning social reality". 
But "the more knowledges we gain, the harder it becomes to tell a master story, to 
present a rationally coherent picture of social reality [... ] telling the truth of social reality 
has become problematic" (1996: 13). Broadly speaking this mode of thought operates 
on two distinct levels. Firstly, the social world seems beyond control, manifestly too 
complex to understand fully, never mind to manage and mould. Secondly, single 
phenomena can be understood in a variety of different ways. Each of these ways is 
equally valid; there is an infinite subjectivity. As such, "the idea of 'total' order to be 
erected floor by floor in a protracted, consistent, purpose-guided effort of labour makes 
little sense" (Bauman 2000: 136-7). 50 
Many philosophers are thus increasingly attracted to epistemological ; relativism. 
Typically, there is seen to be nothing in which to 'ground' any notion of rationality or 
justice except the contingent and ever-changing field of language. Thus, 'truth' is held 
to be relative to time and place to the extent that it is effectively a redundant category. 51 
Edgeworth considers the French triumvirate of Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard to be the 
prime exemplars of this style of thought. These thinkers were united in their aim of 
50 Some of the greatest modern thinkers lost faith in the Enlightenment project well before the 
emergence of late modernity. At the turn of the twentieth century, Weber warned that the 
Enlightenment had led to the triumph of purposive instrumental rationality in all social spheres, 
resulting in the infamous 'iron cage' of bureaucratic rationality (see, for example, Weber 1930: 
181). Contemporaneously, Nietzsche saw modern life, dominated by science and rationality, as 
merely concealing the underlying 'will to power' (1968). In 1944 Horkheimer and Adorno of the 
'Frankfurt school' famously argued, in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1997). that lurking behind 
Enlightenment rationality is a logic of domination and oppression. This finds its fullest 
expression in the 'totally administered world' of fascism in the twentieth century. A revolution 
would thus consist of a revolt of human nature, personality and culture against purely 
instrumental reason. Interestingly, the intellectual heir to the Frankfurt tradition, Jurgen 
Habermas, retains faith in the project of Enlightenment. 
51 This is an ahistorical position, for it is implied that this has forever been the case; as such, 
Enlightenment ideas of progress were always deluded. As Eagleton puts it, this position 
necessarily entails that "just as it was true all along that the emperor was naked, so in a way 
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subjecting Enlightenment discourse to radical critique, particularly the relationship 
between reason and freedom, and they also enjoyed shared roots in structuralism 
(2003: 23). 52 
Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard all clearly display the 'three negations of postmodernism': 
They take a defiant stance against science, reject totalising understandings of the 
social world, and display a loss of faith in utopian thinking (Hebdige 1988: 187-203). 53 
Indeed, Derrida, with his notion of 'deconstruction' (1976), Foucault, with, inter alia, his 
ideas that behind every knowledge claim there is a will to power, and that power is 
omnipresent (1973,1980), and Lyotard, with his rejection of 'metanarratives' and his 
concept of 'performativity' (1984), are among the most influential thinkers in a wide 
range of fields. 54 
Culture 
The cultural strand of late modernism has made its influence felt in fields as varied as 
art, film, literature, and design. However, it was in the domain of architecture where the 
reaction against modernism first made it presence felt, in the work of writers such as 
Robert Venturi and Charles Jencks. 55 As Anderson suggests, "the architectural 
capture of the blazon of the postmodern, which can be dated from 1977-78, proved 
postmodernism was true even before it got started. [... ] There was never any Progress or 
Dialectic or World-Spirit in the first place; this is not the way the world is, or ever was" (1996: 29). 
52 France's particular socio-economic, cultural, theoretical and political situation was also crucial. 
Rapid modernisation after World War 2, developments in philosophy and social theory in the 
1950s and 60s, and "the dramatic sense of rupture produced by the turbulent events of 1968" 
fed "apocalyptic impulses" and feelings of a "fundamental rupture in history" (Best and Kellner 
1991: 16-17). But the political hopes of the radicals were quickly dashed and there emerged a 
general disillusionment at the inability to effect revolutionary change (Callinicos 1989: 6). 
Furthermore, the FCP's support for De Gaulle in 68, as well as the growth of new social 
movements, encouraged the abandonment of Marxism, which had been the perspective of 
choice for many radicals: Althusser identifies Foucault as his "student" (1969: 257) and, in turn, 
Derrida calls himself Foucault's "admiring and grateful disciple" (1978: 31), although his actual 
instruction consisted merely of help with preparation for university entrance examinations 
jBinder 1989: 1370). 
3 Of these three thinkers, only Lyotard has explicitly described his work as 'postmodern'. 
Perhaps the central figure of postmodernism outside of the triumvirate identified by Edgeworth 
is Jean Baudrillard (see especially 1981,1988,1991). 
54 For a critique of Derrida, see Harvey (1989: 350) and Lehman (1991). On Foucault see 
Edgeworth (2003) and fellow 'post' modernist Baudrillard (1987). On Lyotard see Edgeworth 
(2003) and Anderson (1998: 26-7,54). More generally, see Callinicos (1989), Eagelton (1996) 
and Best and Kellner (1991). Critics of the post or late modernist philosophical position see 
weaknesses in its anti-foundational ism, its relativism, its inherent conservatism and politically 
disabling implications, and its tendencies towards reductionism and essentialism, especially 
when dealing with rival theories such as Marxism. 
55 Once again, it is far more common to hear these developments referred to as 'postmodern' 
rather than 'late modern' ones. 
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durable. The primary association of the term has ever since been with the newest 
forms of built space" (1998: 24). 
Due to its eclecticism, the defining features of 'late' or 'post' modern style are difficult to 
specify. 56 Crook, Pakulski and Waters identify three trends. They argue that the 
"processes of differentiation, rationalisation and commodification which generated the 
syndrome of cultural modernity are themselves responsible for its fragmentation and 
transformation as they operate at a 'hyper' level" (1992: 58). For them, 
hypercommodification, the spread of the commodity form into all areas of life, "erodes 
the 'distinction between commodified and noncommodified regions" so that 
"institutionalised distinctions between cultural 'levels' give way to the proliferation of 
style and its packaging as a lifestyle". Thus the modern era of separate 'high' and 'low' 
cultural realms has passed. 'High' culture is dragged into markets and 'low' culture 
becomes more knowing and self-aware and borrows elements of 'high' culture. Thus, 
the hierarchy of cultural forms is eroded. Hyperrationalisation in modernity led to the 
"elitist splitting-off" of expert cultures. But as the idea of a logic of cultural development 
and aesthetic progress loses its appeal to producers and consumers, "aesthetic 
rationality become fragmented, and authoritative tradition mutates into an archive", free 
to be mined at will. The result is "a flat archive of 'styles' which furnishes materials for 
pastiche and parody in place of a developing tradition". In addition technical 
developments promote the privatisation of cultural consumption. Finally, 
hype rd ifferentiation "produces the effects of dedifferentiation', freeing symbolic 
meaning from the constraints of value spheres, so that "fragments of cultural meaning 
[can] transgress boundaries between the spheres of modern culture and between 
culture and society" (ibid: 36-7,74-5). Again, the result is the collapse of culture into a 
depthless collection of packaged styles, ready for deployment in whatever context. 
Additionally, there is often an attempt to deconstruct what are seen as the pretensions 
of modern cultural forms. Eagleton neatly captures the essence of these changes. 
"Postmodernism is a style of culture which reflects something of this epochal change, 
in a depthless, decentred, ungrounded, self reflexive, playful, derivative, eclectic, 
pluralistic art which blurs the boundaries between 'high' and 'popular' culture, as well 
as between art and everyday experience" (1996: vii). 57 
56 A thorough survey of these cultural tendencies is beyond the scope of this work. 
57 Of the many examples of 'late' or 'post' modernist cultural products, some of the most 
prominent are: In art, the 'pop art' of Andy Warhol, in music, the late 1970s genre of punk, and 
in architecture, Michael Grave's Portland Public Service Building, Frank Gehry's 
'deconstructivist' Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, and the Las Vegas Strip. 
180 
The Question of Causation 
The major sociological debate surrounding late modernism, in both its philosophical 
and cultural variants, is the nature of its relationship with late modernisation. At the 
very least, there can be little doubt that late modernism "articulates with" (Lash and 
Urry 1987: 286) late modernisation; there is a clear affinity and compatibility between 
the disintegration of the familiar features and structures of modernity and the doubts 
that plague late modernist philosophers, for example. But are the emerging worldviews 
and cultural outputs somehow a result of or a reaction to the processes of late 
modernisation, or does late modernism actually drive forward late modernisation? 
Crook, Pakulski and Waters suggest that there has been "a reversal of determinacy so 
that the fragments of a hyperdifferentiating culture impact upon, disrupt and 
deconstruct arenas of social structure which might previously have been thought 
impervious to change. " (1992: 167). Culture, then, can be said to have an increasing 
"effectivity", and "models in which cultural processes appear as functions of 'deeper' 
economic or social dynamics cease to apply". Cultural components are thus free to 
"proliferate, split off and recombine in ways which do not correspond to any supposed 
'logic' of modernity". So the "conventional hierarchies of material and ideal 
determination", associated with Marxism, are reversed (ibid: 229). 
Bauman, on the other hand, is keen to stress the social moorings of contemporary 
cultural transformations. He reasons that cultural and artistic phenomena can be 
viewed in fact as surface symptoms of a much deeper transformation of the social 
world" (1992: 64). Similarly, Lash and Urry also prefer to see late modernism's cultural 
and ideological features as related to the more concrete changes of late modernisation 
(1987: Ch 9). 
Unsurprisingly, Marxists such as Harvey and Jameson also argue that 'late' or 'post' 
modernism is a reflex of more fundamental changes in social structure. Harvey "seeks 
explicitly to establish a determinate link between a disorganising social structure and a 
dedifferentiating or postmodernist culture" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 29-30). 
He contends that "the confidence of an era can be assessed by the width of the gap 
between scientific and moral reasoning. In periods of confusion and uncertainty, the 
turn to aesthetics (of whatever form) becomes more pronounced". For him, we have 
entered just such a period where aesthetics, image, ephemerality and fragmentation 
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"take precedence over eternal truths and unified politics" (1989: 327-8). It is also now 
"conventional" to "dismiss out of hand any suggestion that the 'economy' (however that 
vague word is understood) might be determinant of cultural life even in (as Engels and 
later Althusser suggested) 'the last instance'". And yet ironically, "the odd thing about 
postmodern cultural production is how much sheer profit-seeking is determinant in the 
first instance" (ibid: 336). The idea of economic determination, even of the cultural 
realm, is still valid for Harvey: "Precisely because capitalism is expansionary and 
imperialistic, cultural life in more and more areas gets brought within the grasp of the 
cash nexus and the logic of capital circulation" (ibid: 344). 
Jameson (1984,1991) broadly agrees with Harvey's position. 58 He argues that what 
he terms postmodernism "is not the cultural dominant of a wholly new social order, but 
only the reflex and the concomitant of yet another systemic modification of capitalism 
itself" (1991: xii). The cultural and epistemological take of postmodernism is a mere 
"response" to a "very peculiar socioeconomic world indeed" (ibid: xv). For Jameson, 
contemporary cultural forms "replicate, reproduce and ultimately serve to reinforce the 
logic of consumer capitalism". Furthermore, the expansion of the cultural realm means 
that everything from economic value to the structure of the psyche has become cultural, 
although this in itself is a process initiated by the logic of late capitalism (Smart 1990: 
25). Jameson's postmodernism is therefore the cultural counterpart of late modern 
capitalism. 59 
Summary and Conclusion 
The nature of contemporary society has changed to such a degree that it appears that 
the age of modernity has passed. The advanced Western capitalist countries have 
entered an era of `late modernity'. Processes of technical, economic and social change 
58 For a detailed discussion of Jameson's work, see Anderson (1998: Ch 3). Jameson was the 
first scholar to decisively anchor 'postmodern ism' "in objective alterations of the economic order 
of capital itself". This "prodigious inaugural gesture [... ] redrew the whole map of the 
postmodern at one stroke" and "has commanded the field ever since" (ibid: 54). In 1976 
Anderson claimed that the Western Marxist tradition was exhausted as the conditions that 
produced it had passed. He predicted a return to questions of political economy and strategy. 
He has now reversed this judgement, seeing Jameson's work on postmodernity as being among 
the great intellectual monuments of Western Marxism, even its culmination or "grandiose finale" 
ibid: 70-6). 
9 Jameson's other main theme is the idea of spatial disorientation in contemporary society. He 
argues that subjects have lost the ability to position themselves as individuals and collectivities 
within the decentred communications networks of contemporary capitalism. This is the 
background to his call for 'cognitive mapping', "one possible form of a new radical cultural 
politics" (1984: 83-89). 
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can be labelled as processes of 'late modernisation'. They have occurred in three key 
areas. Economy and production have become increasingly globalised. A global 
marketplace and post-Fordist production techniques have emerged. In the realm of 
state and politics national governments have increasingly ceded power to actors both 
above and below them, as well as finding it increasingly difficult to control global 
economic processes. New political and social movements have materialised. Class 
structure has been profoundly transformed; the traditional working class has declined in 
both size and strength, and consumption is increasingly at the heart of self identity in 
place of work. The 'service class' has grown, and a transnational capitalist class has 
developed. The cognitive accompaniment to these processes is 'late modernism'. 
Philosophically, there is increasing adherence to relativism and anti-foundationalism, 
and the idea that truth is an impossibility. Additionally, a distinctive new cultural realm 
has emerged with a style significantly different from that of modernity. 
There are varying theoretical explanations of the transformations that society is 
undergoing, disagreement on whether they constitute a decisively new postmodern era, 
and dispute as to whether late modernism is a response to or a driver of the changes. 
There is also argument as to whether the changes should be resisted and feared or 
celebrated and embraced. Nevertheless, there is remarkable agreement that 
"something significant has changed in the way capitalism has been working since 
about 1970" (Harvey 1989: 173). The how and the why remain contested, but that 
there has been change is not seriously disputed. 
It is also important to recognise that late modernity represents the continuation of 
modern processes: What is described here is not the 'final' manifestation of some new 
type of society. Instead it is a series of interlinked processes, with roots in modernity, 
which are ongoing. Significant elements of modernity persist and show little sign of 
disappearing. 60 Scholte neatly captures the essence of the argument outlined here in 
his discussion of the impacts of globalisation. He claims that the changes that 
capitalism has undergone are broadly comparable to the changes that the state has 
undergone; "in both cases, the core circumstance remains entrenched while some of 
60 Harvey makes this point with regard to the rise of flexible specialisation: "There are many 
different ways of making a profit- of gaining surplus value: whichever way works, you are likely 
to find increasing experiments with it- so there might be a trend towards flexible accumulation; 
but there are some key limits to the process. Imagine what it would mean for social cohesion if 
everyone was on temporary labour- what the consequences would be for urban life or civic 
security. We can already see the damaging effects of even partial moves in this direction. A 
universal transformation would pose acute dilemmas and dangers for the stability of capitalism 
as a social order" (2000: 87). 
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its major features have altered" (2000: 133). This is also a useful way to conceptualise 
late modernity. Its 'core circumstance', the capitalist economy, remains entrenched, 
but it is increasingly difficult to deny that 'some of its major features have altered'. In 
outlining some of these alterations, this Chapter is neither exhaustive nor 
comprehensive. It is merely an indication of the direction, nature and extent of the 
changes. 
Late modernity has significant repercussions for Marxism and Marxist theories of law. 
Marxism is very much a perspective with its roots in modernity; indeed it is the classic 
modern social theory. But the modern premises that Marxism is based on have 
disintegrated. Perhaps most obviously, any contemporary model of society "cannot be 
grounded in the realities of the nation state, by now clearly not a framework large 
enough to accommodate the decisive factors in the conduct of interaction and the 
dynamics of social life" (Bauman 1992: 65). Other concepts at the heart of Marxist 
legal theory, such as the concept of a bipolar class division, are also becoming 
progressively more outmoded. Furthermore, the notion of. a unified and coherent 
dominant ideology, which was questionable at best, is increasingly implausible in a late 
modern landscape. That this feature was at the heart of the most robust Marxist theory 
of law yet developed does not bode well for the continuing utility of that theory. 
Yet Marxism and Marxist legal theory can respond to these changed circumstances. 
The nature of this response will be the subject of Part 3. Before that, Chapter 7 will 
focus its attention on late modern developments in the field of law. 
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CHAPTER 7. LATE MODERNITY AND LAW 
Chapter 6 detailed the processes of late modernity that are reshaping society. These 
processes are having significant effects on the legal field. This chapter outlines those 
effects. Firstly, some of the central features of modern law will be outlined. Then, the 
processes of change that are progressively eroding this law of modernity will be 
detailed. 
Modern Law 
The modern belief in progress, and the idea that human beings could successfully 
understand, control and manage the social world, increasingly led to the emergence of 
a 'social welfare' or 'welfare state' paradigm, in place of the liberal paradigm that 
characterised early capitalism and modernity (Habermas 1996: Ch 9; Edgeworth 2003: 
Ch 3). These welfare societies aimed to redress "the social and economic inequality 
pervasive in liberal capitalist societies". To this end, markets became more 
systematically regulated in an attempt to alleviate boom-bust cycles. This meant many 
sectors of the economy became nationalised, and where the economy was not brought 
under direct state control, interventionist policies designed to reverse inequalities in 
wealth and power were introduced. Citizens' general welfare became one of the 
central concerns of the state (Edgeworth 2003: 75). 
The apogee of modern law was the law of these 'welfare states'. Welfare state law 
represented "both an enhancement and a revision" of the liberal legal system 
(Edgeworth 2003: 80). Law was increasingly used to actively direct social life by the 
interventionist state; in a typically modern manner, law was seen as a tool to help 
construct a rational and reasoned social order. As a result, the "mass and density" of 
legal rules increased (ibid: 82). 
Legal change was most evident in five respects (Edgeworth 2003: 82). Firstly, there 
were significant reforms of private law. The liberal paradigm of private law, where law 
governs dealings between autonomous and formally equal private individuals, was 
eroded. Instead, contractual freedom was increasingly restricted to limit exploitation of 
the weak and poor. A raft of legislation designed to equalise the bargaining power of 
parties in commercial transactions was introduced. The form and content of, inter alia, 
employment contracts, credit agreements and residential leases became increasingly 
fixed. 'Consumer law' grew, which, amongst other things, specified product standards. 
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Laws were also introduced to fix prices of various key commodities, for instance 
residential rents, transport costs and loan interest rates. Increasingly, the idea of a 
formal, abstract legal subject and the principle of generality were abandoned and one's 
actual material context was taken into account; whether one was landlord, tenant, 
employee, employer and so on became increasingly legally relevant. Concomitantly, in 
the courts the 'market individualist' paradigm was replaced by the 'consumer welfarist' 
paradigm (Adams and Brownsword 1987). The conventional notion of property, as 
tangible or intangible things created and transferred by individuals in the market also 
underwent transformation. The welfare state began to create positive rights for 
individuals to resources obtainable and enforceable against the state. Reich described 
this as "new property"; it included such things as subsidies to struggling industries and 
unemployment benefit (1964). 1 As the expanded welfare state became the dominant 
mechanism for allocating resources, private law doctrines of binding agreements and 
promises were displaced by the duties of officials, reasonable expectations of citizens 
and fairness of decision making, all public law principles. The rise of administrative law 
saw contract law decline in importance. 
The second major area of legal change was the emergence of the entrepreneurial and 
corporatist state, which led to "an historically unique structure of government" 
(Edgeworth 2003: 88). The state took on entrepreneurial functions by assuming 
ownership of large slices of the economy with the aim of rationally modernising industry 
and society. Nationalisation of key industries required legally novel control and 
management entities. Nationalised industries exhibit some features of private 
business, but are also responsible to governments with explicitly political objectives. 
Their legal form thus evades traditional public/private definitions. Nationalisation also 
led to novel forms of accountability. As a result, private contract, tort and property law 
were displaced and public law expanded. Corporatism emerged as employers 
associations and trade unions began to negotiate compromises on legal rights with the 
state. These took legal form as collective bargains, which were enforceable in courts. 
Thirdly, the growth of welfare provision and rights was a key feature of the new legal 
landscape. The aim of redistributing wealth led to a "torrent of legislation", enacted to 
confer monetary and other entitlements upon citizens (Edgeworth 2003: 90). 
1 As the state retained the power to withdraw these rights, the individual was placed in a 
vulnerable position vis-a-vis an increasingly dominant bureaucratic apparatus, despite the 
increased security that new property was supposed to (and of course did) engender. 
2 Indeed, Atiyah was able to evocatively title his 1979 work The Rise and Fall of Freedom of 
Contract (1979: see especially Ch 22). 
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Unemployment benefits, pensions and various state-funded compensation schemes 
replaced the partial and unreliable support of charities and communities. The 
extension of universal rights transformed the relationship between citizens and state. 
The state became increasingly subject to legal obligations, and the individual became 
the holder of rights that guaranteed a minimum level of security. This deepened the 
legal conception of citizenship. Rights to political and economic participation were 
increasingly buttressed by a package of rights that began to reverse class inequalities. 
Fourthly, the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of law were reconfigured (Edgeworth 
2003: 91). Welfare states continued and indeed extended the monocentric tendencies 
of liberal sates, as power became increasingly situated in sovereign national 
governments. Ever increasing realms of social life came under legal control; the social 
sphere became 'juridified'. This led to a spatial reorganisation of legal jurisdiction, as 
nationally uniform rules increasingly came to dominate over local norms, institutions 
and arrangements. National space became more systematically subject to legal 
regulation. The temporal co-ordinates of law were also recast. The separation of 
powers had traditionally seen the legislature attempt to regulate the future, the judiciary 
apply law by looking to past principles and precedents, and the executive implementing 
rules by reference to present circumstances (Edgeworth 2003: 92). This arrangement 
was placed under sever strain. The pressure to respond to rapid social change saw 
legislative output explode, with older legal rules increasingly rendered obsolete. Pre- 
eminence naturally passed to the legislature in such circumstances, but all three 
branches of law were increasingly required to look to the likely future impact of their 
decisions and rulings. In addition, the judiciary increasingly began to look to the 
purpose of law to guide decision-making in the case at hand. 
The final major area of legal change in the modern welfare state was increasing levels 
of access to justice (Edgeworth 2003: 94). In liberal societies, access to justice was 
largely reserved for those atop the social hierarchy, for not all formal, abstract legal 
subjects enjoyed equal power and resources. The welfare state saw the introduction of 
heavily funded schemes to make formal justice more accessible. State funded legal 
3 Despite this future-oriented nature of law, in one sense legal relations became more secure 
during the modern period. Previously, short-term contractual relations could be terminated at 
will. But in modernity, jobs and employees were bound in a more secure and enduring manner 
as the employment contract began to resemble a property right. This led to a more stable life 
for many citizens. 
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aid was introduced and progressively grew, as did the actual number of legal 
institutions, personnel and number of lawsuits 4 
As the modern legal world developed, the unifying theme that underlay all the changes 
was the centrality of the nation state. Increasingly the state made law, dispensed 
justice and managed the relationships within its territory. 'Law' was something very 
much associated with the nation state during this period. 
Late Modernism's Critique of Modern Law 
Ideas associated with late modernism, or postmodernism as it is more commonly 
referred to, have "engendered a huge, sometimes angry, sometimes anxious debate in 
many disciplines" (Lyon 1999: 6). Although this mode of thought made its presence felt 
in legal scholarship later than in other disciplines, once it had arrived its influence was 
profound: "It is precisely because law seems to carry the whole burden of civilisation on 
its shoulders that legal scholarship has been so deeply, almost passionately, affected 
by the general mood of self doubt, failure and hopelessness that has been the most 
distinctive manifestation of postmodernism" (Hunt 1990a: 540). As such, a vast body 
of work has emerged that critiques the modern legal system, much of it based upon the 
ideas and theories of Edgeworth's triumvirate of key 'postmodernist' thinkers, Foucault, 
Derrida and Lyotard. According to Hunt, this critique of law has proceeded on two 
distinct levels. Firstly, on a more "immediate" level, is a concern with textuality. 5 
Secondly, on a more "general" level, is a challenge to legal practice and theory's 
philosophical and epistemological underpinnings (1990a: 511). 6 
This body of work has undoubtedly provided a range of innovative and useful insights 
into law. However, what it signally fails to do is register the extent of the changes that 
law itself has undergone since the height of the modern period. Instead, a variety of 
perspectives on law have been developed; law itself is generally not seen to have 
4 On the 'three waves' of access to justice, including a third wave where informal justice 
mechanisms began to emerge, see Edgeworth (2003: 94-96). 
5 This level is, for instance, the concern of Carty and Mair: "Law is a text. Or law is found in 
texts. The great obsession of postmodernity is that 'all is text'". There is a "sense of being 
prisoners of, or trapped by, language" (1990: 395-7). 
As Hunt puts it, in its most general form postmodernism is anti-foundational in the sense that 
it denies the possibility of philosophy providing any epistemological guarantees for legal 
discourse" (1990a: 519). 
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assumed a new and novel identity (Edgeworth 2003: 2). 7 Yet it is possible to talk of the 
emergence of a distinctive late modern legal system. 
The Late Modernisation of Law 
Law in the most developed societies has changed in ways that mirror the wider social, 
economic and political changes outlined in the previous chapter; just as modern law 
"reflected the character of modern societies" (Edgeworth 2003: 2), so contemporary 
law has taken on a distinct late modern identity. This late modern law has not simply 
replaced modern law. Instead, "rather than announcing the wholesale dismantling of 
the edifice of modern law [... ] a process of substantial renovation is in place" (ibid: vii). 
Edgeworth (2003: Ch 5) isolates five distinctive but interrelated processes that are 
central to this renovation. These are privatisation, deregulation, the domestic 
fragmentation of legal systems, the rise of supranational law, and the emergence of 
globalised legal hermeneutics. These processes alone do not capture the entirety of 
the transformations the legal sphere is undergoing, but they do provide strong evidence 
of the reality and direction of change. In addition, Santos' concept of 'interlegality' 
(1995a, 2002) is a useful device through which to understand the changes that are 
occurring. Each of these six elements of the late modernisation of law will be 
discussed in turn. 
Privatisation 
The transfer of once state-owned assets to the private sector has been one of the most 
notable features of late modern society. Processes of privatisation in the advanced 
7 Edgeworth's triumvirate address law or produce theories applicable to law in a number of 
notable works. Foucault once explained law in an 'ultra-Marxist' form as the total penetration of 
the being of man by the exigencies of production (1978: see also Carty 1990a: 5). More 
important is his work on 'governmentality' (1991). Derrida argues that "deconstruction is justice" 
(1992: 15), while Lyotard argues that justice has nothing to do with universal principles, but is 
always local, context dependent, provisional and revisable (Lyotard and Thebaud 1985). See 
also Lyotard on the 'differend' (1988) and human rights (1993). Hunt (1990a) traces the 
increasing influence of late or post modernist ideas on the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) 
movement. For him, the exchange between Gabel and Kennedy (1984), in which Kennedy 
rejects the possibility of theory, was the moment when CLS became explicitly aligned with 
postmodernism. For other good examples of late or post modern thinking on law, see Goodrich 
(1986,1990a, 1990b, 1996,1998), Fitzpatrick (1983,1987,1990,1992), Schlag (1990,1991), 
Carty (1990a, 1990b, 1991), Barron (1990), Douzinas and Warrington (1991; see also the 
critical appraisal from Balkin (1992)), Douzinas and Nead (1999) and Douzinas (1999,2002). 
For critique of these ideas, see Sunstein (1989), Hunt (1990a), Duxbury (1991), Wicke (1991), 
Donaldson (1995), Barron (2000a; 2000b; and Goodrich's response (2001)), and Edgeworth 
2003 (Ch 6). 
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societies of the west have been uneven and proceeded at different speeds, but the 
general drift in the direction of privatisation is unmistakable. The most obvious form of 
privatisation is the direct sale of public assets to the private sector. However, there are 
other forms, such as the contracting out or 'outsourcing' of public functions, the private 
provision of formerly public services, the exposure of state monopolies to competition 
from the private sector, the application of private sector management practices to state 
bureaucracies, 'contracting in' schemes where internal markets are utilised to regulate 
dealings between different sectors of the state, and the introduction of 'user pays' 
schemes in the realm of public provision (Edgeworth 2003: 136). 
The major legal consequence of privatisation is that the legal forms that enabled public 
ownership and government involvement in the economy have been progressively 
abandoned. For instance, privately owned service providers function chiefly through 
contracts made between private parties. Services cease to be public entitlements, 
instead being private commodities to be purchased in the marketplace by individual 
economic actors. As a result contract, and more generally private law, has risen at the 
expense of public law; regulation is ultimately conducted through market pressures, 
with contractual decisions made by "citizens recast in law as consumers" (Edgeworth 
2003: 137). 8 
The social role of contract has therefore expanded, and the 'package of rights' that 
constituted citizenship in the welfare states of modernity is eroding. Private companies 
by definition have less social responsibility. Commitments to full employment or 
universal access to services are sidelined as commercial considerations become 
paramount. Where governments do impose community service obligations, they are 
often vague, easily avoided or impossible to enforce (Edgeworth 2003: 138). 9 Citizens 
are no longer allocated services on the basis of need, but are seen as consumers of 
services motivated by individual desires. The uniform provision of the state is rolled 
back and access to such services is based upon payment of taxes, or payment to a 
private provider. This concept of citizenship, which places the emphasis on 'choice' 
rather than the entitlement to a basic minimum, is largely blind to substantive inequality 
(ibid: 141). 'New contract' is replacing the 'new property' associated with the welfare 
8 Such contracts do tend to be highly structured and regulated; quality control mechanisms such 
as measurable performance targets or oversight by regulatory bodies are often introduced. 
Nevertheless, they remain contracts. 
9 This is particularly problematic when nationalised monopolies are sold intact as one to a 
private company. Where this occurs, market distribution of services does not come into play 
and states are forced to set up special regulatory regimes governing prices and services. 
Despite these regulations, weaker social responsibility and representation inevitably results. 
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state; relations between state and citizen become conditional and short term rather 
than fixed and long term (ibid: 143-4). 10 
Privatisation in general tends to reconfigure the public/private distinction in law. The 
welfare state had introduced a public element into what were previously considered to 
be private domains. Nationalisation was a powerful expression of the belief that 
economic activity was a legitimate concern of the state as it acted as a guardian of the 
public interest. Privatisation has reversed this, and it is reflected in changes in the law. 
Dealings between state as purchaser and private company as provider escape 
parliamentary scrutiny and freedom of information legislation, as do the internal 
operations of privatised institutions. The traditional administrative remedies for citizens 
are often removed, and as citizens are not parties to the contract between government 
and provider, they win no compensatory contractual rights. Yet it is often difficult to see 
how such contracts can be classed as 'private' in the ordinary meaning of the word; for 
instance prison contracts which remain confidential despite the ostensibly public nature 
of such matters. The 'public interest' is now less a concern of states and is instead 
seen to be best achieved by the aggregation of numerous private interests in the 
market (Edgeworth 2003: 142). " It is in this context that contract undergoes its 
renaissance, operating once again in spheres that it was forced out of. Free choice 
becomes central in ascribing rights and responsibilities. 12 
The privatisation of services and utilities means that different regions of national 
territory often now have different levels of service and cost. Uniform national 
conditions have given way to differentiated local patterns. The shift from a universal 
state provider to market based distribution also strengthens the position of certain 
groups; large industrial consumers may get preferential pricing agreements at the 
expense of individual domestic consumers. Additionally, despite the growth in the 
number of shareholders, privatisation still results in universal legal entitlements being 
transformed into the private property rights of a smaller group of individuals and 
institutions (Edgeworth 2003: 139). 
10 Note, however, that the contractual provision of private services does give consumers 'exit 
rights' that did not exist when state monopolies provided them. 
" This echoes Adam Smith's notion of the 'invisible hand', famously deployed in 1776's The 
Wealth of Nations (1976). 
12 The rejuvenation of contract also sees the state itself shrink in size, capacity and reach. 
Increasingly it manages itself internally and governs by contractual means. 
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Of course, privatisation need not inevitably corrode the legal entitlements of citizens, 
and a number of positive developments have occurred. If nothing else, it has 
addressed the problematic areas of the welfare state; its rigidity and undoubtedly over- 
optimistic faith in rational, technocratic expertise in guiding complex social spheres. In 
addition, the transparency of public limited companies both during the sale process and 
in their routine operations has aided accountability to a degree, and novel forms of 
consumer representation, often implemented at the contract awarding stage, have 
been pursued. State costs and costs to consumers are also potentially reduced. But 
the suspicion must remain that any advances are being unequally and unfairly 
redistributed (Aronson 1997). 
Deregulation 
Edgeworth outlines three distinct ways in which legal deregulation is occurring. Firstly, 
there has emerged. what he terms "the new private law" (2003: 145). The 
'materialisation' typical of the law of the welfare state is reversed; measures to equalise 
bargaining power and provide price and quality control in contracts are progressively 
abandoned. The classical concepts of contractual freedom, namely abstract equality 
between parties, and the decontextualised interpretation of language and intent, have 
made a return. For Buckley, the time when judicial and legislative interference with 
freedom of contract was the norm, barely two decades ago, now seems like a distant 
past (1999: 2). Of course, there is "no systematic return to pre-welfare state liberal 
principles in law" (Edgeworth 2003: 149); materialisation persists in some respects, as 
workers, tenants and consumers all retain important legal protections. However, there 
is undoubtedly "a significant reversal of the more extensive forms of materialisation", 
and contractual rights are expanding at the expense of 'new property' rights (ibid: 149- 
50). 
In labour law, for instance, individual rights based upon contract are becoming the 
norm, for example the right to not be in a union, and the right to negotiate pay directly 
with an employer. Statutory provisions on redundancy and unfair dismissal have been 
pared back. 13 The old corporatist mechanisms designed to collectively advance 
workers' rights have been dismantled, and unions have had ' their legal priority to 
represent workers curtailed. The ability to strike is now significantly more difficult and 
fraught with danger, with the introduction of procedural hurdles and re-establishment of 
13 One notable exception to this general trend is the persistence or actual introduction of 
minimum wage legislation, for example in New Zealand (Edgeworth 2003: 146) and the UK. 
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civil liability for loss caused to employers resulting from industrial action (Wedderburn 
et al 1994: 23). Any benefits that the move towards contract does bring are felt 
individually rather than collectively. The move away from equalising bargaining 
conditions and the commitment to redistributionary policies sees inequality become 
institutionalised, and wages and conditions become increasingly localised, even 
individualised. 14 
The second chief way in which legal deregulation is occurring is through the 
"attenuation of agency command and control". State agencies and ministries have had 
their duties, powers and resources restructured, primarily due to the loss of faith in 
centralised planning (Edgeworth 2003: 152). This mode of deregulation began on a 
large scale in the US in the late 1970s and continued through the 1980s, with, inter 
alia, the airline, transport, telecommunication and financial sectors deregulated, and oil 
and natural gas prices removed from statutory control. Canada, Western Europe and 
Australia soon followed similar paths. Of course, legal rules were not completely 
removed from these sectors, but the centralised bureaucratic command and control 
polices were abandoned and the market was reintroduced. The reconfigured forms of 
regulation tend to be based upon flexibility and consensus, and are less directed at 
achieving specified goals. Typically they may take the form of codes of practice, 
charters, private compliance units, or government backed agencies. They are often the 
products of non-state actors and private bodies, who also implement and police their 
operation. Such regulation is decentralised and manipulative rather than state-based 
and authoritative (Edgeworth 2003: 155). The state is no longer the prime driver of 
regulation; increasingly it "steers rather than rows" (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). 15 
14 Dematerialisation has also occurred in housing law, particularly in the area of tenants' rights. 
State provision of public housing has reduced as the public housing stock is sold off. Thus, 
tenants' former rights in public law against the state, crucially the right to tenancy based upon 
need, are replaced by private rights of ownership in the property market. Security of tenure is 
therefore based solely on contract. Where housing is still public, market rents are now 
common. Of course, duties to provide adequate and safe premises do remain (Edgeworth 
2003: 148). 
15 Deregulation in one area often requires an increase in regulation in others; increased product 
safety legislation is necessary where the consumer sector is deregulated, and the marketised 
financial services sector has required extensive consumer protection regulation. Indeed, the 
very process of deregulation inevitably produces new, market-affirming forms of regulation 
(Edgeworth 2003: 153). Similarly, Picciotto recognises that the'rolling back' of the state has not 
simply given free rein to market-mediated social relations, but has introduced new forms of 
regulation and normativity. Although liberalisation and privatisation initially involved 
'deregulation' by undermining existing forms of state action, they were swiftly followed by 
'reregulation' by a wide variety of new means, and the rise of a regulatory state" (2002: 2-3). 
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The third main way in which deregulation is occurring is through the increasingly 
contractual form of welfare rights. There has been a general shift away from welfare 
principles in all advanced countries. The welfare "safety net" is gradually'removed and 
a novel legal regime governing welfare has thus emerged (Edgeworth 2003: 156). 
Crucially, welfare provision is increasingly made conditional and discretionary. 
Universal entitlement is reduced and conditions, time limits and mutual obligations 
become commonplace. As a result it is more difficult to attain and retain benefits. 
Contract is now the mechanism by which the terms on which benefit is to be paid and 
the obligations of the claimant are structured. The notion of welfare entitlement as a 
set of enforceable lifelong claims against the state gives way to "a more fluid sense of 
entitlement"; welfare is increasingly seen as a mutual bargain of rights and duties 
rather than an entitlement owed unconditionally to the citizen on establishment of 
legally predetermined need. Uniform national entitlements are replaced by localised 
and differentiated provision. 'Caseworkers' have greater discretion, and there is less 
chance of a tribunal review of an agreed contract. In addition, the move to private 
providers of welfare sees efficiency and targets valorised at the expense of notions of 
public service, and also makes redress against the state more difficult. 'Clients' who 
are poor bargainers are placed at a disadvantage. The security provided by the 'new 
property' is gradually being eroded, and the concept of citizenship diluted (Edgeworth 
2003: 156-9). As Kosonen argues, the capacity of welfare states to reverse class 
inequalities has declined (1995: 99). Quigley (1998) compares US welfare 
arrangements to mediaeval and early modern English Poor Laws; as Edgeworth 
suggests, this is an exaggeration, but nevertheless draws attention to the "eerie 
parallels with the welfare state's ungenerous ancestor" (2003: 158). 16 
The Domestic Fragmentation of Legal Systems 
In modernity, law and justice became centralised in the nation state. Recent 
developments have seen this unified 'system' begin to fracture. Edgeworth identifies 
three central elements to this process; the rise of informal justice, the increasing 
exposure of the legal profession to competition, and changes to the legal aid system 
(2003: 160). 
1e Other spheres of welfare, such as education, health and pensions have undergone a similar 
reconfiguration. The right to purchase services in the market is increasingly valorised over 
collective public provision (Edgeworth 2003: 159-60). 
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The first and central element is the explosive rise of informal justice" Edgeworth 2003: 
160). Informal justice covers a plethora of initiatives; court annexed alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) and diversionary strategies, specialised informal tribunals, the 
incorporation of third parties such as victims into the legal process, the rise of 
community based initiatives such as justice centres, and the emergence of private 
adjudication and mediation services that compete with the formal justice system (ibid: 
160-1). Furthermore, conditions attached to legal aid increasingly encourage the use 
of informal justice. Initially such informal justice mechanisms were seen as an 
inadequate and second-class alternative to formal justice. However this perception has 
gradually changed and in many respects informal justice now overshadows traditional 
formal law and justice. 17 Informal justice is advocated by a diverse alliance; the 
government and judiciary see it as an effective way to combat system overload, whilst 
ordinary citizens appreciate its relative speed, efficiency and lack of expense, as well 
the greater respect it pays to local norms. 18 
Formal dispute processing has always been exceptional rather than normal; that the 
majority of disputes are resolved informally is obvious. But as Mnookin and 
Kornhauser (1979) note, disputes resolved outside of the courtroom tend to be 
resolved in "the shadow of the law", with law structuring and influencing outcomes. Yet 
today many legal disputes are processed by informal means, and it is increasingly 
annexed to the operations of formal courts. Edgeworth refers to this as "hybridisation" 
(2003: 162). 19 This has led to an increasing "judicial managerialism", as judges 
become increasingly focussed on the management of caseloads (ibid: 163). Cases 
can be diverted to court annexed schemes, and also referred to nominally independent 
tribunals and community justice centres. This managerialism is a far, cry from 
Dworkin's image of a Herculean judge manfully pursuing a 'right' answer (1977: 105- 
30). Once disputes are diverted from the formal court system to the informal sphere, 
traditional legal discourses of objective rights and obligations merge with moral, 
economic and other discourses, and subjective needs and interests are given greater 
weight; the "harmony" of the parties' relationships assumes a more central importance 
" Despite this 'explosion', Galanter (1992: 1) also notes that the formal court apparatus- judges, 
caseloads, lawyers, officials- has continued to expand. Edgeworth suggests that ADR is 
increasingly not an 'alternative' at all, but the only viable option for many disputants, so 
inaccessible are the courts (2003: 171). This may be problematic if ADR is unsuited to the 
needs of the case at hand, or if it fails to offer strategic or just resolution. Indeed, in this 
respect, informalism can lead to "second-class justice for the poor, the badly advised and the 
powerless" (ibid: 166). 
8 With this focus on cost effectiveness and efficiency, informal justice provides a fine example 
of Lyotard's 'performativity' (1984: 46). 
19 Capelletti (1993: 288-294) outlines the extent of this process across a number of jurisdictions. 
195 
(Nader 1988). 20 As such, it becomes increasingly difficult to view law as a closed, 
autonomous social subsystem. Concomitantly, the process of informal negotiation is 
also transformed. It too cannot maintain its autonomy from legal discourse, which 
leads to what Galanter has called "litigotiation" (1985: 1). The system as a whole 
becomes dedifferentiated as legal and non-legal discourses mesh. 
Informal justice mechanisms have also led to an increasing privatisation of justice. 
Private dispute resolution bodies, which have grown exponentially over recent years, 
offer their services directly to disputants. Often, industries and institutions set up their 
own dispute processing mechanisms such as ombudsmen or they pledge to utilise 
ADR. The personnel of these bodies are not constrained by public legal norms, so 
other, more private values can be brought to bear in cases. The reasons behind 
settlements are generally not revealed publicly and therefore they cannot go on to 
serve as norms or precedents in subsequent cases, nor can decisions be scrutinised. 
Additionally, issues of public significance, such as the conduct or accountability of 
public servants, remain hidden. 21 
The second key element of domestic fragmentation is the increasing exposure of the 
legal profession to competition; the profession's monopoly on legal services is eroded 
and a deregulated market in legal services is created (Edgeworth 2003: 172). 
Competition is fostered within the profession itself, through the breakdown of 
monopolies such as that of barristers to appear before higher courts, the introduction of 
market principles into professional practice, and a relaxation of the rules on advertising. 
Additionally, competition from outside of the profession is encouraged; for instance 
non-lawyer professionals are increasingly allowed to perform legal tasks such as 
conveyancing. The provision of legal services is now overwhelmingly driven by 
consumer preference rather than professional expertise, and the increased choice 
means each branch of law must be more responsive in order to survive and flourish. 
The final major factor in the domestic fragmentation of the legal system is the 
progressive restrictions on legal aid (Edgeworth 2003: 174). In the modern welfare 
state, legal aid was the primary means of equalising access to formal justice. 
20 Again this finds an echo in the work of Lyotard, who celebrates the local and small scale. In 
Just Gaming (1985) he argues that justice is always necessarily local and context bound; as 
Edgeworth points out, the rise of informal justice has promoted this "justice of proximity"- local, 
private and communal norms (2003: 169). 
' Fiss (1984) has criticised the growing legal culture of 'settlement', arguing that it may divert 
important matters from public scrutiny and resolution by reference to legal norms. 
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However, since the 1980s, restrictions have been placed on legal aid, largely based 
upon the financial status of recipients or the subject matter of the case at hand. 22 
Consequently, large sections of the population are now excluded. Market principles 
have also been introduced. The state now contracts with private firms to provide legal 
aid services, mirroring the 'user pays', consumer citizenship policies evident in other 
spheres. Regan et al conclude that in "some important respects, eligibility provisions in 
the late 1990s bore a striking resemblance to those of the charitable schemes prior to 
World War 2" (1999: 2). 
There are other markers of domestic fragmentation aside from the three identified by 
Edgeworth. For instance, Boon, Flood and Webb argue that the Law Society's Training 
Framework Review threatens some "familiar landmarks" such as the Legal Practice 
Course and the training contract, while work-based learning is increased. 23 For Boon, 
Flood and Webb, this is driven by a desire to provide flexibility and accommodate 
diversity, differentiation, mobility, market needs, growing legal internationalisation and 
the increased specialisation of practice. As such, the "TFR clearly fits with the growing 
marketisation of higher education and the move towards a neo- or perhaps fully post- 
Fordist, [... ] system of education and training" (2005: 478-81). Another marker of 
domestic fragmentation is the creation, usually in developing countries, of 'export 
processing zonesr24, most famously the maquiladoras of Mexico. These zones have a 
qualitatively different legal regime from the rest of national territory, with duty, tariff and 
tax incentives and relaxed labour laws in order to entice multinational firms. Perhaps 
the most fundamental marker of all is the idea that the body of legal rules, the mass of 
statutes, delegated legislation, administrative legislation and adjudication, judicial and 
quasi judicial decision making, institutions and personnel, and non-formal methods of 
dispute avoidance and resolution "cannot be seen any longer as a coherent, closed 
ensemble of rules or values" (Douzinas and Warrington 1991: 27). 
22 In absolute terms legal aid expenditure has generally increased. This is because of the 
litigation boom and the increased cost of those matters that do still attract aid (mostly criminal 
rather than civil cases). Also, despite the reduction in classes of the population that are eligible 
for legal aid, the numbers in those classes have tended to increase. So, while aid is now largely 
limited to poorer sectors of society, the number of individuals in those sectors has increased 
(Edgeworth 2003: 174-5). 
3 The TFR was launched in 2001 and is due to conclude in 2007. 24 'EPZs' are also known as special economic zones (SEZs) and free production zones (FPZs). 
They. have also been set up by substate authorities (Scholte 2000: 77,105). 
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The Rise of Supranational Law 
Sovereignty was at the heart of modern law. National governments were able to 
effectively regulate tightly defined domestic spaces. Laws originating outside of 
national borders were only binding once the sovereign had incorporated them, and the 
nation state itself was the basic unit of international law. Legal theory thus largely 
ignored non-national law. This is now unsustainable; as Carty and Mair point out, laws 
are no longer "centred around one enduring axis" or "point of reference" (1990: 396). 
Recent years have seen the rise and increasing influence of supranational law and 
"increasingly permeable domestic law" (Edgeworth 2003: 176-7). There are several 
interrelated elements to these changes. 
To an extent, nation states have given up their sovereignty voluntarily. 
Interdependency is seen to further national interests as economic globalisation 
increasingly means that problems cannot be confined to the domestic sphere. States 
are also compelled to partake in transnational law-making structures as they attempt to 
secure effective regulation beyond their own borders (Edgeworth 2003: 177-8). The 
bilateralism typical of modern international law is progressively replaced by 
multilateral ism, and a raft of new institutions has emerged which deliberate over, 
implement and monitor compliance with treaties, which now often have priority over 
domestic legislation and do not require domestic legislation to enforce them. This is 
particularly the case for human rights treaties. Thus the "evolving jurisprudence of 
supranational institutions becomes directly incorporated into domestic law" (ibid: 179). 
The emergence of new supranational institutions increases the number of sources of 
law. As globalisation is most advanced in the economic realm, so global law and 
governance is correspondingly most advanced there. Global economic law 
overwhelmingly promotes the creation and consolidation of free markets, and aids the 
processes of privatisation and deregulation. Nationally based 'protectionist' legislation 
that favours local industry declines (Arup 2000: 307). Bodies such as the World Trade 
Organisation (which emerged out of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union and North American Free 
Trade Area all promote laws, rules and norms that directly impact upon individual 
nation states. In addition, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations 
and professional associations all have influences in these bodies, confusing the picture 
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further. 25 In such a context, it becomes impossible to identify a single location where 
sovereignty can be said to definitively lie. 26 The network of supranational law makers 
tends to harmonise law across nation states, and even technically non-aligned nations 
are under ever increasing pressure to give effect to treaties as interdependency grows. 
The growth of international trade demands this convergence. Consequently, the 
'globalisation' of law is best described as "a change in the range of sources of national 
law, 27 and the interpenetration of national and supranational legal orders" (Edgeworth 
28 2003: 180). 
Perhaps the best example of supranational law is the growth of supranational human 
rights law; this is "one of the most significant contemporary transformative influences 
on the legal doctrines of municipal legal systems" (Edgeworth 2003: 182). International 
human rights law primarily addresses the relationship between the citizen and the 
state, and as such it directly threatens sovereignty. Given this, governments clearly 
have little incentive to enact such laws, and so the primary movers have tended to be 
more esoteric groups such as citizens' groups and NGOs, often transnational in their 
membership. Even where states have resisted the pressures to implement human 
rights law, new social forces and practicalities have meant that in practice, citizens tend 
to enjoy recourse to higher supranational bodies, such as the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee under The International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. This 
creates additional pressure for domestic change (ibid: 183). 
The global consolidation of human rights norms has coincided with the decline of the 
social citizenship and solidarity associated with the modern welfare state. Human 
rights express a very different universalism from that expressed by the modern state; 
national social solidarity gives way to a global discourse of humanity that transcends 
national boundaries and is captured in ideas such as the 'common heritage of 
25 Multinationals have particularly visible effects on state law. Their ability to organise 
production internationally "puts downward pressure on wages and working conditions", notably 
in the clothing and footwear industries (Held et al 1999: 278-80). 26 The most advanced example of a supranational law making institution is of course the EU. 
Indeed, the European Court of Justice has been compared to a Supreme Court enforcing a 
federal constitution (Schachter 1997: 11). 
Z' As such, Hart's 'rule of recognition' (1961: Ch 6) grows more complex. 28 Koskenniemi and Leino (2002) point out that successive International Court of Justice 
presidents have expressed concern at the proliferation of international tribunals and the 
substantive fragmentation of international law, which is seen as damaging to the unity, 
coherence and manageability of international law. But Koskenniemi and Leino argue that 
international law has never really been unified and coherent, and the ICJ is simply worried 
about losing its pivotal role. For them, fragmentation is actually an institutional expression of 
international political pluralism. 
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mankind'. States are forced to align laws to very general concepts of human dignity, 
which has resulted in, inter alia, the increasing domestic recognition of indigenous 
peoples, customary landholding practices and powers of local governance. This 
polycentricity and fragmentation is anathema to the modern process of nation building 
(Edgeworth 2003; 184-5, Santos 1995: 318). 
The rules promulgated by supranational institutions are not the only kind of 
supranational law. Ladeur suggests that "private networks of inter-relationships" 
generate forms of "spontaneous law". This law becomes increasingly important as the 
state "can no longer deliver stable rules of guidance for private actors". Thus self 
organisation through, inter alia, self generated laws and norms helps fulfil law's 
classical role of stabilising expectations (2004: 6-7). Perhaps the best example of this 
spontaneous or "global informal law" (Edgeworth 2003: 190) is the revival of an 
international lex mercatoria. As Teubner (1997) outlines, the new lex mercatoria does 
not derive from international institutions or treaties, nor is it based upon custom or 
embedded practice as the old lex mercatoria was. Instead, it "derives from newly 
constructed cultural practices attendant on the peculiarities of contemporary 
transnational trade" (Edgeworth 2003: 190). Lex mercatoria's legitimacy is not drawn 
from its rationality or adherence to the popular will, but from its reflexivity; the 
subsystem itself generates the norms that regulate it, and is therefore self-validating 
(Banakar 1998: 361). Given its simultaneously supranational and local origins, lex 
mercatoria reflects the contraction of the state in both upwards and downwards 
directions: The norms used are autonomous from the national legal sphere, and the 
process operates in closer proximity to the dispute, and is speedier than traditional 
formal legal remedies; it is essentially a form of ADR. As Edgeworth puts it, 
"procedurally and substantively, the regime is essentially one of private norm creation" 
(2003: 191). 29 
For Teubner (1997), the new lex mercatoria is the key to the emerging regime of 
"global law without a state". This regime is decentralised and autonomous from the 
state, value pluralistic, and lacks the unity of national law. It regulates flexible, volatile 
and fragmented domains as opposed to a clearly defined, bounded national space. 
The idea of a hierarchy of norms, with sovereign positive law at the pinnacle, must be 
29 The new lex mercatoria's primary field of operation is in international commercial arbitration. 
The International Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm has emerged as the leading forum of 
arbitration that applies this informal law (Banakar 1998: 347). 
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abandoned. Instead there now exists a "heterarchy of legal discourses", with law 
developing at the peripheries (ibid: 14,7). 30 
Contract law, which is enjoying a resurgence in late modernity, is considerably 
renovated due to supranational pressures. Collins suggests that the once 'closed' and 
'insular' systems of classical contract law are "breaking down under the globalisation of 
markets and the evolution of international political structures to regulate such markets" 
(1997: 41). The sources of contract law have expanded; rules now emanate from 
transnational legal orders, often considerably independent from any political origin (ibid: 
41). Collins notes that contract law has always emanated from a variety of sources, 31 
but despite this, it always "remained tied to the political authority of the nation state". 
This is no longer the case (1997: 42). 32 1 
Globalised Legal Hermeneutics 
Closely related to the rise of supranational law, judges are becoming increasingly 
prepared to look beyond the rules provided by domestic positive law; their normative 
horizons are progressively widening to include laws of supranational origin and laws 
from other jurisdictions, even where such laws have not been formally incorporated into 
domestic law, and particularly in 'hard' cases. Edgeworth captures these phenomena 
with the concept of "globalised legal hermeneutics" (2003: 185). This growing 'legal 
30 According to Ladeur (1999), lex mercatoria can be considered an example of Teubner's 
'autopoietic law' (1988). Autopoesis, a biological term, was applied sociologically by Luhmann 
(1990). He argued that social subsystems are largely closed and self-generating. Validity is an 
internal product of the system, and is constantly recreated as the system reproduces itself. For 
a critique of these ideas see Neves (2001), Mahlmann (2003: 26-8) and Mieville (2004: 274). 
Teubner argues that law is autopoietic, for it is a self-generating, closed system that does not 
refer to any higher truth or rationality; this is particularly so of the self-created laws of private 
regimes in global society (1988,2004). On this basis, Laduer calls for a 'postmodern 
constitutionalism', where each subsystem is permitted to observe and modify itself and its own 
internal rules (1997). Collins suggests two readings of lex mercatoria are possible. First, as its 
standards ultimately remain dependent on state sanctions for enforcement, it may simply be an 
elaborate form of contract regulated by state law. However, to the extent that the standards 
applicable to contracts "derive from other sources such as conventions, customs of business, 
rules of private associations, then it can be regarded as an independent source of legal 
regulation of contracts" (1997: 45). Above all, Edgeworth suggests that it is important to 
remember that global informal law is still "overshadowed by the spread of formal legal 
9. lobalisation" (Edgeworth 2003: 192). 
These include specialist commercial courts within jurisdictions, common law, chancery courts, 
and historical antecedents such as the natural law tradition. In addition, international business 
transactions "always forged their own miniature legal orders", such as commercial standard- 
form contracts (Collins 1997: 41). 
32 For Collins, the great strength of contractual, private law regulatory strategies is their 
reflexivity (1999: Ch 4). 
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commerce' or 'cross fertilisation' results in the "horizontal sharing of legal principles and 
values" (ibid: 188). 33 
Judges are particularly willing to utilise supranational norms, rules and law, particularly 
where there are interpretative difficulties in domestic law. 34 Global informal law is often 
used in this way, but above all, supranational human rights norms are increasingly 
referred to domestically. Hunt (1997) traces how references to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
exploded in the UK even in the years before the Convention was formally introduced 
into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998.35 Both the Convention and the Court 
continue to influence jurisdictions that are not formally bound by them. 36 Human rights 
obligations created at the supranational level bind citizens extraterritorially, so the old 
idea of sovereign immunity no longer applies;. the International Criminal Court and 
various ad hoc war crimes tribunals have been thrust into the spotlight in a number of 
high profile cases, such as those of Pinochet, Milosevic, and Hussein. 
Additionally, a notion of "global citizenship" has emerged (Edgeworth 2003: 192). 
Individuals and organisations have increasing layers of legal rights that neither 
originate in the positive law of sovereign nation states, nor are exclusively enforceable 
before municipal courts. As such, citizenship is no longer monopolised by the laws of 
nation states. 37 New legal subjects have also appeared, such as national and 
international NGOs, and they often participate in decisions in cases and enforcement. 38 
33 This trend is particularly evident in the former communist states of the eastern bloc, as they 
become increasingly aligned with the west both through global economic processes and active 
design. See also Friedman (2004) on the intertwining of family law, Choudhry (1999) on 
constitutional design, and Van Hoecke (2004). 
34 Collins notes that the rise of supranational law often forces alien concepts into domestic 
jurisdictions. For instance, the European Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
(1999/13) refers to good faith, a concept that has traditionally been resisted in UK law 
(1997: 24). On good faith in general, and its potential for impacting upon UK law, see the series 
of articles by Brownsword (1993,1996,1997,1999). 
35 Hunt found that in the period from 1953-1996, judges made 473 references to the European 
Convention on Human Rights or judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The first 
substantive reference did not occur until 1973, and over half of the total occurred in the last five 
gears of the study. 
e Note also the 'Bangalore Principles', which were formulated in 1988 by a number of appellate 
judges from many common law jurisdictions to guide the application of international human 
rohts norms, especially where local laws are unclear or incomplete (Edgeworth 2003: 188). 
3 Of course, reliance on these rights still depends on the individual belonging to a sovereign 
nation; such is the case in the EU (MacCormick 1997: 342). Global citizenship is also relatively 
'thin', largely comprising of civil and political rights, rather than social rights such as entitlements 
to basic minimums. 
38 National and international non-governmental organisations are also particularly involved in 
enforcing environmental treaties and agreements. 
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Often standing is also given to non member-state citizens such as refugees and 
indigenous peoples (Edgeworth 2003: 193-4). 
Given these developments some classical notions of jurisprudence begin to appear 
increasingly inapplicable. Dworkin's notion of "community" (1977: Ch 4,1986), for 
instance, now seems inadequate descriptively and unrealisable normatively, and 
unable to capture the complexities of a "world of overlapping, and provisional, 
communities" (Edgeworth 2003: 189). Dworkin's 'Hercules' cannot simply look to the 
background principles of a particular community's jurisprudence in order to resolve 
difficulties in hard cases. Similarly, Hart's exhortation for judges to look to public policy 
in cases where, due to the 'penumbra of uncertainty' or law's 'open texture', meaning is 
unclear (1961) seems equally unsuited to contemporary conditions (Edgeworth 2003: 
189). 
A raft of constitutional questions is also raised. Where judges look to human rights 
norms their reasoning tends towards moral reasoning. Given that moral norms tend to 
be very general, there is an inbuilt flexibility, which in some circumstances may confer 
a greater degree of judicial freedom and political power on unelected judges. The 
norms of international human rights jurisprudence may be so malleable as to allow 
scope for personal ideologies or politics to fill out their meaning (Hunt 1997). 
Questions as to whether human rights norms should be more binding than other 
international and domestic norms and whether judges owe any special loyalty to local 
laws are also raised. Alternatively, it is possible that "the advance of human rights 
norms domestically may be both a consistent and principled interpretation of the 
democratic sovereign will, as expressed in both the original ratification of international 
human rights instruments and their incorporation into domestic law" (Edgeworth 2003: 
199). 39 
Interlegality 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos' notion of 'interlegality' is a useful concept when 
attempting to understand how the various elements of the late modern legal world 
relate to each other. 4° Santos 'maps' law, pointing to "local, national and world legality" 
39 For the potential impacts of globalised legal hermeneutics on the rule of law, see Edegworth 
J2003: 197-9). 
° Despite embracing some 'postmodern' themes, Santos has a Marxist heritage; see, for 
instance, his arguments, contra Pashukanis, for a Marxist theory of law rather than a Marxist 
theory against law (1982). 
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(1987: 287,1995a: Ch 7). At the local level, there are the laws of rural areas, the laws 
of marginalised urban areas, and the laws of churches, sports, and professions; this 
law is often informal and unofficial. National legality is predominantly made up of state 
law, while world legality includes lex mercatoria, the laws promulgated by supranational 
institutions, and the internal laws of MNCs. According to Santos, "these different legal 
scales do not exist in isolation but rather interact in different ways [... ] as a result of 
interaction and intersection among legal spaces one cannot properly speak of law and 
legality but interlaw and interlegality" (1987: 288). Although the centrality of state law is 
increasingly shaken, it is "still a decisive political factor" (ibid: 298). But increasingly 
legality is complex and porous; multiple networks of legal orders coexist, overlap and 
interrelate. 41 Santos grounds his interlegality thesis empirically with his study of the law 
of the Pasargada squatter settlement in Rio (1995a: Ch 3). 42 Santos analyses thirteen 
local dispute settlements within Pasargada which demonstrate the power of non-state 
law and norms, yet simultaneously show how this unofficial legal system does not 
challenge the formal system or claim jurisdiction outside of its territorial borders 
(Santos 1995a: 236). 43 
Santos also argues that modernity is crumbling, and embryonic new forms of social 
ordering and modes of knowledge are emerging. 44 The possibility of new forms of 
41 Santos is not alone in pointing to the complexity of the contemporary legal order. Held talks 
of 'layers' of laws beyond the state (2003: 173). MacCormick argues that we must "escape from 
the idea that all law must originate in a single power source, like a sovereign", and "discover the 
possibility that different systems can overlap and interact, without necessarily requiring that one 
be subordinate or hierarchically inferior to the other or to some third system". Legal orders 
should instead be understood as the "complex interaction of overlapping legalities" (1993: 8-10). 
Twining has suggested that there are eight "levels" of law: global, international, regional, 
transnational, inter-communal, territorial state, sub-state and non-state. He argues that "these 
different levels of relations with which law has to deal are not neatly nested in a single 
hierarchy", but instead they "interact" (2000: 139-40,228). 
42 Pasargada is a fictional name for a real squatter settlement. Santos also studies a dispute 
between squatters and developers in Recife, Brazil. 
43 Santos' image of globalisation dovetails neatly with his notion of interlegailty. Santos sees 
globalisation as increasing legal uniformity in some aspects whilst increasing local differentiation 
in others (1998). There is a mix of top-down imposition and bottom-up creation, and the 
changes cannot be accounted for by any monocausal explanation: Thus, legal change is "a 
highly complex phenomenon that mirrors the complexity and ambiguity of the much broader, 
seemingly all-encompassing process of globalisation of which it is only a very partial 
manifestation" (Santos 2002: 163). Twining makes a similar point: "Globalisation does not imply 
homogenisation". Instead, "globalisation does not minimise the importance of the local, but it 
does mandate setting the study of local issues and phenomena in broad geographical and 
historical contexts. For most legal scholars the maxim should be: think global, focus local" 
(2000: 252). See also Santos on 'globalised localism' and 'localised globlaism' (1987,1995a: 
263). 
44 This argument is made in his landmark 1995 work Toward a New Common Sense. For 
Santos, the new era is a 'postmodern' one. Critical reaction to Toward a New Common Sense 
was favourable, but for critique see Sciulli (1996), Warren-Perry (1997), Darain Smith (1998) 
and Twining (2000). 
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common sense has emerged; such a common sense would not be dominated by the 
west, but would be built upon traditions and cultures that have been repressed and 
marginalised by modernity and capitalism. Santos sees six clusters of social relations 
that relate to six configurations of power or common sense: the householdplace, 
workplace, marketplace, communityplace, citizenplace, and worldplace (1995a). In 
keeping with the idea of interlegality, each of these clusters can be seen to have a 
unique and differentiated order of laws and norms, but there is interaction and 
interpenetration between each one. 
In addition, Santos suggests that law can and is being used profitably by emancipatory 
movements at the local, national and global level. Often, such movements use 
informal, non-official forms of law, but state law is also used in unconventional ways. 
For instance, Pasargada's "internal legality [hints] at some of the characteristics of an 
emancipatory legal practice". Although the risks of it being co-opted or undermined are 
great, Pasargada's legal tools are "amenable to use in a radically democratic manner"; 
there is a wide distribution of legal skills expressed by the absence of a specialised 
professional monopoly, manageable and autonomous institutions that are accessible 
and encourage participation, and a style of non-coercive justice "expressed in both the 
predominance of rhetoric and the orientation toward consensus". To supplement this, 
concepts and techniques from state municipal law are borrowed (Santos 2002: 162). 
With law being used in this way, there is a flowering of "subaltern cosmopolitan legality" 
(ibid: 494-5). Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito outline the main features of this 
blossoming form of legality: Most crucially, there is a proliferation of "bottom up" as 
well as "top down" legal reform (2005: 1-2). 5 In addition, there is the construction of a 
nascent global solidarity, the emergence of a grassroots struggle to reform the 
international human rights regime in order that it better reflects multiculturalism, and a 
radicalisation of democratic politics through new forms of participatory democracy. 
However these developments and the movements they depend on remain "fragile" 
(ibid: 18). 46 
as Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito suggest that scholars who focus on law and globalisation 
tend to fail to register the extent and nature of these 'bottom up' changes. Despite their value, 
the 'governance' scholars' concepts of, inter alia, 'responsive regulation' (Ayers and Braithwaite 
1992), 'post-regulatory law' (Teubner 1986), and 'soft law' (Snyder 1994) are focused on 'top- 
down' regulatory responses to globalisation. Meanwhile, 'hegemony' theorists (Dezalay and 
Garth 1996,2002a, 2002b) assess the failure of ostensibly progressive global legal designs 
such as the human rights movement. Again the focus here is on elites, who are oversimplified 
and portrayed as monolithic, whilst space for resistance is closed down and the inevitability of 
hegemonic incorporation assumed (Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2005: 6-12). 
46 Rather than suggest a programme for law, Santos invokes three metaphors that are already 
forming the basis of new consciousnesses: the 'frontier', the 'baroque' and the 'south' (1995a: 
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Summary and Conclusion 
Just as the nature of contemporary society in the advanced capitalist west has 
changed to such a degree that the era of modernity appears to be ending, so too it 
seems that the modern legal system is disintegrating. A distinctive 'late modern' legal 
system is emerging. Central to this are the five aspects of legal change identified by 
Edgeworth; privatisation, deregulation, domestic fragmentation, the rise of 
supranational law, and the emergence of globalised legal hermeneutics. In addition, 
Santos has outlined the notion of interlegality. This is not exhaustive, but it is clear that 
significant changes are afoot. Just as modernity fostered its own unique legal order, so 
too is late modernity. 
Of course, the modern legal order has not been completely destroyed and replaced by 
a new one; instead some of its central features are being reconfigured and renovated 
in a series of incremental changes. These processes do not occur with the same 
speed and intensity in all jurisdictions, but the broad and general trends that point to 
the emergence of a new legal order are unmistakable. Most significantly, it is no longer 
the case that the state is the only, or even the major unit of analysis when considering 
law. " Sovereign state law can no longer be held up as an ideal type against which 
other forms of law and norms are to be measured (Cotterrell 1992: 29-31). Instead, 
law emanates from a plethora of different and interacting sources and comes in a 
variety of different and interacting forms. The result is something of a 'patchwork quilt' 
of legality. 48 As such, "black box" theories that treat nation states and legal systems as 
discrete, impervious entities that can be studied in isolation either internally or 
externally are now of limited value (Twining 2000: 51). 49 
The most prominent socio-legal theorists "at best offer only partial understandings of 
the present legal landscape" (Edgeworth 2003: 203). Their theories tend to rely upon 
Ch 8,1995b). The 'frontier' is "characterised by a preference for the institutional and social 
ferment of life on a frontier" (Edgeworth 2003: 129), the 'baroque' is a "cultural metaphor" that 
privileges eccentricity and a "temporary suspension of order and canons" (Santos 1995a: 499- 
500), while the 'south' "signifies the form of human suffering brought about by capitalist 
modernity" (ibid: 507). For critique of the metaphors, see Sarat (1995), Darain Smith (1998) 
and Twining (2000). 
" The other most notable change is perhaps the renaissance of contract law. 
48 It has been speculated that the emergence of an unsystematic plurality of law signals a return 
to pre-modern law. Hicks, for instance, talks of "a new middle ages of law" (1995: 13). 
as Twining includes Rawls' A Theory of Justice in this category. Rawls states that his theory is 
restricted to societies which are "closed system[s] isolated from other societies" (1972: 8). As a 
consequence, its relevance in contemporary conditions is questionable. 
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outmoded concepts of nation states, bounded polities and monocentric legal systems. 
None provides the conceptual tools adequate to the task of understanding the legal 
order of late modernity. 50 The same could be said of all the Marxist theories of law 
assessed in Part 1. They belong firmly in the tradition of modernity and as such 
assume the bounded, territorial nature of law and accept the nation state as the focus 
of analysis. Yet Marxist legal theory can respond to these changed circumstances, and 
in the process both, rejuvenate itself and offer a plausible account of the late modern 
legal order. Part 3 will outline how this is so. 
50 Edgeworth accuses several socio-legal scholars of this failing: From the "high watermark" 
(2003: 99) of modernity are Freidmann (1959,1971), Unger (1976), Nonet and Selznick (1978) 
and Habermas (1987,1996). More recent theorists are more alive to some of the processes of 
change but still fail recognise the enormity of these processes and are unable to offer an 
adequate conceptual framework in which to ground analysis: Teubner (1983), Willke (1986) and 
Ladeur (1997). Even Santos does not furnish a sufficient description of the profound changes 
the legal sphere has undergone (Edgeworth 2003: 131-2). 
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PART 3. MARXIST LEGAL THEORY IN LATE 
MODERNITY 
While I do not believe that we should jettison all the grand theories of the past we certainly 
have to be careful in applying previous paradigms to contemporary conditions. " 
Kellner in Theory, Culture and Society (1988: 267) 
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CHAPTER 8. MARXIST LEGAL THEORY IN LATE MODERNITY 
In Part 1 it was suggested that the work of Hugh Collins represents the culmination of 
Marxist thinking on law. However, in solving the problem of determination, Collins' 
work is forced to rely on a notion of 'dominant ideology' that must be implausibly 
omnipresent and elastic if it is to account for all law. Part 1 also showed how Marxist 
legal theory is always indissolubly linked to its concrete socio-political conditions. In 
Part 2 the momentous changes that society is undergoing were outlined; a distinctive 
period of 'late modernity' is emerging. Such changes are plainly evident in the legal 
sphere. Given this, the task of Part 3 is clear. Late modernity has provided a new 
context for a renovated Marxist theory of law, based upon the work of Collins. This 
Chapter will outline this renovated Marxist theory of law. The argument is that late 
modern conditions are actually alleviating the central weakness of Collins' theory; it 
seems, then, that the facts are starting to fit the theory better. Following this, Chapter 9 
will discuss some of the consequences and difficulties of the new position. 
The Argument 
As was outlined in Part 1, Collins solves the problem of determination by arguing that 
the base determines the superstructure through the medium of the dominant ideology. 
Briefly, ideologies are formed through social practice as individuals and groups engage 
in and with productive processes. One's experiences of productive processes 
crystallise in the form of a set of ideas or a worldview; this Collins terms 'ideology'. A 
'dominant ideology' emerges, associated with a dominant class, and as this class 
controls the mechanisms of power in society, including its legal system, laws are 
enacted that are in line with, or pursuant to, that ideology. Collins' solution to the 
problem of determination thus avoids mechanical notions of 'reflection' and restores 
human agency to a central place in Marxist legal theory. However, this human agency 
is conditioned by ideologies that are formed in the relations of production, through 
people's experiences of productive processes. As such, the economic sphere retains 
ultimate primacy, there is no 'lapse' into idealism and the theory retains its Marxist 
credentials based on the Preface. 
Yet in solving the problem of determination in this way, Collins opens up another great 
difficulty, which he acknowledges. As he puts it, "if a serious attempt is made to situate 
the ideologies behind all legal rules in productive activities, large areas of the law are 
left unexplicated. [... ] As our attention shifts to legal rules which govern subject matter 
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only remotely connected to productive activities, it becomes progressively more difficult 
to provide a Marxist account of the ideologies behind the laws". The "dilemma" is 
therefore as follows: "If the principles of Marxist explanation of ideologies are strictly 
adhered to, large gaps in the account of laws appear. If, on the other hand, the 
plasticity of the dominant ideology is stressed, there seems to be a break with the 
original structural style explanation of ideologies for the crucial link between the 
relations of production and the ideological superstructure appears to be broken and 
replaced by a crude form of conspiratorial instrumentalism" (Collins 1982: 76). If this 
Marxist legal theory is to explain the content of all law, then it is forced to rely upon an 
implausibly elastic conception of the dominant ideology. ' 
However, the recent developments that are forging a late modern society and legal 
order can help to alleviate this theoretical weakness. Crucially, Collins' theory is, first 
and foremost, a theory about the determination of the legal by more fundamental 
elements in society. Essentially, Collins suggests a way in which the base determines 
the superstructure, whilst simultaneously preserving space for conscious human action. 
Within this scheme, modern ideas such as the sovereign state and the idea of unified 
working and ruling classes play only a peripheral, non-essential role. Of course, 
Collins does refer to conditions of modernity; his theory is a self-confessed attempt to 
update the old Marxist 'class instrumentalist' theory of law, and the dominant image of 
law throughout his work is that of a ruling class actively codifying its ideology and 
worldview through the mechanisms and apparatus of the nation state. 2 That Collins' 
theory was promulgated immediately following the height of the modern period and is 
therefore grounded firmly in the modernist tradition of sociological explanation makes 
this hardly surprising. But his adoption of the categories of modernity is peripheral to 
the main thrust of his argument. As a result the passing of those conditions does not, 
on its own, invalidate the central arguments of the theory. 
Instead, the processes of late modernity mean that it is no longer necessary to rely on 
a single, all-encompassing dominant ideology, the Achilles heel of Collins' work. The 
core of Collins' theory, the idea that law is created in line with ideologies formed in the 
1 See discussion in Chapter 5 above. 
2 Note that Collins suggests that the "elementary instance of law, in its most basic form", is not a 
code or a regulation, but "a court applying customary norms of behaviour" (1982: 93). This is 
because a court responding to a particular case in line with its ideology is the most direct 
expression of his theory. This notion "delineates the least complex form of social institution 
which can fulfil the standard functions of law satisfactorily. [... It is] the simplest example of the 
phenomenon, an archetype from which sophisticated systems are derived" (ibid: 90). 
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processes of production, can be retained. Other notions, specifically those associated 
with modernity such as the idea of a coherent, well-defined ruling class, dominant state 
apparatus and a single dominant ideology, can be safely jettisoned without 
compromising the force of the solution to the problem of determination. 
The remainder of this Chapter will outline just how this is so. Firstly, the effects of late 
modern processes in the economy and production, state and politics, class structure, 
and the emergence of late modernism will be discussed. Then, the impacts of the 
concomitant changes in the legal sphere, namely privatisation, deregulation, domestic 
fragmentation, and the rise of supranational law and globalised legal hermeneutics, will 
be detailed. The suggestion will be that Marxist legal theory can articulate with late 
modernity in two distinct but related ways. Firstly, Marxist theory can identify and 
account for late modern developments in society and in law, albeit in a controversial 
way. Marxism suggests a distinct chain of causation that explains how developments 
in fundamental levels of society have impacts upon law. Secondly, the late modern 
developments that Marxism can account for simultaneously render Collins' Marxist 
theory of law more plausible; they help to resolve its central flaw and ensure that its 
theoretical 'bite' is strengthened. 
Late Modernity and Marxist Legal Theory 
The processes of late modernity that were detailed in Chapter 6 provide the key to the 
renovation of Collins' Marxist legal theory. The changes to the economic and 
productive sector suggest the underlying causes of the emergence of a distinctive late 
modern period. The changes to the state, politics and class structure highlight what 
needs to be jettisoned from Collins' theory if it is to remain relevant. Finally, on the 
basis of Collins' solution to the problem of determination, contemporary law can be 
seen as an example of late modernism; a cultural, cognitive accompaniment to more 
fundamental processes. Each of these ideas will be dealt with in turn. 
Economy and Production 
According to Collins' Marxist legal theory, an understanding of the underlying economic 
structure of society provides the key to understanding what is going on at the 
superstructural level. As Marx's Preface suggests, developments in the economic 
base of society, the forces and relations of production, are the fundamental cause of 
211 
changes in the legal sphere. Therefore, the starting point for any explanation of late 
modern legal developments must be the developments in the economic base. 
Harvey develops an argument along these lines. He sees the "current transformation 
[as] merely a modification of capitalism which allows it to accommodate its own 
contradictions and crises" (Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1992: 30). Harvey argues that 
capitalism cannot deliver "steady and unproblematic growth" (1989: 180). Instead, 
capitalism has inbuilt "crisis tendencies", most notably a tendency to 
overaccumulation. 3 Post-war Fordism suppressed and stifled this tendency for a time 
through spatial and temporal displacement ,4 and by controlling devaluation and 
technical and organisational change (ibid: 184-5). Inevitably, however, the 
effectiveness of such interventions was finite: Ultimately, the Fordist "mechanisms 
evolved for controlling crisis tendencies were finally overwhelmed by the power of the 
underlying contradictions of capitalism". What Harvey terms 'flexible accumulation' is a 
"superior regime of capitalist production [... ] which would assure a solid basis for 
further accumulation on a global scale" (ibid: 186). Nevertheless, "the underlying logic 
of capitalist accumulation and its crisis-tendencies remain the same" (ibid: 189). 5 
Melossi supplements Harvey's arguments with his observations on the role of labour in 
the late modern economy. Melossi suggests that capitalist entrepreneurs, workers and 
the state continually try to overcome the limits imposed upon their development and 
freedom of action by the other two groups. As such, "innovation would therefore 
3 Overaccumulation occurs as productive capacity increases above a level that consumer 
markets can bear, as competing capitalists continually try to make the productive process more 
efficient. Harvey defines it as "a condition in which idle capital and idle labour supply could exist 
side by side with no apparent way to bring these idle resources together to accomplish socially 
useful tasks. A generalised condition of overaccumulation would be indicated by idle productive 
capacity, a glut of commodities and an excess of inventories, surplus money capital (perhaps 
held as hoards), and high unemployment". Such conditions prevailed in the 1930s and 
periodically since 1973 (1989: 180-1). Devaluation, geographical expansion of capital and 
labour, and the extension of credit can contain overaccumulation for a time, but the underlying 
trend will inevitably assert itself in the end. 
4 For instance the geographical expansion of capital and labour and the speeding up of the 
turnover time within which money relays profit to the investor. 
5 According to Harvey, the shift to modes of flexible accumulation "is a rather traditional 
response to crisis. The devaluation of labour power [which flexible accumulation partly relies 
upon] has always been the instinctive response of capitalists to falling profits" (1989: 192). 
Furthermore, the emergence of "an ill-remunerated and broadly disempowered under-class [... ] 
raises the spectre of a crisis of underconsumption" of the type that Fordism and Keynesianism 
were adept at avoiding. As such, flexible accumulation may not even offer a short term solution 
to capitalism's crisis tendencies (ibid: 192). What is unique about present arrangements, 
however, is the emphasis on innovative financial and monetary solutions, such as the role of 
credit, in postponing the crisis (ibid: 192-7). Ultimately, Harvey maintains that the recent 
transformations are "certainly within the grasp of historical materialist enquiry" (1989: 328). For 
doubts as to the validity of this argument, see Crook, Pakulski and Waters (1992: 235). 
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constitute a crucial tool by which entrepreneurs undercut the power of labour in 
situations during which a prolonged spell of prosperity has placed workers in 'a 
privileged position. The result of innovation, usually backed by political-legal power, is 
to destructure and disorganise the type of economy in which the former type of working 
class has achieved its dangerous (for the entrepreneurs) power" (2003: xxxii-xxxiii). He 
adds that innovation "is often the result of a common feeling that the boundaries of the 
'old' social system are too rigid and suffocating for the development that the long period 
of prosperity has made possible" (ibid: xxxiv). 6 
Ultimately then, late modern processes can be seen as large scale responses to 
problems of capitalist accumulation and the unprecedented power of organised labour 
at the height of modernity. Clearly, many would not be prepared to accept that these 
processes are at the root of a more thoroughgoing renovation of society that includes 
the cultural sphere? and the legal sphere. However, for a Marxist theory of law based 
upon the Preface, these arguments are indispensable. Such a theory, having isolated 
the economic and productive sphere as the driving force of society, and having 
identified that society has undergone massive changes, must be able to point to the 
cause of those changes in the economic and productive sphere, otherwise it will lapse 
into incoherence. The arguments mounted by, inter alia, Harvey, enable Marxism to do 
just that, and are therefore vital to the theory developed here. 
State and Politics 
Collins' Marxist Iegal theory concentrates on nation-states and their domestic 
legislatures. Its explicit focus is "the role of law in governing relations between 
individuals and groups within one society' (1982: 14-5 [italics added]). 8 As such, the 
law that Collins discusses is the positive legislation of national governments and the 
judicial pronouncements of national courts. Such a focus is to be expected, of course, 
as Collins' ideas were formulated just after the height of the modern era, but before the 
enormity of the late modern changes had been properly registered. In modernity, 
relatively strong national governments wielded largely undisputed power over their 
territorial jurisdictions. However, as Chapter 6 outlined, national governments have 
increasingly ceded power to actors both above and below them and are increasingly 
toothless in the face of processes of globalisation. Indeed, the relative decline of the 
6 One is reminded of Schumpeter's notion of "creative destruction" (1943: 81-6). 
7 As Harvey and Jameson argue: See Chapter 6 above. 
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nation state is one of the central features of late modernisation. The state remains an 
important player, but just a single player nonetheless. As such, any contemporary 
sociological study of law that restricts its focus in this way whilst simultaneously 
attempting to produce a general theory of law is plainly unsatisfactory. 
However, Collins' refusal to outline a precise concept of law means that it is relatively 
straightforward to apply his theory to contemporary conditions; nowhere does Collins 
suggest that the term 'law' should be reserved for the positive legislation of national 
governments and the judicial pronouncements of national courts. Even if one were to 
adopt the more sophisticated concept of law influenced by Weber and Hart, detailed in 
Chapter 5,9 there remains no need to see law as exclusively the product of nation 
states. Once again, Collins' is a theory about the determination of the legal, and 
references or allusions to the nation state are peripheral to the main argument. The 
late modern processes that have eroded the central importance of the nation state 
therefore do not render Collins' Marxist theory of law redundant. On the basis of his 
theory, it is open for bodies and groups other than the state to create and implement 
law and norms. 10 
Class Structure 
An important element of Collins' theory is the idea that there is a relatively 
straightforward social stratification. His theory utilises a notion of reasonably coherent 
and large scale class groupings: A ruling capitalist class which is in control of the state 
apparatus successfully promulgates its dominant ideology, while a subordinate working 
class is effectively controlled. " Divisions and schisms exist within these two groups, 
and their may be a number of peripheral groups, but the basic division between 
working and ruling class blocs is maintained. Such notions were relatively plausible in 
modernity, where a largely unified and clearly delineated working class, based in the 
extractive and manufacturing sectors, could reasonably be said to share objective class 
° See also the section on relative autonomy (1982: 47-52), which continually refers to "the 
State". 
9 See pages 140-148 above. 
10 Collins himself suggests that on the basis of his theory, the "minimal conception of law" is a 
"court applying customary norms of behaviour" (1982: 92-3). Although Collins himself may well 
have had quintessentially modern national courts in mind, there is nothing inherent in his 
formulation that ties it to the nation state; courts and similar bodies applying customary norms of 
behaviour can, and increasingly do, operate at levels above and below the nation state. How 
far this is compatible with the Weberian-Hartian definition of law suggested in Chapter 5 is open 
to question, however. 
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interests which were, in many respects, opposed to those of the ruling class of society. 
Similarly the ruling class could be said to have possessed a reasonably consistent and 
coherent ideology. Again, Collins' theory is very much a modernist theory, produced at 
the climax of the modern age. 
The classical Marxist notion of two large opposed class blocs has always been 
something of a caricature. Marxists themselves have regularly attempted to better 
theorise the more complex and messy nature of reality. 12 As Chapter 6 outlined, the 
substantial reorganisation of the traditional class make-up in late modernity has 
decisively ended any thoughts of society being neatly divided into large scale, neat 
blocs. Instead, a number of ruling groups have emerged, field or sector specific and 
with no one single group in overall control of clearly defined territorial spaces. Even 
more significant is the demise of the traditional working class. No longer do substantial 
sectors of the population work in a limited number of industries and live in tightly bound 
occupational communities. Instead, classes have become more fragmented as the 
number of potential relationships to productive activities has increased. Reflecting this, 
a range of new interest groups have formed. As a result, any theory of law, even a 
Marxist one, will struggle to coherently argue that law is solely or even predominantly 
the product of class divisions and class conflict. 13 
" This idea permeates the entirety of Marxism and Law, Collins introduces it very early in the 
book (1982: 8). 
12 Marx and Engels themselves made such an attempt with their notion of the 
'lumpenproletariat' (see Marx and Engels (1968: 44), Engels (1956: 14) and Marx (1963: 75). 
Of many more recent attempts, perhaps the best known, discounting Laclau and Mouffe's 'post 
Marxism', is that of Poulantzas, who developed the idea of 'class fractions' (1973,1978). 
13 Strictly speaking, the old categories of proletariat and bourgeoisie can be retained if one 
utilises the kind of classical Marxist definition of class outlined by Cohen: "The proletarian is the 
subordinate producer who must sell his labour power in order to obtain his means of life. This 
definition [... ] defines the class with reference to the position of its members in the economic 
structure, their effective rights and duties within it. A person's class is established by nothing 
but his objective place in the network of ownership relations, however difficult it may be to 
identify such places neatly. His consciousness, culture, and politics do not enter into the 
definition of his class position. Indeed, these exclusions are required to protect the substantive 
character of the Marxian thesis that class position strongly conditions consciousness, culture 
and politics" (1978: 73). Robinson and Harris offer a similar definition: "By class, we mean a 
group of people who share a common relation to the processes of social production and 
reproduction, constituted relationally on the basis of social power struggles. This concept can 
apply to antagonistic polar opposites, such as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and also to 
fractional interests within a single class". Class is a "collective position vis a vis the means of 
production and the productive process" (2000: 21). Consequently, the notions of proletariat and 
bourgeoisie can be retained as umbrella categories so long as it is recognised that they are far 
too broad in the late modern world to be of any analytical use. Although they alert one to a 
crucial division in society, they singularly fail to capture the complexity of contemporary social 
arrangements. 
215 
Yet once again, the idea of two opposed class blocs is not actually central to Collins' 
theory. The theory suggests a way in which the legal is determined. Potentially any 
group, class or otherwise, could enact law in line with it. So, that the stratification of 
society has become more complex is not sufficient to render Collins' theory invalid. 
Late Modernism as Cognitive Accompaniment 
In Chapter 6 it was suggested that late modernism is the cognitive accompaniment to 
late modernisation; it is the set of visions, ideas, worldviews and forms of 
consciousness that have emerged in tandem with late modernisation. Meanwhile, on 
the basis of Marx's Preface, law is the superstructural accompaniment to more 
fundamental economic processes. 14 Clearly there is an affinity and a correspondence 
between these two separate arguments. Indeed, they dovetail so neatly that one may 
suggest that, firstly, late modernism belongs to the superstructural realm, 15 and 
secondly, contemporary law and institutional design is an example of late modernism; it 
is a cultural, cognitive accompaniment to more fundamental processes. This is also in 
tune with the argument laid out by Harvey, where the driving force of late modernity is 
seen to be the fundamental economic processes; such processes are prior to late 
modernism, including law. 
As was suggested above, the fragmentation of the great class blocs of modernity does 
not render Collins' legal theory moribund. However, it does have important 
consequences for it. As society has fragmented, the number of potential relationships 
to production has increased. Indeed, many people are increasingly remote from 
production in the traditional sense. Unlike in modernity, the world is no longer 
experienced in a very similar manner by huge numbers of people. Individuals with 
shared relationships to productive activities have come to form an increasing number of 
differentiated and specialised groups. Each groups' experiences of the world differ 
according to their vantage point, their position within productive relations. As a result, 
the social basis for a multitude of worldviews and ideologies exists. Increasingly, these 
ideologies are sectional, emerging from particular zones of society with very little 
relation with or contact to other zones. 1e 
0 
14 Collins goes to great lengths to preserve this idea, whilst acknowledging the effects of law on 
the base, with his concept of metanormativity. See Collins (1982: Ch 4) and Chapter 5 above. 
15 Though, in accordance with Collins' theory of metanormativity, it still may have effects on the 
base. 
16 Sumner suggests that "technical divisions divide a class within itself. [... j Hence ideologies 
will arise which reflect these technical relations. These could include ideologies related to 
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Such ideas resonate with themes developed by 'postmodernist' social commentators. 
Stanley Fish, for instance, has promulgated the notion of 'interpretive communities' 
(1980). 17 He argues that truth is produced and located within such communities. 
Visions and notions of truth from one community may have little validity for other 
communities with different standards of truth. 18 Similarly, Bourdieu speaks of the 
"habitus" of various classes and class fractions; this refers to a set of classificatory 
schemes or cognitive structures which structure the "orienting practices" and activities 
of agents. They underpin and are more fundamental than consciousness and 
language, and provide ultimate values (1984: 466-72). 19 
As a consequence of the fragmentation of society, it has become more plausible to talk 
not of the 'dominant ideology' of the ruling class, or the 'revolutionary' or 'reactionary' 
ideologies of the working class, but instead of the 'micro-ideologies' of a multitude of 
different groups, each of which expresses something of the very particular nature of 
occupational status and consumption patterns based on different incomes. [... ] Groups organise 
to establish their power and social units and to create situations of leisure and culture. The 
technical divisions of the economy thus fix themselves at the political and cultural levels. Once 
established, the political and cultural relations between technically founded groups themselves 
form the basis for ideological differences and the picture is further complicated" (1979: 231). 
Collins himself echoed this idea of ideologies and social formations gradually accreting and 
becoming more complex over time (1982: 89; see Chapter 5 above). Sumner adds that any 
study of ideology should also consider "differences In age, sex and race based on biology and 
developed in social forms in earlier modes of production", as well as the social divisions of "town 
versus countryside and intellectual versus manual labour". Ideologies and the consequent 
political and cultural forms that arise from these groups do reflect their class character, "but are 
not solely founded on class relations" (1979: 233-4). 
17 See the introduction to Fish (1980) for a fascinating personal account of his intellectual 
development over the course of the 1970s and his development of the notion of interpretive 
communities. For a good summary of this notion, see Fish (1989: 141). 
18 For example, Fish suggests that visions from the community of theorists cannot claim validity 
in other spheres. As such, normative theories from outside of professional spheres such as law 
are not only largely invalid within the legal sphere, but are also impotent in the face of their 
normal, routine operations. Although Fish maintains that there is no way of judging between or 
ranking different communities, he is keen to distance himself from relativism. He argues that 
even though standards of right do not exist independently of interpretive communities, "within a 
community [... ] a standard of right (and wrong) can always be invoked because it will be 
invoked against the background of a prior understanding as to what counts as fact, what Is 
hearable as an argument, what will be recognised as a purpose, and so on" (Fish 1980: 174). 
Fish does, however, accept that "once one removes literal meaning as a constraint on 
interpretation", the conclusion that "we live in a rhetorical world" is inevitable (1989: 25). Fish 
also suggests that communities are the 'motors of change' in society. This idea has distinct 
Marxist undertones. Interpretive communities are an "ongoing project"; "the community [... ] is 
always engaged in doing work, the work of transforming the landscape into material for its own 
project; but that project is then itself transformed by the very work it does" (Fish 1989: 146,150). 
Fish has been criticised for only loosely defining the concept of interpretive community, and for 
his relativistic bent (see Edgeworth 2003: 260, and for Fish's response to charges of relativism, 
Fish 1989: 29-30). 
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their place within the relations of production. As Turner puts it, the existence of late 
modern culture "means that by definition there cannot be a single, dominant, or 
coherent ideology" (1990b: 250). 20 
Similarly, it was also suggested above that the decline of the nation state and its 
territorial government does not lead to the redundancy of Collins' theory. But again, 
there are important consequences. No longer is the worldview of a single dominant 
class promulgated through a coherent and powerful national state apparatus, as Collins 
supposed. Instead, as the state has ceded power to a range of other actors, the 
number of outlets for micro-ideologies to be expressed legally has increased. Of 
course, the modernist view of state and law was an intensely idealised one. To an 
extent a number of individuals and groups have long enjoyed the ability to make or at 
least influence law. Similarly, traditional state based law, what most would still 
intuitively regard as 'law', has not been completely sidelined in late modernity. Modern 
state law still exists, and is still one of the most important forms of law. However, 
increasingly it is 'just another' form of law. The old, monocentric view of legal systems 
must be abandoned. 
Taken together, the fragmentation of classes and the demise of the state, far from 
sounding the death-knell for Collins' theory, actually signpost a way in which that theory 
can be successfully renovated and made relevant in late modernity. Society is now, 
more than ever before, made up of many groups each with their own ideology derived 
from their own unique position in the relations of production. As a result it is becoming 
increasingly unnecessary to 'stretch' the concept of the dominant ideology in order to 
explain the concept of all law. Instead, it is more useful to look to individual and 
differentiated micro-ideologies in order to explain the content of sector specific law and 
norms. Furthermore, with the eclipse of the state as the sole law making institution, 
micro-ideologies can be manifested in legal enactments, rules and norms promulgated 
by a variety of groups through a variety of institutions; these tend to be focussed more 
narrowly on individual areas or specific problems. 21 Thus, Collins' general theory is 
preserved, and by taking into account late modern conditions, the key weakness of the 
19 Bordieu, in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (1984) links aesthetic 
judgements to positions in social space. See Lash and Urry (1987: 292-3). 
° Turner himself is talking about 'postmodern' rather than 'late modern' culture, put the point 
remains. 
21 Of course, the nation state is not completely sidelined; it still produces law, perhaps more so 
than any other body. However, not only is the state merely one player of many, but often 
experts in particular fields are increasingly used to create state law. As such, even within the 
state, micro-ideologies are increasingly brought to bear. 
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theory is actually alleviated. The dominant ideology thesis' inability to comprehend all 
the fine detail of law is solved, the theoretical 'gap' filled. 
The key component in the renovation of Collins' theory is the new. concept of micro- 
ideologies. - This replaces the concept of the dominant ideology and thus removes the 
Achilles heel of Collins' theory. Yet micro-ideologies are formed in exactly the same 
way as Collins suggested the dominant ideology was formed; they are responses, 
themselves rooted in ideology, to practical experiences. 22 It is the increasing variety of 
practical experiences that leads to the increasing number of ideologies, which reflect 
ever more sectional and specialised modes of living, working and producing. Crucially, 
these micro-ideologies are not centred upon the nation as the central axis of 
experience. Although national ideologies persist, and indeed remain significant, they 
are but one form of micro-ideology. 
Micro-ideologies form on two central axes. The first can be called the 'axis of genus', 
which relates to particular interests, pursuits and occupations. The second is the 
geographical axis, which relates to the physical origin and reach of the ideology; micro- 
ideologies can form at the substate level and the suprastate level, or indeed on the 
national level. So, for example, the international capitalist class involved in trade will 
develop an ideology based upon their position in the social hierarchy and the very 
specialised nature of the tasks they perform; their ideology is of an international, even 
global nature. Meanwhile, the ideologies of indigenous groups in, say, Australia, may 
emerge at the substate level and reflect the very particular situation, interests and 
needs of indigenous people. Interpretive communities in academia may form within 
disciplines or subdisciplines, and be limited to single university departments or reach 
around the world. Of course, micro-ideologies do not form in a vacuum, and significant 
cross fertilisation, combination and separation can be expected. The multitude of 
groups in late modernity, each with their own micro-ideology, have unprecedented 
22 See Chapter 5 above. As Sumner points out (1979: Ch 8) it is clear that not all ideologies 
form in economic practice. To maintain that they do is economically reductionist. Ideologies 
can and do form in political and cultural practice. Indeed, as society fragments, it is more likely 
that micro-ideologies formed in non-economic practice will come to the fore, as many individuals 
have increasingly little contact with actual productive processes. However, there are structural 
limits to the kinds of ideologies that are likely to form, as Sumner argues by reference to Marx: 
"In Capital, Marx demonstrates that the regular production of capital depends in part upon the 
generalised exchange of commodities between private owners. Where exchange is a dominant 
social relation, the ideologies necessitated by it [ideologies of ownership, legal personality and 
contract] become dominant social ideologies. [... ] These three ideologies are inseparable from 
the regular practice of exchange. [... They] form the backbone of those legal systems which 
exist in societies where exchange is a dominant social relation" (1979: 220-222). 
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access to law making mechanisms. Such mechanisms are often self-created, and may 
only have legitimacy within a single interpretative community, but the nation state no 
longer monopolises the law making machinery. 23 
In short, Collins' Marxist theory of law is amenable to modification in order to retain its 
explanatory power. Previously, Marxism saw "laws in modern societies [as] ideological 
formations given legal form and sanction by the state" (Sumner 1979: 51). In late 
modernity, it sees laws as ideological formations given legal form and sanction by not 
only the state, but by a plethora of other bodies which concretise, give expression to 
and operationalise the ideological outpourings of a range of disparate groups 24 
Legal Late Modernity and Marxist Legal Theory 
Processes of late modernity, far from rendering Collins' Marxist legal theory defunct, 
actually suggest that its key theoretical weakness can be transcended. The late 
modernisation of the legal system itself strengthens the plausibility of this claim. In 
modernity, not only was the development of micro-ideologies stifled due to the 
existence of well defined class blocs, but even where such ideologies did develop, the 
sovereign power of the nation state and its dominance of the legal meant there existed 
far less scope for them to be expressed legally. Late modern legal systems, on the 
other hand, have opened up considerable space within which micro-ideologies can 
operate. This will be illustrated by focussing on each of the six areas of legal late 
modernisation that were detailed in Chapter 7; privatisation, deregulation, domestic 
fragmentation, the rise of supranational law, globalised legal hermeneutics and 
interlegality. ' Each of these developments provides opportunities for micro-ideologies 
to flourish. As a result the idea that the central weakness of Collins' Marxist theory of 
law is alleviated is significantly reinforced. 
23 Of the examples given above, international traders' micro-ideology may be expressed legally 
and normatively through global governance institutions or lex mercatoria. That of indigenous 
peoples may be expressed though normative codes and regulations with jurisdiction over only 
those indigenous peoples, or through state law that increasingly recognises their rights and 
claims. Finally, the micro-ideologies of academic communities may be expressed through 
regulations and norms governing research and conduct, and may also influence more formal 
laws, such as those of the nation state. 
24 As Kamenka puts it, "what the 18`" and 19th centuries did to religion- showing that there were 
many religions, and that they are all made by men, reflecting different climates, periods, values 
and aspirations, and much dastardliness and cynicism- the 20th century is doing to law" (1983: 
47). 
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Privatisation 
The major legal effect of privatisation has been a renewal of the importance of contract 
law, particularly in dealings between the state and its citizens. The uniform national 
standards, agreements, terms and conditions that were particularly associated with the 
modern welfare state in areas such as public housing rents and utilities provision has 
declined. Increasingly, citizens are recast as consumers who purchase goods and 
services in the marketplace. The rise of contract enhances the chances of micro- 
ideologies being set to work in individual bargaining situations. Individuals and groups 
at more local levels have the opportunity to negotiate deals in tune with their micro- 
ideology, or at least only enter into contractual relationships where an outcome 
compatible with their micro-ideology is likely. 
Of course, it is inevitably the micro-ideologies of more powerful groups such as utility 
providers and state agencies that are reflected in supposedly individualised contracts, 
so the capacity of the average individual citizen to advance their own interests remains 
severely curtailed. Nevertheless, the ability to contract in more and more spheres of 
life undoubtedly increases the potential for micro-ideologies to be exercised, even if 
complete freedom of contract remains a myth. 
Deregulation 
Deregulation has similar potential effects to privatisation. The materialisation of 
individuals at law which was typical of the modern welfare state is being progressively 
abandoned. The classical principles of contractual freedom, such as abstract equality 
between parties, and the decontextualised interpretation of language and intent, render 
individuals as equal bargaining units in the marketplace, with the ability to contract on 
their own agreed terms, regardless of their actual material circumstances. Thus, just 
as privatisation has led to a renaissance of contract law, so deregulation ensures that 
the form that this renaissance takes is very much along the lines of classical 
contractual principles. As a result, the micro-ideologies of individuals and groups are 
better able to flourish and be reflected in legal and normative agreements and 
standards. 
The late modern form of welfare rights, highlighted by Edgeworth as one of the key 
facets of deregulation (2003: 156), provides an example of these processes. Welfare 
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rights tend now to be based upon a contractual model, with conditions attached. Thus 
local terms and norms and the particular sectional interests of the parties involved can 
be reflected in each individual welfare agreement. The micro-ideologies of individuals, 
and perhaps to a greater extent local agencies or welfare providers, are brought to the 
fore in place of nationwide governmentally implemented standards. 
Similarly, the "attenuation of agency command and control" (Edgeworth 2003: 152), 
which has led to a decline in centralised government planning, and the reintroduction of 
the market in many spheres, has led to a growth in flexible and consensual regulatory 
mechanisms. Codes of practice and charters now increasingly govern conduct in 
areas formerly subject to centralised state control. These mechanisms give vent to the 
micro-ideologies of whichever body or agency is responsible for them, often non-state 
organisations or private bodies. They also allow for the development of norms and 
standards that are increasingly specialist and technical. As a result, regulation of an 
ever finer grain spreads its tentacles into an ever greater number of orifices of the 
social whole. 25 
Domestic Fragmentation of Legal Systems 
The 'domestic fragmentation of legal systems' (Edgeworth 2003: 160) is centrally 
important in giving scope for the legal expression of micro-ideologies. The creation of 
an increasingly deregulated market in legal services, the break-up of the old 
monopolies and the introduction of competition from outside the legal profession all 
increase the specialisation of particular firms and providers, as they seek to carve out 
their own profitable niche in the market. This increasing fragmentation, differentiation 
and specialisation increases the chances of field specific micro-ideologies developing 
and influencing practice in the various branches of law. For instance, a private provider 
of legal aid services is likely to operate with very different ideological guiding principles 
than a traditional city barrister. 
However, the chief mechanism through which the domestic fragmentation of legal 
systems aids the ascendancy of micro-ideologies is informal justice, which has 
undergone an "explosive rise" (Edgeworth 2003: 160) over recent years. Alternative 
dispute resolution, tribunals and the like are not only cheaper and more efficient than 
25 Such a notion is reminiscent of ideas about the increasing juridification of the social 'world, 
which has been termed "legal pollution" (Teubner 1986,1987), and the colonisation of the 
'lifeworld' by the 'system' (Habermas 1987; see also Deflem 1996). 
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the formal court system, but they are more able and willing to take into account non- 
legal as well as legal discourses and the subjective needs and interest of the parties at 
hand. This clearly provides an outlet for the micro-ideologies of the parties involved. In 
addition, the fact that proceedings are often private means that precedents tend not to 
be created and followed to the extent that they are in traditional common law. As a 
result, each case is dealt with largely in isolation and on its own merits, with the needs 
and interests of the parties and ideologically driven notions of 'fairness' or 
'reasonableness', at the heart of the decision making process. Thus proceedings 
utilising these fora are truly local and context dependent, and open to the expression of 
micro-ideologies. 
Another strand to domestic fragmentation is the increasing ability of sub-state bodies, 
often devolved from national state governments, to enact their own laws and norms. 
Regions within nations are increasingly operating and being perceived as discrete 
economic entities (Scholte 2000: 133), which compete for business and investment, 
particularly from MNCs. "Substate governments", according to Scholte, have begun to 
develop "direct transborder contacts with each other". For large 'global cities' this has 
entailed the regulation of, inter alia, supraterritorial telecommunications webs, air 
corridors and capital flows, while for smaller towns "transborder policy initiatives" in 
areas such as development and crime control are common (2000: 144-5; see also 
Hocking 1993). 26 With this comes an increasing ability to formulate laws and norms at 
the sub-state level, and thus there are further openings for micro-ideologies to exert 
their influence on law. Similarly, semi autonomous non-governmental bodies, or 
QUANGOs, are often given the power to effect rules and regulations in a particular 
geographical space and in specific fields of interest. Furthermore, the creation of 
export processing zones sees national governments deliberately create a separate 
legal regime so that parts of its territory are more attractive for multinational investment. 
Thus the state itself can be seen to be differentiating into its component sectors, each 
potentially guided by different ideologies. 
Even where the state itself remains the dominant legislatory body, it is increasingly 
forced to regulate increasingly technical and specialised areas. As such, the state 
legislature itself is forced to become increasingly fragmented and specialised, or at the 
26 Indeed such is the foreign policy autonomy of some Chinese Provinces from Beijing, some 
commentators (Goodman and Segal 1994) have pondered whether the country can remain 
united in the long term. 
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very least rely on expertise from outside the state body. 27 For example, the burgeoning 
legislation on biotechnology clearly requires the involvement of specialist personnel 
right from the initial planning, through the drafting process, and continuing through to 
implementation. Another example is provided by patent law, where practitioners are 
involved in creating 'self-reflexive' laws (Armitage and Davis 1994). This increasing 
specialisation and reliance on experts within particular fields provides further potential 
for micro-ideologies to affect law and norms in decisive ways, even when the laws that 
are eventually passed bear all the hallmarks of traditional state law. 
The Rise of Supranational Law 
The rise of supranational law has offered considerable opportunity for the legal 
expression of micro-ideologies. As Chapter 7 described, a range of bodies operating 
'above' the nation state are increasingly involved in the supranational creation of law 
and norms. Examples of such bodies include the EU, IMF, WB and multinational firms. 
As a result the micro-ideologies of these various groups and organisations are brought 
to bear during the creation of supranational law and norms. For instance, a 
multinational corporation is concerned primarily with its operative performance and 
efficiency, and its normative interventions are largely directed to this end. Meanwhile, 
an organisation such as the International Monetary Fund attaches conditions to its 
loans and assistance, usually in the form of 'structural adjustment programmes', which 
are in tune with its broadly neo-liberal guiding principles. As supranational 
organisations tend to operate in very narrow sphere, their legal and normative 
interventions are often finely tuned, technical ones. Multinationals and the IMF will not, 
for example, legislate on murder or the rules of the road. Where supranational bodies' 
competence is wider and they enjoy jurisdiction over a wide range of areas, for 
example in the case of the EU, they are increasingly likely to turn to experts in the field 
for guidance; 28 this leads to a specialised, reflexive and technical style of regulation 
that mirrors that of the nation state. 
In addition, the rise of "global informal law" (Edgeworth 2003: 190) offers a particularly 
effective avenue for micro-ideologies to flourish and influence law. It is increasingly 
important in international trade, where speed and efficiency are paramount and traders 
27 Of course, this has always been the case to some degree, but the trend in this direction is 
accelerating. 
28 There are many examples of highly specialist knowledge being utilised at supranational 
levels: the drafting, implementation and enforcement of the European Patent Convention of 
1973 is a well documented one (Armitage and Davis 1994). 
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require some means to stabilise expectations without overbearing institutional 
interference, and outcomes favourable to their interests. The revived lex mercatoria 
performs precisely these functions. Its lack of complex institutional mechanisms, its 
spontaneous, responsive and self-reflexive bent, and its focus on narrow problem 
areas allows the micro-ideologies of the individuals and groups involved almost 
unmediated expression: As Edgeworth suggests, "procedurally and substantively, the 
regime is essentially one of private norm creation" (2003: 191). Global informal law 
such as lex merctaortia is possibly the single form of late modern law that responds 
most easily to the analysis proposed by Collins; it provides a straightforward example 
of practice conditioning ideology, from which field-specific norms and rules to guide, 
enable and inhibit are derived. 29 
Globalised Legal Hermeneutics 
Even where the laws and norms of supranational bodies are not formally incorporated 
into domestic legislation, the trend towards globalised legal hermeneutics means that 
domestic law itself is becoming increasingly satiated with laws and norms that 
themselves result from micro-ideologies in a number of disparate fields. As such, 
micro-ideologies that are embedded in various discourses do manage to find their way 
into traditional state based law and legal institutions. This is particularly so of human 
rights norms, which national legislatures are finding progressively more difficult to 
ignore, even if they are not formally bound by them. As a result of this, even traditional 
domestic law becomes progressively infused with micro-ideologies from a wide variety 
of discrete field s. 3o 
Interlegality 
Santos' notion of interlegality provides a useful conceptual framework with which to 
analyse contemporary law and legal systems. Late modern legality is something of a 
patchwork quilt; a variety of groups create laws and norms in line With their unique 
micro-ideology. Indeed, the acknowledgement of a multitude of overlapping legal 
29 Collins suggests that according to his scheme, the "elementary instance of law" is a "court 
applying customary norms of behaviour" (1982: 93). This is because such courts make 
authoritative pronouncements that "articulate norms which are in tune with the dominant 
ideology' (ibid: 92). As such, in late modernity global informal law is potentially this 'elementary 
instance of law'. It makes authoritative pronouncements and guides conduct in tune with micro- 
ideologies, and tends to lack complex institutional machinery. 
30 This further buttresses the idea that a self-contained national legislative system is 
increasingly becoming anomalous in late modern conditions. 
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orders is perhaps the single most significant factor in opening the way for an 
exploration of the influence of micro-ideologies. However, there is a risk involved in the 
adoption of this framework for a purportedly critical theory such as Marxism. Law may 
begin to appear to be "shot through" with the competing interests of various groups, 
with no deeper pattern discernable (Adams and Brownsword 1992: 17). Late 
modernity may therefore appear to be a Gesellschaft society; a multitude of groups, all 
with their own distinct worldview, are free to create their own laws and norms through 
an exploding plethora of institutional mechanisms. This is potentially a somewhat 
benign, pluralist vision of contemporary social order. 31 
However, the paradigm of interlegality is compatible with a more conflict-oriented view 
of society. As such, Marxist legal theory can incorporate the paradigm and yet 
simultaneously retain its critical edge. There are two central reasons for this. Firstly, it 
tends to be the case that only those groups with sufficient power and influence in their 
particular sphere are able to gain access to or create their own law making machinery 
and institutions; all groups inevitably form their own micro-ideologies in the course of 
practical experience, but there is no equal access to institutionalised power. Those 
groups that do have such access inevitably favour current productive arrangements for 
it is those very arrangements that have conferred upon them their power and influence. 
So, despite variations in micro-ideologies, ultimately it is likely that the majority of those 
who are in a position to influence laws and norms will, broadly speaking, seek to 
maintain existing productive relations, whether consciously or subconsciously. As a 
result, instead of a single ruling class operating through the state machinery, there 
exists a number of elite groups, disparate in background, expertise and aims, but 
nevertheless united by a faith in existing economic and productive arrangements. Thus 
the ability of various different groups to influence law does not threaten capitalism and 
its associated social stratification in any fundamental sense. 32 
31 Marxism's difficulty in accounting for such plurality has been noted before. As Gorz suggests, 
"classical socialist doctrine finds it difficult to come to terms with political and social pluralism, 
understood not simply as a plurality of parties and trade unions but as the co-existence of 
various ways of working, producing and living, various and distinct cultural areas and levels of 
social existence. Yet this kind of pluralism precisely conforms to the lived experience and 
aspirations of the post-industrial proletariat, as well as the major part of the traditional working 
class" (1982: 79). For Laclau and Mouffe "the very wealth and plurality of contemporary social 
struggles has given rise to a theoretical crisis" (1985: 2). 
32 Sumner has argued this point. He suggests that "the economically dominant classes have 
been able to make their power and ideology the dominant features of the society's 
superstructure. Despite the qualification that there have always been ideological differences 
within and across classes, reflecting their subdivision within social practice and the national and 
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Secondly, it is possible, though more unlikely due to a lack of resources, that 
subordinate groups can create their own effective legal and normative orders, often 
utilising innovative mechanisms and institutions that diverge considerably from the 
modern ideal of positive state legislation. Santos' work on Pasargada (1995a: Ch 3) 
clearly demonstrates this possibility. Indeed, laws and norms that are generated 
internally by particular groups are likely to be more readily accepted and effective than 
laws and norms imposed from above. However, the legal orders that subordinate 
classes create are extremely unlikely to affect the dominant classes in any meaningful 
manner, whereas the legal orders of the powerful may have very potent effects on the 
weak. For instance, the laws of Pasargada play a crucial role in regulating and 
normatively ordering the lives of its residents, and resolving local disputes. However, 
they have very little impact on the international capitalist class or heads of state. 
Meanwhile, the rules and norms promulgated by those elite groups have potentially 
very serious impacts upon the residents of Pasargada; rules governing, for instance, 
trade, property rights, contractual rights and planning matters may affect Pasargada in 
significant ways. So, legal orders can be ranked in terms of their scope and reach. 
Some orders have little penetration beyond the narrow confines of the group in which 
they originated. Others radiate effects across vast swathes of the social spectrum. 34 
The continuing influence of elite groups and the inability of subordinate groups to have 
significant effects beyond their locales ensures that Marxist legal theory's critical edge 
need not be lost, even if the notion of interlegality is accepted. Indeed, by allowing for 
the possibility of a multitude of sometimes competing legal and normative orders, the 
notion of interlegality reinforces the Marxist idea that law can be a site of struggle. 
international extensions of the social structure, this is the most general form of ideological 
patterning in a class society" (1979: 53). 
3 Despite this, Hunt suggests that even if the notion of class or party hegemony is abandoned, 
"local hegemony", which refers to "the construction of some hegemonic project within some 
particular area or region of social life", remains important (1990b: 312-3). 
Sumner suggests that subordinate groups come up against political power barriers in 
establishing their legal orders: "Some classes, some occupational groups, some pressure 
groups and some individuals have more power than others in the legislative process. It is not 
as pluralistic as other ideological forms because it is subject to the political process and, hence, 
the relative ability of different classes and political groups to establish their ideas as law. 
Political success requires money and power as well as potent ideas, even more so than other 
fields of superstructural practice. Thus law as an ideological form is less pluralistic, than, say, 
the novel or music. It is a much closer reflection of class inequality than other forms. It tends to 
express the ideologies of the dominant class and their political and cultural representatives. [... ] 
When the chips are down, the essential function of the legal system is revealed as itself: the 
reproduction of class power" (1979: 270). However, since Sumner wrote, institutional 
innovations have perhaps reduced the barriers to creating legal and normative orders, although 
the barriers to those orders becoming influential outside of their group of origin remain. 
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The Persistence of Capital 
Despite the far reaching changes that constitute late modernity, it is crucial to stress 
that from the Marxist perspective the changes can 
, 
be seen as part of the unfolding 
logic of capitalism, rather than as- constituting a qualitatively new epoch. In short, 
Marxists can continue to argue that capital and capital accumulation still shape late 
modernity, and insist upon the primacy of economic factors in determining socio- 
political relations and ideological formations. This has been alluded to previously, 35 but 
it is useful to outline in more detail some of the arguments that can support the idea 
that recent developments are explicable in terms of the classical Marxist framework. 
Of course, Marx and Engels themselves were among the first thinkers to suggest that, 
firstly, capitalism would necessarily become a global phenomenon, and secondly that it 
would bring about almost incessant and cataclysmic social change . 
3' These ideas 
were famously expressed in the opening section of The Communist Manifesto. 
Marx and Engels on the Destructive Power of Capitalism 
Marx and Engels provide the definitive statement of the destructive power of capitalism: 
"Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch form 
all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated 
before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and 
man is at last compelled to face with sober sense, his real conditions of life, and his 
relations with his kind. " (Marx and Engels 1968: 38). 
This perpetual uncertainty and flux manifests itself in a variety of ways. Harvey has 
attempted to show how "the repeated intentional destruction of the built environment is 
integral to the accumulation of capital" (Berman 1982: 100). Berman suggests that 
even the class system itself is also constructed on loose and shifting soil, and is no 
more permanent than any other feature of capitalist modernity: "if [Marx's] overall vision 
of modernity is true, why should the forms of community produced by capitalist industry 
35 See pages 181-82 and 211-12 above. 
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be any more solid than any other capitalist product? Might not these collectivities turn 
out to be, like everything else, only temporary, provisional, built for obsolescence? " 
Industrial workers can thus be seen to be as transient as their machines and products, 
sustaining each other today but finding themselves scattered tomorrow among different 
collectivities with different conditions, different processes and products, different needs 
and interests (Berman 1982: 104). Rather than being seen as marking the demise of 
capitalism, or the entry into a new historical period, the fragmentation of the great class 
blocs of modernity may on this view be. an integral part of capitalist development, 
something predictable on the basis of Marx's theory and intrinsic to the laws of motion 
of capitalism as Marx formulated them. 
Marx and Engels on Crisis 
Building on this notion of instability and flux, the pair also note capitalism's tendency to 
crisis, and highlight the manner in which such crises are overcome. Here the 
Manifesto is worth quoting at length: 
"Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of 
property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of 
exchange, is like the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether 
world whom he has called up by his spells. For many a decade past the history of 
industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces 
against modern conditions of production, against the property relations that are the 
conditions for the existence of the bourgeois and of its rule. It is enough to mention the 
commercial crises that by their periodical return put the existence of the entire 
bourgeois society on its trial, each time more threateningly. In these crises, a great part 
not only of. the existing products, but also of the previously created productive forces, 
are periodically destroyed. In these crises, there breaks out an epidemic that, in all 
earlier epochs, would have seemed an absurdity - the epidemic of over-production. 
Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears 
as if a famine, a universal war of devastation, had cut off the supply of every means of 
subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed; and why? Because there 
is too much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much 
commerce. The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further 
the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have 
36 See page 156 above. 
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become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as 
they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois society, 
endanger the existence of bourgeois property. The conditions of bourgeois society are 
too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get 
over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive 
forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough 
exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and 
more destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented. " 
(Marx and Engels 1968: 40-41) 
These themes were followed up by Marx, particularly volume 3 of Capital, where he 
outlined the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. According to Marx, as men were 
replaced by machines in the labour process, the opportunities to realise surplus value 
through labour in the productive process were progressively reduced, leading to crisis. 
Capitalists respond by further streamlining and making the labour process more 
efficient, but this further implicates one in a cycle of diminishing returns (Marx 1959: 
Part 3). 37 As noted earlier, Harvey notes how in Capital Marx demonstrates how the 
social processes operating under capitalism lead to "individualism, alienation, 
fragmentation, ephemerality, innovation, creative destruction, speculative development, 
unpredictable shifts in methods of production and consumption, a shifting experience of 
space and time, as well as a crisis ridden dynamic of social change" (1989: 111). 
Marx, Engels and Globalisation 
Marx and Engels also outline an early notion of globalisation, relating it back to 
capitalism's destructive tendencies: 38 
"The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie 
over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, 
establish connexions everywhere. 
37 Of course, this theory has been much criticised, classically by the Japanese Marxist 
economist Nobuo Okishio (1961). However, a modest version of the theory holds that the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall an underlying, but not the exclusive cause of crisis in 
complex economic systems. 
38 Indeed, the expansion of markets through globalisation is one mechanism through which 
crisis and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall can be averted, at least temporarily. 
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"The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan 
character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of 
Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which 
it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being 
destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life 
and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up 
indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries 
whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In 
place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, 
requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the 
old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every 
direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in 
intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common 
property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more 
impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world 
literature. 
"The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the 
immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, 
nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with 
which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely 
obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, 
to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls 
civilisation into their midst, i. e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it 
creates a world after its own image. " (Marx and Engels 1968: 38-9) 
With these passages, Marx and Engels were among the first to suggest that 
capitalism's expansionary tendencies would progressively see it engulf the globe. 
Contemporary processes of globalisation are thus plainly explicable within the 
framework set down by the founders of Marxist theory. 
Many classical Marxist thinkers also emphatically believed that the logic of capitalism 
would necessarily see it expand into new markets. This is best evidenced by the 
plethora of Marxist work on imperialism. Lenin (1950), Bukharin (1972) and Hilferding 
(1981), the central figures of what Brewer calls "the classical Marxist theory of 
imperialism" of the 1910s (1990: 20), all argued that capitalist development would 
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engulf the world. Similarly, Rosa Luxemburg, in The Accumulation of Capital (1951), 39 
argued that capitalist economies suffer from the problem of 'realisation'. This problem 
occurs when firms cannot sell enough of the products they produce. Therefore, they 
seek new markets abroad. In addition, competitive pressures such as the need for 
raw materials and cheap labour also drive capital on its expansionary mission. 
More recently, Baran (1973) suggested that capitalism would not bring development to 
the entire world, but that the underdeveloped world would remain frozen at low levels of 
production and income while the developed world continued to benefit from the fruits of 
capitalism. This became a key idea in the 'dependency theory' of Frank (1969) and the 
'world systems' theory of Wallerstein (1974,1983). Amin (1974) also argued that the 
countries of the capitalist 'periphery' would become increasingly dependent upon the 
countries of the 'core' ao 
Marxism and the Emergence of Late Modernity 
Marxism, then, can account for the rising tide of globalisation. However, the question 
remains as to why the structures and relations associated with the height of the modern 
period have crumbled. Why is it that a distinct 'late modern' period has emerged? 
Once again, Marxism provides possible answers to this question. 
Harvey provides the definitive Marxist line on the transition to late modernity. 
Consistent with the arguments of the Preface, he suggests that shifts in the economic 
sphere have led to the emergence of late modernity. As outlined above, 41 Harvey sees 
late modern arrangements as representing a modification of capitalism that ensures it 
can contain its contradictions and crises. The basic outline of his argument is worth 
repeating here, for it suggests why we have experienced the transition to late 
39 Originally published in 1913. 
40 See also Bill Warren's iconoclastic argument outlined in Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism 
(1980). In a similar vein to Marx's praise in the Manifesto for the bourgeoisie's revolutionary 
zeal, Warren argues that capitalism is a progressive force as only it can successfully render the 
conditions for socialist transformation, such as social democracy and the proletariat. For 
Warren, then, imperialism is "the work of young and vigorous capitalism economies" (Brewer 
1990: 280), rather than its 'highest stage' as Lenin supposed. Ideas of imperialism have been 
given a contemporary twist by Hardt and Negri (2000). They reject the old notion of imperialism 
based around individual nation states and replace it with a new construct they call 'Empire', in 
this new Empire, there is no centre to speak of, no seat of power, and the proletariat is recast as 
a 'multitude' of poor and oppressed around the world. Rather than ensure the continuance of 
the capitalist system, however, this renders it increasingly vulnerable at all points to attack. 
41 See pages 204-5 above. 
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modernity, and does so within a theoretical framework rooted in the key themes of 
Marxism and the writings of Marx himself. 
Harvey returns to Marx's theory of capitalist crisis: "Steady and unproblematic growth" 
is not possible within the logic of capitalism, for there are inbuilt tendencies to crisis, 
particularly to overaccumulation. Overaccumulation occurs as productive capacity 
increases above a level that consumer markets can bear, as competing capitalists 
continually try to make the productive process more efficient. Harvey defines it as "a 
condition in which idle capital and idle labour supply could exist side by side with no 
apparent way to bring these idle resources together to accomplish socially useful tasks. 
A generalised condition of overaccumulation would be indicated by idle productive 
capacity, a glut of commodities and an excess of inventories, surplus money capital 
(perhaps held as hoards), and high unemployment. The conditions that prevailed in 
the 1930s and have emerged periodically since 1973 have to be regarded as typical 
manifestations of the tendency towards overaccumulation". Devaluation, the 
geographical expansion of capital and labour, and the extension of credit can contain 
overaccumulation temporarily, but ultimately the underlying trend will inevitably assert 
itself. For Harvey this is one of the core features of "the Marxist argument": in short, 
"the tendency to overaccumulation can never be eliminated under capitalism. It is a 
never ending and eternal problem for any capitalist mode of production. The only 
question, therefore, is how the overaccumluation tendency can be expressed, 
contained, absorbed, or managed in ways that do not threaten the capitalist social 
order" (Harvey 1989: 180-81). 
Post-war Fordism contained, absorbed and managed the tendency to 
overaccumulation chiefly through spatial and temporal displacement. Crucially, this 
involved the geographical expansion of capital and labour, the speeding up of the 
turnover time within which money relays profit to the investor, and by controlling 
devaluation and technical and organisational change (Harvey 1989: 184-5). Ultimately 
these techniques ran up against their limits 42 As such, "the crisis of Fordism can to 
some degree be interpreted [... ] as a running out of those options to handle the 
overaccumulation problem [... ] it was simply that the mechanisms evolved for 
controlling crisis tendencies were finally overwhelmed by the power of the underlying 
contradictions of capitalism" (ibid: 185-6). The 'flexible accumulation' that is for Harvey 
the central feature of late modernity is a "superior regime of capitalist production [... ] 
42 See Harvey (1989: 182-6) for a detailed discussion of this point. 
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which would assure a solid basis for further accumulation on a global scale" (ibid: 186). 
Nevertheless, "the underlying logic of capitalist accumulation and its crisis-tendencies 
remain the same" (ibid: 189 [emphasis added]). 
In one sense, the shift to modes of flexible accumulation is not a surprise. As Harvey 
puts it, it represents "a rather traditional response to crisis. The devaluation of labour 
power [which flexible accumulation partly relies upon] has always been the instinctive 
response of capitalists to falling profits" (1989: 192). Indeed, for Callinicos (1989) the 
current transformations represent not an epochal shift, but 'business as usual' for 
capitalism 43 
While Harvey outlines the fundamentals of the shift to late modernity from a Marxist 
point of view, and shows how the process is explicable within a traditional Marxist 
framework, Melossi offers a theoretical understanding of the changed position of labour 
within the late modern economy, also rooted in classical Marxist themes. Melossi 
suggests that there are three significant "actors" in the economic arena; capitalist 
entrepreneurs and workers being the main two, and the state being "a third party 
increasingly important in the adjudication of the results of conflict between the first two" 
(2003: xxxii). This conforms to the model of corporatism outlined in Part 2, which was 
an important feature of Fordist modernity. Each of these actors continually attempt to 
overcome the limits imposed upon their development and freedom of action by the 
other two groups. As such, "innovation would therefore constitute a crucial tool by 
which entrepreneurs undercut the power of labour in situations during which a 
prolonged spell of prosperity has placed workers in a privileged position. The result of 
innovation, usually backed by political-legal power, is to destructure and disorganise 
the type of economy in which the former type of working class has achieved its 
dangerous (for the entrepreneurs) power" (ibid: xxxii-xxxiii). He adds that innovation "is 
often the result of a common feeling that the boundaries of the 'old' social system are 
too rigid and suffocating for the development that the long period of prosperity has 
made possible" (ibid: xxxiv). 44 So, the move away from the modern economy, with its 
43 Despite this, for Harvey there is uniqueness in the emphasis on innovative financial and 
monetary solutions, such as the role of credit, in postponing the crisis (1989: 192-7). 
Furthermore, the emergence of "an ill-remunerated and broadly disempowered under-class [... ] 
raises the spectre of a crisis of underconsumption" of the type that Fordism and Keynesianism 
were adept at avoiding. This suggests that flexible accumulation may be found wanting even as 
a short term solution to capitalism's crisis tendencies (ibid: 192). 
44 One is reminded of Schumpeter's notion of "creative destruction", the "essential fact about 
capitalism" (1943: 81-6), where individual capitalists, particularly entrepreneurs, will seek to 
innovate in production and crate new markets in order to speed accumulation and efficiency. 
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large, well organised working class bloc is in part a result of capitalists simply acting in 
their own interests to limit the power of labour. In essence, the corporatist system and 
the collective strength of the working class at the height of modernity was a fetter on 
the full development of the capitalist class. That latter class took action to remove that 
fetter. 
Melossi's arguments ultimately complement those of Harvey. By devaluing labour 
power, reducing the collective strength of labour, and removing barriers to capitalist 
innovation, the problem of overaccumulation can be postponed. 
Taken together, these arguments demonstrate that Marxism can account for 
contemporary developments without abandoning its'central insight about the primacy of 
economic factors in determining social and political relations. The destructive power of 
capitalism, its crisis tendencies and expansionist logic were all outlined by Marx and 
Engels. Recent moves away from Fordist welfare statism toward late modern forms of 
organisation can also be explained within a unashamedly Marxist framework where 
central importance is ascribed to economic relations. Indeed, Harvey's theorisation of 
this transition is perhaps the most rigorous and sophisticated available. 
Given this, it makes sense to consider how Marxist legal theory moored in classical 
Marxist ideas about the centrality of the economic can be updated in order to better 
account for the unique features of the late modern legal order. It is precisely this task 
that our updated version of Collins' legal theory performs. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The momentous social changes of the last thirty years or so have not rendered Marxist 
legal theory defunct. Instead, Collins' Marxist legal theory is able to articulate with late 
modern developments in such a way as to alleviate its central weakness. This 
articulation occurs in two distinct but related ways. Firstly, Marxist theory can identify 
and account for late modern developments in society and in law. Secondly, the late 
modern developments that Marxism can account for simultaneously render Collins' 
Marxist theory of law more plausible. This is because they remove the need to rely on 
an all-encompassing dominant ideology. 
Indeed, Schumpeter echoes many of Marx's ideas regarding capitalism's power to incessantly 
transform itself. 
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On the first point, Marxism holds that a move to a more flexible economy was 
necessary in order to avert an impending capitalist crisis. The roots of this crisis can 
ultimately be traced to the inevitable problem of overaccumulation. There was also a 
desire amongst capitalist elites to undermine the growing power of labour in modernity. 
Secondly, late modern developments in society and law have helped to resolve the 
central flaw of Collins' theory. The state has ceded power to a variety of other actors, 
and the classical Marxist vision of two competing class blocs has been exploded; 
classes have fragmented and a multitude of groups have taken their place. Yet Collins' 
central thesis, that ideologies are formed as people experience productive relations, 
and that law is created in line with those ideologies, can be retained. It is no longer 
necessary, however, for the theory to rely on an implausible notion of an elastic and 
omnipresent dominant ideology that is credited with explaining the content of all laws: 
law is no longer the product of a single sovereign ruling class operating with a single 
dominant ideology. Instead, various groups create laws, regulations and norms in line 
with their own micro-ideology that is the result of their differentiated experiences of and 
relationship to productive activities. The late modern legal system affords ample and 
increasing opportunity for the development and implementation of laws derived from 
micro-deologies through the processes of privatisation, deregulation, domestic 
fragmentation, and the rise of supranational law, globalised legal hermeneutics and 
interlegality. The dominant ideology thesis' inability to comprehend the rich tapestry 
and the fine detail of law is solved; the theoretical 'gap' left by Collins is filled. 
The final result is a theory that allows space for the study of variation, difference and 
specificity at the micro-level, yet still locates and accounts for this in a macro-level, total 
explanatory framework. In other words, it allows for analysis of local, small scale 
situations while anchoring this to a more total understanding of the social and legal 
world. Furthermore, as late modern processes continue to develop and become ever- 
more entrenched, Collins' theory in this renovated form will become increasingly 
relevant and plausible. 
China Mieville, suggesting the continuing utility of Pashukanis' commodity exchange 
theory when studying international law, suggests that "we need Pashukanis to make 
sense of international law and the legal form: and we need international law to make 
better sense of Pashukanis" (2006: 115). The same could be said of the relationship 
between Collins' Marxist legal theory and late modern legality: We need Collins to 
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make sense of late modern law, and we need late modern law to make better sense of 
Collins. 
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CHAPTER 9. FACING THE CONSEQUENCES 
In this chapter some of the issues raised by the theory outlined in Chapter 8 will be 
discussed. Firstly, the utility of purely theoretical excursions such as this one will be 
defended. Secondly, the difficulties involved in theorising late modernity will be 
explored. Thirdly, some of the consequences of sidelining traditional Marxist notions 
such as class and state will be suggested. Finally some of the potential limitations of 
the position sketched in chapter 8 will be outlined. The overall insistence is that 
despite its limitations and the fact that Marxism has always encountered severe 
criticism and even outright hostility from those opposed to its most basic theoretical 
underpinnings, the theory developed here offers a useful contribution to socio-legal 
studies at a time of significant change. 
Why Theory? 
The exclusively theoretical nature of this project can be justified on a number of levels. 
Firstly, theory itself is a crucially important aspect of all scholarly practice. As Sumner 
argues, "facts never speak for themselves". As such, general theory "is indispensable 
to the production of any concrete knowledge. Every researcher works on the basis of 
general concepts and assumptions. Whether it is acknowledged or not, this is an 
eternal fact of research practice. It is therefore better that these concepts and 
assumptions are clearly specified and organised so that they are openly available to 
scrutiny, enabling the limitations of the produced knowledge to be clearly identified" 
(1979: 59). 1 
The Marxist theory of law developed here is pitched at the macro level. As such, it 
suffers from the problems that all theories of this nature do: Excessive simplification, 
false generalisation, and a neglect of variation (Garland 2001: viii). But there are also 
1 Twining outlines the importance of theory in a more schematic manner. He suggests that 
there are six "standard services of theorising": Theory provides a "coherent 'total picture', or 
series of such overviews, of law in the world"; it facilitates the construction and clarification of 
important general concepts; it aids the development of general normative principles and helps 
to clarify values and their universalisability; it allows for the generation of "middle order empirical 
hypotheses and general working theories"; it advances the development of an "intellectual 
history of law as a discipline"; it contributes to the critical examination of the "assumptions 
underlying legal discourse" (Twining 2000: 242). This work seeks to perform all of these 
functions, with the exception of generating normative principles, although these could potentially 
be inferred from the work. As Twining himself suggests, legal theorising may occasionally 
"provide leadership with inspiring visions and grand designs or hypotheses, but more often it is 
reactive, setting contexts, sharpening tools, suggesting refinements, questioning assumptions 
and generally tidying up" (ibid: 242). 
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benefits that justify theorising at more rarefied levels. In particular, there is "an ability to 
point to the structural properties of the field, and to identify the recurring social and 
cultural dynamics that produce them"; such properties do not become visible in 
localised case studies (ibid: viii). Santos (1987) suggests that "large scale maps" 
should not be discarded just because they gloss over some local details. As 
Edgeworth puts it, "like maps of an entire continent, they reveal more because of what 
they leave out, and should not be rejected simply because they omit the topography of 
individual cities" (2003: 17). Indeed, analysis conducted at the local level alone is 
unlikely to adequately identify the significance of the local case and how it relates to the 
bigger picture. 2 
However, despite its focus on the macro level, the Marxist theory of law deployed here 
is structurally able to accommodate smaller scale theorisations. This is because it 
views society as being constituted of a plethora of small groups, an increasing number 
of which are beginning to shape the legal order in various ways. It is therefore open for 
further theorisation to be conducted regarding processes at these more local levels. In 
addition, there are clear opportunities for empirical work to take place at the micro- 
level, focusing on the multitude of groups, micro-ideologies and legal mechanisms in a 
more detailed manner. 3 This dovetails with Mills' suggestion that large-scale 
theoretical generalisations should allow users to shuttle between different levels of 
conceptual and empirical abstraction (1959: Ch 2). Ultimately, "the challenge is to 
unite generalisation with specificity" (Mieville 2006: 229). Furthermore, the empirical is 
not completely sidelined in the endeavour of constructing a new theoretical framework; 
the theory developed here is no ungrounded idealist fantasy. Instead, it is heavily 
based upon the work of scholars who have studied and measured the phenomenon of 
late modernity; this is a theory based upon and driven by empirical work. 
Finally, the purely theoretical approach is further justified by the currently parlous state 
of Marxist theorising. Marxist legal theory in particular requires significant 
development: A refurbished set of robust and coherent analytical concepts anchored in 
2 Garland suggests that although individual authors cannot escape this dilemma, for the 
scholarly community as a whole it disappears as a range of studies, some "sweeping accounts 
of the big picture" and others "more focused case studies that add empirical specificity and local 
detail", complement and reinforce each other: "One kind of study provokes and facilitates the 
other, in a scholarly dialectic that requires them both" (2001: vii). 3 As Sumner suggests, "theory on its own [... ] does not produce concrete knowledge. It 
requires a consistent extension in research practice" (1979: 59). Possible avenues of future 
theoretical development and empirical research will be suggested in the conclusion. 
As such, it shares some affinity with Glaser and Strauss' 'grounded theory', where theory is 
generated from empirical data (1967). 
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an internally consistent, general Marxist framework is necessary, both to address the 
flaws of previous Marxist approaches to law, and to better account for the emerging 
processes late modernity. Only once such concepts have been constructed can fruitful 
empirical work take place. As Sumner suggests, "the study of law will not be advanced 
by continually investigating specific pieces of legislation or specific legal systems. 
These investigations must be accompanied by enquiries into the theory of law and the 
methodology and philosophy of the social sciences" (1979: 9). 5 
Towards a Prolegomenon 
The theory developed in this work is very much a prolegomenon, with rather modest 
aims; it is an initial redrawing of Collins' Marxist theory of law that aims to render that 
theory more relevant to late modern conditions, and introduces new arguments and 
concepts, chiefly the notion of micro-ideologies, in order to do so. As Mouzelis puts it, 
the aim is "not to provide a highly detailed, fully worked out conceptual map", but 
instead to provide, "in as tentative and parsimonious a fashion as possible, a set of 
interrelated concepts" (1990: 81). 
The nascent and open-ended status of the theory is by no means a weakness. Hunt 
talks of 'a new sense of theory'; theory not as "a complete or formal model" that 
condenses or concentrates reality, but instead as a "provisional metaphor, as a 
potentially useful way of thinking and saying something new. Such a view of theory 
makes no claims to Truth or truths, but is subject only to a rigorously pragmatic 
evaluation: does a shift or change in the theoretical metaphor help or hinder articulating 
something that is otherwise ignored, neglected or otherwise unsayable? In short, it 
involves a conception of theory without guarantees" (1 990a: 539). Mouzelis calls this a 
"conceptual framework" as opposed to a "substantive theory" (1990: 22). A conceptual 
framework does not aim to provide "a set of empirically verifiable and knowledge- 
producing statements" (ibid: 22), but rather "maps out the problem area and thus 
prepares the ground for its empirical investigation" (Nadel 1962: 1), and therefore 
suggests useful ways in which phenomena can be explored in a theoretically consistent 
manner. Conceptual frameworks "should be seen more as flexible, malleable kinds of 
scaffolding than as finished, rigid structures with fixed functions and built-in furniture" 
(Mouzelis 1990: 154). Given this, the "task of sociological theory" consists not of 
5 Of course, more traditional Marxisms tended to be more concerned with effecting real change 
in society, rather than just elucidating a set of concepts with which to study it. Such is the 
metamorphosis of Marxism (see chapter 5 above). As Shaw puts it, "the job of interpreting the 
world is always to be done, even when ways of changing it are difficult to identify" (1985: 2). 
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providing "universal substantive generalisations" but "the tentative construction of 
conceptual tools facilitating empirical research either by solving methodologically 
crippling puzzles, or by suggesting fruitful ways of looking at and raising questions 
about the social world" (ibid: 81). As such, "it is clear that the Marxist analysis of law 
need not stand or fall, [... ] as some ideologs would have it, on its ability to provide a 
logically impenetrable, appropriately pedigreed, and totally explanatory system" 
(Spitzer 1983: 121). 6 
Theorising Late Modernity 
Theorising successfully at the macro level has always been an undertaking fraught with 
difficulty. The onset of late modernity has served to increase that difficulty in a number 
of ways. Most importantly, there are increasing reservations regarding the legitimacy 
of theorising social 'totalities' at the macro level. Firstly, from the sociological 
perspective, there are doubts that grand, totalising theoretical schemes are adequately 
able to come to terms with a dividing and fragmenting social world. Secondly, from a 
more philosophical perspective, there is a feeling that there is little value in grand 
theoretical schemes in a relativistic world of infinite subjectivity where it is impossible to 
ascertain 'truth'. 7 
On the sociological objection, it is clear that studying society as a 'totality' is an 
archetypally 'modern' thing to do. When totality is asserted reductively and all social 
phenomena are fitted into rigid straightjackets then it is problematic. However, there is 
nothing inherently wrong with totalising analysis. As Jameson has consistently argued, 
"the problem is not with employing a totalising mode of analysis, but rather with 
instantiating a too abstract totality and constructing interconnections which are too 
simple, direct, and unmediated. " The real issue, then, is to construct a sufficiently 
sophisticated framework which can "map the full complexity" of social practices in a 
6 Mouzelis calls this general approach "theoretical pragmatism". He suggests that "the most 
fruitful way of assessing the worth of a conceptual framework [... ] is neither to put the major 
emphasis on its philosophical, epistemological underpinnings, not to demonstrate its logical 
consistency. Although both these tasks are important in themselves, what really matters is 
heuristic utility: the ability of a conceptual framework satisfactorily to solve methodologically and 
theoretically recalcitrant social science issues, as well as to assist in the empirical investigation 
of concrete problem areas (1990: 3). Consequently "theoretical pragmatism is critical of the 
philosophical, epistemological turn in the social sciences, as well as of the wholesale adoption 
of paradigms used in such disciplines as linguistics, semiotics, or psychoanalysis" (ibid: 3). 
On the sociological doubts, see Bauman (1992). On the philosophical ones, see Lyotard 
(1984). 
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non-reductive way (see Best and Kellner 1991: 187). 8 Indeed, to understand the 
specific features of the capillaries of the social world may actually require totalising 
analysis, as "difference itself cannot genuinely be understood outside of a relational 
and systemic context" (ibid: 187). 9 Furthermore, as Best and Kellner point out, much 
modern thought, including that of Marx, "calls for theory to be reflexive and self-critical, 
aware of its presuppositions, interests and limitations. This tradition is thus non- 
dogmatic and open to disconfirmation and revision. [... ] These critical themes in 
modern theory present a model of theory that is non-scientistic, fallibilistic, 
hermeneutical, and open to new historical conditions, theoretical perspectives and 
political applications. We therefore believe [... ] it is a mistake to reject this tradition" 
(1991: 257-8). 
As suggested above, macro level theory offers a vision of the social whole and the 
interconnections between its discrete elements that micro-level theory simply cannot. 
Best and Kellner have made this point: "From our perspective, social, cultural and 
political theory cannot be divorced from a theory of capitalism and an analysis of the 
systemic relations between the various levels and institutions of capitalism, both in 
terms of their independent dynamics and their interconnections within a capitalist mode 
of production. Thus, we would insist upon the continuing relevance of neo-Marxian 
theories which attempt to theorise social phenomena in terms of the contemporary 
stage of capitalism, though we would argue that the existence of new phenomena, 
such as those analysed by postmodern theory, requires extensive reconstruction of all 
social theories of the past" (1991: 262). As Chapter 6 suggested, despite all the 
changes, the late modern era remains a capitalist one, and so the construction of a 
total picture of that system remains important: "Nothing has fundamentally changed in 
the nature of world capitalism to invalidate the relevance of Marxism today" (Russell 
2002: 122). b0 
8 This applies equally to 'postmodern' analyses. Indeed, perhaps the most 'totalising' claims of 
all are that metanarratives are dead and that all truth is relative; these are both claims advanced 
by postmodernists. Best and Kellner argue that "most postmodern theories tend to be 
reductive, dogmatically closed to competing perspectives, and excessively narrow. Most 
postmodern theories neglect political economy and fail to present adequately connections 
between the economic, political, social and cultural levels of society" (1991: 263). 
9 Best and Kellner are here invoking themes from the work of Jameson. 
10 Totalising analysis is important in another respect. As Jameson suggests, "without a 
conception of the social totality (and the possibility of transforming a whole system), no socialist 
politics is possible", and political struggle is doomed to a reformism that focuses on isolated 
aspects of the capitalist system (1988a: 355). 
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On the philosophical objection to totalising theory, some ground can be conceded to 
postmodernist thinkers. According to Larrain, "the problem is that, ultimately, in the 
social sciences, one can give reasons for holding a position but there cannot exist final 
guarantees which could convince everyone of a certain position" (1983: 211). 
However, Larrian adds that "relativism and scepticism are self defeating and 
contradictory, for they implicitly postulate the absolute truth of their own positions. [... ] 
In fact, all positions necessarily posit a claim to validity. This is so even if one says that 
one's own position is only relatively valid, for in the end one has to accept a proposition 
that is not relative, namely that one's position is only relatively valid. [... ] One cannot 
therefore criticise Marxism for dogmatism because it claims to have the truth. This is 
an a priori of all positions. One can criticise the specific way in which a claim to validity 
is justified, but not the fact that the claim is posited. [... ] To raise, as an objection of 
principle to Marxism, the fact that it implicitly lays claim to validity, and yet cannot give 
a final guarantee, is also a fool's way out of a very difficult problem" (ibid: 211). 
Twining also rejects the more extreme claims of postmodern relativism. His 
epistemological concept of "innocent realism" holds that there is one world that exists 
independently of us and it can be truly and accurately described. However, it 
"acknowledges that there can be many different descriptions of an object, event or 
phenomenon, all of which may be true, provided that they are compatible. It accepts 
that we can look at an object from different points of view, but it is the points of view not 
the object that are different" (2000: 215-6). 
Marxism has long been alive to these ideas. It happily acknowledges that there is no 
pre-theoretical access to facts. This is evident in the work of countless theorists, such 
as Althusser" and Collins12, whilst Hunt has called for a "pragmatic conception of truth" 
that is rooted in social practice. Such a conception embraces contingency and social 
construction, but insists on structural limits to variation (1990a: 529-31). In addition, 
the theory developed here is fully appreciative of the importance of studying 
phenomena in their context and specificity; indeed this is the very thrust of the concept 
of micro-ideologies and the exhortation to look to smaller groups rather than the large 
scale class blocs of modernity. But it is also willing to probe the historical nature of 
these developments; why is it that the class blocs of modernity have fragmented and 
why is it that micro-ideologies have come to dominate? It is this quest for causal, 
historical understanding that separates Marxism from more extreme variants of late- or 
" See Chapter 4 above. 12 See Chapter 5 above. Collins "stresses the ideological nature of the acquisition of knowledge 
[... J. Each person carries around an ideological grid acquired through education by which 
experience is translated to knowledge" (1982: 38-9). 
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post- modernist relativism. 13 Postmodernism may be useful in alerting theorists to the 
inherent limitations of theory and the marginal perspective of the theoriser. As these 
ideas were never antithetical to Marxism anyway, at best postmodernism has made 
clearer what was previously latent. But in doing so, there is a sense in which it has 
'thrown the baby out with the bathwater'. Historical materialist sociological analysis 
need not be abandoned; it remains a useful tool. To acknowledge the limits of theory 
need not entail a lapse into relativism. 
Applying the `Marxist' Label 
Clearly, the theory outlined here jettisons much that was central to traditional Marxist 
analysis. The state is sidelined, and class, perhaps the central feature of most Marxist 
sociological study, is also demoted in importance. According to the argument in Part 1, 
this a perfectly legitimate use of the Marxist canon; no one single mode of thought has 
exclusive rights to the Marxist label, and concepts and ideas from Marx and Marxism 
can be used in ways that diverge from the central strands of the tradition. However, it 
is also undeniable that some would scarcely recognise the final product as Marxist. 
Why, then, retain the label? 14 
One reason to retain the Marxist label is the fact that the theory is based upon Marx's 
Preface. As such, it maintains "one of Marxism's lasting contributions to social science 
methodology" (Mouzelis 1990: 157). This is "its portrayal of collective agents in a 
dialectical relationship to their social environment- with economic, political and 
ideological structures setting limits to collective action, while at the same time collective 
agents (classes, social movements and so on) react to these limitations and try, more 
or less systematically, either to change or maintain them. In other words, Marxist 
methodology shows human beings as both the producers and the products of their 
social world" (Mouzelis 1990: 157). The Preface compels us to look to the relations of 
13 Postmodernism often appears to theorise away the possibility of socio-historical investigation. 
This is because, as Eagleton puts it, postmodernism asserts that, "just as it was true all along 
that the emperor was naked, so in a way postmodernism was true even before it got started (... j 
There was never any Progress or Dialectic or World-Spirit in the first place; this is not the way 
the world is, or ever was" (1996: 29). 
14 In Chapter 1 it was suggested that the Marxist canon is open to interpretation and extension 
in a plethora of ways, and no one way or collection of ways has exclusive claim on the term 
'Marxist'. Even a belief that capitalism can persist indefinitely, or the suggestion that if it does 
perish, it will not be replaced by communism, is not necessarily incompatible with a Marxist 
position (Woolf 2002: 110-11). There are limits to what a 'Marxist' can plausibly believe in, 
however (see Eagleton 1996: 102-3). 
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production as the decisive factor in determining superstructural instances such as law, 
but reminds us that these relations are themselves a site of struggle. 15 
Secondly and relatedly, there is value in retaining the Marxist label as it situates the 
theory in an intellectual tradition and identifies its heritage. Marxist concepts may 
require transformation, development or even abandonment, but that does not 
necessarily require one to step out of the tradition altogether. As Elster (1986: 2) 
suggests, if one can trace the ancestry of their most important beliefs back to Marx, 
then that is good reason to consider themselves a Marxist. Wright argues that even 
though Marxist ideas are regularly utilised by non-Marxists16, there is still value in 
adopting the label: "what was really at stake to me was the nature of the constituency 
or audience to whom I wanted to feel accountable" (2003: 19). 
Ultimately, whether a theory is Marxist or not has no bearing on its utility. Laclau feels 
that Marxism should be treated in the same way as other ideologies such as 
'liberalism', 'conservatism' or 'socialism'; that is, as a vague term of political reference, 
whose content, boundaries and scope are open to constant redefinition (1990: 203). If 
a theory is useful, it is of little. consequence if it happens to be Marxist as well. As 
Dworkin suggests, "it is better to look at theories than labels" (1982: 165). 17 
15 Mouzelis suggests that Marxists can retain a faith in the universal primacy of the forces and 
relations of production, yet still avoid the worst tenets of economic reductionism by developing a 
separate, non-economic set of conceptual tools for analysis of the non-economic spheres. 
Such concepts should avoid analysing non-economic phenomena in terms of class or the 
reproductive requirements of the mode of production (1990: 49,173). The concept of micro- 
ideologies developed here is a move in this direction. 
16 It is undeniable that the boundaries between Marxist and non-Marxist thought have become 
somewhat fuzzy. As Downes and Rock argue, "it is more difficult than in the past [... ] to see 
where Marxism begins and ends" (2003: 368). The central thrust of Marxist theory is now 
widely adopted by social theorists of all hues: "a materialist explanation is one in which the 
motive forces are competition, scarcity, supply and demand; an idealist one emphasises the 
role of ideas, usually of certain 'great men', which are taken to be the exogenous driving 
element [... ] [today there is an] almost completely materialist approach to these questions now 
taken by social scientists and historians. [... ] Indeed it is questionable what it means to take a 
specifically Marists approach to history when the materialist axiom, the cornerstone of the 
Marxist approach, has become central to almost all contemporary social thought" (Roemer 
1988: 124). Indeed, like any theory, Marxist social theory will disappear if it is not plausible. On 
the other hand, if it is plausible, it is likely to enter into the mainstream of social science and 
cease to be specifically Marxist (Elster 1986: 5). 
17 Indeed, even Marx himself was happy to claim that he was not a Marxist. This was in 
response to the French socialists, including his son in law Paul Lafargue, adopting the 'Marxist' 
label in the 1870s (see Engels 1968e: 679). 
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Remaining Difficulties 
There are a number of remaining difficulties with the renovated Marxist theory of law 
itself. Firstly, the theory does not outline a precise concept of law; it fails to identify 
law's differentia specifica. This is because it is primarily concerned with content and 
not form. Of course, micro-ideologies also guide institutional design and creation, but 
there is nothing in the theory that tells one what law actually is, unlike say, Pashukanis 
or Hart. 
However, late modern conditions have made the construction of a core concept of law 
that differentiates it from other social phenomena increasingly problematic. This is 
because of the overwhelming multiplication of different forms of 'law'. 18 As such, "to 
develop a broad theory of law that goes beyond state law to include religious law, 
traditional law, and much else besides, a theorist has two main options: to abandon 
any attempt to hold on to a single coherent conception of law or to attempt to construct 
a minimalist core concept of law" (Twining 2003: 206). 19 Collins pursued a third option. 
Rather than outlining a concept of law, he talks instead of an "elementary instance of 
law", which is "a court applying customary norms of behaviour" (1982: 93) 20 This has 
the advantage of not 'writing out' any phenomena. At the expense of a clear and 
rigorous concept of law, Collins instead provides a formulation which can 
accommodate various phenomena which share a 'family resemblance'. As such it is 
open to retheorise law away from the state alone. This would appear to be a more 
pragmatic approach in late modern conditions. It also allows for the possibility of 
subordinate forms of law, such as Santos' Pasargada law. 
Nevertheless, it remains possible to loosely elaborate the starting point for a concept of 
law on the basis of theory here. Sumner's suggestion that law "is a collection of 
ideologies, sanctioned in the correct manner by the institutionalised executors of social 
power" (1979) can be updated to take into account late modern conditions: Late 
modern law is a collection of ideologies, sanctioned, in varying ways (custom, 
legislation), by the executors of social power in a given sphere. The vision of law 
implied by the theory also resonates with Unger's concept of law: "in its broadest 
18 Theorists who are less concerned with elucidating a sociological concept of law that is 
grounded in empirical reality will be less inconvenienced by this multiplication. Natural law 
theorists may fit into this category. See, for example, Beyleveld and Brownsword (1986). 19 Tamanaha (2001) has attempted the latter strategy, but his concept of law, necessarily thin in 
order to encompass the manifold forms of late modern law, is frustratingly vague (Twining 2003: 
253). 
20 See Chapter 8 above. 
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sense, law is simply any recurring mode of interaction among individuals and gropus, 
together with the more or less explict acknowledgement by these groups and 
individuals that such patterns of interaction produce reciprocal expectations of conduct 
that ought to be satisfied" (1976: 53). Of course, there remains open the possibility, 
outlined in Chapter 5, of adopting a defintion of law based on the work of Weber and 
Hart but rendered consistent with Collins' Marxist framework. 
The second difficulty with the theory as it stands concerns the persistence and 
durability of capitalism. Marx's idea of unremitting class conflict culminating in 
revolution has, thus far, proved well wide of the mark, and so subsequent Marxists 
have been forced to account for this. Collins' solution was the notion of the dominant 
ideology. Its diffusion helps to ensure that capitalism is maintained. But the 
abandonment of this concept means that it is necessary to find a new mechanism of 
capitalist preservation. The concept of micro-ideologies cannot perform this task on its 
own, for the emergence of a host of groups potentially threatens the stability of the 
existing social order. There must be some underlying unity among the multitude of 
groups in order that capitalism is maintained. What is it that holds them in check? 
There are various potential answers to this question. Firstly, the number of plausible 
and commonly accepted ideologies is necessarily limited structurally by the relations of 
production, and it may be the case that ideologies that portray existing relations as 
natural and eternal are privileged in this. Secondly, the fragmentation of society means 
that even if counter ideologies are formed they may be too isolated to constitute a real 
threat to the capitalist system? ' Thirdly, in an era of unprecedented ideological 
difference, capitalism may be increasingly preserved by the dull compulsion of 
economic necessity rather than any underlying ideological consensus (Abercrombie, 
Hill and Turner 1980). On the other hand, it may be the case that due to its changed 
nature, capitalism will gradually find it more difficult to keep the splintered elements in 
check. 
This final possibility ensures that the hope of a radical transformation of society 
remains open. However, such a radical transformation will not be exclusively along the 
21 This idea finds a curious ancestor in the shape of Alexander Hamilton, a founding father and 
creator of the Federalist Party in the US. His political pluralism aimed to ensure that "the 
danger of any one faction [in America] gaining a position of dominance would be greatly 
reduced" (Birch 2001: 178): In The Federalist no. 51 of 1787, Hamilton argued that "[US] 
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens that the rights of 
individuals or of the minority will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority" 
(Hamilton et al 1901: 287). Precisely this trend in late modernity may well contribute to the 
persistence and durability of contemporary capitalism. 
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class lines set out by Marx and classical Marxists. As Shaw puts it, "that a classical 
working class no longer confronts a classical capitalist class does not invalidate 'class' 
as a mode of analysis altogether, but it does imply that any socialist project must move 
beyond simple historical class terms [... ] a range of social forces are opposed to it [the 
interests of capital] which are far more complex and diverse, with less obviously 
coherent aims, than the classical Marxist model has proposed" (1985: 13). Politically, 
identifying what is common to the various subordinate groups then becomes the key to 
forming large scale alliances. 22 
There is, it would seem, already an identifiable "common object" in the experiences of 
various marginal, oppressed and dominated groups (Jameson 1988b: 71). This 
common object is the "the determination of structures of constraint within late 
capitalism" (Best and Kellner 1991: 191). As a result, the task is to emphasise the 
specificity of each group's experience of domination, "while asserting the ultimate 
commonality of their oppression within late capitalism, thereby implying an alliance 
politics and some sort of engagement with the new social movements" (ibid: 191). Best 
and Kellner make this point forcefully. According to them, there is a "concrete and 
substantive basis for a radical political alliance to lie in a common anti-capitalist politics. 
The exploitation and repression of diverse groups and individuals by the capitalist 
economy and state provides a fundamental point of commonality to unite a myriad of 
22 Many from the Marxist tradition, such as Hindess and Hirst, Stedman Jones and the 
Eurocommunists, gradually began to turn away from many traditional Marxist themes, 
particularly the notion of class, as the plausibility of large-scale class politics decreased. Their 
ideas rose to prominence in the 1980s in the journal Marxism Today (Callinicos 1989: 4), and 
reached their fullest expression in the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). Laclau and Mouffe 
famously see Marxism as economically reductionist and 'classist', and argue that any attempts 
to soften this by stressing indeterminacy, complexity, agency and autonomy are merely ad hoc 
additions to the theory that do not solve its underlying tendencies. They promulgate a 'post- 
Marxism' that rejects essentialism and foundationalism, and stresses the non-correspondence 
of economic and political, the disassociation of politics from class, the dissolution of social life 
into discourse, the replacement of working class by a discursively constructed plural subject, 
and the subordination of socialist struggle to a plurality of democratic struggles. Many criticisms 
of their position have been launched, most famously by Geras (1987,1988; see also their 
response (1987) and Mouzelis (1988,1990 Ch 2)). See also Wood (1986), Best and Kellner 
(1991) Eagelton (1991), Howarth (1998) and, more sympathetically, Philips and Jorgensen 
(2002). Among the common criticisms of Laclau and Mouffe are their caricatured view of 
Marxism and implication that where there is no absolute mechanical determination, there is no 
determinacy or relationship at all. They stray close to relativism and neglect power. Politically, 
they tend to a reformism which fails to identify where best to target to effect change and 
whether some agents or practices may be more central than others in achieving change. They 
fail to specify precisely what their 'radical democracy' entails. Finally, they stray close to an 
idealist position where socialism becomes a moral option. Despite this, they have consistently 
reaffirmed their position (Laclau 1990, Laclau and Mouffe 2001), although there is now a clear 
"intellectual division of labour", with Laclau focussing on theoretical issues and Mouffe moving 
into political philosophy (Townshend 2004: 275). A loosely defined 'Essex School' of discourse 
theory has emerged in their wake (Smith, 1998; Torfing, 1999; Howarth, 1998,2000). 
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oppressed social groups. While the oppression of women, workers, blacks, Asians, 
gays and lesbians, and so on, is not reducible to economic conditions, they are all 
conditioned by them insofar as they live within a capitalist society" (ibid: 292). Such a 
programme does not reduce the import of workers struggles; the working class have 
the potential to disrupt the economy and production in a way that, say, the women's 
movement could not. 23 However, it accepts that their struggle is merely one among 
many. 24 
Summary and Conclusion 
This Chapter has outlined some of the issues raised by the theory developed in 
Chapter 8. It suggests that macro-level theory is a necessary element of the 
sociological canon as it provides a large scale picture that locates more local 
phenomena in their proper context. There is nothing inherently disabling about macro- 
level theory, provided it is seen as an open ended framework or a constantly evolving 
prolegomenon. Secondly, the need to theorise late modernity can be defended on 
similar grounds; despite societal fragmentation and doubts as to the possibility of 
grounding knowledge, attempts to theorise the social system as a whole remain 
necessary so long as they are alive to context, specificity and the limits of theory. 
Thirdly, the advantages of applying the 'Marxist' label to the theory were discussed. 
The theory takes Marx's Preface as its staring point, and classing it as Marxist 
23 Equally, working class struggle is unlikely to be able to significantly impact upon patriarchal 
relations. The abolition of capitalist relations of production will not automatically eliminate all 
inequalities (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 192). As Eagleton puts it, "Since nobody can accomplish 
anyone else's emancipation for them, it is a question of democratic principle that those 
victimised by oppressive power must free themselves from it; and in the area of material 
production, this means that those who are most directly disadvantaged by it. But it follows from 
the same principle that, for example, women, and not working people as such, are the agents of 
political change when it comes to the swat of patriarchy. If it is a mistake of Neanderthal 
Marxists to imagine that there is a single agent of social transformation (the working class), it is 
equally an error of new-fangled postmodernists to imagine that this agent has now been 
outdated by 'new political movements', for this would mean either denying that economic 
exploitation exists, or imaging with 'elitist' presumption that women or gays or ethnic groups 
who were not part of the working class could substitute themselves for it in challenging the 
power of capital" (1996: 60). Best and Kellner agree: "While capitalism cuts across all social 
groups, the specific concerns of any one group do not intersect with all other groups [... ]. The 
privileging of anti capitalist politics does not entail the privileging of labour and class politics 
within an alliance, since the dynamics of male domination, racism, homophobia, etc, are not 
reducible to class oppression and not automatically eliminated with the creation of non- 
exploitative social relations. The abolition of capitalism, then, is a political objective relevant to 
all oppressed groups, but it is only one step in the creation of a free and democratic society' 
(1991: 292). 
4 Hunt is pessimistic that significant political change can be fashioned on this basis. He 
suggests that "Marxist socialism is simply too encrusted with its history to provide contemporary 
inspiration [... ] few would retain a hope that the working class (or any other unitary subject) has 
the capacity to bring the fragments together" (1990a: 511). 
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identifies its intellectual heritage. Finally, some of the specific theoretical difficulties of 
the position were considered. That the theory does not specify a precise concept of 
law ensures that nothing is 'written out' of the theory. In addition, it remains open on 
the basis of the theory to acknowledge the persistence and durability of capitalism, 
whilst simultaneously leaving open the possibility of agents effecting radical social 
change. 
The net result is a plausible and workable prolegomenon for a renovated Marxist theory 
of law which is alive to its own limitations. 
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CONCLUSION 
"It is the capacity to grapple with the reproduction of mechanisms of domination that 
makes Marx an essential companion into the 21 s" century. " (Hunt 2004: 603) 
This research demonstrates that the Marxist theory of law, at least in its superior 
variant, offers a plausible and attractive perspective on the contemporary legal world. 
Marxism remains capable of providing a viable socio-legal theory. 
Part 1 considered Marxist legal theory. Chapter 1 argued that Marxism is far from 
being 'dead'. This is because there are a variety of 'Marxisms', all based on different 
and sectional interpretations and extrapolations of Marx's work. Thus the exhaustion of 
one strand of Marxism does not sound the death knell for the entire tradition. Chapter 
1 then demonstrated that Marx's outline of historical materialism in the 1859 Preface 
provides a useful starting point for a feasible legal theory. However, historical 
materialism raises two problems that are' particularly pertinent for legal theoreticians; 
the problem of determination and the problem of base and superstructure. The 
coherence and plausibility of each Marxist legal theory is determined by the quality of 
the solutions to these two problems. Chapter 1 also suggested that the solutions 
offered by each theorist are indissolubly linked to their concrete socio-political situation. 
In other words, Marxist legal theory, like any theory, is context bound; bound by time 
and bound by place. 
Chapter 2 considered the contribution to Marxist legal theory of Engels and Lenin. 
Both, it was argued, fail to provide convincing solutions to the problems of Marxist legal 
theory. Engels lapses into a crude materialism, while Lenin promotes an equally 
limited class instrumentalism. Chapter 3's focus was the work of the classic Marxist 
legal theorists, Pashukanis and Renner. Once again, they both fail to adequately solve 
the problems of determination and base and superstructure. Pashukanis ultimately 
fails to provide room for conscious human action in the determination of law, while 
Renner's theory collapses into economic reductionism. The object of Chapter 4 was 
the golden age of Marxist legal thinking, the 1970s. The views of the two main camps 
were explored; the instrumentalists with their roots in radical criminology, and the 
structuralists influenced by Althusser. Yet despite the advances and increasing 
sophistication in Marxist thinking about law during this decade, the twin problems 
remained unresolved. A century of Marxist thinking on law had passed, and still the old 
dilemmas persisted. 
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The search for a workable Marxist legal theory led, in Chapter 5, to the work of Hugh 
Collins. His 1982 work Marxism and Law represents the pinnacle of Marxist legal 
theory, learning from the lessons of the 1970s. Collins provides, in general terms, the 
most theoretically attractive solutions to the problems of determination and base and 
superstructure. Yet the downfall of his theory comes with his solution to the former 
problem. The problem of determination is resolved by recourse to a notion of the 
'dominant ideology', but in order to make the theory account for law in its entirety, the 
notion must be stretched to a point where it becomes unworkable. And so there the 
tour of Marxist legal theory ended; with provisional solutions to the two key problems, 
but solutions that need further refinement and renovation if they are to become 
convincing. 
Part 2 was concerned with the emerging set of economic, political and social 
arrangements that are forging a new context within which Marxist legal theory has to 
operate. This nascent period can be termed 'late modernity'. Chapter 6 outlined the 
massive changes that have occurred over the last three decades or so in the fields of 
economy and production, state and politics, and class structure, and discussed the 
notion of late modernism as a cultural accompaniment to these processes. Chapter 7 
described the concomitant changes that have occurred in the legal sphere, to the 
extent that it is possible to speak of the existence of a 'late modern legal order'. The 
renovation of the modern legal order through processes of privatisation, deregulation, 
domestic fragmentation, the rise of supranational law and globalised legal 
hermeneutics and the concept of interlegality were explored. 
Part 3 sketched a prolegomenon for a renovated Marxist theory of law. This theory is 
based upon the work of Collins, but it responds to the new context provided by late 
modernity. Chapter 8 outlined the renovated theory. It suggested that Marxist legal 
theory can articulate with late modernity in two ways. Firstly, Collins offers an 
explanation of how fundamental socio-economic changes impact upon the legal 
sphere. Secondly, late modern developments help to alleviate the central weakness of 
Collins' theory. The state has ceded power to a variety of other actors, and the class 
blocs of modernity have fragmented. Thus, in late modernity, various groups create 
laws, regulations and norms in line with their own 'micro-ideology'. These micro- 
ideologies are formed in the manner that Collins outlines. As such, the core of idea of 
his theory, the ideological determination of law, can be retained. However, late modern 
developments remove the need to rely on an all encompassing and therefore 
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implausibly elastic dominant ideology. Instead, field specific micro-ideologies guide law 
and norm creation in discrete spheres. The late modern legal system provides scope 
for the expression of these laws derived from micro-ideologies through the processes 
detailed in Chapter 7. The theoretical 'gap' left by Collins is filled; late modern 
developments render the Marxist theory of law more plausible. 
Chapter 9 looked at some of the consequences of the new position. The utility of 
purely theoretical exercises, particularly macro level ones, the difficulties involved in 
theorising late modernity, the consequences of jettisoning some traditional Marxist 
notions such as class and state for the theory's designation as Marxist and some of the 
limitations of the position arrived at were assessed. Despite these issues, it was 
suggested that a viable prolegomenon for a renovated Marxist theory of law is created. 
So What? 
The central significance of this project is that it demonstrates that Marxist legal theory 
can retain a central place as a socio-legal perspective on late modern law. Historical 
materialism remains a plausible take on society and societal development. Any legal 
theory based upon it therefore has the potential to say interesting and worthwhile 
things. In addition, the work adds to the considerable body of work which suggests that 
a late modern legal order is emerging. The work's novelty is to locate the source of this 
emerging legal order in more fundamental societal changes, utilising a Marxist 
explanation to suggest how this process of causation may occur. The overall result is a 
prolegomenon for a plausible and robust Marxist theory of law that is in tune with 
current socio-political conditions. 
The legal theory developed here is embryonic and requires a great deal of further 
development. But it is a necessary first step in resuscitating Marxist legal thinking, and 
renovating its much maligned theories. Thus, despite its fledging nature, it provides a 
workable starting point from which Marxist legal theory can develop anew. Marxism is 
not exhausted as many suppose, and it should not be ignored when thinking about 
contemporary law. 
This nascent Marxist theory of law provides clear and ample opportunities for further 
theoretical development and empirical research. Theoretically, two avenues of 
development are immediately evident. Firstly, it may be useful to attempt to resolve the 
question of law's differentia specifica. Can a concept of law be arrived at that does not 
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'write out' significant examples of late modern ordering? Clearly, such a project would 
need to take account of the classical concepts of law, such as those of Hart and Unger. 
However, there may also be fruitful lines of investigation based upon Mieville's 
redrawing of Pashukanis. Secondly, there are clear possibilities for further theorisation 
on the durability of capitalism in late modernity: What role do micro-ideologies play in 
the persistence of capitalist relations of production? 
Empirically, the theory offers a rich seam of research possibilities. The beauty of the 
approach for empirical research is that the multitude of late modern legal actors and 
their micro-ideologies can be studied in their specificity, with full attention given to their 
own peculiarities. Indeed, in principle, the approach allows even the study of the 
individuals invölved in the law making process. ' Previously Marxist theory, with its 
focus on large scale class blocs and ideological hegemony, has found this difficult. But 
this focus on the local and small scale can simultaneously be related back to a total 
picture of the social and legal world. Empirical studies could focus upon the makeup of 
groups, their position in the relations of production, and the interests and ideologies 
that stem from this. Their levels of access to institutional mechanisms, or their ability to 
create new legal orders can also be studied. How each groups' micro-ideology 
manifests itself in law can be studied through analysis of legal texts, regulations, 
decisions, policy statements and actual practice. In addition, the existence or potential 
for alliances between the groups, and the nature of them, is also a ripe area for 
research. Such research may be able to shed light on how powerful groups help to 
maintain capital's dominance, and how subordinate groups can challenge that status 
quo. 
In sum, Marxist legal theory is revived and made relevant in the late modern era, and a 
platform for further theoretical -development and empirical research has been laid. 
Marx's theory is patently "rife with potential" (Vincent 1993: 391), and there is no need 
to treat it as a museum piece. As Best and Kellner argue, "since capitalism continues 
to be a major constitutive force in many contemporary societies, the Marxian theory 
and critique of capitalism continues to be a crucial element of a critical theory of 
society" (1991: 296). Indeed, "far from being over, the argument with Marxism is only 
' As Adams and Brownsword suggest, "explanations should start with the reasons and 
purposes of individual actors" (1992: xii). This ability to study groups and even individuals in 
their specificity, locality and context also resonates with late- and post- modernist ideas. 
2 Sumner's guide to Reading Ideologies (1979) may be extremely useful in endeavours of this 
nature. 
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just about to begin all over again, this time in the context of a capitalism careering out 
of control" (Downes and Rock 2003: 367). 
Marxism is inherently a theory of its time. Its own theoretical structure suggests that 
once its social basis disappears, then it will necessarily and. unavoidably wither away. 
As Eagelton suggests, "socialist theory [... ] is only too content to view itself as 
belonging to a particular age- that of capital itself- and will thankfully no longer need to 
stay in business when that era comes to a close, if it ever does. Socialists will then be 
released from the inconvenience of their beliefs, in which there is little profit and scant 
pleasure, and feel free to talk about something more enjoyable for a change, such as 
colour imagery in Joseph Conrad or the curiously mellow quality of Cotswold stone" 
(1996: 29). But the emergence of late modernity does not signal that this is about to 
occur. True, circumstances have changed to such a degree that much that is 
commonly associated with Marxism must be abandoned. But Marxism can still 
contribute to an understanding of contemporary society. Jean-Paul Sartre's words 
resonate: "Far from being exhausted, Marxism is still very young, almost in its infancy; 
it has scarcely begun to develop. It remains, therefore, the philosophy of our time. We 
cannot go beyond it because we have not gone beyond the circumstances which 
engendered if' (1968: 30 [italics added]). 
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